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Abstract 
Purpose This thesis explores the complementary areas of critical 
infrastructure disturbance and high reliability in an airport context.  
Regarding disturbance, this research aims to provide a more 
detailed understanding of the specific processes and stages of 
disturbance in airport critical infrastructure.  From the 
complementary perspective of high reliability (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007), this research seeks to explore the current level, and potential 
to further develop, high reliability in Australian airport management 
organisations.  This research aims to inform both the theoretical and 
practitioner perspectives of the airport management, high reliability, 
and risk management, literature space.   
  
Methodology This thesis adopted a single case study approach with Australian 
airport management organisations (3 data collection airports) 
serving as the case with four specific organisational levels 
(leadership, corporate management, operational management, and 
officer) serving as the units of analysis.  Furthermore, this thesis 
adopted a qualitative multi-method approach utilising the data 
collection tools of in-depth interview (56 in total), participant 
observation at airport sites (64 days in total), and documentary 
analysis (83 documents selected on a purposeful sampling 
approach).  Analysis was governed by the qualitative validity criteria 
of credibility, confirmability, dependability, and transferability.  The 
chosen research design of this thesis provided an opportunity to 
explore extant literature themes as well as revealing emergent 
areas of investigation.   
  
Findings The first problem area of investigation focused on disturbance 
events in airport management organisations.  The first sub-question 
was asked as; RQ1A: What is the process that an airport 
experiences during disturbance? Findings introduced a new 
empirically tested approach defined as the Critical Infrastructure 
Disturbance Process (CIDP).  This process included pre-event, 
response/recovery (as a concurrent function), post-event, and near-
miss phases.  These four phases comprise the process an airport 
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experiences during disturbance, be it a live disturbance event or 
near-miss process.  The second sub-question was asked as; 
RQ1B: What are the functions of the specific stages an airport 
experience during disturbance? Findings introduced definitions for 
the ten stages of the CIDP model as planning, preparation, 
assessment, coordination and facilitation, containment and 
limitation, operational continuity, review, learning, near-miss review, 
and near-miss learning (Tables 6.2 - 6.11 of this thesis).  
Furthermore, the influence of position in the airport management 
hierarchy and sub-group objectives were discussed and guiding 
questions were developed as a means of providing holistic 
understanding of the disturbance process across airport 
management organisations.  These two sub-questions addressed 
Overarching Research Question 1: How does an airport move 
from business-as-usual, into a disturbance, and return to business-
as-usual?  Findings highlighted that the CIDP process represents 
an empirically developed approach to explain how airport 
management organisations change modes of operations.   
 
The second problem areas of investigation examined high reliability 
theory and its application to airport management organisations.  
The third sub-question of this thesis was asked as; RQ2A: What is 
the current level of high reliability in Australian airports?  Findings 
revealed that Australian airport management organisations the 
criteria for commitment to resilience and deference to expertise, yet 
do not adequately represent preoccupation with failure, reluctance 
to simplify, or sensitivity to operations.  As such, this thesis 
contends that Australian airport management organisations 
represent a position of compartmentalised reliability whereby some, 
but not all of the criteria of a HRO are satisfied.  This was further 
developed in the fourth sub-question as; RQ2B: What is the 
potential to further develop high reliability in Australian airports?  
Findings discussed the further develop via the implementation of 
programs to enhance the cross-functional experience of staff, as 
well as increased exposure to strategic development of different 
business units.  The implications of these two programs are 
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addressed in Table 6.12 of this thesis.  These two sub-questions 
helped to conclude Overarching Research Question 2:  Can 
Australian airports be considered functionally reliable against Weick 
and Sutcliffe’s five traits of high reliability?  This thesis concluded by 
proposing the following empirically grounded position: 
 Australian airport management organisations function as 
 compartmentally reliable organisations that represent traits of 
 commitment to resilience and deference to expertise.  
 Australian airport management organisations do have the 
 potential to enhance practice to move closer to the definition 
 of a highly reliable organisation.  Improvements regarding the 
 development and maintenance of cross-functionality and 
 shared awareness are required for these organisations to be 
 considered highly reliability organisations against the Weick 
 and Sutcliffe (2007) classification.   
  
Significance This research has provided a contribution to literature through the 
development of the CIDP model as a means of better 
understanding the process and stages of disturbance.  Additionally, 
the critical importance (yet difficulty) of understanding near-misses 
in airport management organisations is a noteworthy finding and 
represents a clear path for future research in the airport literature 
field.  This research has also utilised the traits high reliability theory 
as a frame of investigation to explore and understanding airport 
management organisations.  Practitioner significance is apparent 
through the development of cross-functional programs to bring 
airport management organisations closer to a position of high 
reliability.   
  
Contribution This thesis is of value to both academics and practitioners in the 
areas of risk management and high reliability.  Furthermore, those 
with an interest in the airport research space may also find value in 
the investigation of airport management organisations via a 
qualitative research methodology.   
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James Joyce 
	  
1 
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One – Introduction 
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1.1 Introduction 
Chapter One – Introduction, is presented in eight separate sections.  Section 1.1 
Introduction will discuss the components and purpose of this chapter.  Section 1.2 
Research Background will outline the key research questions for investigation and 
provide preliminary detail on the components of disturbance and high reliability.  
Section 1.3 Definitions will explain the range of terms and their context by which 
they are used in this thesis.  Section 1.4 Research Questions will introduce the two 
overarching research questions exploring disturbance and high reliability, along with 
four sub-questions under these areas to explore current practice in airport 
management organisations.  These sub-questions will explore the specific areas of 
the components of disturbance events, the process by which they occur, the 
presence of high reliability traits in airport management organisations, and the 
potential to enhance reliability in the airport industry.  Following this, Section 1.5 
Research Significance will provide detail on the theoretical and practitioner 
contribution of this research.  Section 1.6 Methodology Overview will introduce the 
selected research design of this thesis and provide justification of the approach 
against the proposed research problems.  This overview will address components 
including data collection tools, analysis approach, validity approach, ethical 
considerations, and methodological limitations.  Section 1.7 Thesis Outline will 
preview the seven sections of this thesis.  Section 1.8 Summary will summate this 
chapter and provide direction for the following section of this thesis.  The eight 
sections of Chapter One – Introduction are represented graphically in Table 1.1.  
 
Table 1.1: Introduction Chapter Sections 
Chapter One:  Introduction  1.1 Introduction      
1.2 Research Background    
1.3 Definitions      
1.4 Research Questions    
1.5 Research Significance    
1.6 Methodology Overview    
1.7 Thesis Outline     
1.8 Summary      
Chapter Two:  Literature Review  
Chapter Three:  Methodology  
Chapter Four:  Study One  
Chapter Five:  Study Two  
Chapter Six: Discussion  
Chapter Seven:  Conclusions  
 	  
3 
1.2 Research Background 
Airports are typical examples of a complex sociotechnical system encompassing a 
flow of people, goods and services, all within the context of nationally important 
critical infrastructure.  Authors De Bruijne and Van Eeten (2007; p.18) note that 
airports are considered to be forms of critical infrastructure in a similar way to other 
industries such as “energy, information technology, telecommunications, health 
care, transportation, water, government and law enforcement, and banking and 
finance”.  The provision of reliable capabilities and capacities for continued 
operations in airports is a complex and difficult task at the best of times.  Adding to 
this complexity are elements such as operational failures with check-in and 
passenger facilitation systems, natural disasters, weather variability, and incidents 
involving terrorists or criminal acts.  The operational space of an airport is one that is 
in a constant state of actual and potential change.  The failure of one node of an 
airport system has the potential to cause negative effects for air travel nation wide in 
terms of delay and financial cost (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009).   
 
The challenge of coordinating and planning in such complex sociotechnical contexts 
places considerable pressure on airport management to facilitate coordination of 
what are often conflicting goals and expectations between groups in respect to safe 
and secure air travel.  When an airport system encounters disturbance, the nature of 
the relationships between airport operators, government, first response agencies, 
and private contractor needs to adjust with the goal of bringing functionality back to 
a state of normal operations.  Understanding the ways in which airports as 
sociotechnical systems are affected by events ranging from a minor in-house 
disturbance through to catastrophic loss of operations is the central focus of this 
thesis.  As a result, enhanced understanding of the way disturbance events develop 
is required, along with a stronger appreciation of how the system gives the potential 
to design greater efficiency and effectiveness into an overall managerial repertoire 
within the industry and among aviation industry participants.   
 
Research into safe and secure airport operations has increased in recent years and 
has a wide range of scope for future academic development.  Documents such as 
An Independent Review of Airport Security and Policing for the Government of 
Australia (Wheeler, 2005) and National Aviation Policy White Paper – Flight Path to 
4 
the Future (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009) highlight the importance of further 
development of practices that promote an assurance of the functional resilience of 
airport systems in Australia.  The relative importance of infrastructure systems, 
airports in particular, was highlighted by the release in 2010 by the Attorney 
Generals Department of a strategy and policy position moving from Critical 
Infrastructure Protection to Critical Infrastructure Resilience (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2010a).  While this recently adopted position clearly defines the purpose 
and rationale for such a change it does not detail how the overarching goal of 
enhancing preparedness and reliability of critical aviation infrastructure could be 
achieved.  A critical issue in risk management research is a lack of clear 
understanding and categorisation into the components of disturbance events, the 
functions that need to take place to transition between stages of the event, and the 
potential to enhance system wide reliability.  A key objective of this thesis is to 
explore the process of disturbance that airports encounter along with the potential to 
enhance the ability of the organisation to deal with such disturbance.  This is 
particularly important for the airport research space as airports form a key 
component of critical infrastructure for Australia (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2010a).   
 
If we examine highly reliable functionality in sociotechnical systems as a way of 
understanding changes in states of operation as a result of disturbance, an 
enhanced understanding of the process can help inform decision makers as to the 
correct courses of action available to them for dealing with such change (Weick and 
Sutcliffe, 2007).  The notion of flexibility as a means of enhancing reliability was 
addressed by authors Rochlin, LaPorte and Roberts (1987) in their seminal paper 
The Self-Designing High-Reliability Organization: Aircraft Carrier Flight Operations 
at Sea.  In this study, the authors empirically defined discrete modes of operations 
and the systemic advantages of such flexibility in dealing with previously unseen 
disturbance.  In the scope of this thesis, these operational states can be described 
broadly as business-as-usual (BAU) whereby airport management organisations are 
functioning within normal parameters, and disturbance operations where systems 
are operating outside of what is considered a normal state of functionality.  
Developing processes and protocols which can moderate or lessen the impact of 
disturbance is a complex task as it forces managers to move away from the 
traditional business-as-usual approach and open themselves to the possibility of 
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threats outside of the normal patterns of the business (Boin and McConnell, 2007).  
This research aims to provide a more detailed understanding into the nature of 
disturbance and vulnerability in airport management organisations.  Therefore, when 
events do occur, event severity in terms of impact or allowable outage time can be 
reduced, bringing operations back online in a more effectual manner.   More 
specifically, this thesis aims to better understand the disturbance event process in 
airport operations spanning the ways in which both the operational and corporate 
functions within the airport, anticipate, respond to, and recover from disturbance 
events.   
 
This first stage of investigation involves exploring current literature (see chapter 2) 
which can inform understanding of how systems move from business-as-usual 
operational states, into disturbance, then out of disturbance to business-as-usual 
operations (be they the same state or a revised state).  The importance of 
developing an accurate conceptualisation of the disturbance process has been a 
goal in the crisis management literature space since its inception however further 
investigation is required to attain clear understanding (Smith, 1990).  This 
investigation will include a comprehensive review of current best practice models for 
understanding disturbance, and developing a revised approach for empirical testing 
during this thesis.  Furthermore, this investigation includes considering the 
components of disturbance along with the severity and process by which they occur 
(Mitroff, Pauchant and Shrivastava, 1988; Pearson and Mitroff, 1993; Smith, 2006).  
In addressing the research problem of understanding disturbance in critical 
infrastructure systems, it is important to address not only the functional elements of 
an event, but also the factors that facilitate transition between stages of a 
disturbance.  By understanding both the process of disturbance and the stages that 
an organisation moves through, this thesis contributes to understanding for airport 
management organisations to enable a more detailed approach to respond quickly 
and appropriately to disturbance events.  The review of literature that is the 
foundation for development of this first area of investigation is provided in Section 
2.2 Risk and Crisis Disturbance Models.   
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The second key component of this investigation looks at the ability of complex 
sociotechnical systems to be highly reliable (to maintain near error-free operations) 
and have operational continuity in the face of disturbance.  This thesis utilises the 
Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) traits of reliability approach by exploring aiport 
management organisations in terms of preoccupation with failure, reluctance to 
simplify, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to 
expertise.  This thesis investigates high reliability traits as a means of understanding 
both assumptions and values as well as ability and performance of the system with 
the potential to further enhance reliability.  By utilising this frame of investigation, the 
analysis focuses on identifying the current state of highly reliable practice in airport 
management organisations, along with exploring the potential to enhance resilience 
in aviation critical infrastructure.  The continual review and improvement of practice 
is of critical importance, as airports also require near error free operations, parallel 
to the functionality of aircraft carriers (see Rochlin, LaPorte and Roberts, 1987), 
whereby continuity of operations can be maintained even when significant stress is 
placed on the functionality of the system.  Applying Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2007) 
traits of reliability approach to the context of airports, the following hypothetical 
position of this thesis is stated as: 
An airport demonstrating high reliability traits is likely to exhibit specific 
capabilities including early recognition of disturbance, rapid and appropriate 
response, smooth transitions between modes of operation, and the integration 
of explicit post-event learning, recovering functionality back to an acceptable 
pre-event norm.   
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1.3 Definitions 
As introduced in Section 1.2 Research Background, this thesis focuses on 
addressing the nature of disturbance in airport critical infrastructure as well as the 
reliable functionality of airport management organisations.  In addressing these key 
problem areas it is important to have a clear foundation of what the different terms 
are defined as in the context of this thesis.  The following dot points define the key 
terms of this thesis and discuss their importance to the research problem areas:   
• Agility denotes the ability of an organisation to adapt in order to deal with 
various disturbance; to be “robust, flexible, responsive, innovative, resilient, 
and adaptive” (Alberts and Nissen, 2009, p.38).  Agility is a component of 
this research as it details the ways in which flexibility can be attained and 
provides a potential to enhance the way groups deal with disturbance.  As is 
discussed in Chapter Two – Literature Review, the ability for a sociotechnical 
system to adjust in order to deal with previously unseen disturbance is of 
critical importance.  As such, the discussion around agility examines the 
notion of edge organisations (and organising) as the ability to respond 
appropriately and drive decision-making further down in the organisational 
hierarchy (Alberts and Hayes, 2003).  In this way, organisations are able to 
function in a cross-functional rather than a hierarchal structure to enhance 
the way they deal with disturbance 
• Business-as-usual (BAU) in this thesis represents the functional state 
whereby an airport management organisation is performing at its expected 
operating level.  No out of the ordinary disturbance is associated with this 
level of operations.  Business-as-usual is of critical importance to this study 
as it serves to define how members of airport management organisations 
actually view “usual” operations, and what are the signals that something out 
of the ordinary could occur or is occurring.  The business-as-usual 
operational level is explored at various levels within the hierarchy of airport 
management and investigates the understanding of the operational and the 
commercial sides of the organisations as to how they view “usual” is 
explored.   
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• Business-not-usual (BNU) in this thesis signifies the functional state 
whereby an airport management organisation is encountering some level of 
disturbance and as such, is not performing at its expected level.  This is the 
contradictory state to business-as-usual operations however it is important to 
note that this does not necessarily mean the organisation is in crisis or 
emergency.  An observation which was made on site in the early stages of 
this research program was that although airport management organisations 
spend the large majority of their effort preparing for low probability/high 
consequence (as dictated by federal government legislation, and enforced 
by federal security and safety organisations), the vast majority of real-world 
disturbance in airports does not escalate to that level of severity.  In most 
cases, the majority of the time airport management organisations are dealing 
with issues within team (categorised in this thesis as normal operations 
disturbance or minor disturbance levels) or with support from outside 
agencies but with the airport management organisation still maintaining 
control and authority (categorised in this thesis as major incident disturbance 
level).   
• Crisis is “characterised by low probability, high-consequence organizational 
events that threaten the most fundamental goals of an organization” (Mitroff, 
Pauchant and Shrivastava, 1988, p.84).  The crisis management literature 
has made an extensive influence to this thesis in the area of understanding 
the ways in which disturbance develops and how to appropriately deal with 
bringing operations back to a business-as-usual state.  Previous empirical 
development in the crisis literature space has provided a number of models 
that are reviewed in Chapter Two –Literature Review and developed into an 
optimised conceptual model for testing.   
• Disturbance in this thesis is refers to the condition whereby business-as-
usual operations have ceased and the airport management organisation is 
functioning in a state of business-not-usual.  Central to the discussion of 
disturbance is the notion of scalability whereby the severity of the 
disturbance will dictate the process and objectives required to bring 
operations back to their normal functional state.  In this way, descriptors 
such as crisis, disaster, emergency, event, could all be considered as areas 
which disturb regular functionality of a system and simply differ in terms of 
their severity.  This is of particular interest to airport management 
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organisations as, in a similar way to aircraft operations at sea, continual 
functionality of operations is a core requirement despite the impacts of 
different types of disturbance.  In the context of airports management 
organisations, the facilitation of movement of flights throughout singular ports 
in the system is critical to avoid knock-on system wide impacts.   
• Near-miss has been defined in a number of ways in both academic and 
practitioner work.  This thesis adopts the description of a near-miss 
developed by Phimister, Oktem, Kliendorfer, and Kunreuther (2003, p.445) 
who note that; 
“These incidents have the potential to, but do not, result in loss.  Near-
misses are often less obvious than accidents and are defined as having 
little if any immediate impact on individuals, processes, or the 
environment.  Despite their limited impact, near-misses provide insight 
into accidents that could happen.  As numerous catastrophes illustrate, 
management failure to capture and remedy near-misses may 
foreshadow disaster.” 
As is illustrated by the above statement, near-misses serve as a potential to 
understand vulnerability in our system.  By exploring near-miss data, 
organisations have the opportunity to correct issues before they escalate.  
• Organisational Culture has been defined in academic literature as; 
“A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it 
solved its problem of external adaption and internal integration that has 
worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught 
to new members as the correct was to perceive, think, and feel in 
relation to those problems” (Schein, 2004, p. 17).   
Of particular interest to this thesis is looking into the distinction in how 
hierarchal levels and work groups view different traits of high reliability 
(Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007).  Organisational culture provides an interesting 
frame of reference by looking at both the visible and underlying patterns of 
an organisation.  This is of particular interest to the study of high reliability in 
this thesis as organisational culture has the potential to provide a picture of 
what an organisation says is important, against what is actually important in 
times of systemic disturbance.   
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• Resilience has been defined in academic literature as “a measure of the 
persistence of systems and of their ability to absorb change and disturbance 
and still maintain the same relationship between population states or state 
variables” (Holling, 1973, p.14).  This thesis does not directly investigate 
resilience, but rather considers it an overarching goal of a system in the way 
that airport management organisations are able to deal with previously 
unseen disturbance and maintain functionality.   
• Risk (R) is commonly referred to in literature as the likelihood (L) of the 
event occurring and the consequence (C) to the organisation should the 
event take place; R = L x C (Christopher & Peck, 2004).  By looking at the 
likelihood and consequence of disturbance, airport management 
organisations develop planning and preparation components in the hope of 
being more resilient when their organisation moves into a business-not-usual 
context.  Risk contributes to understanding both prior to disturbance, in 
terms of what is the potential disturbance, and post disturbance, as a means 
of investigating the appropriateness of the risk profile in hindsight.  As 
organisations function in a consistently evolving state, it is critically important 
that a detailed process of reviewing organisational risk is developed and 
embedded in organisational practice.  This review process needs to consider 
likelihood and consequence across all components of the organisation and 
needs to be continually update to reflect the evolving nature of the 
operational environment.   
• Sensemaking is of interest to this thesis particularly in understanding how 
airport management employees use prior conceptions of disturbance in their 
decision making process during an event.  This concept is defined in 
academic literature as: 
 “the ongoing retrospective development of plausible images that 
 rationalize what people are doing.  Viewed as a significant process of 
 organising, sensemaking unfolds as a sequence in which people 
 concerned with identity in the social context of other actors engage 
 ongoing circumstances from which they extract cues and make plausible 
 sense retrospectively, while enacting more or less order into those 
 ongoing circumstances” (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld 2005, p.409).   
Sensemaking is of particular interest to risk management research as it shapes the 
way people act during disturbance events.  Furthermore, sensemaking also 
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influences business-as-usual operations as members reflect on prior disturbance 
and utilise this understanding to adjust standard operating procedures (SOP).   
 
The following terms are descriptors developed for the potential levels of severity 
encountered in a disturbance.  These definitions were developed through document 
analysis of airport operations guidelines and via observation on site.  They are 
further refined during the first study of this thesis with findings discussed in Chapter 
Four - Disturbance Process Model.   
• Level 1: Normal Operations Disturbance 
Normal operations disturbance is the lowest level of rating in this 
categorisation.  This level internalises the event in a single team within the 
organisation.  The main objective of an organisation responding to such an 
occurrence at this level is to coordinate tasks within the team to best deal 
with the event and avoid escalation into higher levels.  Usually these events 
will be governed by SOP’s and will be a regular occurrence in the system.   
• Level 2: Minor Incident Disturbance 
Minor incident disturbance is the third highest level of rating in this 
categorisation.  This level internalises the event across a number of teams 
within the organisation.  This may involve a lead team within the organisation 
or the need to distribute tasks across various groups.  Organisational 
response activities at this level are categorised as facilitating coordination 
between components of the business and de-escalating the event into the 
‘within group’ normal operations level.  Critical at the minor incident 
disturbance level is understanding the authority and decision making 
process as there may be competing interests (operational and commercial) 
at play in terms of what dictates the approach taken.  As with the normal 
operations disturbance, these events occur on a regular basis.  However, as 
a distinction from the normal operations disturbance level, SOP’s may not be 
equipped to deal with the scenario and as such more detailed decision-
making and coordination may be required.   
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• Level 3: Major Incident Disturbance 
Major incident disturbance is the second highest level of rating in this 
categorisation.  It is the first level that involves the event being externalised 
from the organisation requiring cooperation and coordination between the 
airport management organisation and external agencies.  Organisational 
response activities at this level are categorised as facilitating coordination 
between all involved groups and de-escalating the event into the ‘in house’ 
incident level.  In a similar mode to the minor incident level, when detailing 
with mix of competing interests the complexity of pre-event, response, 
recovery, and post-event all increase.  As such, it is considered that a higher 
level of coordination and understanding will be required when dealing with 
an event that spans both internal and external organisations groups.  Initial 
participant observation highlighted that the major incident level is dealt with 
operationally as similar to the crisis disturbance level, however, both 
functional states have vastly different functions of who is involved in decision 
making, who maintains authority to make critical decisions, and which group 
is holds responsibility once decisions are made.   
• Level 4: Crisis Disturbance 
Crisis disturbance is the highest level rating of this categorisation.  At the 
crisis level, airport management operations are offline and are not in control 
of the disturbance event.  At this level, external agencies are in authority for 
command and control of the disturbance event.  The large majority of airport 
management vulnerability development (through programs of Office of 
Transport Security and Civil Aviation Safety Authority) has focused its 
attention at this level in preparing for a disturbance that renders operations 
offline, however from a risk based perspective this would be considered a 
low probability event.  The high consequence of this type of disturbance 
means that decision making and authority has likely been removed from the 
airport management organisation and as such a shift to preparing to take 
operations back online takes place.  The main approach of the business at 
this level of severity is in facilitating first response activities as well as 
preparing to take back control of the site and facilitate a return to business-
as-usual state of operations.  A summary of these four severity levels is 
provided in Table 1.2.  
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Table 1.2: Disturbance Severity Levels Summary 
 
Severity Level 
 
Indicator Key Attributes 
Normal 
Operations 
Disturbance 
Level 1 
 
• Level 1: Single group requirement (Internal) 
• Decision making and authority remains within the 
internal organisational group 
• Disturbance is able to be handled with standard 
operating procedures with no additional 
assistance required (from other organisational 
teams or external first response agencies) 
 
Minor Incident 
Disturbance Level 2 
 
• Level 2: Multi group requirement (Internal) 
• Decision making may require coordination 
between more than one internal organisational 
group (ie; corporate risk and incident response) 
• Clear guidelines required regarding who has 
authority around various disturbance types 
 
Major Incident 
Disturbance Level 3 
 
• Level 3: Extended group requirement 
(Internal/External) 
• Decision making may require coordination 
between more than one internal/external system 
wide group (ie; Operational Airport Management, 
Corporate Airport Management, First Response 
and Government Agencies) 
• Authority may need to be mediated between 
groups 
 
Crisis 
Disturbance Level 4 
 
• Level 4: Extended Group requirement 
(Internal/External) 
• Decision making has been removed from the 
organisation and placed with external agencies 
• Authority has moved to the responsibility of 
external groups away from the Airport operator 
• Airport management organisation shifts away 
from authority into a supporting role 
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1.4 Research Questions 
As previously discussed, this thesis explores the dual imperatives of understanding 
the ways in which disturbance occurs, and traits of reliability that serve as 
enhancing factors for the limiting or avoidance of disturbance.  Rather than look at 
the entire airport, this thesis will focus on exploring the airport management function 
of airports.  Investigating this research problem by analysing both the disturbance 
and reliability functions of airport management organisations, Section 1.2: Research 
Background introduced the following hypothetical position: 
An airport demonstrating high reliability traits is likely to exhibit specific 
capabilities including early recognition of disturbance, rapid and appropriate 
response, smooth transitions between modes of operation, and the integration 
of explicit post-event learning, recovering functionality back to an acceptable 
pre-event norm.   
 
The first research question deals with understanding the notion of disturbance, 
particularly for the context of an airport management organisation.  As addressed in 
Sections 1.2 and 1.3, this thesis has adopted the term disturbance as a means of 
highlighting the inherent scalability of events in which critical infrastructure 
encounter.  This range is not simply operational and non-operational, but rather a 
scale of potential disruption that critical infrastructure may encounter as it moves out 
of business-as-usual operations and into disturbance.  The key research problem 
area for this first area of investigation involves the way in which the process occurs 
in terms of the components of disturbance, as well as the process involved in 
moving between the different modes of operations.  Therefore, the first overarching 
research question of this thesis has been developed as:  
Question 1  How does an airport move from a business-as-usual, into a 
disturbance, and return to business-as-usual?   
Within this first research area two sub-questions have been developed to further 
explore the notion of disturbance in airport management organisations.  These two 
sub-questions focus on empirically testing the conceptual disturbance model and 
were developed following the review of literature of this thesis.  Specifically, this 
investigation focuses on the processes an airport undergoes during disturbance, as 
well as the functions of the specific stages of disturbance in an Australian airport 
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management organisation case setting.  The first set of sub-questions of this thesis 
have been developed as: 
RQ1A: What is the process that an airport experiences during 
disturbance?   
RQ1B: What are the functions of the specific stages an airport experiences 
during disturbance?   
The second research question deals with exploring the potential of airport 
management organisations to be highly reliable.  As discussed in Section 1.2 
Research Background, Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) developed five traits of high 
reliability as preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to 
operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise.  In their work, 
Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) explored the nature of sociotechnical systems that can 
maintain near error free operations, even during times of disturbance.   The 
development of the five traits of high reliability serves as a framework by which 
reliable functionality can be further explored in other sociotechnical system contexts.  
In the scope of airport management organisations, the investigation into current 
adherence to highly reliable traits and the potential to enhance the norms of these 
practices provides likely improvement of functionality when dealing with disturbance.  
As such, the second overarching research problem of this study has been 
developed as: 
Question 2: Can Australian airports be considered functionally reliable against 
Weick and Sutcliffe’s five traits of high reliability? 
As with the disturbance research, this second research question has two sub-
questions to investigate the ability of an airport management organisation to be 
flexible and functionally reliable.  These two sub-questions are focused on exploring 
the current presence of high reliability practice in airports as well as the potential for 
this practice to be further enhanced making airports as sociotechnical system more 
reliable.  The second set of sub-questions are developed as: 
RQ2A: What is the current level of high reliability in Australian airports? 
RQ2B: What is the potential to further develop high reliability in Australian 
airports?   
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1.5 Research Significance 
As discussed in Section 1.4 Research Questions, this thesis is focuses on exploring 
the dual imperatives of disturbance and high reliability in an airport management 
context.  Both the disturbance (in the risk and crisis management literature) and 
high reliability research areas have provided a rich foundational body of academic 
literature that helps to inform understanding in this space, however gaps in 
theoretical understanding still remain.  This thesis aims to address these gaps by 
exploring the concepts of disturbance and high reliability at different airport 
management organisation data collection sites and at different hierarchal levels 
within the respective airport management organisations.  Table 1.3 summarises the 
developed research questions and how they address gaps in current understanding.   
Table 1.3: Research Development 
 Research Gap Question Significance 
1A 
 
Prior research has developed a 
range of models but has yet to 
provide a holistic model that 
has been empirically tested in a 
critical infrastructure context.   
 
What is the 
process that an 
airport experiences 
during 
disturbance? 
 
This study will address this gap 
in study one via empirical 
testing of a combined best 
practice model.   
 
1B 
 
Prior research has discussed 
the disturbance process in both 
linear and process based ways.  
 
What are the 
functions of the 
specific stages an 
airport experiences 
during disturbance 
 
This thesis will address this by 
the testing of proposed 
conceptual model with 
reference to a process/loop-
based approach and define the 
appropriate stages levels to 
reflect real-world airport 
management practice.   
 
2A 
 
Prior research has addressed a 
range of critical infrastructure 
contexts for high reliability 
theory yet has not provided a 
detailed analysis of the topic in 
a commercial airport 
management setting.  
 
What is the current 
level of high 
reliability in 
Australian 
airports? 
 
This study will address this in 
study two by reviewing traits of 
high reliability by exploring 
various organisational groups 
and hierarchal levels.   
 
2B 
 
Prior research has 
conceptualised the high 
reliability discussion in terms of 
organisations that “are” or “are 
not” highly reliable.  A middle 
ground position of scalability of 
reliable practice is 
underexplored in literature.  
 
What is the 
potential to further 
develop high 
reliability in 
Australian 
airports?   
 
This thesis will address the 
potential for enhancement of 
certain traits to align an 
organisation with more highly 
reliable position. 
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1.6 Methodology Overview 
Due to the exploratory nature of the research questions, this thesis uses a 
qualitative research approach.  Qualitative research has been defined in literature 
as “an interpretive, multimethod approach that investigates people in their natural 
environment” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, in Christensen 2007, p.59).  The selected 
research paradigm of this study is that of the interpretivist research paradigm as it 
adopts the stance that meaning and understanding comes as a result of exploring 
the social interaction of participants (Guba and Lincoln, 2005).  As this research 
deals with different operational groups, both the shared assumptions, interpretations 
of values and beliefs all serve as a means of better understanding not only the core 
concepts within work groups but also across different hierarchal levels within airport 
management organisations.  As this research focuses on the concepts of 
disturbance and high reliability, qualitative research guided by an interpretivist lens 
provides opportunity to explore these topics in a deeper and richer manner than a 
corresponding quantitative study would be able to.  Furthermore, qualitative study 
serves as a means of providing detailed description of the decisions made and the 
underlying rational associated with the actions of participants (Schwandt, 1997; Yin, 
2003).  A critical advantage of a qualitative approach in exploring disturbance and 
high reliability is that it provides the ability for the investigation to explore 
phenomena in their contextual setting and explore previously unknown themes 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2005).  This also addresses the question of research 
significance as prior qualitative work on commercial airport management 
organisations is as yet underexplored.   
	  
The research design of this thesis adopts a single case study approach with multiple 
levels of analysis.  A single qualitative case study was decided as the research 
context of airport management organisations is a complex phenomena of which the 
researcher has no direct control over and as such a case study approach would 
provide potential for the most valid outcomes (Yin, 2003).   Furthermore, the levels 
of analysis have been developed as Leadership, Corporate Management, 
Operations Management, and Officers to explore disturbance and reliability at a 
range of levels of hierarchy within the selected data collection organisations.  This 
approach enables the analysis to focus on the interactivity between the distinct 
hierarchal levels (senior management, middle management, and front-line staff) and 
furthermore to also investigate the relationships within the middle management level 
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regarding corporate and operations teams.  As each organisational level and group 
maintains different objectives, the investigation will aim to explore the potential 
impact of these differences on disturbance and high reliability.   
 
Data site selection for this thesis utilized a purposeful (judgment) sampling approach 
whereby both collection sites and data were selected based on its ability to inform 
the research problem areas (see Eisenhardt, 2002).  Three airport management 
organisations were selected as data collection sites, each of which service both 
international and domestic markets.  Data collection tools utilised in this thesis 
includes in-depth interviews, participant observation, and document analysis.  A key 
component of this research is the critical incident technique (Flanagan, 1954) 
whereby respondents were asked to place the concepts of disturbance and high 
reliability in the form of stories from their own experience.  This approach focused 
on understanding disturbance and reliability from the experience and perspective of 
operators in airport management organisations whereby practice may inform theory.   
 
The use of data collection tools was influenced by the purposeful (judgment) 
sampling approach in the form of respondents selected, the types of activities 
observed and types of documents analysed.  For example, interview respondents 
from selected organisational levels all had previous experience in disturbance in 
terms of planning, training, live involvement, and review.  Activities observed and 
selected documents focused on both disturbance and high reliability.  By attending 
planning and training for disturbance, as well as thematic review of airport 
management risk and crisis planning documents.  The impact of the purposeful 
(judgement) sampling approach meant that questions could be more targeted 
towards the research sub-questions around both disturbance and high reliability as 
respondents already had a working knowledge of these areas in airport 
management organisations.  The data analysis process took place by addressing 
each study individually (Chapter Four: Disturbance Process Model, and Chapter 
Five: High Reliability Assessment) and then comparing and contrasting the findings 
in Chapter Six: Discussion.  This process was informed by qualitative validity criteria 
in the form of credibility, confirmability, dependability, and transferability (Guba and 
Lincoln, 2005).  Furthermore, research protocols were enforced in accordance with 
Queensland University of Technology research ethics approval processes 
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(Appendix 5, 6, and 7).  This included the de-identification of data, confidentiality of 
respondents, and generic reporting to data site organisations.  Moreover, limitations 
in the form of generalisability of findings and contextual nature of the research area 
have been considered and addressed in Section 3.9: Methodological Limitations.   
 
1.7 Thesis Outline 
To explore the components of disturbance and high reliability, this thesis is 
presented in seven separate yet complementary sections; 
• Chapter One – Introduction provides an outline of the different 
components of this research study and has highlighted the specific 
research problem areas of disturbance and high reliability.   
• Chapter Two – Literature Review discusses prior literature that has 
contributed to empirical understanding in the areas of disturbance and high 
reliability.  This discussion addresses the research field by reviewing prior 
models of disturbance as well as highlighting the ways in which academic 
literature has discussed vulnerability and reliability.  Chapter 2 then 
discusses gaps in the literature and develop this into the key research 
questions of this thesis.  This chapter also introduces the conceptual 
framework of this thesis.   
• Chapter Three – Methodology details the chosen research approach of 
this study.  Furthermore, this discussion provides a justification of the 
selected methodology and discusses the appropriateness of the chosen 
approach in investigating the specific research questions of this thesis.  
This discussion addresses the components of the chosen research 
paradigm, research design, the different data collection methods, 
qualitative validity criteria, ethical considerations, and methodological 
limitations.   
• Chapter Four – Study One: Disturbance Process Model empirically 
tests the proposed conceptual disturbance model with the three data 
collection sites.  This investigation focuses on the components of 
disturbance as well as the process by which they transition.  Potential 
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revisions and improvements to the conceptual model are also addressed 
and the end of this chapter.   
• Chapter Five – Study Two: High Reliability Traits empirically 
investigates the notion of high reliability in a commercial airport 
management context.  This inquiry investigates the current presence of 
high reliability traits in airport management organisations as well as 
exploring the potential to further enhance reliable practice in the airport 
management research context.   
• Chapter Six – Discussion explores data from chapters four and five and 
details emergent themes.  Moreover, chapter six compares and contrasts 
the findings of the disturbance and high reliability studies against each 
other and explores the research implications for both theory and practice.   
• Chapter Seven – Conclusions links the preceding chapters and provides 
answers to the overarching research questions of this thesis.  This 
summary highlights the critical outcomes of this work and discusses the 
contributions of this thesis to the body of knowledge.  Furthermore, this 
chapter discusses the limitations of this study and highlights future research 
for the discipline of disturbance and high reliability.   
 
1.8 Summary 
Chapter One – Introduction has provided an overview of the various components of 
this thesis.  This chapter has discussed the rationale for further study in the 
complementary areas of disturbance and high reliability.  This discussion has 
highlighted the critical need for understanding disturbance by examining the specific 
components of disturbance as well as the process by which disturbance takes place 
in critical infrastructure.  The high reliability component of this thesis was also 
introduced and focuses on the current traits of high reliability in airport management 
organisations, along with the potential for further development of reliability in airport 
management.  The significance of this research has been discussed and highlights 
how each of the developed sub-questions addresses a specific gap from both 
theoretical and contextual standpoints.  Furthermore, this chapter has discussed the 
purpose of the seven chapters of this thesis and provided an outline of the research 
process.   
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The following thesis component, Chapter Two – Literature Review, critically 
examines the previous academic work relevant to the defined problem areas.  This 
review addresses the crisis management literature space as a means of better 
understanding disturbance.  Moreover, this review details high reliability theory (and 
its analogous literature areas) to understand how airport management organisations 
can enhance their ability to maintain operations.  Chapter Two – Literature Review 
also provides discussion towards the development of the research questions and 
conceptual framework of this research study.   
  
22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two – Literature Review 
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2.1 Introduction 
The following chapter discusses prior academic literature relevant to the research 
questions highlighted in Chapter One – Introduction.  This section aims to inform the 
theoretical gap in understanding regarding the ways in which we conceptualise 
disturbance events, as well as the understanding of factors that enable systems to 
be more reliable when dealing with such disturbance.  As such, the first discussion 
that takes place addresses previous literature that has contributed to knowledge on 
the functional components and processes by which disturbance events occur in 
critical infrastructure.  Section 2.2 Risk and Crisis Disturbance Models discusses 
three previous models of disturbance and aim to provide a synthesis by which an 
optimised model was developed for empirical testing in this thesis.  The second 
discussion in this chapter investigates the areas acknowledged by previous 
literature that can provide a more detailed understanding as to the way a system 
can be better prepared for disturbance.  To detail the current understanding on the 
functional and tacit ways in which literature has understood reliable functionality 
Section 2.3 through Section 2.6 introduces the areas of Disaster Incubation Theory, 
Normal Accident Theory, and High Reliability Theory.  Section 2.7: Research 
Questions will discuss the development and rationale of the two overarching 
questions and four sub-questions of this thesis.  These sub-questions address 
disturbance in terms of the functional components and processes that take place.  
Reliability will be explored in terms of presence in airport management organisations 
and the potential for enhancing functionality.  Section 2.8 Conceptual Framework 
will provide detail as to the contributing theories on disturbance and high reliability 
and discuss the linkage between the perspectives.  Table 2.1 highlights the nine 
sections of this chapter.   
Table 2.1:  Literature Review Chapter Sections 
Chapter One:  Introduction  2.1 Introduction      
2.2 Risk and Crisis Disturbance Models  
2.3 Risk and Crisis Understanding   
2.4 Disaster Incubation Theory   
2.5 Normal Accident Theory    
2.6 High Reliability Theory    
2.7 Research Questions    
2.8 Conceptual Framework    
2.9 Summary      
Chapter Two:  Literature Review  
Chapter Three:  Methodology  
Chapter Four:  Study One  
Chapter Five:  Study Two  
Chapter Six:  Discussion  
Chapter Seven:  Conclusions  
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2.2 Risk and Crisis Disturbance Models 
The concept of crisis is one that has been addressed in a number of diverse areas 
of literature and as such it is important to note the development of the discipline 
from a theoretical and practical sense (Pauchant and Douville, 1993).  As noted by 
Smith (2006, p8), “risk and crisis should be seen as part of the same continuum and 
organisations need to develop their management strategies accordingly” and as 
such this thesis defines them as components of the broader crisis event space.  
Crisis, as discussed in the management literature has been defined as  “the result of 
multiple causes, which interact over time to produce a threat with devastating 
potential” (Boin and McConnell, 2007, p.46).  A complementary view holds that 
crisis is a “ situation or episode in which different actors and groups seek to attribute 
meaning to a particular set of circumstances which pose extraordinary threats to an 
individual, institution and/or society” (Drennan and McConnell, 2007, p.2).  Common 
threads to both definitions are that a crisis, as a phenomenon, results from a 
complex set of contributing factors, is of a serious nature, and poses considerable 
threat and institutional disruption at a number of stakeholder levels.  In the context 
of an organisation, a crisis could pose a serious threat to the nature of its core 
mission of an organisation (Weick, 1988).  As such, the preparedness of an 
organisation in terms of its crisis management is of critical concern as it may one 
day be called upon to preserve the very existence of the organisation.   
 
While the term crisis is conventionally associated with organisations while they are 
going through a critical failure, the complementary concept of risk deals with the 
likelihood of moving into a crisis event with a range of potential consequences.  The 
concept of risk (R) is defined as the likelihood (L) of the event occurring and the 
consequence (C) to the organisation should the event take place; R = L x C 
(Christopher and Peck, 2004; Norrman and Jansson, 2004).  The International 
Standards Organisation Guide 73 (2009) discusses this in a similar manner defining 
the concept of risk as a combination of the probability of an event occurring and the 
consequence of the event should it occur (International Standards Organisation, 
2009).  Hence, risk management systems are the foundation by which crisis 
planning and readiness, in the forming and implementing of high reliability 
strategies, are developed and organised.  By combining the elements of crisis 
(systemic failure) and risk (potential and consequences of failure) a logical position 
adopted in this thesis is to refer to disturbance as a scalable disruption that may 
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result in minimal to critical impacts.  In the context of this thesis, both documentary 
analysis of airport emergency planning and security plans along with observation of 
response teams highlighted that the vast majority of disturbance takes place in a 
disruption rather than a crisis sense.   
 
The following section reviews three relevant models in literature that has addressed 
the categorisation of the event progression stages as well as the function of each 
component in the overall process.  This critique takes place in chronological order 
from the earliest model to the latest.  The three disturbance event models 
progressively address the way in which disturbance events have been 
conceptualised by key researchers.  Progressing from 1988 to 2006 these models 
address different aspects of disturbance events and use different descriptive 
language.  Each model provides a unique perspective on the components and 
progression of a disturbance and together they provide a detailed conceptual 
framework as to how prior research interprets critical infrastructure disturbance.  
The models selected are A Preventative Model of Crisis Management by Mitroff, 
Pauchant, and Shrivastava (1988), The Five Phases of Crisis Management by 
Pearson and Mitroff (1993), and Incident Escalation to the Limits of Contingency 
Planning by Smith (2006).  Section 2.1.1 - 2.1.3 will discuss these three models, the 
contribution of these models to theoretical understanding, and discuss the potential 
attributes that an enhanced model of disturbance event categorisation would 
include.  This discussion will develop into Section 2.1.4 that provides a comparison 
of strengths and weaknesses of prior theoretical development.   
 
2.1.1 Model 1: A Preventative Model of Crisis Management  
The first model for discussion is from The Structure of Man-Made Organizational 
Crisis: Conceptual and Empirical Issues in the Development of a General Theory of 
Crisis Management (Mitroff, Pauchant and Shrivastava, 1988).  This model was 
developed from a quantitative research study of public affairs officers from fortune 
1000 companies.  The article gives minimal indication as to the specific operational 
requirements the respondents responsible for in actual disturbance events.  
Respondents spanned industries including “banking, chemicals, food, health, heavy 
manufacturing, high technology, pharmaceuticals, power utilities” (Mitroff, Pauchant 
and Shrivastava, 1988, p. 90).  It is worthy to note that there were 1000 surveys 
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mailed out to respondents with only 114 returned for analysis.  The outcome of this 
research was the development of two different models being a preventative model 
of crisis management (Figure 2.1) and a crisis creation model of “Design for 
Disaster”.  This discussion focuses on a means of conceptualising the distinct 
stages of a crisis from a best practice position.   
	  
Figure 2.1: A Preventative Model of Crisis Management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Mitroff, Pauchant, and Shrivastava, 1988) 
 
Although this model represented an early attempt in understanding the components 
of how disturbance events occur, it contains a number of attributes that are highly 
sophisticated and in some ways have not been replicated since.  The authors 
Mitroff, Pauchant and Shrivastava developed a four-stage approach to disturbance 
describing the central components of the phenomena as detection, crisis, repair, 
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which have the potential to alert of an impending disturbance event.  The linking 
function between point one and point two notes that strategies of prevention in 
terms of mitigation against the disturbance, and preparation in the form of activities 
to lessen the impact of the event which stem from this initial detection activity.  The 
second component, crisis, acknowledges that that no system can ever be “crisis 
proof” and there will always be times when even the best prevention and 
preparation strategies are not enough to stop an event occurring.  The linking 
function between point two and point three deals with how we can lessen the impact 
of the event and move into a recovery of functionality phase.  The third phase, 
repair, includes strategies, plans, and the approaches an organisation has in place 
to recover from the event.  The authors stress that this would need to be an 
approach that is both tested and in-place to be considered appropriate.  The linking 
function between point three and point four notes that the return to normal system 
operations is based on the ability of repair strategies that deal with both long term 
and short term repair issues.  The final point of assessment is not clearly defined by 
the authors but they do detail the need to incorporate learning back into the 
functions of the three previous stages of detection, crisis, and repair.  Table 2.2 
highlights the key contributions and gaps of this model.  It is also worthy to note that 
the authors of this first contribution to the disturbance management body of 
literature highlight the need for future research to verify on the validity of the model 
as well as the structures and processes identified (Mitroff, Pauchant and 
Shrivastava, 1988).   
Table 2.2: A Preventative Model of Crisis Management Discussion 
Key Contributions Research Gap 
• Events as a process rather than a 
static conceptualisation of a 
disturbance.   
• Notes that prevention strategies can 
take place to avoid disturbance and 
that assessment is still required.   
• Highlights that the event cycle is 
distinct each time and does not 
necessarily need to cover each 
stage every time.   
• Provides linking between event 
stages but does not clearly define at 
all stages what needs to take place 
for this to be operationalised. 
• Does not address how a “near-miss” 
assessment would need to be 
compared to a full crisis 
assessment.   
• Does not consider the severity of 
potential crisis in relation to actions 
that would take place at each stage.   
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2.1.2 Model 2: The Five Phases of Crisis Management  
The second model for discussion is from the Pearson and Mitroff (1993) article From 
Crisis Prone to Crisis Prepared: A Framework for Crisis Management.  In this study 
the authors identified 4 major disturbance management variables: Types, Phases, 
Systems, and Stakeholders.  The methodology developed for this study utilised 
interviews of over 500 individuals in over 200 companies (with an exact number not 
provided).  This study focused on large organisations, as the authors note “we 
conducted nationwide surveys of America’s largest organisations, spanning virtually 
ever industry in the public and private sectors” (Pearson and Mitroff, 1993, p.49).  It 
is worthy to highlight that on the following page the authors state “questionnaires 
were sent to public affairs officers of the Fortune 1000” (Pearson and Mitroff, 1993, 
p.50) hence, the same survey and exhibit findings were used in this study as in the 
prior Mitroff, Pauchant, and Shrivastava (1988); A Preventative Model of Crisis 
Management study.  As such, the prior work by Mitroff, Pauchant, and Shrivastava 
(1988) was further informed through Pearson and Mitroff (1993) qualitative interview 
component (p.50).  The use of qualitative data collection enabled the research to 
reveal emergent disturbance themes and utilised the following questions to further 
interrogate the phases of disturbance event process: 
• What are the generic time phases through which all crisis move? 
• What are the detailed activities of each phase? 
• What must be managed for each phase? 
• Is it enough to be reactive or does one need to be proactive? 
 
Figure 2.2: The Five Phases of Crisis Management Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Pearson and Mitroff, 1993, p.52) 
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Pearson and Mitroff (1993) define the phases of a disturbance event in five distinct 
phases (Figure 2.2).  The first stage, signal detection, suggests that most 
disturbance events have a series of early warning signals that can be detected.  The 
signal detection phase details the need for successful resilient organisations to 
probe and scrutinise evidence and indications of impending disruptions to maximise 
disturbance detection and minimise risk.  The second, preparation/prevention has 
the dual imperative of attempting to minimise the impact a future disturbance will 
have, if not avoiding the disturbance all together.  Elements in this stage include the 
development of disturbance teams, disturbance training, and disturbance simulation.  
The third, containment/damage limitation, is concerned with localising the impact of 
disturbance to immediate system and preventing it from spreading into other parts of 
the business.  Pearson and Mitroff (1993) note that effective containment/damage 
limitation is developed pre-disturbance.  The fourth stage, recovery, focuses on how 
well an organisation has developed systems for both short term and long-term 
recovery from disturbance.  Effective recovery is broken down into the procedures 
and operations needed to get back to operations, servicing essential stakeholders, 
and having appropriate backup systems established to recover to business-as-
usual.  The fifth stage, learning, has the key objective of understanding and 
reflecting on the disturbance phases and discussing factors that were positive or 
negative in the organisations response to disturbance.  A key factor is the need to 
highlight that this phase is about improving future capabilities and improving 
problems as opposed to laying blame for past disturbance.  Table 2.3 highlights the 
key contributions and gaps in understanding of this model.   
Table 2.3: The Five Phases of Crisis Management Discussion 
Key Contributions Research Gap 
• Events as a process rather than a static 
conceptualisation of disturbance.   
• Change to “containment” over “coping” 
implies the move to managed approach 
• Includes preparation/prevention as a 
specific stage rather than a linking 
function as previously conceptualised 
by model 1. 
• Includes learning as a specific stage of 
disturbance rather than a linking 
function as previously conceptualised 
by model 1. 
• Does not address the mechanics of 
linking section to section, as such no 
clear discussion of steps that need to 
take place to move disturbance from one 
phase to the next.   
• Includes preparation/prevention stage 
but does not adjust the subsequent 
phases as a result of avoidance.   
• Highlights the phases of events but gives 
only minimal detail as to what is needed 
at each stage to enhance event reaction 
by the organisation.   
30 
2.1.3 Model 3: Incident Escalation to the Limits of Contingency Planning 
The third model from Smith (2006) takes the perspective that although disturbance 
events can be prepared and planned for there are always unconsidered factors that 
may result in a disturbance.  Hence in some disturbance, management cannot fully 
understand or prepare for such events and as such may miss early warning signals 
which could have led to avoidance of the event.  As such, the model developed by 
Smith (2006), Incident Escalation to the Limits of Contingency Planning, is one that 
focuses more IN the event rather than PRE the event and looks at how modes of 
operation change.  Smith (2006) highlights the need for complex sociotechnical 
systems to anticipate, have realistic foresight for consequences, an understanding 
of the interconnections that take place contribute to scale and complexity, and an 
understanding of the skills required by business to function in times of normality 
against times of organisational dysfunction.  Smith’s (2006) model is presented in 
Figure 2.3.   
 
Figure 2.3: Incident Escalation to the Limits of Contingency Planning  
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Prior to the stages detailed in the model, Smith suggests that there will be an initial 
phase of escalating into the event reaching “points of inflection at crisis emergence” 
(Smith, 2006, p.309), whereby there is a transition in which a disturbance event will 
further escalate or be contained.  Where the event is escalated this would signal a 
move into incident escalation into the limits of contingency planning into the phase 
of initial task demands generated.  This is a key contribution that the previous 
models did not overtly highlight.  As Smith (2006) introduces scalability into his 
approach, the objectives and requirements of a system dealing with either a serious 
incident or a disturbance would thus be altered.  This may extend to the people 
required in dealing with an event, the time sensitivity of actions, the ability for our 
system to function at a reduced level of operational continuity, and so on.  This 
detail by Smith (2006) is of particular importance to the airport management 
organisation context of this study as commercial airports have a wide range of 
stakeholder interests during a disturbance.  A key understanding derived from this 
model is the central role which managers play in assessing which stage of the event 
they are in, what appropriate action is required, and if the considered action will 
cause further escalation of the event or bring the event closer to resolution.   
 
Smith (2006) presents the disturbance event approach in three distinct phases.  The 
first phase is where the organisations event management plans and procedures are 
brought into play as a means of containing and limiting the impact of the disturbance 
event.  In this phase Smith notes the importance training will have on the ability of 
the organisation to implement these tasks.  The next phase, Secondary Task 
Demands Generated (Period B), involves post activation of event management 
plans and procedures and looks at moving from merely responding to inputs of the 
event and takes more of a controlling and management based approach.  Smith 
also discusses that at this point the event would clearly be a crisis and would require 
significant external resources to bring the organisation back online.  The final stage, 
Final Tasks (Period n), represents the process of bringing operations back online 
“by which the organization is returned to a state close to the ‘pre-crisis’ position” 
(Smith, 2006, p.312).  A key addition here is that Smith (2006) notes that the ability 
of the organisation to return to a pre-disturbance position is entirely dependent on 
the scenario and in fact the organisation may never truly recover to a previously 
defined business-as-usual state of operations.  Table 2.4 highlights the contribution 
and gaps of this model for understanding disturbance events.   
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Table 2.4: Incident Escalation to the Limits of Contingency Planning 
Discussion 
Key Contributions Research Gap 
• Recognises that “inflection” points 
take place whereby pre-determined 
strategies and plans can cause the 
event to be avoided.   
• Separates tasks based on time of 
the event and prioritises based on 
the ability to de-escalate back to 
normal operations.   
• Recognises the separation between 
initial tasks aimed at contingency 
planning and secondary tasks aimed 
at managing and moving towards a 
state of bring operations back online.   
• Includes severity scale of “serious 
incident” into “crisis” against other 
models that only consider worst-
case scenario rather than 
embedding escalation as a 
possibility.   
• Highlights that disturbance may 
result in the organisations never truly 
regaining business-as-usual 
operations as defined by pre-
disturbance indicators.   
 
• Does not address learning overtly as 
part of the disturbance event 
management process.   
• Looks at the event in linear terms 
however does not have a means of 
incorporating experience and 
understanding from managers back 
in to the pre event and preparedness 
phase.   
• The scale introduces the need for 
models to represent escalation of 
disturbance however falls short of 
representing an accurate picture of 
real-world practice.   
• Perrow (1999) proposed a four-
stage escalation process to 
represent the severity scale due to 
the ability to capture events from 
day-to-day occurrences through to 
catastrophic system failures.   
 
This section has highlighted three key models that contribute to understanding in the 
way disturbance events occur.  These three models, A Preventative Model of Crisis 
Management (Mitroff, Pauchant, and Shrivastava, 1988),The Five Phases of Crisis 
Management (Pearson and Mitroff, 1993) and Incident Escalation to the Limits of 
Contingency Planning (Smith, 2006), highlight differing approaches which all have 
contributed to the understanding of what takes place when we move from business-
as-usual into business not usual and into recovery phases.  The following section 
will provide a comparison of these models and propose a new theoretical 
disturbance event transition structure to more accurately define the event transition 
space.   
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2.1.4 Comparison of Disturbance Models 
A comparison of the functional sections of the prior disturbance models is presented 
in Figure 2.4.  To adopt a consistent comparison between the different perspectives 
for how disturbance is conceptualised three previous models are compared against 
the generic disturbance phases of pre-event, response, recovery, and post-
event.  The comparison is presented in table format for the purpose of contrasting 
the prior work, although it is proposed that any offered conceptual disturbance 
approach as a process based model (similar to the Pearson and Mitroff, 1993 
conceptualisation of disturbance).  This process is represented as the right side 
arrow where the post-event disturbance function would look to inform future pre-
event planning, preparation, avoidance, and detection.   
Figure 2.4: Previous Disturbance Models and Conceptual Development 
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Figure 2.5 provides definitions of the ten stages of the proposed conceptual 
disturbance approach.  They were developed in the context of crisis management 
concept however they are also relevant to the scalable disturbance based approach 
adopted by this thesis.  These definitions are further developed and refined in 
Chapter Six – Discussion.   
Figure 2.5: Definitions of Conceptual Disturbance Stages 
Pre-Event 
Planning 
The process of plan development for crisis management.  
This is expected to include components dealing with 
processes, decision-making, communication, and authority. 
Preparation 
The process of testing the developed crisis management 
approach via training, desktop exercises, and real-world 
exercises.  A critical component here is to ensure that 
preparation is developed to a level that is as close to real life 
response and recovery as possible.   
Detection 
The components of our system that have the ability to 
highlight when and how our system is transitioning (or has the 
potential to transition) out of normal operations into a 
disturbance state.   
Avoidance 
The means by which our system can avoid the need for 
response and recovery through the use of standard operating 
procedures.  The may include both asset and human 
redundancy systems.   
Response 
Coordination 
and 
Facilitation 
The initial response component of the live phase of an event 
whereby the initiation of assessment and management of the 
situation takes place.  Decision-making and situational 
awareness are critical to ensure an appropriate and timely 
response takes place.   
Containment 
and 
Limitation 
The secondary response component of the live phase of an 
event in which assessment has been undertaken and 
processes are in place to stop further escalation.  Objectives 
are focused on ensuring that, where possible, damage is 
localised to avoid cascading failure of the system.   
Recovery 
Operational 
Continuity 
The initial recovery component of the live phase of an event 
whereby operations are in the process of being restored yet 
we have not yet reached a full operational capacity.  Decision-
making is focused on a staged return with priority given to 
critical systems.   
Disturbance 
Resolution 
The secondary response component of the live phase of the 
event in which assessment is taking place to assess is the 
system is ready to business as usual operations.  Objectives 
are focused on risk assessment of returning to operations and 
understanding how the system would deal with a potential 
shift out of a crisis environment.   
Post-
Event 
Review The explicit review process addressing both information and decisions made during each of the prior phases of the event.   
Learning 
The process of highlighting areas for improvement and 
developing an approach for enhancing organisational 
reliability.   
(from Devine, Barnes, Newton, and Goonetilleke, 2013, p.4)  
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2.1.5 Summary of Disturbance Literature 
Each of the three previously addressed models has specific areas of contribution to 
knowledge.  Each model also has limitations that impede a holistic understanding of 
the range of potential disturbance situations an airport management organisation 
may encounter.  As such a significant gap in understanding is present, as literature 
does not provide a model by which disturbance can be understood as a holistic and 
scalable process.  In response to this current situation, the final column of Figure 2.4 
provides a proposed conceptual disturbance process that aims to build from the 
best each reference model has to offer in the understanding of disturbance.  This 
model proposes an idealised picture of the flow of critical infrastructure disturbance 
event in an airport management context.  The purpose of the proposed conceptual 
approach to disturbance aims to combine the strengths of the three previous models 
to provide a more realistic picture of current practice.  The four-phase/ten-stage 
approach of pre-event (planning, preparation, detection, and avoidance), response 
(coordination and facilitation, and containment and limitation), recovery (recovery, 
and resolution), and post-event (review, and learning) will be utilised as the 
foundation of study one of this thesis.  This conceptual model will be explored in 
Chapter Four – Disturbance Process Model and will address the relevance of the 
model to a real-world context.  Following this, Chapter Six – Discussion will highlight 
revisions to the model and introduced an amended disturbance process model 
based on empirical findings.   
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2.3 Risk and Crisis Understanding 
The following section addresses the second research problem area of the 
contributing factors of how events move from one stage to the next.  A discussion of 
parent theories in risk and crisis literature, Disaster Incubation Theory (Turner, 
1978), Man-Made Disaster Theory (Turner, 1994), Normal Accident Theory (Perrow, 
1984), and High Reliability Theory (La Porte and Consolini, 1991; DeBruijne, 2006; 
and Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007) will take place.  This literature stream was first 
developed in the late 1970’s and helps to provide direction and understanding into 
the causes of disturbance events, potential threats to organisations, and potential 
ways of enhancing resilience.  As this thesis adopts its central investigation as High 
Reliability Theory, the parent literature areas will be discussed by their contribution 
to risk management knowledge, but also as a means of their contribution to 
understanding highly reliable functioning.  This is represented below in Figure 2.6.  
 
Figure 2.6: Literature Progression of Risk and Crisis Understanding 
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2.4 Disaster Incubation/Man Made Disaster Theory 
Early work in the area of disturbance management was developed using the 
approach of Disaster Incubation Theory (Turner, 1978).  Disaster Incubation Theory 
(DIT) as an approach to critical failure examined ways in which the human and 
technical elements in complex socio-technical systems interact.  This work deals 
with the ways that organisations contribute to their own systemic failures.  A central 
element of this work was that disturbance can incubate in an organisation over time 
and that while insider knowledge may have existed about the growing issues these 
weak signals were not acted upon in meaningful ways.  DIT was the first key theory 
to address the notion that disturbance events escalate (and de-escalate) over time, 
a central area of investigation regarding the process of disturbance of this thesis.   
 
Later work by Turner (1994) addressed the need for organisations to focus on 
avoiding overly rigid approaches to systems with a move towards more open 
communication channels as well as an awareness of consequences of actions.  
Pidgeon and O’Leary (2000, p.180) define DIT as: 
“A discrepancy between some deteriorating but ill-structured state of affairs 
and the culturally ‘taken for granted’.  More specifically the cultural norms, 
assumptions and beliefs adopted by an organisation or industry for dealing 
with hazard and danger”.   
DIT introduces the notion of a discrepancy between what is actually occurring in 
response to threats and what should be the ideal situation as set out by situational 
need.  Of particular value to this thesis is that the work of DIT sets out the need for 
cultural understanding.  Furthermore, DIT highlights the influence that culture has on 
what we say we do (espoused approach) and what we actually do (actual 
approach).  In a similar way to Schien’s (2004) conceptualisation of culture, surface 
level artifacts and practices may not match up to the shared understanding of 
underlying values and assumptions of staff.  As such, culture presents a key area of 
importance when understanding disturbance as it highlights the importance of 
understanding both the explicit governance and the real-world actions of 
organisational members.   
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These core themes of incubation, escalation, and cultural influence were further 
developed into the notion of Man-Made Disasters (MMD).  MMD Theory suggests 
that critical failures in systems come as a result of limited awareness of warning 
signals of an event, in some cases, which develop long before the actual incident.  
Turner (1994) notes that any approach that assumes that the causes of a disaster 
are based entirely on the technical and engineering aspects of a system is short 
sighted in that it disregards the design, decision-making, and oversight of human 
elements in the system that play a contributing factor to the failure.  This position is 
supported by the notion that failures of a system are of direct consequence of 
“sloppy management” and/or the nature of the system being overly complex (Turner, 
1994).   
 
The key outcome of the work in MMD is that although there will likely be strategies 
in place that consistently review operations, wherever there are complex 
interactions at play, there is a high likelihood that some elements which can cause 
damage may not be detected.  Furthermore, a near-miss situation, whereby an 
organisation successfully avoids complete organisational catastrophe, can serve as 
a learning experience and needs to be incorporated back into disturbance event 
planning and preparation.  The key contribution of MMD to the larger body of 
knowledge on disturbance management is the notion that regardless of technical 
approaches to the mitigation of risk, the human element in socio-technical systems 
will still play a central role in terms reliability and resilience (Pidgeon and O'Leary, 
2000).  The key themes of the DIT and MMD theoretical positions, along with their 
contribution to understanding reliability are summarised below in Table 2.5.  
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Table 2.5: Contribution of the DIT/MMD Literature to Reliability 
Key Themes Contribution to Knowledge 
Incubation 
 
• Understanding areas of inherent vulnerability within 
critical infrastructure systems.   
• Disturbance may compound in previously unconsidered 
ways and as a result create a more complex problem.   
 
Escalation 
 
• Severity levels have the potential to change and as 
such considerations need to be re-assessed as to the 
appropriateness of the process employed.   
• Disturbance events needs to be considered as fluid 
rather than static with emphasis being placed on 
continual understand and justification of planning and 
assessment decisions.   
 
Cultural Influence 
 
• Understanding when and how the organisation is 
shifting away from acceptable levels of risk is critical.   
• As highlighted by incubation, moving slowly away from 
a prior state has the potential to go unnoticed or 
ignored by organisational members with potentially 
serious system wide consequences.   
 
Sociotechnical Considerations 
 
• The combination of people and systems will always 
create a degree of risk and the potential for disturbance 
in organisations hence greater understanding is critical.   
• Understanding the ways in which vulnerability is 
created through design, decision making, and oversight 
is of key importance in recognising the potential for 
systemic disturbance 
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2.5 Normal Accident Theory 
While the notion of human in-attentiveness is an important part of both DIT and 
MMD concepts, the size and complexity of institutional systems forms a core part of 
another key consideration for the crisis management literature space in the literature 
on Normal Accident Theory (Perrow, 1999).  Normal Accident Theory (NAT), was 
developed with the focus of understanding major technological disasters but also 
the impact of organisational and institutional functioning and design.  Within NAT, 
the two critical components are the closeness of interdependencies between 
components in terms of tight or loose coupling and the amount and nature of 
interactions that take place within the system (Perrow, 1999).  As discussed by 
Perrow (1999), understanding NAT involves addressing the coupling of the 
elements in the system, as well as the amount and nature of complex interactions 
between the components.  Of particular interest to this research study is potential for 
a more informed understanding of disturbance events in a complex sociotechnical 
space.  Often disturbance events will have organisation, vendor, contractor, and 
government interests involved.  By learning from the experience of NAT in that 
complex interactions are a critical point of understanding.  NAT influences the 
research design of this project whereby it becomes of critical importance to 
understand the entire airport space and its impact on airport operations, not simply 
the airport operator.   
 
The first element, coupling, addresses the degree to which components of a system 
are related to one another and hence, the nature and magnitude of impact a failure 
in one system component will have on another (Tamuz and Harrison, 2006).  Tamuz 
and Harrison (2006, p.1658) define coupling by stating; “coupling explains the 
relative degree of dependence among system components”.  The notion of a system 
that is tightly coupled makes the degree of risk that failure in one element can 
spread throughout the entire system more easily (Perrow, 1999).  More specifically, 
“Tight coupling (in mechanical terms) refers to the lack of slack, buffer or give 
between two items, meaning that what happens in one directly affects what happens 
in another” (Perrow, 1999, p.90).  If we consider this in the frame of disturbance, the 
notion of coupling becomes of critical importance.  Whereby failure in one system 
can adversely impact other systems or the entire system, a loosely coupled system 
would lessen the threat of a singular event cascading to becoming a holistic 
organisational crisis.   
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The second element, interactions (Perrow, 1999), relates to the ways in which order 
in systems is managed.  In systems where elements of the system can interact with 
elements outside of the system, higher levels of complexity results and as such 
(along with coupling) there is a high degree to which a normal accident style failure 
can occur.  As noted by Wolf (2001, p.294);  
“failures that result as a consequence of interactions among a technical 
system’s components that are unanticipated because of the very large number 
of potential interactions in complex systems”.   
With the advent of increased outscoring of business functions in a wide range of 
critical infrastructure contexts, there becomes an increase in the threat associated 
with increasingly complex interactions.  Hence, it becomes important to note that 
outsourcing of core business functions increases the number of interactions and 
hence raises the number of complex interactions that can enhance the possibility of 
a normal accident occurring.  In the context of airport management organisations, 
that function on low internal staff numbers and rely heavily on external contractors 
and consultants, complex interactions represent a potential vulnerability for the 
continued operations of the sociotechnical system.   
 
The key contribution NAT has provided to understanding disturbance has been to 
better comprehend the propensity for vulnerability and failure of a system.  As 
previously discussed the classification was developed against four areas whereby 
the organisation can be defined in terms of the interaction (linear or complex) and 
interconnectedness (tight or loose).  The contrast between linear and complex 
systems is present that a failure in one component of a linear system will not likely 
cause systemic disruption, whereas a complex system has the potential to be more 
vulnerable.  In a similar way, the distinction between loose and tight systems 
whereby a loose system is less likely to have a compound failure whereas a tight 
coupled system has a high potential for one failure to cause more considerable 
disruption.  It becomes essential to comprehend these attributes in a compound 
manner and understanding the potential vulnerability created by the combination of 
interaction and coupling attributes.  The key attributes of linear systems, complex 
systems, loose coupling, and tight coupling are provided in Table 2.6 below.   
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Table 2.6: NAT Classification Attributes 
Criteria One: Interaction 
(Perrow, 1999, p.88) 
 
Linear Interaction 
 
Complex Interaction 
 
• Critical components, subsystems, and 
controls are segregated 
• Dedicated connections in terms of 
functions and information flow 
• Substitutions are available if required 
• Feedback loops are limited 
• Detailed understanding vulnerability 
 
 
• Critical components, subsystems, and 
controls are interconnected 
• Connections are shared; indirect flow of 
processes and information 
• Limited substitutions are available 
• Feedback loops are present 
• Limited understanding of vulnerability 
 
Criteria Two: Coupling 
(Perrow, 1999, p.96) 
 
Loose Coupling 
 
 
Tight Coupling 
 
• Delays in process are possible and the 
order of sequences can be adjusted 
• Multiple process approach 
• Slack is available in critical components 
of supplies, equipment, and personnel 
• Buffers and redundancies are a natural 
occurring in the system 
• Adjustments to supplies, equipment, and 
personnel are available and can be 
tasked up easily 
 
 
• Delays in processing are not possible and 
sequences must be consistent 
• Single process approach 
• Limited slack in supplies, equipment, and 
personnel 
• Buffers and redundancies must be 
developed into the system 
• Adjustments to supplies, equipment, and 
personnel are difficult and must be 
expressly pre-prepared in the system 
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It is worthy to note however, that Perrow (1999) argues that there is no “better” or 
“worse” classification as the inherent risk associated with the development of some 
systems can also lead to greater potential rewards.  As Perrow notes: 
“the advantages of linear systems might suggest that the latter (linear) are 
much more preferable and complex systems should be made linear … 
Unfortunately this is not the case.  Complex systems are more efficient … 
there is less slack, less underutilized space, less tolerance for low-quality 
performance, and more multifunction components”. (Perrow 1999 p.88) 
NAT furthers the position noted in this thesis that it is important to understanding the 
combination of interactional and coupling specific to the industry context.  Rather 
than attempting to change the classification, understanding the strengths and 
weaknesses becomes critical to conceptualising the type and exposure to failure the 
organisation has.  Examples of these compound classifications are provided in 
Figure 2.7 below.   
 
Figure 2.7 Perrow’s Generic Classifications of Interaction and Coupling 
 
Dams 
Power Grids 
Marine Transport 
Marine Transport 
Airways 
 
 
 
Nuclear Power Plant 
Nuclear Weapons Accidents 
Aircraft 
Chemical Plants 
Space Missions 
 
Linear Tight Complex Tight 
 
Linear Loose 
 
Complex Loose 
 
Assembly Line Production 
Trade Schools 
Most Manufacturing 
Single Goal Agencies 
Junior College 
 
 
Military Missions 
Mining 
Research and Development Firms 
Multi Goal Agencies 
Universities 
 
(Perrow 1999, p.97) 
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Further developing this discussion, a seminal example of an NAT style failure was 
highlighted by the Challenger Space Shuttle disaster whereby complex interactions 
and tight coupling (along with a range of organisational factors) caused the 
catastrophic failure of the system (Perrow, 1999).  Within the system the high 
degree of component coordination needed, along with the management of the 
system, and the timeframe pressure on achieving program outcomes pushed the 
programme from safe and state of the art space travel to include other competing 
forces which moved the approach away from the initial program vision (Ocasio, 
2005).  These attributes compounded a system that was already running extremely 
low levels of tolerance.  The Challenger Space Shuttle disaster highlights the 
consequence of complex interactions and vulnerability coming together to cause a 
critical failure that from the perspective of NAT is never completely avoidable 
(Perrow, 2006).  In contrast to this example, Weick (1976) discussed the example of 
college education in the United States as an example of a loosely coupled system.  
By a loosely coupled system this would exhibit traits whereby failure in one element 
of the system would not severely impact another component of the system.  An 
issue created in one component of the organisation, such as the change of faculty 
member, would have minimal impact on the functionality of the rest of the system.   
 
NAT can contribute to better understanding the problem areas of this thesis.  As 
discussed in the introduction section of this document, an airport as a complex 
socio-technical system has a vast range of components, and as such the notion of 
NAT can provide understanding into the anticipatory elements of disturbance 
readiness and resilience.  As discussed in Section 1.2: Research Background, both 
resilience and reliable practice in sociotechnical system requires flexibility in the way 
in which a system can deals with a disturbance to its operational environment.  
From the NAT perspective, both interactivity and coupling will have a potential 
bearing on the level of vulnerability the organisation is in at a level of normal 
business operations.  This threat will be based in the susceptibility of an 
organisation to encounter a normal accident, as well as the nature of how failures 
can propagate through the system and cause a normal accident (Perrow, 1999).  
Table 2.7 below summarises these key areas of contribution.   
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Table 2.7: Contribution of the Normal Accident Literature to Reliability 
Key Theme Contribution to Knowledge 
 
Combined 
Classification of 
Interaction and 
Coupling 
 
 
• Interaction highlights the potential vulnerability present in a system 
by actions in an intended or unintended sequence 
• Coupling highlights the potential vulnerability produced in a system 
through co-dependency of people, processes, and resources 
• Classification of interaction and coupling can potentially highlight the 
strengths and weaknesses in a system which can guide the 
development of enhanced reliability 
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2.6 High Reliability Theory	  
The preceding sections have highlighted a range of extant literature that has 
contributed to understanding the nature of disturbance in critical infrastructure 
systems.  The discussion centred on the complementary areas of Disaster 
Incubation Theory and Man-Made Disaster Theory and highlighted four critical 
themes that contribute to understanding of disturbance.  First, incubation noted that 
critical infrastructure systems contain underlying vulnerability due to their nature and 
that previously unconsidered elements may compound to create a significant 
disturbance.  Second, escalation noted that disturbance events should be 
considered as evolving and that continual understanding around risk classification 
and decision-making is required.  Third, cultural influence discussed the importance 
of understanding when potentially serious objectives and considerations are moving 
away from culturally accepted norms.  Fourth, sociotechnical considerations 
examined how the potential for vulnerability is created through understanding the 
interaction of design, decision-making, and oversight components within systems.  
This prior discussion continued by addressing the impact of Normal Accident Theory 
on disturbance.   
 
The NAT component of the literature review looked at understanding the criteria of 
classification around different types of systems.  The areas of interaction and 
coupling were addressed as a means of defining the potential for vulnerability within 
a system.  This classification resulted in the four classifications of linear tight, 
complex tight, linear loose, and complex loose.  At the surface level the position of 
linear loose looked to be the most advantageous however as noted by discussion 
this would also mean negating the strengths of a system operating a minimal levels 
of tolerance.  Furthermore, systems do not have the luxury of changing their 
classification, but rather this discussion highlights that through enhanced 
understanding of the inherent nature of our system we may incorporate appropriate 
planning and development to negate our weaknesses.  The next discussion for this 
review of literature focuses on understanding the ways in we may understand the 
current level of reliability in our system along with the potential to enhance practice.  
This discussion is informed by the previous components as a means of 
understanding disturbance yet will focus on the more optimistic side of the literature 
whereby these inherent weaknesses may be overcome with development of 
reliability.  The literature discussion so far is represented in Figure 2.8.   
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Figure 2.8: Literature Progression to High Reliability 
 
 
 
 
This thesis contends that the key area of importance in the disturbance literature is 
the contribution of High Reliability Theory (HRT) as a means of understanding 
organisations that exhibit particular characteristics that help make them become 
more capable to withstand the effects of disturbance (La Porte, 1996; La Porte and 
Consolini, 1998).  HRT has the central focus of understanding how organisations 
that operate in highly complex sociotechnical systems provide high levels of 
performance, in terms of safety and output, which can avoid both catastrophic 
failures as discussed in the DIT perspective as well as compound failures of 
coupling and complexity (as discussed in the NAT perspective) and provide near 
error free operations (La Porte and Consolini, 1991; La Porte and Consolini, 1998; 
De Bruijne, 2006).  HRT purports that some organisations are able to provide near 
error free operations while being close to the edge of catastrophe.  Shrivastava, 
Sonpar and Pazzaglia (2009) note that in dangerous systems where the nature of 
the action negates a second chance, such as aircraft carriers and nuclear power 
facilities, the system is forced to become highly reliable in terms of their operations.  
HRT provides an explanation that is in direct dispute to that of the previously 
discussed NAT position that would establish that the challenges of tight coupling 
and complexity could not be overcome.  La Porte and Consolini (1991) note that 
organisations that are highly reliable can function in tightly coupled systems, which 
Traits of High Reliability: 
Understanding 
Potential to Enhance Reliability: 
Development 
Disaster Incubation Theory  
(Turner, 1978) 
Man-Made Disaster Theory 
(Turner, 1994) 
Normal Accident Theory  
(Perrow, 1999) 
High Reliability Theory 
(La Porte and Consolini, 1991; DeBruijne, 
2006; and Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007) 
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require complex interactions, and furthermore contain highly interdependent 
technologies.   
 
In the seminal published study on HRT, derived from empirical research into 
functioning of an U.S. Aircraft Carrier under real operational conditions, Rochlin, La 
Porte and Roberts (1987) contended that the high degree of flexibility of operations 
along with the continual cycle of learning, teaching, and practice amongst plane 
handling staff built high levels of reliability into functional capabilities.  In that study, 
when a disturbance occurred, which to a certain degree happened every day as part 
of normal military flight operations at sea, the system was able to flex and maintain 
operations without going into critical failure (Rochlin, La Porte and Roberts, 1987; La 
Porte, 1996).  This literature thread was furthered by Bierly and Spender (1995) who 
also addressed the value of highly flexible systems that prepare for failure through 
adherence to vigilant standards and training.  Adding to this was the incorporation of 
organisational culture as a critical element in high reliability as a means of forming 
collective knowledge of a system (Bierly and Spender, 1995).   
 
La Porte and Consolini (1998) investigated HROs in terms of modes of behaviour 
governing operational choices during times of normality through to times of 
disturbance.  Their findings suggested that under disturbance conditions, 
organisations changing from top down hierarchal approach to a more collaborative 
network style of decision making and management is not un-common (La Porte and 
Consolini, 1998).  Drawing on the seminal research based on aircraft carriers 
(Rochlin, La Porte and Roberts, 1987) they defined three distinct modes of 
operation on these floating airports; routine, high-tempo, and emergency response 
mode.  For example, normal operations were conducted within a traditional military 
chain-of-command approach.  This adjusted when in modes two or three operational 
management adjusted to situation-specific, expert-lead, problem identification and 
decision-making roles with equal authority for critical decisions resting across ranks, 
from enlisted specialist aircraft handlers up to very senior officers (La Porte and 
Consolini, 1998).  This approach proved successful for operations as it enabled, as 
previously addressed by Weick (1987), the ability to transition between centralised 
and decentralised semi-autonomous processes when faced with disturbance.   
 
49 
When considering the previous research into this literature space it is worthy to note 
that authors have looked at understanding High Reliability Organisations in distinct 
ways.  As highlighted by Hopkins (2007), initial research in this space adopted more 
of a safety and catastrophe avoidance based approach to the discussion.  The 
misconception in this approach was that it made possible for any organisation that 
did not encounter critical failure as a potential and as such the notion of complexity 
of systems (adopted from the prior discussed NAT perspective) was highlighted.  As 
such, the present day work on HRT has developed in three elements focused on 
classification of traits of high reliability (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007), the relationship 
of culture and reliability, as well as the more recent focus on the potential for the 
development of highly reliable functionality in systems (Riley, Davis, Miller, and 
McCullough, 2010; Lekka and Sugden, 2011; Sutcliffe, 2011).  Therefore, the 
following review will focus on these two areas to review current knowledge from the 
perspective understanding the components of what makes an organisation highly 
reliable and what is the potential to embed these components into practice to 
enhance the reliability of an organisation.   
 
2.6.1 High Reliability Traits 
The previous section highlighted a background understanding for concept of HRT 
and the importance of this literature space to understanding near error free 
operations in critical infrastructure.  A comprehensive review of academic literature 
regarding the way research has understood reliability was developed by DeBruijne 
(2006).  In this initial work, De Bruijne (2006) established a clear synthesis of 
understanding in the topic and highlighted the components by which the unique 
attributes of high reliability organisations (HRO’s) manifest.  Furthermore, DeBruijne 
(2006) provided a valid contextual contribution by focusing on case studies away 
from the traditional military/nuclear previous work and moved more towards a 
commercial context by researching the electricity and communication industries.  In 
this review, specific component factors were developed from previous conceptual 
and empirical studies and were developed into a list of attributes by which HROs 
can be defined and understood.  DeBruijne (2006) focused on nine components that 
looked at the functional characteristic of such organisations as well as the 
components by which they create reliability enhancing conditions.  A contribution of 
this synthesis was that it looked at both the functional attributes of such 
organisations (in a similar mode to the previous DIT, MMD, and NAT discussion) but 
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furthered this by addressing the underlying cultural attributes (Weick, 1987).  This 
study provided a means of understanding holistically the sociotechnical components 
which impact reliability (detailed in Table 2.8).  
Table 2.8: DeBruijne’s Reliability Enhancing Characteristics and Conditions 
Reliability Enhancing 
Characteristics and 
Conditions 
Contribution to Understanding Reliability 
1. “Commitment to 
reliable operations in 
mission and goals” 
• The overarching operational focus is to maintain highly 
reliable operations 
• Commitment to high reliability defines the organisations focus 
in everyday practice and in defining shared objectives 
2. “Sustained high 
technical performance” 
• The organisation is highly aware that a lack of understanding 
of critical components of the system and the ways they 
interact with the potential to lead to catastrophic failure 
• Commitment to legitimate governance which assess the 
adherence to performance standards 
3. “Structural flexibility 
and redundancy” 
• The ability for system wide adjustment and correction based 
on changes in the operational environment 
• Workaround of both technical and actors in the system enable 
the system to “fail gracefully” (DeBruijne 2006, p.65) allowing 
for component failure yet avoidance of system wide failure 
4. “High degrees of 
responsibility and 
accountability” 
• The organisation has a key focus of making employees at all 
levels aware of and focused on vulnerability  
• This is embedded in employees through continuous 
improvement cycles of review and learning  
5. “Flexible decision-
making processes” 
• The ability of the system to shift modes of operation quickly 
and develop appropriate action for disturbance 
• Hierarchal approach replaced by flat structures in disturbance 
6. “Continual search for 
improvement and training 
for worst case scenarios” 
• The organisational focus of preparing staff to deal with 
disturbance and identify weaknesses in the system 
• Understanding and reliability is embedded into members 
7. “Reliability not 
marginalizable, not 
fungible (or be traded 
off)” 
• In a similar way to the first characteristic, reliability is the 
central operational goal that is acted upon and reinforced  
• Cost reductions or increased productivity are secondary to the 
continual development of reliability (LaPorte and Consolini, 
1991) 
8. “Organizational culture 
of reliability” 
• Establishes the importance of a culture which places reliable 
functionality above all else and also enables flexibility for 
adjusting modes of operation to deal with disturbance 
• Enables the “what we say we do” and “what we actually do” to 
move closer together and support the highlighting of 
vulnerability and corrective action at all levels within an 
organisation 
9. “Strong presence of 
external groups with 
access to credible and 
timely operational 
information” 
• The need for critical feedback to be available to the 
organisation to maintain high functionality 
• Feedback is appropriate, honest, and is actively embedded 
back into correcting components of the system to further 
develop reliable practice 
(Developed from DeBruijne, 2006, p.63) 
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The nine characteristics and conditions described by DeBruijne (2006) provide a 
broad classification of the attributes of an organisation which could be considered 
highly reliable.  Authors Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) developed a more focused 
approach to understanding high reliability organisations in their seminal text 
Managing The Unexpected; Resilient Performance in and Age of Uncertainty 
(2007).  The five traits of reliability are introduced as; preoccupation with failure, 
reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and 
deference to expertise (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007).  Their work introduced the notion 
of traits of reliability as a means of understanding qualities of what makes an 
organisational highly reliable.  Furthermore, this frame of reference was also 
discussed as a potential means of exploring how these traits could be applied to 
other organisational contexts.  Moreover, the five principles of reliability serve as a 
set of guiding principles that have the potential to interrogate how and why 
managers make the decisions they do in disturbance event situations across the 
various stages and levels of severity of a disturbance.  This is of particular 
importance when understanding the nature of operational change as business-not-
usual operations de-escalated to a state of business-as-usual.  The dual imperative 
of exploring both the understanding of reliability and the potential to enhance 
reliability provides a key direction of interest for this thesis (in this case in a 
commercial airport management organisation).   
 
Both DeBruijne’s (2006) reliability enhancing characteristics and conditions, and the 
Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) traits of high reliability organisations contribute to this 
thesis by providing a means of exploring high reliability.  Both of these studies 
highlight the functional and cultural ways in which high reliability has the potential to 
be present and understood in organisations.  This previous literature helps to inform 
understanding in terms of understanding and developing these themes.  In the 
context of an airport management organisation, this prior development serves as a 
means of applying these theoretical components to new context.  Although the two 
studies explain their approach on the surface level in different ways, a comparison 
of the descriptors reveals that in many ways they are talking about the same 
concepts.  Table 2.9 below compares and contrasts these two approaches and 
provides comment on the synergies that are present.  As the Weick and Sutcliffe 
(2007) approach is more highly cited in literature, this has been used and is the 
basis by which to fit DeBruijne’s work along with comments on emergent themes.   
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Table 2.9: Comparison of DeBruijne (2006) to Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) 
Reliability Enhancing Characteristics and 
Conditions: DeBruijne (2006) 
(*Additional text is thesis author comment) 
Traits of High Reliability 
Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) 
 
1. “Commitment to reliable operations in mission 
and goals” 
8. “Organisational culture of reliability” 
 
1. Preoccupation with Failure 
“They treat any lapse as a symptom that 
something may be wrong with the system, 
something that could have severe 
consequences if several separate small 
errors happened to coincide” (Weick and 
Sutcliffe, 2007, p.9) 
 
 
*Continuous and overt critical analysis of 
vulnerability and the potential for disturbance 
 
 
4. “High degrees of responsibility and 
accountability” 
9. “Strong presence of external groups with 
access to credible and timely operational 
information” 
 
2. Reluctance to Simplify 
“HROs take deliberate steps to create more 
complete and nuanced pictures of what 
they face and who they are as the face it … 
They welcome diverse experience, 
skepticism towards received wisdom, and 
negotiating tactics that reconcile difference 
of opinion without destroying the nuances 
that diverse people detect” (Weick and 
Sutcliffe, 2007, p.10) 
 
 
*Members are actively involved in developing an 
accurate and holistic picture of vulnerability and 
the potential for disturbance 
 
 
2. “Sustained high technical performance” 
3. “Structural flexibility and redundancy” 
 
3. Sensitivity to Operations 
“(HROs) are attentive to the front line, 
where the real work gets done … When 
people have well-developed situational 
awareness, they can make the continuous 
adjustments that prevent errors from 
accumulating and enlarging.  Anomalies are 
notices while they are still tractable and can 
still be isolated” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007, 
p.12) 
 
*Cross-functional understanding of system 
components regarding information and decision 
making with the ability to correct potential 
disturbance before it escalates 
 
 
6. “Continual search for improvement and training 
for worst case scenarios” 
7. “Reliability not marginalizable, not fungible (can 
not be traded off)” 
8. “Organizational culture of reliability” 
 
4. Commitment to Resilience 
“HROs develop capabilities to detect, 
contain, and bounce back from those 
inevitable errors that are part of an 
indeterminate world.  The hallmark of an 
HRO is not that it is error-free but that 
errors don’t disable it.  Resilience is a 
combination of keeping errors small and of 
improvising workarounds that allow the 
system to keep functioning” (Weick and 
Sutcliffe, 2007, p.14) 
 
 
*Reliability remains the key operational objective 
of the organisation during all modes of operation 
 
 
3. “Structural flexibility and redundancy” 
5. “Flexible decision-making processes” 
 
5. Deference to Expertise 
HROs cultivate diversity, not just because it 
helps them notice more in complex 
environments, but also because it helps 
them do more with the complexities they do 
spot.  Decisions are made on the front line, 
and authority migrates to those people with 
the most expertise, regardless of their rank” 
(Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007, p.16) 
 
*The system has the ability to identify and task 
expert decision makers to deal with situation 
specific disturbance 
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2.6.2 High Reliability and Organisational Culture 
Both DeBruijne (2006) and Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2007) categories highlight the 
underlying values and assumptions (cultural attributes) of organisational members, 
and the ability and performance (functional attributes) of the system.  These 
components could be utilised to understand the underlying values, beliefs, and 
assumptions of the organisation with relation to disturbance and reliability.  In this 
way it would involve looking at the espoused situation in the form of surface level 
artifacts/practice/norms/behaviour, and comparing this position against the actual 
situation of practice.  Furthermore, these components could be utilised to explore 
which elements (if any) have the potential to be enhanced to improve the ways in 
which our system deals with disturbance culturally and functionally.  As shown in 
Figure 2.9, more surface level attributes are easier to see yet has less impact on the 
overall culture of an organisation.  Conversely, the lowest and least visible values, 
beliefs and assumptions level is difficult to adjust as it is more representative of the 
core of what the organisation holds as important (Schein, 2004).   
Figure 2.9: Understanding Organisational Culture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Weick and Sutcliffe 2005; adapted from Schein, 1985) 
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As addressed by Weick (1987), organisation culture is particularly important in the 
study of high reliability systems as it provides a basis for understanding how 
members within the system make meaning and how this can help enhance 
resilience during times of uncertainty.  A critical component in understanding the 
interactivity of components in a system from a high reliability perspective is the way 
in which organisational culture dictates the values, rules, and norms of practice.  
Specifically, this discussion will focus on organisational culture as defined by 
seminal author Schein as: 
“A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its 
problem of external adaption and internal integration that has worked well 
enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as 
the correct was to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems” 
(Schein, 2004, p. 17).   
 
This thesis proposes that organisational culture is a concept that can offer great 
insight into the gestalt of how and why people respond to disturbance in the way 
they do.  Numerous authors in high reliability (see La Porte and Consolini, 1998; 
Weick, 1987; Weick and Roberts, 1993; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2005) have discussed 
the key contribution which organisational culture can make towards how a company 
detects, reports on, responds to, and recovers from disturbance events.  By 
understanding elements such as social artefacts, espoused beliefs and values, and 
the underlying assumptions of a group it is possible to gain an understanding into 
what gives culture meaning (Schein, 2004).  Weick (1987) discusses the critical role 
which culture plays in building high reliability in that organisational culture can serve 
as a mediator between centralisation and decentralisation of control in disturbance; 
“A system which values stories, storytellers, and storytelling will be more 
reliable than a system that derogates these substitutes for trial and error … 
people know more about their system, know more of the potential errors that 
might occur, and they are more confident that they can handle those errors 
that do occur because they know that other people have already handled 
similar errors” (Weick, 1987, p.133).   
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The most visible level of organisational culture, artifacts and practices, discusses 
those surface level elements which influence the way employees act.  This surface 
level is also the most able to be influenced by managers.  The middle level of norms 
and behaviour patters, while not as visible as artifacts and practices, discusses 
those elements that are acultured into a group over time.  This is of particular 
importance when we explore both the explicit and tacit ways in which employees 
understand and deal with disturbance events.  The deepest level of values, beliefs 
and assumptions are those unspoken rules and directives that create a shared 
understanding for employees in an organisation.  This underling level is particularly 
important for understanding disturbance events as it serves as a means of 
comparison between what we say-we-do as an organisation and what we actually 
do (Schein, 2004).  When studying aircraft operations at sea La Porte and Consolini 
(1998) found the presence of a shared understanding of what different operators 
roles were with a clear understanding of the purpose and approach needed from the 
most menial tasks all the way through to critical operations.  This shared 
understanding provided not only the ability for members to step in and support when 
needed, but also to have faith that persons in a team dealing with disturbance were 
capable and in command of the situation.  Specifically, this research study will focus 
on the ability of organisational culture at its three distinct levels to contribute to (or 
the converse position) disturbance readiness and reliability.   
 
In a similar way to DeBruijne (2006), Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2007) work looked at 
moving away from the more structural and functional way of addressing disturbance 
by looking at more than the prior organisational structure, staff training, and 
redundancy themes.  Their approach adopts a more interpretive frame to explore 
the underlying elements which impact the ways in which people understand, 
recognise and respond to disturbance events.  Weick and Sutcliffe (2005) use an 
interpretation of Schein’s (2004) organisational culture levels approach as a means 
of discussing elements which are easily seen in an organisation, through to those 
which are underlying and are more difficult to address.  Their position discusses that 
surface level artefacts and practices, mid level norms and behaviour patterns, and 
underlying values, beliefs, and assumption all play a part in the way an organisation 
can deal with uncertainty (Figure 2.8).  As with DeBruijne (2006), this work 
contributes to this thesis by highlighting the need to address aspects of disturbance 
from a cultural perspective as well as a functional and structured approach.   
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2.6.3 High Reliability Enhancement 
The first area of discussion for the enhancement of high reliability is the explicit 
inclusion of sensemaking.  Studies have previously highlighted the importance of 
sensemaking in understanding organisational reliability development and 
functionality (Weick, 1988; Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2005).  In the context of 
this study, sensemaking is defined as: 
“The ongoing retrospective development of plausible images that rationalize 
what people are doing … a significant process of organising, sensemaking 
unfolds as a sequence in which people concerned with identity in the social 
context of other actors engage ongoing circumstances from which they extract 
cues and make plausible sense retrospectively, while enacting more or less 
order into those ongoing circumstances” (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld 2005, 
p.409) 
Sensemaking is of particular interest to this study as it serves as a means of 
understanding the ways in which people make decisions, and the retrospective 
contributing factors that brought them to that decision.  Weick (1988) highlights the 
dual imperatives of sensemaking in disturbance events.  First, noting sensemaking 
from the perspectives of disturbance prevention, whereby we have understood 
trigger events and made appropriate corrections as a result.  Second, through 
disturbance management, whereby we have not been able to avoid the disturbance 
but rather we reduce the impact and contain the event through rapid understanding 
of errors.  These perspectives provide a means of understanding disturbance events 
should they occur or develop into a near-miss whereby the system has been able to 
avoid moving out of a business-as-usual state of operations. 
 
Weick (1988) highlights the importance of human decision-making in the form of 
sensemaking as follows:  
“Crises obviously are over determined and human sensemaking may play only 
a small part in their development. Nevertheless, crises engage human action, 
human action can amplify small deviations into major crises, and in any search 
for causes, we invariably can find some human act which may have set the 
crisis in motion. It is our contention that actions devoted to sensemaking play 
a central role in the genesis of crises and therefore need to be understood if 
we are to manage and prevent crises.” (Weick 1988, p.309) 
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In this way, sensemaking serves as a process whereby respondents attempt to 
review the range of data presented to them, understand the importance of that data 
to their current situation, and take appropriate action to avoid or manage the 
particular disturbance (Weick, 2005).  In the context of an airport management 
organisation, this process may take place by the function of a security officer 
noticing something out if the ordinary at a screening point, all the way through to an 
incident commander prioritising injured following an air disaster.  Therefore, the 
ability of organisational members to understand and adjust to situations, rather than 
simply following pre-determined plans, highlights a key skill by which a more 
appropriate strategy for dealing with disturbance can be employed.   
 
While sensemaking focuses on the retrospective conceptualisation of disturbance, 
the second area of discussion of agility explores how groups are able to transition 
both functionally and culturally during disturbance.  Agility, as an adjunct to the 
notion of reliability, is an important consideration in organisations seeking optimal 
functionality when responding to crisis.  The literature on work teams which operate 
during crisis events yet maintain resilient decision-making capability have been 
described as using the concept of ‘edge organising’ (Alberts and Hayes, 2003).  
Edge organising was conceptualised as both a description and explanation of an 
approach that functions in a manner quite distinct from that of a traditional top-
down/hierarchal approach to decision-making and management.  Therefore, the 
edge operating concept is one which places high regard on flexibility and ready 
access to information to deal with situations as they arise, thus taking advantage of 
not having to function within a regimented and constrained chain-of-command.  
Compared to a more tradition hierarchy based approach, the agile approach 
enables more efficient and appropriate transition between tasks as they present 
themselves (Alberts and Hayes, 2003).  Alberts and Hayes (2003, p.217) note: 
“Edge organizations are particularly well suited to deal with uncertainty and 
unfamiliarity because they make more of their relevant knowledge, 
experience, and expertise available” (Alberts and Hayes, 2003, p.217). 
 
Literature on the edge operating principal highlights the key advantage of an edge 
organisation to be “robust, flexible, responsive, innovative, resilient and adaptive” 
(Alberts and Nissen, 2009, p.38) during disturbance.  Scott (2006) discussed key 
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distinguishing features of the agility under five key attributes being highlighted as; 
distributive information, collective sensemaking, distributive power-base, dynamic 
task allocation, and shared understanding of command intent.  In a similar way to 
the Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) principles of reliability (preoccupation with failure, 
reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience and 
deference to expertise), the distinguishing features of agile performance help us to 
understand the ability of a group to quickly and efficiently deal with a disturbance 
event.  Considering this in the form of disturbance, an organisation which has better 
access to information, a decision making approach which can deal with a wide 
range of factors and perspectives, an understanding of goals, and the ability to task 
accordingly would be thought to make more appropriate decisions.  Compared to a 
more tradition hierarchy based approach, the agile approach enables more efficient 
and appropriate transition between tasks as they present themselves (Alberts and 
Hayes, 2003).  Figure 2.10 below highlights this distinction.   
 
Figure 2.10: Command and Control Approach Space 
 
(from Alberts and Nissen, 2009, p.13) 
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This literature review does not promote the notion that all organisations can become 
‘edge organisations’ but rather that the concept of agility is one which can be used 
to enhance the ways in which organisational members recognise, react, and 
respond to disturbance.  Although the concept of edge organisations originated in 
military settings, it has significant similarity to studies by Rochlin, La Porte, and 
Roberts (1987), and La Porte and Consolini (1998) who identified the ability of 
flexible organisations to better contend with crises and their consequences.  When 
the concept of agility is contextualised within the setting of De Brujine’s High 
Reliability Traits (2006) and Weick and Sutcliffe’s High Reliability Principles (2007), 
the capability of an organisation to adapt both culturally (assumptions and values) 
and functionally (ability and performance) presents a particularly strong frame of 
reference for exploring options for an organisation to deal with disturbance events.  
 
2.6.4 Summary of High Reliability Literature 
Sections 2.3 - 2.6 have explored a range of topics that inform understanding on the 
nature of disturbance.  The Disaster Incubation/Man-Made Disaster discussion 
revealed themes of incubation, escalation, cultural influence, and sociotechnical 
considerations that shape the vulnerability of systems.  The Normal Accident Theory 
discussion looked at classifications of interaction and coupling that reveal the 
propensity of a system to encounter compound failure as a result of a disturbance.  
These approaches provided grounding for the High Reliability Theory discussion as 
the reveal how and why disturbance might occur in our system.  Section 2.6 
developed this knowledge into a review of the way we understand reliability, the 
importance of culture, and the potential to enhance reliability in our system.  Weick 
and Sutcliffe’s (2007) five traits of reliability; preoccupation with failure, reluctance to 
simplify, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to 
expertise, are adopted in this research as a frame by which to explore reliability.  
This will be further enhanced with attention being paid to the notion of organisational 
culture, sensemaking and agility in critical infrastructure.  A comparison of the main 
theoretical areas utilised in this review are provided below in Table 2.11.  This table 
highlights the commonalities found between different conceptualisations reliability 
and what is the potential to further enhance the development of reliability in our 
system.   
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Table 2.11: Comparison of High Reliability Perspective to Agility Theory 
 
High Reliability Theory 
(Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007) 
 
High Reliability 
Characteristics and 
Conditions 
(DeBruijne, 2006) 
 
Agility and Edge 
Organising 
(Alberts and Hayes, 2003) 
 
Preoccupation  
with Failure 
 
• Commitment to reliable 
operations in mission and 
goals 
• Organisational culture of 
reliability^ 
 
! Shared Understand of 
Command Intent 
Reluctance  
to Simplify 
 
• High degrees of 
responsibility and 
accountability 
• Strong presence of 
external groups with 
access to credible and 
timely operational 
information 
 
! Distributive Information 
Sensitivity  
to Operations 
 
• Sustained high technical 
performance 
• Structural flexibility and 
redundancy 
 
! Distributive Information 
! Dynamic Task Allocation 
! Shared Understanding of 
Command Intent 
Commitment  
to Resilience 
 
• Continual search for 
improvement and training 
for worst case scenarios 
• Reliability not 
marginalizable, and can 
not be traded off 
• Organizational culture of 
reliability 
 
! Collective Sensemaking* 
! Shared Understanding of 
Command Intent 
Deference 
to Expertise 
 
• Structural flexibility and 
redundancy 
• Flexible decision-making 
processes 
 
! Collective Sensemaking* 
! Distributive Power 
Allocation 
* as also addressed by Weick (1988) and Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld (2005) 
^ where De Bruijne highlights an organisational culture of reliability as a singular component, 
this thesis adopts the broader conceptualisation of organisational culture whereby it plays an 
influencing role over all functions of high reliability for an organisation (Weick and Sutcliffe 
2005; adapted from Schein, 1985) 
 
This review of literature has addressed the key areas of contribution to the 
disturbance and reliability research space.  The next section will now further this 
discussion into defining the research questions of this thesis.  Discussion for two 
overarching research problems addressing disturbance and reliability, with sub-
questions under each to further empirical understanding of this problem area.   
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2.7 Research Questions 
As discussed in Section 1.4: Research Questions, this research study adopted the 
following hypothetical position: 
An airport demonstrating high reliability traits is likely to exhibit specific 
capabilities including early recognition of event, rapid and appropriate 
response, smooth transitions between modes of operation, and the integration 
of explicit post-event learning back into an acceptable pre-disturbance norm.   
 
Investigating this hypothetical position is determinate on two distinct areas.  The first 
area explores the process by which disturbance events take place according to the 
progression of stages of event, and levels which the organisation progresses 
through. This first area of this position focused during a disturbance event on what 
are the components and process that take place to an airport management 
organisation.  To understand this research problem more specifically the first 
overarching research problem was proposed for investigation:   
Question 1  How does an airport move from a business-as-usual, into a 
disturbance, and return to business-as-usual?   
 
As discussed in the disturbance event models component of the prior literature 
review, this area has received a range of prior academic and practitioner discussion 
yet a holistic disturbance process based and empirically tested model had not been 
developed.  The nature of events had received previous empirical discussion with 
data collected from public affairs officers (Mitroff, Pauchant, and Shrivastava, 1988, 
and Pearson and Mitroff, 1993), yet no clear framework that encompassed a holistic 
perspective of disturbance events with reference to severity stages and near-miss 
processes had previously been developed.  Figure 2.11 shows the proposed 
conceptual four phase, ten-stage structure by which a merging of these previous 
models can enhance understanding and represent a more realistic picture of 
practice.  In this model, the process is able to progress through all stages (pre-
event, response, recovery, post-event), three stages (no recovery required), or a 
near-miss process via two stages (pre-event to post-event by avoidance).   
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Figure 2.11: Proposed Disturbance Event Model 
 
(Devine, Barnes, Newton, and Goonetilleke, 2013; developed from Mitroff, 
Pauchant, and Shrivastava 1998, Pearson and Mitroff 1993, and Smith 2006) 
 
Within the first overarching research problem, sub-questions were developed to 
further investigate the nuances of the disturbance process.  As this study introduced 
a conceptual approach by which this process may or may not take place, it was 
important to detail the validity of the operational elements of disturbance, as well as 
the process by which the operational stages evolve as the organisation moves 
between states of operations.  The first sub-question was developed as: 
RQ1A: What is the process that an airport experiences during 
disturbance? 
As discussed in the literature review component of this thesis, prior theoretical work 
in the risk and crisis literature space has provided a context for the classification and 
understanding of how events take place, yet this has been developed from a 
catastrophic/crisis level of understanding.  The exception being Perrow (1999) who 
in a conceptual discussion challenged that, “I propose that the system be divided 
into four levels.  Disruption to the third and fourth levels will be called accidents and 
disruption to the first and second levels will be called incidents” highlighting the need 
for distinctions to be made based on the severity faced by the infrastructure 
(Perrow, 1999, p.65).  Furthermore, as noted in the review of previous literature 
around crisis models, Smith (2006) includes severity between the defined levels of 
serious incident and catastrophe (both involving outside assistance for the 
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organisation) rather than ranging from a baseline of normal operations.  This 
research study is informed by document analysis of various airport emergency and 
crisis planning documents as well as Perrow (1999) and Smith’s (2006) work to 
develop an appropriate scale of categorisation.  As detailed in Section 1.3: 
Definitions, this research contends that a furthering of this approach in a realistic 
and holistic view of disturbance severity would include normal operations 
disturbance event level (within single teams within the organisation), minor 
disturbance event level (across multiple teams within the organisation), major 
disturbance level (across multiple teams within the organisation and external 
responders – organisation still retains command and control authority) and crisis 
disturbance level (across multiple teams within the organisation and external 
responders – organisation has lost command and control authority).  Hence, the 
second sub-question has been developed as: 
RQ1B: What are the functions of the specific stages an airport experiences 
during disturbance? 
 
The second area of the previously stated hypothetical position looks at the presence 
of pre-defined traits of reliability.  This position espoused that the organisation will 
be more likely to respond in an effective and efficient manner to disturbance when 
able to function in a highly reliable manner.  This area investigates not only the 
presence of such reliability traits in airport management organisations, but also the 
potential to influence and enhance the presence of these traits.  As a result, the 
second area of this research study is focused on understanding presence of high 
reliability traits in airport management organisations.  As proposed in the 
hypothetical position of this study, the presence of high reliability traits would better 
enable an organisation to deal with changes in modes of operation in an efficient 
and effective manner.  This is of critical importance to aviation management as 
unexpected occurrence from a range of perspectives such as safety, terrorism, and 
emergency may occur with little or no warning.  As highlighted by literature, both 
cultural and functional elements of the system have the potential to lead to the 
enchantment of organisational reliability.  As such, the second overarching research 
problem was proposed as follows: 
Question 2: Can Australian airports be considered functionally reliable against 
Weick and Sutcliffe’s five traits of high reliability? 
64 
As with the first area of disturbance models, the second overarching research 
problem also develops sub questions as a means of provided detailed analysis into 
the research area.  The prior literature review has highlighted the development of 
understanding in this research space utilising disaster incubation and man made 
disaster theory, normal accident theory, and high reliability theory.  From this 
investigation Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2007) five traits of high reliability emerged as an 
appropriate frame by which to further investigate the state of this area in airport 
management organisations.  The key strength of the Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) 
approach is as a result of its key focus on not only the functional components of 
reliability, by the emphasis it places of the cultural attributes and the importance 
they bring to making an organisation more resilient.  By investigating the 
components of preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to 
operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise, a more detailed 
picture of high reliability in airport management organisations can be revealed.  As 
such, the first sub-question for the second research problem is: 
RQ2A: What is the current level of high reliability in Australian airports? 
 
This literature discussion in Section 2.6 also explored areas whereby reliability may 
be enhanced.  This focused on three main areas in the form of organisational 
culture, sensemaking and agility.  These two concepts were introduced as a means 
of enabling an organisation to become more flexible, a key requirement in high 
reliability.  Organisational culture provides organisations a means of investigating 
the comparison of surface level artifacts against the more underlying beliefs around 
reliability.  Sensemaking focused on the way previous experience and 
understanding can influence present decision-making.  Agility looked at ways in 
which authority and decision-making can be driven closer to the front line in an 
organisation to give a more responsive organisational approach.  As such, the 
second sub-question for second research problem has been developed as:  
RQ2B: What is the potential to further develop high reliability in Australian 
airports?   
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2.8 Summary 
Chapter Two – Literature Review addressed the research problem areas of 
disturbance and reliability by undertaking a review of previous work in the topic and 
highlighted key themes for further investigation.  This investigation began with a 
review and analysis of prior thinking on disturbance management models.  The 
current state of understanding was that there was no consensus on the components 
of disturbance along with the process by which organisations move between modes 
of operation.  This review discussed three disturbance models, detailed their 
contribution to understanding, and developed an optimised model for further 
investigation in this thesis.  This model proposed a four phase, ten-stage approach 
that utilised a process-based approach, highlighting the importance of 
understanding disturbance as a continual cycle.  The second component of this 
literature review explored prior understanding of how both vulnerability and reliability 
function in critical infrastructure.  By addressing the contributing literature of disaster 
incubation and man-made disaster theory, normal accident theory, and high 
reliability theory, a range of themes emerged as a means of understanding the 
reliability in terms of its traits and the potential for its further embedding in 
organisations.  Chapter Two – Literature Review concluded by proposing two 
overarching research questions for investigation to contribute to knowledge in 
disturbance and reliability.  Within these questions sub-questions emerged to further 
drill down the proposed investigation.   
 
The following section, Chapter Three – Methodology, addresses the chosen 
research design of this thesis.  This chapter outlines the approach to further explore 
the research questions developed in Chapter Two – Literature Review.   
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Chapter Three – Methodology 
67 
3.1  Introduction 
Chapter Three – Methodology is developed in ten sections to provide a transparent 
picture of the ways in which data was collected, analysed, and reported in this 
research thesis.  Section 3.3 begins with discussing the interpretivist research 
paradigm and will highlight the rational for utilising this approach in this thesis.  
Following this, Section 3.4 details qualitative research as an appropriate research 
method for this study and will discuss its function of providing thick description to 
further knowledge in both disturbance and reliability.  Section 3.5 discusses the 
selected research design as a single embedded case study approach of Australian 
airport management organisations.  This approach will utilise four units of analysis in 
terms defined as leadership, corporate management, operations management, and 
officer levels within airport management organisations.  The case study approach is 
particularly appropriate for this study as this work hopes to inform not only the 
disturbance and reliability research space, but also contribute to knowledge in the 
airport management context.  Research design also addresses site selection for 
data analysis as well as research procedures at each site.  Section 3.8 will outline 
the qualitative validity criteria of credibility, confirmability, dependability, and 
transferability that will be utilised to provide legitimacy to the analysis.  Chapter 
Three – Methodology will then discuss the ethical considerations of this document 
along with the identified limitations of this research design.  Furthermore, these 
limitations are discussed and de-limited by highlighting the appropriateness of the 
chosen approach against the specified research areas.  The ten sections of this 
chapter are represented in Table 3.1.   
Table 3.1:  Methodology Chapter Sections 
Chapter One:  Introduction  
3.1  Introduction     
3.2  Conceptual Framework   
3.3  Research Paradigm    
3.4  Qualitative Research    
3.5  Research Design    
3.6  Data Collection    
3.7  Data Analysis     
3.8  Validity Criteria    
3.9  Ethical Considerations   
3.10  Methodological Limitations  
3.11  Summary     
Chapter Two:  Literature Review  
Chapter Three:  Methodology  
Chapter Four:  Study One  
Chapter Five:  Study Two  
Chapter Six: Discussion  
Chapter Seven:  Conclusions  
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3.2 Conceptual Framework 
As previously noted, the theoretical investigation of this thesis explores the dual 
imperative of addressing the components and process of disturbance.  Furthermore, 
this thesis will investigate the presence of, and potential for development, previously 
defined high reliability traits in airport management systems.  This discussion has 
been developed from the complementary disturbance management and reliability 
fields of literature.  It is proposed that this investigation would function by addressing 
disturbance factors (process and stages) and reliability influencers (current 
presence of and potential to further develop) as complementary layers analysis.  
Figure 3.1 presents the conceptual framework of this project in the scope of the 
previously defined research questions in terms of the research problem areas, the 
specific research questions for investigation, and the contributing parent theories 
from academic literature.   
Figure 3.1:  Research Conceptual Framework 
 
(Developed for this research from Mitroff, Pauchant, and Shrivastava, 1988; 
Pearson and Mitroff, 1993; Smith, 2006; La Porte and Consolini, 1991; DeBruijne, 
2006; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007; Turner, 1978; Turner, 1994; and Perrow, 1984) 
Reliability Influencers: 
RQ2A: Current Presence of High 
Reliability Traits 
RQ2B: Potential to Develop Traits of 
High Reliability 
Disturbance Factors: 
RQ1A: Understanding process of 
operation during disturbance 
RQ1B: Understanding the functions 
of specific stages of disturbance 
Contributing Theory: 
• High Reliability 
• Normal Accident 
• Disaster Incubation 
• Man Made Disaster 
Contributing Theory: 
• Crisis Disturbance 
Models Review 
• Proposed Conceptual 
Disturbance Event Model 
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3.3 Research Paradigm 
Healy and Perry (2000) define the four social science research paradigms as 
positivism, realism (post-positivism), constructivism (interpretivism), and critical 
theory.  These four approaches take distinction paths with regards to ontology (the 
reality that a researcher is seeking to investigate), epistemology (the relationship 
between what the researcher is seeking to investigate and the reality of the setting), 
and the methodology (the approach for investigating) employed (Healy and Perry 
2000, Denzin and Lincoln, 2005).  Figure 3.2 compares the for main social sciences 
approaches against their corresponding ontology, epistemology and methodology.   
Figure 3.2:  Comparison of Social Science Research Paradigms 
Paradigm Positivism Realism 
 
Constructivism 
(Interpretivism) 
 
Critical 
Theory 
Ontology 
Naïve Realism: 
 
Reality is the 
empirical world 
with a focus on 
identifying 
cause and 
effect 
relationships.   
 
Critical 
Realism: 
 
Reality is 
imperfectly 
apprehendible 
hence a focus 
on exploring 
tendencies.   
Realitivism: 
 
Reality exists 
independent of 
our cognition 
where 
knowledge is 
relative to a 
particular 
context and 
time.   
 
Historical 
Realism: 
 
Reality is a 
socially 
constructed 
construct 
and focuses 
on 
relationships.   
Epistemology 
Objective: 
 
The  
correspondence 
between 
statements and 
reality through 
inductive 
verification of 
via deductive 
falsification 
 
Subjective: 
 
Dependent on 
practical 
consequences 
Subjectivist: 
 
There is no 
predetermined 
methodology or 
criteria to justify 
the authenticity 
of our 
knowledge 
Subjective: 
 
No set 
approach 
due to the 
range of 
discourses 
Methodology 
Quantitative: 
 
Experiments 
Surveys 
Mixed 
Methods: 
 
Case Studies 
Structural 
Equation 
Modeling 
Qualitative: 
 
Hermeneutical / 
Dialectical 
Grounded 
Theory 
Case Study 
 
Qualitative: 
 
Dialogic / 
Dialectical 
(Guba & Lincoln, 2005; Healy & Perry, 2000) 
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This research study utilises the interpretivist research paradigm as it adopts the 
position that realities are constructed via the social interaction of participants and 
that the meaning created provides understanding of knowledge (Guba and Lincoln, 
2005).  Therefore, this thesis adopts the position the approach of a relativist 
ontology, a subjectivist epistemology, and a qualitative methodology to explore risk 
and reliability in an airport management context.  In this way the interpretivist 
approach view knowledge a concept that is both socially constructed and subjective 
(Corbin and Strauss, 2008).  The interpretivist position was developed from the 
seminal work of Berger and Luckmann (1966) who looked at elements such as how 
components such as interpretation, assumptions, values, symbols and artefacts 
contributed to the development of reality for participants.  A key component of the 
interpretive approach to research is “the task of the researcher to understand the 
multiple social constructions of meaning and knowledge” through the use of 
methods which allow the acquisition of a range of perspectives on the area of 
investigation (Robson, 2002 p.27).  This was particularly valuable when 
investigating disturbance and reliability as it enabled the research to explore 
different organisational levels and groups revealing nuanced data to inform theory.   
 
This research adopts an exploratory outlook as previous work in both the 
disturbance and high reliability bodies of literature have focused largely outside the 
context of commercial operations.  This prior focus has centred around military and 
government controlled critical infrastructure hence it was important to adopt an 
approach that would highlight existing knowledge and further develop understanding 
in the discipline via interpretive empirical investigation (Babbie, 2001).  This thesis 
has used in-depth interview, participant observation, and documentary analysis to 
explore views around disturbance and reliability at different levels within airport 
management organisations.  With regards to the research problem areas of 
categorisation and understanding of critical infrastructure disturbance, the 
interpretivist approach allows the research to explore the concepts in their natural 
setting while gaining understanding from those who experience the phenomena on 
a day-to-day basis. The interpretivist approach explores the way groups create a 
shared social understanding of particular issues, and as such understanding can be 
gathered as to where they place importance in the disturbance management 
process (pre-event, response, recovery, and post-event) and how they feel reliability 
functions (or does not function) within their organisation (Guba and Lincoln, 2005).   
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3.4 Qualitative Research 
Qualitative research is defined as “an interpretive, multimethod approach that 
investigates people in their natural environment” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, in 
Christensen 2007, p.59).  From this, it can be seen that a qualitative research 
design incorporates the use of reflexivity in development and analysis, a use of 
multiple methods to attain valid findings, and the use of investigating participants in 
their natural setting.  In comparison to a quantitative approach, qualitative research 
involves gaining detailed information about a small sample, as opposed to gaining 
limited information across a wider sample (Veal, 2005).  This enables the qualitative 
research approach to demonstrate vividly a phenomenon to outside readers as a 
means of providing detailed, adopting a Geertz approach, thick description of the 
practice and meaning (Schwandt, 1997; Yin, 2003).  A qualitative approach is well 
suited to circumstances where research questions are investigating phenomena that 
require deep and varied description and understanding (Zikmund, 2003).  Being 
focused on providing understanding of phenomena, ‘thick description’ is furthered by 
data which is based on the participants own sense of meaning which is particularly 
relevant when trying to understand underlying values, beliefs and assumptions as is 
the case in organisational culture and sensemaking (Pettigrew, 1979).  Qualitative 
case study research allows the researcher to identify the contextual and other 
factors as they relate to the settings in which a phenomena studied and report data 
in the same terms (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005).  To summarise, qualitative research 
is useful for describing complex phenomena, including dynamic processes such as 
those encountered by Australian airport management organisations (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  
 
3.5 Research Design 
An airport is a complex socio-technical system that incorporates a wide range of 
objectives, interests and participants with a variety of tasks.  Furthermore, as 
highlighted in Section 1.2: Research Background, the airport management research 
space is one that has received limited prior academic research, with much of the 
development of knowledge taking place from the practitioner and industry body 
literature.  As such, it is of critical importance that the research design be able to 
capture a range of detailed phenomena which the researcher has no direct control 
over (Yin, 2003).  Rather than focus on all components of the airport complex 
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system, this thesis constrains its focus to look at the central management function of 
the airport.  Airport management organisations present an interesting context by 
which to explore disturbance and reliability as they represent privately run 
organisations that are responsible for the continued functionality of complex critical 
infrastructure.  These organisations handle the vast majority of day-to-day 
operations through the use of contract staff and consultants with the airport 
management organisation dealing largely with the strategic development and 
operations of the business.  This presents interesting challenges from a cultural 
perspective due to the reliance on third party organisations at all disturbance stages 
(pre-event, response, recovery and post-event) with contract agreements mandating 
the level and limitations of the commitment of third party organisations.  
 
3.5.1 Case Study Approach 
This study utilises a single embedded case study approach of Australian airport 
management organisations utilising qualitative methods to provide detailed findings 
on individual research problem areas as well as discussion of the nature of 
disturbance and reliability.  In this way, airport management organisations serve as 
the overarching case, with specific airport sites functioning as data collection sites.  
Within these three data collection sites, four specific levels of data collection will 
take place across their respective organisational levels from senior leadership 
through to officers on the front line.  Yin (2003) proposes three factors for the 
selection of an appropriate research strategy: “(a) the type of research question 
posed, (b) the extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioural events, 
and (c) the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events” (Yin, 
2003, p. 5).  In this research study the researcher does not have direct control over 
the phenomena and as such case study is an appropriate fit with the defined 
research questions of this thesis.  As this study investigates a contemporary 
phenomena looking at how airport participants view, participate and understand the 
disturbance process, a case study approach enables understanding via capturing 
the experiences of the those employees working within the bounds of the 
phenomena.  The scope of this research study adopts an instrumental case 
approach in which the case plays a supporting role and helps to facilitate 
understanding of the broad phenomenological spread of disturbance components 
and processes along with the understanding and potential for development of high 
reliability within Australian airport management organisations (Stake, 2005).   
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This research study uses a single embedded case design looking at three distinct 
data collection sites with four levels of analysis in each site (see Figure 3.3: Case 
Study Research Design Classifications).  This approach will allow the researcher to 
look at elements within the data collection sites and compare and contrast findings 
against other levels and units of analysis.  A key element in this investigation is the 
process of disturbance that takes place within particular groups of the airport 
management organisations as well as organisation wide disturbance.  This 
scalability of disruption is with reference to the defined disturbance levels (Level 1: 
Normal Operations Disturbance, Level 2: Minor Disturbance, Level 3: Major 
Disturbance, and Level 4: Crisis Disturbance) introduced in chapter one of this 
thesis.  Furthermore, analysis will deal with addressing the appropriateness, 
effectiveness, and timeliness of how airport management organisations deal with 
disturbance in real time and improve highly reliable functionality of their system.   
Figure 3.3: Case Study Research Design Classifications  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Yin,	  2003	  p.40)	  
Levels of analysis within each data collection site will include leadership (level 1), 
corporate management (level 2A), operations management (level 2B), and officer 
(level 3) levels of the organisation (see Table 3.2 Embedded Analysis Levels).  As 
each of these groups plays a differing but equally important role in the disturbance 
management and highly reliability functioning of an airport management 
organisation, these levels will be investigated to compare and contrast the 
similarities and gaps in functionality and perspective.  These four groups will be 
compared against the specific research questions to gauge their individual 
perspective as well as the holistic perspective of research problem areas.  
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Table 3.2: Levels of Analysis 
Hierarchy Level of Respondents 
 
Airport 
Leadership 
 
Leadership: 
Level 1 
 
Middle 
Management 
 
Corporate Management: 
Level 2A 
Operations Management: 
Level 2B 
 
Frontline 
Employees 
 
Officer: 
Level 3 
 
3.5.2 Site Selection 
To gain understanding from case study research it is important to select data 
collection sites that can provide rich detail and understanding to inform the research 
questions.  Site selection for this research project utilises a purposeful (judgment-
based) sampling approach as a means of selecting data collection sites (Eisenhardt, 
2002).  Three specific sites were selected based on each site servicing both 
international and domestic travellers, across different parts of the Australia aviation 
network.  By facilitating analysis within case and across case, theoretical replication 
will be attainable in the scope of this research project (Yin, 2003).  The chosen data 
collection sites have been kept confidential to protect the identity of the selected 
airport management organisations.  In this thesis the three case study sites will be 
addressed as A-Air, B-Air, and C-Air rather than their official airport names.   
 
The three selected sited all have common elements in three distinct ways regarding 
security and policing, the size and function of the airport, and their business and 
ownership structure.  Firstly, all of the selected airports chosen is that they are all 
part of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) network for Counter Terrorism First 
Response (CTFR) capability (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010b).  These specific 
airports function under the AFP Unified Policing Model which was enacted as a 
direct result of the Review of Airport Security in Australia (Wheeler, 2005).  The 
Unified Policing Model provides a consistent set of guidelines and systems across 
the selected sites to security, policing, and counter-terrorist activities 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2011).  This resulted in similar federally regulated 
approaches in policing and emergency response capability at all three data 
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collection sites.  Second, all of the selected airport function in both a domestic and 
international capacity with standardised requirements as to areas such as 
quarantine and boarder protection.  Furthermore, the approach of the three 
respective sites regarding disturbance and reliably is standardised with all sites 
having both corporate and operational risk management functions.  Third, as a 
result of the Australian governments initiative to sell off state run commercial 
airports, all three airports function as privately run commercial airports with similar 
partner airlines and retail outlets at all three data collection sites (Hooper, Cain, and 
White, 2000).  Furthermore, the internal function of each site is complementary with 
specific functions for emergency management, airside operations, occupational 
health and safety, security and risk and compliance at each data collection site.   
 
3.6 Data Collection 
This section details and justifies the specific data collection tools of in-depth 
interview, participant observation, and document analysis that have been utilised in 
this thesis.  As mentioned this study focuses on those elements within the airport 
system that have relevance to disturbance event management.  The airport 
management organisation environment is an interesting context for investigation as 
the competing objectives of running a commercial for-profit enterprise is a distinction 
from the majority of previous studies in reliability that have focused on a more 
government or military context.  Prior research highlights the context of airport 
management organisations as a “complex system … a large-scale, multi-
stakeholder and multi-jurisdictional sociotechnical system” with different system 
layers containing competing objectives and functions (Wu, Mengersen and Johnson, 
2010 p.2).  Hence, the challenge for gathering data in a setting such as this is to 
utilise methods that can provide a clear picture of the underlying values, beliefs and 
assumptions of the system rather than simply looking at surface level descriptors.  
The chosen methods of in-depth interview, participant observation, and 
documentary analysis provide a means of understanding the setting and critical 
issues from the perspective of the participants.  Each of these data collection 
methods serve to inform the investigation and support each other in provide a 
complete picture of disturbance and reliability in airport management organisations.  
The following sections will now detail the approach utilised with these methods 
individually as well as the triangulation achieved by their combined use.   
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As previously mentioned, data collection approach for this thesis utilised three data 
collection tools across three data collection sites of A-Air, B-Air, and C-Air.  The data 
collection process for study one and study two took place concurrently whereby the 
researcher was collecting any data available to disturbance and reliability when it 
presented itself.  This took place during the in-depth interview component whereby 
the interview process was split into equal parts of the interview with questions 
regarding the conceptual disturbance model taking the first half and the investigation 
of high reliability taking the second half.  Furthermore, the participant observation 
method was also required to take place simultaneously as the majority of the areas 
observed (actual work practice, staff meetings, review sessions, staff training, and 
development) considered the components of disturbance and reliability in parallel.  
Once all data was collected analysis began and looked at the research problem 
areas of disturbance (study one) and reliability (study) separately.  The approach for 
study one and study two data collection is presented below in Table 3.3 and 3.4.   
 
Table 3.3: Study One Data Collection Process 
 
Data 
Collection 
Sites 
 
 
Study One Data: 
Disturbance Process Model 
 
Analysis 1 Discussion 
A-Air Observation Document Analysis 
In-Depth 
Interview Disturbance 
Themes 
Investigation 
Revised 
Empirically 
Based Model 
B-Air Observation Document Analysis 
In-Depth 
Interview 
C-Air Observation Document Analysis 
In-Depth 
Interview 
 
 
Table 3.4: Study Two Data Collection Process 
 
Data 
Collection 
Sites 
 
Study Two Data: 
High Reliability Assessment Analysis 2 Discussion 
A-Air Observation Document Analysis 
In-Depth 
Interview Reliability 
Themes 
Investigation 
Exploration of 
Reliability in 
Practice 
B-Air Observation Document Analysis 
In-Depth 
Interview 
C-Air Observation Document Analysis 
In-Depth 
Interview 
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3.6.1 In-Depth Interview 
The first method, in-depth interviews, served as the principal data collection method 
of this thesis and was selected as it proved a means of gaining thick description of 
the knowledge and experience of case study participants.  An in-depth interview is 
focused on interacting with research participants on a particular topic relevant to the 
research questions (Taylor, Kermode and Roberts, 2006).  In-depth interviews are 
particularly useful in areas where topics have been previously unexplored (or 
underexplored such as in airport risk management) in literature and require a more 
detailed interrogation of concepts (Creswell, 2003).  Fifty-Six interviews were 
undertaken with the tone focused on what Flanagan (1954) discussed as the critical 
incident technique, whereby respondents were asked to discuss examples 
regarding past disturbance events in the context of the proposed model (Butterfield, 
Borgen, Amundson, and Maglio, 2005).  Specifically, utilising the conceptual 
disturbance model (Figure 2.9) and Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2007) traits of reliability 
discussion focused on critically evaluating events in terms of the components and 
stages of disturbance, as well as the current and potential states of reliability (a full 
copy of the in-depth interview questions is provided in Appendix A.01).  Fontana and 
Frey (2005) discuss an ethnographic based interview approach whereby although 
specific topics are predetermined there is still scope to explore areas which emerge 
during the discourse with participants; this was adopted during interviews to 
maintain exploratory themes while using the critical incident technique.  An example 
of this would be where interview respondents would begin to speak off topic yet the 
researcher would give latitude to see if any emergent themes appeared as a result 
of their discussion.   
 
The use of in-depth interviews holds the potential to draw out information regarding 
the underlying values, beliefs and assumptions of airport management 
organisations.  Furthermore, in terms of disturbance and high reliability, in-depth 
interviews provide a means of reflecting on past experience and exploring why 
decisions were made the way they were, what the outcome of that approach was, 
the effectiveness of the chosen decision, and potential for exploring different ways 
of practice.  It was expected that the distinct levels would inform the components of 
the two research problem areas in different ways.  As such the in-depth interview 
approach provided a means to probe, adjust, or omit interview questions where 
needed (Robson, 2002).  As with regards to in-depth interview sampling, as with 
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data site selection, a judgement (purposeful) sampling technique was employed with 
elements of a convenience sample where respondents were available in high-tempo 
operations (such as available on shift).  Members of the above-mentioned groups 
are most appropriate for addressing disturbance and reliability (Robson, 2002).  This 
coupled with the critical incident technique served as a means of investigating past 
incidents in the context of how decisions regarding disturbance and reliability were 
made.  Furthermore, respondents provided details on a range of disturbance levels 
(from Normal Operations Disturbance Level 1 through to Crisis Disturbance Level 4) 
providing a numerous incidents to explore the concepts of both disturbance and 
reliability.  A list of respondents is provided below in Table 3.5.   
Table 3.5: In-Depth Interview Respondents  
 
Level 
 
Respondent Number 
Total 
 
Leadership 
 
 
Chief Executive Officer 
Operations General Manager 
Corporate General Manager 
Organisational Development General Manager 
 
 
1 
3 
1 
1 
6 
Corporate 
Management 
 
Corporate Risk and Compliance Manager 
Occupational Health and Safety Manager 
Information Technology Manager 
Communications Manager 
Car Parking Manager 
Environmental Manager 
Standard and Assurance Manager 
 
 
3 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
11 
Operations 
Management 
 
Terminal Manager 
Airside and Wildlife Manager 
Airside Operations Manager 
Airside Facilities Manager 
Security Manager 
Emergency Manager 
 
 
4 
1 
3 
1 
5 
4 
18 
Officer 
 
Emergency Operations Officer 
Airside Wildlife Officer 
Duty Terminal Officer 
Corporate Risk and Compliance Officer 
Airside Safety Officer 
Airside Operations Officer 
Airport Security Officer 
Terminal and Landside Officer 
Media Officer 
Training Officer 
 
 
1 
1 
4 
1 
4 
1 
6 
1 
1 
1 
21 
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As knowledge was gained between the various stages of data collection, the in-
depth interview questions were slightly adjusted to better reflect the investigation of 
the disturbance and reliability problem areas.  The most common example of this 
occurring was where an interview respondent misunderstood a term being used or 
understood it to have a different meaning than what the disturbance and reliability 
literature considered it to be.  For example, in the following quote the respondent 
who was an experienced airport manager misunderstood the use of the term “near-
miss” whereby they understood it to mean two planes avoiding collision rather than 
the risk management perspective of the potential for an interaction of the system to 
have had more serious consequences than the actual outcome: 
“I haven’t heard of any in my life. I really couldn’t answer that.  Basically I 
haven’t seen anything like that.  That is really a question for the airlines 
themselves or for air traffic control who monitor that sort of thing.  We are 
always looking for ways to improve airlines.”   
During this specific example the respondent was allowed to finish their statement 
and was then explained the use of the term in the context of this study.  When this 
type of scenario occurred the researcher revised their interview questions to include 
detail on the specific meaning of specialised terms before asking the question.  This 
served as a means of continuous refinement of the in-depth interview approach 
during the course of data collection.  In this way the interviewer was able to provide 
more clarity to respondents and keep questions focused on the specific areas of 
investigation of this thesis.   
 
In situations where the respondent was required to leave before the end of the 
interview (usually to respond to airport management disturbance events that may be 
taking place at that time), the data was considered to the start of the particular 
section.  For example, when an interview respondent had completed the 
disturbance components of the interview but not the reliability questions, only the 
disturbance component was considered.  As the high reliability component of this 
thesis aimed at understanding the presence of specific traits of high reliability all 
questions were required to form a valid point of comparison with other levels and 
data sites.  In situation where this had occurred (only at operations management 
and officer level respondents) this has been expressly noted at the start of that 
analysis section to provide a clear and transparent representation of data collection.   
80 
All in-depth interviews were digitally recorded and checked for errors as soon as 
possible after the conclusion of the interview.  At no stage during the interview 
process did the digital recording fail and the audio quality was high on all recordings 
enabling for a clear transcription of responses.  Additionally, notes were made at the 
conclusion of interviews to capture any key points raised or subtle nuances revealed 
during the interview that may have been overlooked at a later time (Patton, 1990).  
Examples of this included where the respondent was particularly strong in their 
when recounting a disturbance incident which highlighted the severity of particular 
situation.  Other examples included where respondents were light-hearted or 
reflecting with humour on experiences they had encountered.  By capturing 
additional information such as the mood or body languages of the respondent this 
enabled the researcher to make more informed decisions on the importance of 
examples relayed.   
 
Transcription of interviews took place by the researcher (21 interviews) and a 
professional transcription service (35 interviews) at the first available time following 
the data collection.  In the case of interviewer transcribed and third party transcribed 
data, the researcher replayed the audio of the interview while reading along with the 
transcription to check for any inconsistencies in reporting (Carson, Gilmore, Perry 
and Gronhaug, 2001).  Any inconsistencies were noted along with a timestamp of 
when it occurred on the recording for further review if required to ensure consistency 
(Yin, 2003).  In occurrences were inconsistences were identified, the research 
updated the transcript prior to analysis to ensure an accurate representation of the 
data was present.  This contributed to the validity of the data utilised in this thesis to 
ensure accuracy and relevance to the investigated research questions.   
 
3.6.2 Participant Observation 
Participant observation was chosen as the first supporting data collection method of 
this thesis particularly as it has been a dominant method of investigation for 
reliability studies due to its ability to inform theory from practice and as such, 
subsequent key theories developed (see Weick and Roberts, 1993; Bierly and 
Spender, 1995; LaPorte and Consolini, 1998).  A key advantage observation 
maintains over other social science research methods is its ability to provide 
directness to the phenomena and context under investigation (Robson, 2002).  
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Where in-depth interviews and document analysis may provide an idealised 
representation of practice, observation enables the researcher to comprehend the 
situation directly and witness how events unfold in real time.  However, the notion of 
reactive effect describes that there is potential for data to adjust as a result of 
research participants knowing they are being observed (Christensen, 2007).  In an 
attempt to negate potential data bias as a result of reactive effect, the researcher 
undertook extended placement with data collection sites to gain familiarity with key 
participants and organisational structure.  This took place in the initial stages of 
observation at each site with initial activities such as presentations on the research 
and introductions to other members by trusted insiders.  In terms of sampling for 
observation, it was not expected that events of all levels of severity would take place 
during the observation data collection period.  However, the participant observation 
revealed planning and preparation for disturbance at all severity levels took place 
and were available to be observed by the researcher.   
 
Participant observation took place at all three airport data collection sites over 64 
total days.  This included a range of embeddedness with commercial and 
operational functions at the airport and spanned all four levels of analysis from 
leadership (such as observation during quarterly risk and compliance meetings) 
through to officer (such as observation while participants were responding airside 
safety disturbance events).  The function of this process was to gain as much 
understanding as possible as to the business-as-usual and disturbance functionality 
at airport management organisations.  Prior to beginning observation each day, the 
researcher revised the previous days account and also reviewed a prompt sheet to 
reinforce the focus of observation for that day (Appendix A.02).  This prompt 
included a copy of the conceptual disturbance process model, contributing reliability 
themes (disaster incubation theory, man-made disaster theory, and normal accident 
theory), and the Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) five traits of high reliability approach.  
The process by which data was captured during observation was through detailed 
notes being taken at the time (both hand-written and digitally typed out where 
possible) and audio recorded when appropriate (for example, moving out of the 
direct vicinity of participants and capturing the researchers thoughts into the digital 
recorder).  Following the initial capturing of data, this was then further refined into a 
observation diary whereby both detailed notes and a summary report were 
developed from each day of observation.  Analysis of the observation was 
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undertaken during the evening after observation each the day to capture accounts 
as accurately as possible.  The analysis process looked to further develop themes 
and identify emergent areas of investigation to be compared against the other two 
data collection methods.  To protect the anonymity of participants, observational 
data will simply be referenced to the data site rather than the specific work group 
observed.  Table 3.6 below highlights the range of different work teams of which the 
research was embedded during participant observation.   
Table 3.6: Participant Observation Contexts 
Data Site Total Days Work Groups Observed 
A-Air 
64 Days 
Corporate Risk and Compliance 
Business Continuity Management 
Emergency Management 
Airside Operations 
Airside Safety 
Terminal Operations 
Terminal Security 
First Response Group (Police) 
B-Air 
Corporate Risk and Compliance 
Emergency Management 
Training and Staff Development 
Airside Operations 
Airside Safety 
First Response Group (Fire and Rescue) 
C-Air 
Corporate Risk and Compliance 
Business Continuity Management 
Emergency Management 
Terminal Security 
Airside Security 
Media and Corporate Relations 
 
3.6.3 Document Analysis 
Document analysis was chosen as the second supporting data collection method in 
this thesis.  Like observation, this supporting data method provides supplementary 
supporting justification for the primary data collection focus of extensive in-depth 
interviewing.  This method has the key strength of being an unobtrusive form of data 
collection that through content analysis can examine the purpose and meaning of 
organisational artefacts in the form of written word and imagery (Robson, 2002).  
Additionally, document analysis has less time sensitivity than in-depth interview or 
participant observation whereby data can be collected retrospectively and analysed 
at an appropriate time.  Document analysis served as a means of complementing 
the in-depth interview and participant observer tools providing text based 
information by which comparisons were made leading to the exploration and 
development of themes (Marshall and Rossman, 2006).  Furthermore, documents 
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provide a means of exploring both primary and secondary data to utilise across 
method triangulation (Yin, 2003).  This functions to reduce the advent of researcher 
bias or error by providing the potential for a cross check for emergent themes.  Data 
selection was undertaken via a purposeful (judgement) sampling method with 
documents selected that have the ability to inform understanding of disturbance and 
reliability.   
 
Document selected for analysis were selected based on their ability to inform 
understanding of the disturbance management process and high reliability in airport 
management organisations.  Documents came from a mostly the middle-
management level within the organisation as that is where the vast majority of 
strategic development of emergency response, safety, and security takes place.  
Documents have not been specifically named in this thesis, but rather given a 
description of their content.  No specific names have been included due to the 
sensitive nature of commercial information within (i.e. details around ongoing 
investigations of disturbance at airport management organisations).  Qualitative 
analysis was used against the pre-determined key themes of both the conceptual 
disturbance process model and the five traits of high reliability (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007).  Disturbance themes included exploration of pre-event, response, recovery, 
and post-event data as developed and defined in the proposed disturbance process 
model (Section 2.7).  E.g., action items developed from post-event disturbance 
reviews were investigated for review and learning elements.  Specifically, this 
disturbance data was compared and contrasted against in-depth interview data to 
explore complementary or dissenting viewpoints.  High reliability themes for 
investigation included the five traits of reliability as developed by Weick and Sutcliffe 
(2007) of preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations, 
commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise.  E.g., airport emergency 
plans were reviewed and information emerged regarding levels of documented 
authority and decision making; critical in the high reliability trait of deference to 
expertise.  This data was then compared and contrasted against in-depth interview 
findings where respondents at all four levels of analysis (leadership, corporate 
management, operations management, and officer) were asked to detail how 
deference to expertise functions during planning elements as well as real-world 
disturbance events.  In this way, document analysis serves the purpose of 
interrogating what they organisation “says” it does against what it “actually” does in 
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the reality of a real-world situation.  Tables 3.7 – 3.9 below provide a comprehensive 
list of documents reviewed from the three data collection sites.   
Table 3.7: A-Air Document Analysis List 
Code Document Description 
A01 Emergency management process guidelines 
A02 Reporting guidelines for compliance and assurance program 
A03 Risk review of public liability exposure and vulnerability 
A04 Project risk management framework 
A05 Risk and compliance board reporting 
A06 Risk and compliance audit approach guidelines 
A07 Operational continuity plan for international terminal 
A08 Compliance reporting users guide 
A09 External risk and compliance report 
A10 Organisational structure and group functions and responsibilities 
A11 Enterprise risk management group structure 
A12 Confidential reporting policy and procedure 
A13 Compliance and risk management committee meeting report (1) 
A14 Compliance and risk management committee meeting report (2) 
A15 Compliance and risk management committee meeting report (3) 
A16 Corporate risk action items for ongoing review (1) 
A17 Corporate risk action items for ongoing review (2) 
A18 Corporate risk action items for ongoing review (3) 
A19 Occupational health and safety hazard assessment approach 
A20 Compliance and risk management committee meeting report (4) 
A21 Business continuity management development report and presentation 
A22 Organisational risk and hazard register (internally developed) 
A23 General manager risk reporting and notification process 
A24 Operational groups and responsibilities policy 
A25 Organisational risk and hazard register (externally developed) 
A26 Annual review of risk and emergency management report and presentation 
A27 Occupational health and safety response procedures 
A28 Revised risk reporting structure – organisation wide 
A29 Revised risk reporting assessment approach – organisation wide 
A30 Revised enterprise risk assessment approach – organisation wide 
A31 Revised enterprise risk assessment guidelines – organisation wide 
A32 Organisational hazard matrix 
A33 Organisational compliance matrix 
A34 Risk and compliance governance structure report and presentation 
A35 Business continuity development presentation and guidelines 
A36 Staff security and emergency awareness training guidelines 
A37 Compliance and risk management committee terms of reference 
A38 Airport emergency plan and procedures 
A39 Airport emergency guidelines and requirements 
A40 Incident reporting process 
A41 Annual safety and security exercise report 
A42 Severity classification development 
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Table 3.8: B-Air Document Analysis List 
Code Document Description 
B01 Airport emergency plan and procedures 
B02 Annual safety and security exercise report 
B03 Final report and findings of major disturbance event (1) 
B04 Emergency training and exercise forum report 
B05 Final report and findings of major disturbance event (2) 
B06 Final report and findings of major disturbance event (3) 
B07 Emergency response map and contacts report 
B08 Emergency response guidelines and handbook 
B09 Annual safety and security exercise external review 
B10 Report on major disturbance event to state emergency services commissioner 
B11 Annual safety and security exercise external recommendations report 
 
Table 3.9: C-Air Document Analysis List 
Code Document Description 
C01 Documentation hierarchy for emergency, safety, and security 
C02 Emergency risk management policy and guidelines 
C03 Operations communications plan 
C04 Wildlife hazard management plan 
C05 Final report and findings of major disturbance event 
C06 Airport disturbance coordination procedure 
C07 Emergency response gate access procedure 
C08 Emergency management framework 
C09 Readiness and response procedures – level 3 and 4 events 
C10 Organisation intranet desktop 
C11 Organisational exercise and training program 
C12 Planning and disruption management arrangements 
C13 Annual safety and security exercise external review 
C14 Security training document 
C15 Risk treatment planning report 
C16 Operating protocol during disturbance 
C17 Planning and incident management arrangements 
C18 Operational communications plan 
C19 Airport aerodrome manual and procedures 
C20 Airport standard operating procedures for airside and landside 
C21 Airport security guide 
C22 Major disturbance situation report (1) 
C23 Major disturbance situation report (2) 
C24 Major disturbance communications and authority plan 
C25 Employee induction training guidelines 
C26 Employee induction presentation – general information 
C27 Employee induction presentation – risk management for project managers 
C28 Airport security assessment guidelines 
C29 Organisational chart and responsibilities 
C30 Risk management framework and assessment guidelines 
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3.7 Data Analysis 
The purpose of data analysis is to develop conclusions in a clear and transparent 
manner from a range of data points to explore current literature themes as well as 
emergent themes (Corbin and Strauss, 2008).  This thesis employed a staged data 
analysis approach whereby the process was split into five distinct stages each with 
its own specific purpose.  These stages are presented below in Figure 3.4.   
 
Figure 3.4: Data Analysis Process 
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Stage one has been described in the preceding stages of this chapter whereby data 
collection of in-depth interview, participant observation, and document analysis took 
place across the three data collection sites of A-Air, B-Air, and C-Air.  Stage two 
involved preparing the various data types for analysis.  This involved the review of 
transcribed data against the original audio recording, the review of observation 
notes, and the review of documents to include documents relevant to the 
disturbance and reliability research problem areas.  At this stage, preliminary 
guiding notes were taken regarding the emergence of themes.  Following the data 
preparation stage, analysis took place in a two-step process.  Stage three 
developed data analysis for study one, the disturbance problem area.  At this stage 
the proposed conceptual model was explored against current themes developed 
from the literature review component of this thesis as well as identification and 
exploration of emergent themes (framework provided in Appendix A.02).  When 
emerged from singular data analysis elements, these would then be compared and 
contrasted across method to check for complementary or dissenting positions.  A 
critical element in this process was the documentation of the approach taken by the 
researcher so as to not lose place of how themes have emerged and the ability to 
track the development of those themes.  Study one themes centred on research 
questions 1A and 1B exploring the process and functions of disturbance stages for 
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airport management organisations utilise the conceptual disturbance process model 
as guidance.  Stage four developed data analysis for study two, the reliability 
problem area utilised Weick and Sutcliffe’s 5 traits of high reliability as guiding 
themes for investigation.  This analysis component also focused on current and 
emergent themes with a particular focus on the functional and cultural 
considerations of high reliability theory (framework provided in Appendix A.03).  
Specifically, these themes focused on understanding the research sub-questions 2A 
and 2B which addressed the areas of the currently presence of reliability traits as 
well as the potential to further develop such areas.  The key literature themes are 
highlighted in below in Table 3.10.  Stage five focused on the further development 
of themes and exploring the relationship between the disturbance level and the 
reliability level as introduced in the conceptual framework of this thesis.   
 
Table 3.10: Pre-Determined Literature Themes 
 
Research 
Problem 
Area 
 
Themes for Analysis 
 
Disturbance 
Criteria 
 
 
• Pre Event  
1. Planning, 2. Preparation, 3. Detection, and 4. Avoidance 
• Response  
5. Coordination and Facilitation, and 6. Containment and Limitation 
• Recovery  
7. Operational Continuity, and 8. Disturbance Resolution 
• Post-event  
9. Review, and 10. Learning 
 
 
Reliability 
Criteria 
 
 
• Preoccupation with Failure  
The continued and overt critical analysis of vulnerability and the potential 
for disturbance.   
• Reluctance to Simplify 
Organisational members are actively involved in developing an accurate 
and holistic picture of vulnerability and the potential for disturbance.   
• Sensitivity to Operations 
Cross-functional understanding of system components with information 
and decision-making. The ability to make decisions to correct potential 
disturbance before it escalates.   
• Commitment to Resilience 
Reliability remains the key operational objective of the organisation during 
all modes of operation.   
• Deference to Expertise 
The system has the ability to identify, task, and empower expert decision 
makers to deal with situation specific disturbance.   
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Another equally important process was the use of triangulation of analysis.  
Triangulation was utilised in this thesis to avoid reliance on single points of data.  In 
this study there was two types of triangulation employed.  The first form involved 
‘within method’ triangulation (Jick, 1979) whereby data or findings from specific 
forms of collection was compared to identify emergent themes.  For example, theme 
convergence was developed from the comparison of findings from in-depth 
interviews of respondents at the same organisational level or in comparison to 
employees at different organisational levels within the data collection sites.  The 
second form of triangulation involves triangulation across method (Jick, 1979) 
whereby results from different data collection methods were contrasted to look for 
emergent themes and to compare views regarding particular emergent themes from 
the perspectives of different data collection methods (Patton, 1999).  For example, 
specific operational approaches identified in operational emergency response 
documents with regards to disturbance were compared and contrasted against both 
in-depth interview response information and participant observation data on 
operational emergency response.  A discussion of the typical contributions of data 
methods to triangulation is provided below in Table 3.11.   
 
Table 3.11:  Data Collection Method Triangulation 
 
Data Collection 
 
In-Depth Interview Observation Document Analysis 
Purpose 
 
Principle Data 
Collection Method 
 
Supporting Data 
Collection Method 
Supporting Data 
Collection Method 
Contribution to 
Triangulation 
 
Informing 
understanding of the 
underlying values 
beliefs and 
assumptions  
 
Informing 
understanding of the 
norms and behaviour 
patterns of group 
members 
Informing 
understanding of the 
surface level artifacts 
of risk management 
practice 
Data Analysis 
 
Qualitative around identification of themes 
 
Development 
 
Comparison of findings against prior literature position 
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3.8 Validity Criteria 
As noted by Guba and Lincoln (2005) and Marshall and Rossman (2006), a 
positivist approach to validity criteria would not adequately fulfil the requirements of 
a quantitative research project such as this thesis.  Rather than focus on traditional 
positivist validity traits such as internal/external validity, reliability, and 
generalisability this research project will employ a qualitative case study based 
criteria (Guba and Lincoln, 2005; Healy and Perry, 2000; Marshall and Rossman, 
2006).  The validity of this research project will be judged against credibility, 
confirmability, dependability, and transferability (Guba and Lincoln, 2005). 
 
3.8.1 Criteria One: Credibility  
The first of the four validity criteria, credibility, is focused on ensuring that the 
legitimacy of information in terms of representation of what respondents report is 
critically assessed and analysed by the researcher (Schwandt, 1997).  Credibility 
was verified in this research project in three distinct ways.  First, the research utlised 
within method triangulation via the use of multiple sources of data collection points 
within each method (Jick, 1979).  This took place during data collection and analysis 
by interviewing respondents in different groups, observing a range of business 
functions, and reviewing and analysing different documents in the respective 
disturbance and reliability theme areas.  Second, this research utlised across 
method triangulation (Jick, 1979) whereby themes identified within method were 
compared and contrasted across in-depth interviews, participant observation, and 
documentary analysis to triangulate findings.  Third, this research explored both 
previous and emergent themes in terms of credibility by utilising both within method 
and across method triangulation and comparing across the three distinct data 
collection sites defined in this chapter as A-Air, B-Air, and C-Air.   
 
3.8.2 Criteria Two: Confirmability  
The second of the four validity criteria, confirmability, addressed how the concepts 
were understood, linked, defined, and if this process has been undertaken in an 
appropriate manner (Healy and Perry, 2000).  Similar to the positivistic validity 
measure of construct validity, the focus is on the appropriateness of research 
protocols and their ability to provide accurate measurement against the ways in 
which data is collected, analysed and reported (Healy and Perry, 2000; Yin, 2003).  
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Riege (2003) sites the need for a chain of evidence type approach whereby there 
are clear linkages and transparency between data collection, analysis, sampling, 
development of themes and onto final reporting of findings and conclusion.  
Particularly important in observational and in-depth interview methods, confirmability 
can be attained via the examination and re-examination of themes, along with the 
utilisation of both within method and across method triangulation (Jick, 1979).  
Confirmability was attained in this thesis by the use of a detailed journal of 
observation including elements important to identified literature themes.  This record 
was updated during the participant observation process as much as possible and 
then reviewed at the end of each day to make sure key data considerations were 
added.  Along with the digital recording process, in-depth interviews were 
transcribed by the researcher (21 of the 56 total with a professional transcription 
service used for the remainder) to enable subtle nuances to be captured during 
review and added to comment on the hard copy file.   
 
3.8.3 Criteria Three: Dependability  
The third of the four criteria, dependability, aims to gain transparent reporting of 
data, along with consistency across all aspects of the research design, data 
collection, and data analysis process.  Dependability aims to show a clear and 
logical approach to the research in a way that could serve as a blueprint for others 
wanting to develop a similar research design approach.  The positivistic concept of 
reliability is similar to dependability in that the results gained by other researchers 
adopting a similar approach should be consistent with the findings of the project 
(Yin, 2003).  Within this thesis, particular attention has been paid to giving a clear 
and transparent account of research design and process to aid in dependability.  
This thesis has been as detailed as possible in specifying the research process, 
paradigm, design, data collection and analysis to provide a framework by which 
other researchers could investigate and replicate findings or to provide further 
development of identified conclusions (Healy and Perry, 2000).  The only exception 
to this approach of full disclosure has been in relation to commercial-in-confidence 
organisation or government data what can not be revealed due to privacy, ethical, or 
security reasons (Riege, 2003).   
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3.8.4 Criteria Four: Transferability  
The final of the four criteria, transferability, is defined by the ability of the research 
conclusions and recommendations to be generalised to a wider population (Marshal 
and Rossman, 2006).  The concept of transferability is similar to the quantitative 
criteria of external validity that focuses on the generalisability of the study findings to 
other settings (Healy and Perry, 2000).  This project adopts a single qualitative 
embedded case study approach (Yin, 2003) whereby the context is airport 
management systems and levels of analysis serve as the layers within the system 
that deal with disturbance and reliability.  This approach aims to provide analytical 
generalisability to the study of disturbance and reliability by comparing and 
contrasting findings from the separate data collection sites as well as the different 
hierarchal groups (Yin 2003).  Furthermore, it is worthy to note that prior research 
has highlighted airports along side other sociotechnical systems as key forms of 
critical infrastructure (De Bruijne and Van Eeten, 2007).  As such it is proposed that 
the findings of this thesis have the potential to apply to similar critical infrastructure 
contexts.   
 
3.9 Ethical Considerations 
This research was governed by and adhered to the ethical guidelines set out by the 
QUT Ethics Committee.  These guidelines reduce the bias on the part of the 
research and provide an ethically sound framework by which to research.  The 
following documents have been submitted for review to the QUT: 
• The QUT Human Participants Form which outlines and addresses possible 
issues regarding the research study.  This provided a summary of 
information about the research design, potential risks and benefits 
associated with the study, an overview of participants involved, and detail on 
data management.  (Appendix A.03) 
• The QUT Research Participant Information Form that detailed information 
regarding the respondent requirements for participating in the research study 
and giving informed consent for information gathered.  (Appendix A.04) 
• The QUT Research Participant Recruitment and Consent Form provides 
details regarding the purpose and potential outcomes of the work for 
organisations and specific participants in the study.  (Appendix A.05) 
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These documents were reviewed and approved by the QUT Research Ethics 
Committee.  During the ethics review process a key area of consideration 
highlighted by the committee was the need to ensure the confidentiality of both 
interview participant data and commercially sensitive airport management 
information.  Respondent anonymity was of the upmost importance for this research 
study to enable respondent confidence in discussing disturbance.  As such, a 
decision was made early on in this program to not identify any airport sites used and 
to simply refer to them as the generic descriptors of A-Air, B-Air, and C-Air.  
Furthermore, detailed background information was not given on the specific 
research sites as this could be used to potential identify data collection sites.  To 
protect the specific respondents, a generic number was given to interview 
informants with job titles used only where necessary to support the context of the 
information.  Direct quotes were edited to remove any reference to specific persons 
or airport sites as a means of further protecting the confidentiality of respondents.  
Documents were given generic descriptors rather than official names as in some 
cases they included discussion of ongoing investigations of disturbance at airport 
management organisations.  Advice was sought by the author and supervisory team 
regarding the potential to embargo of publication of this thesis for a set period of 
time so as to limit any adverse effects for participants or airport management 
organisations.  Moreover, any information returned to airport management sites 
(vetted by an advisory committee) has been generic in nature and reports on 
academic research findings rather than any site specific information.  Although the 
strictness of disclosure employed in this thesis has the potential to limit the 
transparency of findings it was considered necessary to ensure that the 
confidentially of respondents and airport management organisations, who most 
generously gave their time and involvement in this research, was protected.  
 
3.10 Methodological Limitations 
There are two main methodological limitations encountered by this research.  As 
previously discussed, while qualitative case method is particularly useful for 
providing thick and detailed description of a phenomena which the researcher does 
not have overt control, its limitations lay in the difficulty in providing statistical 
generalisability compared with a quantitative research based design (Yin, 2003).  
However, the outcome of investigating phenomena with a qualitative case based 
approach is its ability to provide analytical generalisability, whereby findings can be 
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transferable to complementary situations and contexts.  Therefore, the focus of this 
research is to provide analytical rather than statistically generalisable findings and 
conclusions, noting the need for future research.  A potential methodological 
limitation is found in the fact that this research collected case study data exclusively 
in airport management organisations.  However, as noted by Wheeler (2005), and 
De Bruijne and Van Eeten (2007; p.18), airports are defined as forms of critical 
infrastructure along with industries such as “energy, information technology, 
telecommunications, health care, transportation, water, government and law 
enforcement, and banking and finance”.  As such, it is proposed that in an analytical 
sense, findings and conclusions from this research will be applicable to the boarder 
critical infrastructure space with reference to understanding disturbance and 
reliability.   
 
3.11 Summary 
Chapter Three – Methodology has outlined the approach taken with regards to 
research design, data collection, analysis process, validity criteria, ethical 
considerations, and methodological limitations of this thesis.  Research design was 
discussed in terms of the single embedded case approach adopted with the use of 
qualitative data collection methods.  The use of in-depth interview, participant 
observation, and document analysis was discussed with detail provided as to the 
appropriateness and specific use of each method.  Data analysis explained the 
process by which data was prepared, categorised thematically, and triangulated to 
provide accurate and consistent findings.  This developed into a discussion of the 
ways in which validity of analysis and findings is maintained in this thesis.  The 
adopted approach utilised credibility, confirmability, dependability, and transferability 
as the four criteria for assessment (Guba and Lincoln, 2005).  This chapter 
concluded by detailing the ethical approval process for this research along with a 
discussion of the methodological limitations of this research.   
 
The following section Chapter Four – Disturbance Process Model will discuss the 
first research area of this thesis.  This will include analysis on the conceptual 
disturbance model developed by this thesis in terms of both the model components 
and process along with real-world disturbance examples.  
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Chapter Four – Disturbance Process Model 
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4.1 Introduction 
Chapter Four – Disturbance Process Model details the first research study of this 
thesis.  As mentioned in the initial sections of this document, this thesis investigates 
the complementary areas of disturbance and reliability.  Chapter Two – Literature 
Review developed the first area of this discussion by analysing prior academic work 
that had contributed to understanding in the disturbance and reliability body of 
literature.  However, as highlighted, prior work in the disturbance management 
space had not provided a holistic model for understanding the components of 
disturbance, as well as the process by which transitions take place between stages.  
Chapter Three - Methodology has outlined the approach this thesis adopted for 
investigating disturbance utilising the conceptual disturbance model as a foundation 
for investigation.  This chapter investigates the disturbance problem area of this 
thesis by investigating the proposed conceptual model (Figure 4.1) in an airport 
management context: 
Question 1  How does an airport move from a business-as-usual, into a 
disturbance, and return to business-as-usual?   
 
Figure 4.1: Conceptual Disturbance Process Model 
 
(Devine, Barnes, Newton, and Goonetilleke, 2013; Developed from Mitroff, 
Pauchant, and Shrivastava 1998, Pearson and Mitroff 1993, and Smith 2006). 
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This chapter addresses two specific sub-questions of this problem area which have 
been developed from literature to contribute to gaps in knowledge: 
RQ1A: What is the process that an airport experiences during 
disturbance?   
RQ1B: What are the functions of the specific stages an airport experiences 
during disturbance?   
Sections 4.2 - 4.5 discuss these research questions against the four levels of 
analysis of leadership (Section 4.2), corporate management (Section 4.3), 
operations management (Section 4.4), and officer (Section 4.5).  The purpose of this 
analysis is to provide a detailed description of the nature of disturbance in the 
context of Australian airport management organisations.  The four levels are 
discussed in terms of the components (focusing on research question 1A) and the 
process of disturbance (focusing on research question 1B) with particular 
importance placed on respondent examples to discuss the proposed conceptual 
model in terms of real-world practice.  As discussed in Chapter Three – 
Methodology, the critical incident technique provides a means of investigating 
concepts through the recounted experiences of respondents.  This analysis then 
seeks deeper understanding of the phenomena in Section 4.6 where a comparison 
of the four groups will be developed and will highlight areas of similarity and 
distinctions between the levels.  Section 4.6 also provides conclusions on key 
themes to emerge from this discussion as well as implications of the results.  These 
themes and results will be further developed in Chapter Six – Discussion.  This 
chapter concludes with Section 4.7 that provides a summary of the analysis and 
lead into the second study of this thesis Chapter Five – High Reliability Assessment.  
Table 4.1 below highlights the seven sections of this chapter.   
Table 4.1: Disturbance Process Model Chapter Sections 
Chapter One:  Introduction  4.1 Introduction      
4.2 Leadership Analysis     
4.3 Corporate Management Analysis   
4.4 Operations Management Analysis   
4.5 Officer Analysis     
4.6 Comparison of Levels    
4.7 Summary      
Chapter Two:  Literature Review  
Chapter Three:  Methodology  
Chapter Four:  Study One  
Chapter Five:  Study Two  
Chapter Six: Discussion  
Chapter Seven:  Conclusions  
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4.2 Disturbance Process Model: Leadership 
The first disturbance level of analysis focuses on the leadership level.  The 
leadership level is comprised of the senior management of the three airport 
management organisations.  This level is the most senior in terms of hierarchy of 
airport management organisations.  These participants are responsible for the 
strategic development of the organisation in terms of both operational continuity and 
reaching commercial objectives.  For investigating the disturbance process model, 
six in-depth interviews were undertaken with members of this level.  Participants 
included one Chief Executive Officer, one Corporate General Manager, one 
Organisational Development General Manager, and three Operations General 
Managers.  All members of this level of analysis had previous experience in various 
disturbance events (or exercising for disturbance events).  Furthermore, all 
participants at this level had requirements regarding risk and compliance functions 
in their respective airport sites.  This included aspects such as review and sign-off 
on risk registers, prior participation in risk committees, and involvement in federally 
regulated requirements regarding aviation safety and security.  As such, with 
reference to expertise and experience, all respondents at the leadership level of 
analysis are considered to have a high level of understanding regarding disturbance 
and its commercial implications.  These respondents can be considered as key 
informants to describing their role in contributing data to the analysis of this thesis.   
 
As mentioned in Chapter Three – Methodology, this thesis employed the critical 
incident technique whereby respondents were asked to discuss the disturbance 
process model in the context of prior events.  This enabled the research to better 
understand the accuracy and relevance of the model to real-world practice while 
furthering understanding of theory.  Of the six respondents at the leadership level 
critical incidents discussed were: 
• A-Air interview respondents discussed a critical failure of the airport 
information technology infrastructure that resulted in serious delays for 
passengers and detrimental revenue impacts for the airport management 
organisation.  Against the severity scale introduced in Section 1.3, this type 
of incident would be categorised as a Level 3: Major Disturbance due to the 
airport remaining in command and needing to coordinate response and 
recovery across a range of internal organisational teams.  This example was 
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particularly valuable in terms of the critical incident technique as the airport 
management organisation had returned to normal operations only thirty 
minutes prior to the commencement of the in-depth interview.   
• B-Air interview respondents discussed a complete terminal evacuation and 
shut down of operations as a result of a total loss of power within the 
terminal.  This event resulted in a range of issues around stakeholder 
impacts due to flight rescheduling, loss of revenue, and the need for staff 
members to work longer than originally estimated in disturbance planning 
documents.  Against the severity scale this event had the potential to 
develop into a Level 4: Crisis Disturbance where the airport management 
organisation was not in control of decision-making and was being directed by 
first response agencies.   However in the case of this critical incident the 
Level 3: Major Disturbance with the airport management organisation 
regaining control but still involving the assistance of first response agencies 
from outside the organisation was a more accurate representation of the 
situation.   
• C-Air interview respondents discussed similar disturbance incidents to the B-
Air respondents but with subtle differences.  C-Air detailed a terminal 
evacuation from the perspective of a direct threat and also an indirect threat 
to operations.  The first example of a direct threat highlighted a traditional 
evacuation whereby a small fire was discovered in a retail store and 
evacuation was undertaken more as a precaution.  The second example of 
an indirect threat was the result of bushfires close to the airport grounds 
resulting in emergency services personnel recommending that the airport be 
evacuated due to the potential of a change of fire direction.  Both 
disturbance events would be categorised as a Level 3: Major Disturbance as 
the airport operator was still in charge but assistance from external first 
response agencies was utilised.  In both cases no persons were injured as a 
result however the subsequent impact caused operational and financial 
losses for the airport management organisation.   
As the leadership level of the organisation is largely responsible for the corporate 
functioning of the business during normal operations, the function this group play in 
disturbance is mainly around facilitation and support of expert decision makers.  The 
critical incidents discussed all fit against the four-phase/ten-stage process of the 
disturbance process model.   
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4.2.1 Disturbance Process: Leadership Level 
Research question 1A is focused on investigating the process that an airport 
management organisation experiences during disturbance. The leadership level is 
responsible for a range of different functions during disturbance and is assigned a 
consultative and supportive role to expert decision makers (in theory but not always 
in practice as further analysis sections will address).  Respondents were asked to 
give their thoughts on the proposed model and its relevance to real-world practice.  
Of the six respondents, all highlighted the value of the model in a positive fashion 
and supported its relevance to real-world practice.  None of the six respondents at 
the leadership level discounted the model as a function of real-world practice in a 
strategic sense.  Respondents sited the accuracy of understanding disturbance in a 
process based approach and that the components of the model presented a realistic 
picture of practice. 
“It looks to me like it reflects it almost perfectly in my opinion.  There is not too 
much to add.  That is a similar process to what we follow.  There is nothing 
there I could add.  To be honest it's perfect.”   
“I think the 4 stages (pre-event, response, recovery, and post-event) are 
reflective broadly speaking.  I agree with the individual terms, containment and 
limitation and other terms we used.  So yeah the 4 categories are how we 
would describe it (in practice).”   
These initial examples support the use of the generic phases of pre-event, 
response, recovery, and post-event from the perspective of leadership 
respondents.  This will be further investigated at other levels of analysis during this 
chapter.  This position will be compared and contrasted to confirm the 
appropriateness of the disturbance process model holistically.   
 
Furthermore, respondents highlighted the value of looking at disturbance as a 
process that is constantly evolving and adjusting.  Rather than focus on prescriptive 
plans that attempt to account for every possible eventuality, the conceptual 
disturbance process model addresses the position that there will always be 
uncertainty present when dealing with complex sociotechnical systems (as 
highlighted by the literature discussion of Disaster Incubation Theory, Man Made 
Disaster Theory, and Normal Accident Theory).  The flexible nature of disturbance 
was shown when respondents discussed the model in terms of scalability of 
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disturbance and the potential time variance that components of the process would 
take to move through the complete disturbance cycle.   
“I think you go through each one of those (four-phase/ten-stage process).  You 
are just doing it at different levels against different scales after different 
periods of time.”   
As discussed in the literature review component of this thesis, prior work has largely 
considered the process of disturbance in a low likelihood/high consequence manner 
whereas real-world practice requires is dealing with scalable disturbance almost 
constantly.  As highlighted by the example respondent above, the disturbance 
process model remains relevant to practice at a range of potential severity levels.   
 
This discussion was further supported by respondents highlighting the opportunities 
presented when going through the disturbance stages as a means of assessing the 
performance of the system.  By looking at the disturbance process as an opportunity 
to provide a real-world test to an airport management system, the framework of the 
four-phases/ten-stage process provides the potential to explore performance of the 
system by looking at what was prepared for prior to disturbance against what the 
outcome was.  By interrogating real-world disturbance against the disturbance 
process model, there is potential enhancement of any of the components of the 
system.   
“I think it's very good, that has to me all of the key ingredients.  It is saying you 
are preparing so you are getting yourself match fit for when the event occurs 
and in that I incorporate the planning.  Then testing you’re readiness and 
implementing it.  So the immediate response and transitioning from 
containment into recovery and then what did you learn from it in terms of an 
improvement cycle.  Inevitably given the nature of events there will be 
variants.  Things might have gone as you would have expected and variants 
and you have closed the loop.  Understanding why you had the variants, can 
point you to either your plan was deficient, you know you need to modify it or 
actually the plan was fine we just implemented poorly?”   
“I think that models are great but they're only useful in so far as they advanced 
their ability to prepare for things (disturbance).  I think its something like this 
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process really driving us.  Its something like a single or double loop learning 
approach.”   
 
As the disturbance process model was developed conceptually from prior academic 
literature, the need to revise and improve the approach was always expected.  
Revisions around the generic components of the model that were proposed at the 
leadership level of analysis were relevant to the response and recovery phases of 
the model.  The suggestions introduced the notion that in a real-world airport 
management organisation response and recovery are not separate linear 
components of disturbance, but that they occur concurrently.  When a disturbance 
event activates and becomes an actual live event, components of the business will 
be focused on responding to the disturbance while others will be looking at 
strategies to return operations back to business as usual functionality.  This was 
further supported via document analysis whereby at the higher end of the severity 
scale (Level 3 Major Disturbance and Level 4 Crisis Disturbance levels) members of 
the leadership analysis level are tasked with addressing business continuity and 
stakeholder management issues with the objective of bring operations back online.  
This function took place from the beginning of the disturbance rather than after the 
response phase as originally conceptualised in prior academic literature as well as 
the proposed disturbance process model of this research study.   
“It's an interesting discussion actually.  I was talking with the guys in my team 
and I really think that response and recovery are the same.  They are 
concurrent.”   
“The only point that I would make is how we see it (the response and recovery 
process) is in parallel.  The immediate response from a pretty early stage it's 
standing up you know between that focusing on recovery.  So we define yeah 
coordination facilitation and containment as assisting the agencies (in major 
incident and crisis events) and working with the various agencies to minimize 
the consequences.  You can’t have your head buried in the response and then 
once you have it contained go, “oh well okay now what?”  You should be 
starting to think about the point at which they made it an emergency.  So I 
would have said that in parallel with response and recovery.”   
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The final component addresses was that of the near-miss component of the model 
that had received minimal previous attention in risk and crisis management 
literature.  Following on from the previous examples in which a system that 
experiences a disturbance process has the potential to learn from and enhance their 
system, near-misses serve as a means of understanding what could have been 
potentially more serious for the organisation.  This component of the process was 
highlighted as an area of critical concern yet systems in place to capture, 
categorise, learn from, and embed lessons learned were not developed.  
Respondents sited that this was a key area for improvement in their systems. 
“When we have those mistakes or that near-miss we should examine that so 
much.  That's another big thing you need to get in there with out it becoming 
the big stick, it's got to become the carrot for people to say this is our learning 
opportunity.  And it's not about bashing anybody it's about turning it into the 
carrot.   
 
This discussion also highlighted the variability of persons within the system in how 
they codify and act upon a near-miss.  Information can be lost due to staff not 
reporting areas that could have resulted in more serious consequences but for 
whatever reason did not in that particular occurrence.  Respondents noted the lack 
of structure and guidance around the process and that many times potential learning 
is lost as a result of business-as-usual tasks overcoming the process of 
investigating potential vulnerabilities.   
“It’s really about the transfer information.  But you've got to recognise the 
really important information that needs to be transferred … which is probably 
… I don’t think we do that.  We don’t do that well to be honest.”   
“I will routinely email managers and say that this is sounding more serious 
than what the words suggest or what are we're doing about it.  I'm worried 
about this and that's across a board range here on these daily reports.  I think 
the review process is pretty ad hoc because it may rely on me to do it (rather 
than managers considering potential vulnerability).”   
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A potential means of adjusting the near-miss approach in critical infrastructure was 
highlighted as a move away from a governance approach to an expert decision 
maker process.  Interestingly, this approach falls in line with Weick and Sutcliffe’s 
(2007) fifth trait of reliability of deference to expertise. 
“Maybe the solution is not about codifying and someone without that high level 
of skill is looking at an incident and categorise it.  Maybe its really about 
making sure that you have a person with a particular skill set geared around 
near-misses and making sure they have half an hour a day to review all 
incidents that have come through.   So it’s not about coding the incidents.  It 
becomes about making sure you have got the right person looking the 
information.”   
 
The following section will discuss research question 1B that focuses on the 
functions of the specific stages of disturbance.  A summary of findings on both the 
process (Section 4.2.1) and the stage functions (Section 4.2.2) of will be provided at 
the conclusion of the leadership level of analysis in Section 4.2.3.  
 
4.2.2 Disturbance Stage Functions: Leadership Level 
Research question 1B is focused on the functions of the specific stages that an 
airport management organisations experiences during disturbance.  The pre-event 
phases of the conceptual disturbance process model introduces the first four stages 
of planning, preparation, detection, and avoidance.  At the leadership level of 
analysis a heavy emphasis was placed on the planning component.  Specifically this 
focused on the importance of the Airport Emergency Plan (requirements of the Civil 
Aviation Safety Authority Australia) and the Transport Security Plan (requirements of 
the Office of Transport Security Australia) as being the central contributing planning 
documents around disturbance.   
“Basically there are two big chunks; one is the AEP which is the airport 
emergency plan and that covers specifically the aviation side of the business.  
Then the other part would be I guess your security related incidents that tend 
to come from your TSP (Transport Security Plan).  So how we're going to deal 
with any significant security issue.”   
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It was interesting to note that these documents and their respective training 
requirements focus on the most severe types of disturbance being Level 4: Crisis 
Disturbance (with the only exception being B-Air which incorporated detailed Level 
3: Major Disturbance planning also).  Furthermore, respondents at the leadership 
level highlighted the distinction that these federally regulated programs serve as 
minimum requirements of compliance for maintaining an airport in Australia.  The 
need to go further than these requirements was noted as a means of being 
prepared in the pre-event stage for potential disturbance.    
“The question is then do the regulations make us compliant or do they make 
us reliable … I think they are minimum standards so not necessarily reliable.  I 
think they give you good guidance as to good and best practice.  But we will 
make assessments of a number of things along the way to determine whether 
we need to do more, or we can't really do less, but we will get to the minimum 
standard and then we determine whether we need to do more.”   
 
The response phase of the conceptual disturbance process model looks at stages 
five and six of the process of coordination and facilitation, and containment and 
limitation.  Following on from the previous phases of pre-event, much of the 
discussion at the leadership level centred on the activation of the pre-determined 
planning process as a means of response.  Furthermore, respondents discussed the 
process of response as one that involves a change in mindset of participants 
whereby they are actively seeing out potential tasks required.   
“You are responding by activating what is effectively your plan.  Your planning 
and your preparation becomes that first step of response.  So that would be 
that first part there (respondent points from pre-event into response on 
model).”   
 
An interesting element that emerged at the leadership analysis level was that the 
respondents spoke about “others” in the organisation dealing with the stages of 
coordination and facilitation, and containment and limitation.  In the initial discussion 
regarding roles and responsibilities of the leadership level, respondents highlighted 
stakeholder management as a critical part yet when discussing response to 
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disturbance leadership members focused on the incident level rather than the 
corporate level.   
“They would go through their planned response … Who is going where? What 
do we need to do? What do we need to be ready for? So they would have 
gone from normal operations to they have now got a heightened awareness of 
might needs to be done.”   
 
The recovery phase of the conceptual disturbance process model looks at the 
seventh and eighth stages of operational continuity, and resolution.  At the 
leadership level, one of the critical factors discussed was reliance on people in the 
system to provide ideas via real time decision making rather than using pre-
determined approaches.   
“For me one of the strengths that you have got is the competence of your 
team and their ability to improvise and to get things done.  So in the major 
incidents I have been involved in, provided you have got good senior level 
management you can improvise.  But you can’t rely on that and also it doesn’t 
actually … all of that improvisation has its limits and wont substitute or deliver 
you the large complex infrastructure that we need.  So if we do have an 
uncontrolled fire in the terminal, with the very best of improvisation and post 
incident follow up it's going to take you weeks or months to stand-up the 
alternative facilities.”   
 
This ad-hoc approach was further highlighted in both the documented disturbance 
plans as well as participant observation on site.  In the review of documents, the 
majority of the emphasis and development regarding disturbance had been placed 
on response phase of the process over recovery.  Furthermore, participant 
observation, during meetings chaired by the leadership level (A-Air) addressed the 
development of business continuity approaches as being an ongoing process that 
was in its infancy. The development of business continuity planning was discussed 
as an important and ongoing issue at the leadership level and one that is highly 
complex.   
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“It's fair that the organisation is struggling to get traction on that (development 
of continuity planning) given the enormity of the challenge.  We have spent too 
long looking at what's the maximum total outage that we could have in certain 
circumstances.  The guys have done a lot of work, what I think is preparatory 
work, towards those plans and I became frustrated that we were not making 
sufficient progress.  We have changed the approach to it and it's certainly a 
priority in the currently used business plan.”   
Respondents did not directly address the stage of disturbance resolution.  Via 
participant observation and document analysis of risk and compliance committee 
meeting, much of the final assessment regarding when disturbance was over and 
the organisation was ready to commence business-as-usual was the responsibility 
of operations management (the third data collection level of this study).  In this 
process the leadership level was usually informed of the decision rather than being 
explicitly involved in the decision making process.   
 
The post-event phase of the conceptual disturbance process model explores the 
ninth and tenth stages of review and learning.  The leadership level highlighted the 
importance of the post-event process as a means of providing the opportunity to 
enhance reliability of the system.  The process discussed by leadership at all data 
collection sites revealed the severity of disturbance playing a key role in how review 
and learning is undertaken.   
“We have a process now of every serious incident we call stakeholders in and 
we have a post-event review.  There will be a discussion about what 
happened and why it happened, what actions, and then there will be a report 
on recommendations that goes back into your pre-event as we have said.  So 
that will happen sometime today.”   
“We do an analysis post-event.  Analysis will be on or level threes and above 
(out of a four level scale very similar to the severity levels Section 1.3: 
Definitions of this thesis) and that's an outcome based analysis not so much 
looking at the potential outcome.”   
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When discussing events at the lower level of severity (Level 1: Normal Operations 
Disturbance and Level 2: Minor Disturbance), leadership respondents discussed 
their expectation that the review and learning process as being undertaken with the 
same attention as at higher levels.  They mentioned their intention to improve the 
structure around this process as a means of further developing potential to enhance 
disturbance readiness.  Furthermore, the review process was discussed as having 
more success than learning, with learning a more difficult process to embed and 
implement system wide.   
“I would expect for the lower level issues that the staff responsible for them 
would be doing that anyway.  Having said that, well it's not in any full 
structured sense.  So our process of management, implement more with 
control, take remedial action with the plan or that is something that we have 
espoused in that company as our model for the process of management.  We 
are building that into our training and my hope is that our staff on a daily basis 
think like that.”   
“Do we review on that?  We document.  I’m not sure how well we learn 
necessarily.  We will document what happens and that gets reviewed by 
management.  So whatever standby’s we have, whatever follow-on actions we 
have, it gets reviewed and then it’s closed.  How much learning comes to that, 
I don’t know.  Yeah, so the top left arrow (post-event phase back to the pre-
event phase) is probably done on a calendar basis as well as an event basis 
for the bigger ones.”   
 
This highlights a potential area of vulnerability for airport management 
organisations.  As highlighted in Chapter Two – Literature Review by the 
perspectives of Disaster Incubation Theory (Turner, 1978) and Man-Made Disaster 
Theory (Turner, 1994), small events have the potential to compound into more 
serious disturbance.  As such, leadership should consider the level of current review 
and learning within their systems as a means of enhancing future resilience.  The 
following section of this study will present a summary of findings from the leadership 
level of analysis.  This will address both the process of disturbance discussed in 
Section 4.2.1 and the functions of specific stages discussed in Section 4.2.2.   
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4.2.3 Study One: Leadership Level Summary 
Critical incidents discussed from each data collection site were highlighted as Level 
3: Major Disturbance events.  The events considered were a breakdown of critical IT 
infrastructure (A-Air), evacuation due to environmental particulate concerns (B-Air), 
and evacuation due to fire (both on-site and off-site during different disturbance 
incidents at C-Air).  Respondents detailed the incidents in terms of the urgency in 
bringing operations back to business-as-usual to avoid incurred financial costs and 
delays as a result of the system being below operational capacity.   
 
The first part of the leadership level analysis, Section 4.2.1, highlighted a range of 
data with reference to the process an airport experiences during disturbance 
relevant to its level of analysis.  This discussion highlighted two main areas of 
interest for the understanding of disturbance in an airport management organisation.  
First, the conceptual disturbance process model was highlighted as reflecting real-
world practice in an accurate manner however amendments could be considered to 
adjust the response and recovery into a concurrent component.  This was further 
supported by documentary analysis of a range of airport management processes 
specific to disturbance event highlighting the critical importance of flexibility in terms 
of both process stages and severity of disturbance (documents A13, A14, A15, A20, 
B03, B05, B10, C05, C22, and C23).  Second, the near-miss function of disturbance 
management is considered by leadership to be an important area of consideration 
however implementation and embedding of the near-miss process has been lacking 
in practice.  This contention was further supported by observation of leadership 
respondent members during internal airport meetings whereby the highest 
importance was placed on understanding near-misses and where the organisation 
“got lucky” (Leadership participant observation with A-Air and C-Air).  Potential for 
improvement to the near-miss function was discussed by leadership respondents as 
a focused review of data by subject matter experts rather than attempting to 
implement analysis for all organisational levels.  The lack of development at the 
capturing of near-miss events should be a critical point of concern for airport 
management organisations as these events provide an opportune learning 
environment to continually review the operation of airport systems.   
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The second part of the leadership level analysis, Section 4.2.2, discussed the 
functions of the specific stages of the disturbance process from the perspective of 
the leadership level of analysis.  Both the pre-event and response components were 
discussed in terms of the planning stage whereby critical importance was placed on 
following pre-determined approaches to disturbance.  A potential weakness was that 
the majority of planning took place at the higher level of the severity, leaving more 
day-to-day normal operations disturbance with a less formalised process.  This was 
continued into the recovery components of operational continuity and resolution 
whereby the leadership level expressed concern over the reliance on problem 
solving rather than structure along with undeveloped approaches to business 
continuity.  This was particularly prevalent in after action documents from events 
whereby authors mentioned the need to improvise areas that should had the 
potential to have standard operating procedures (documents A13, A20, and B03).  
In a similar discussion, the post-event phase highlighted that review is undertaken 
yet learning and explicit adjustment of the system is lacking.  This was specifically 
discussed in a meeting of leadership respondents whereby one senior manager 
asked others in the forum why the organisations were seeing “the same apparent 
solutions over and over with no change in practice” to avoid or reduce the 
consequence of the disturbance in question (leadership participant observation with 
A-Air).  As with the previous components, the learning and review process is 
undertaken at all levels of severity yet is more formalised at the higher levels of the 
organisational hierarchy.  This formal process of review was viewed first hand 
during the meeting discussed in the previous example (leadership participant 
observation with A-Air).   
 
A summary of the discussion point from Sections 4.2.1 Disturbance Process: 
Leadership Level and 4.2.2: Disturbance Stage Functions: Leadership Level is 
provided below in Table 4.2.   
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Table 4.2: Summary of Disturbance Findings – Leadership Analysis 
RQ1A: What is the process that an airport 
experiences during disturbance?   
 
RQ1B: What are the functions of the specific 
stages an airport experiences during 
disturbance?   
 
 
• The leadership level of analysis 
discussed critical incidents of technology 
failure, terminal evacuation due to power 
loss, and terminal evacuation due to fire.  
All cases were categorised as Major 
Disturbance Level 3 severity.    
• Respondents at the leadership level of 
analysis supported the proposed 
disturbance process model.   
• Potential amendment suggested by 
developing the phases of response and 
recovery concurrently.   
• Near-miss phase highlighted as an area 
of critical importance that is currently 
underdeveloped in the three data 
collection sites.   
 
 
The planning stage was highlighted by 
the leadership level as playing a critical 
role in the effectiveness of how response 
is undertaken.  
• In contrast, recovery was discussed as 
more of a problem solving based rather 
than a highly structured approach.   
• High severity events received a more 
structure process than lower level events 
with much of the recovery and post-event 
process functioning ad-hoc.   
• Learning highlighted by the leadership 
level as lacking which highlighted a 
potential barrier to closing the loop on the 
process from post-event back into a re-
developed planning stage.    
 
 
The following section of this document, Section 4.3, applies the same analysis 
approach at the corporate management level of analysis.  The corporate 
management level essentially functions as middle management within airport 
management organisations, spans across all groups in the organisation, and is 
staffed with knowledge area experts.  In terms of the organisational hierarchy, 
members of the corporate management analysis level function at the same level of 
authority as third analysis group; operations management, which is discussed later 
in this chapter in Section 4.4.   
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4.3 Disturbance Process Model: Corporate Management 
The second disturbance level of analysis focuses on the corporate management 
level.  The corporate management level is comprised of members of the commercial 
side of the organisation who are specialists in particular areas of the airport 
management business.  This level of analysis sits at the second most senior level in 
the context of this thesis with these members sitting below the leadership level in 
business-as-usual operations.  This group is considered on the same level in the 
airport hierarchy as the operations management group that will be discussed in 
Section 4.4.  Participants at this level included three Corporate Risk and 
Compliance Managers, three Information Technology Managers, one Occupational 
Health and Safety Manager, one Communications Manager, one Car Parking 
Manager, one Environmental Manager, and one Standards and Assurance 
Manager.  In their day-to-day rolls participants at the corporate management level 
are responsible for the development of risk management and compliance reporting 
systems for the airport, planning and preparation for disturbance events, the review 
of prior events, and the implementation of action items identified by post-event 
reviews.  When disturbance takes place (at Level 2: Minor Disturbance and above), 
members of corporate management group are called upon to play key decision 
making roles in dealing with a range of areas including continuity of operation, 
health and safety requirements, communications with stakeholders and the media, 
and adherence to federally regulated standards.  Respondents from the corporate 
management level are considered by this research to have a high level of real-world 
experience with all phases of the disturbance management process and the 
resulting commercial implications.   
 
Even though the corporate management level of analysis sits under the leadership 
level in terms of hierarchy, during a disturbance key elements of planning and 
review function under the risk and compliance functions of the corporate 
management level.  The following critical incidents developed out of the eleven in-
depth interviews with the corporate management level.   
• A-Air respondents discussed two critical incidents dealing with a critical 
failure of airport information technology infrastructure (as was discussed by 
the leadership respondent in Section 4.2.2) and a serious safety failure that 
had the potential to be far more severe than what occurred.  The information 
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technology failure was discussed by the corporate management as a result 
of a lack of planning and consultation with appropriate members of the 
system.  The planning and preparation prior to the event only took into 
account the impacts on IT systems and negated the potential business 
impact resulting from a loss of key network functions.  This first critical 
incident would be considered a Level 2: Minor Disturbance in terms of 
severity.  The second critical incident detailed the events around a serious 
safety failure when a staff member did not follow protocol and as a result 
placed himself in potentially life threatening situation.  Corporate 
management level respondents discussed this incident by highlighting 
differences in how levels of severity are viewed by different groups within the 
organisation.  The initial review by the employees’ manager classified the 
severity in a Level 1: Normal Operations Disturbance whereas corporate 
managers looked as this event as having had the potential to reach Level 4: 
Crisis Disturbance.   
• B-Air respondents discussed two critical incidents that occurred as a terminal 
power failure (and the resulting evacuation) and a bomb threat to an inbound 
flight.  The first critical incident of the terminal power failure came as a result 
of a burst water pipe near the main transformer for the terminal.  Previous 
disturbance plans had considered the partial or total loss of terminal power 
and as such a plan was in place for the use of a sophisticated generator 
system that would service the site until power could be recovered.  What 
occurred however was a failure of the generator system to power up and as 
a result the terminal needed to be evacuated.  This first event constituted a 
Level 3: Major Disturbance as the airport operator was still in charge of the 
situation yet was reliant on first response agencies to assist with response 
and recovery.  The second critical incident discussed by corporate 
management respondents was a bomb threat to and international flight 
landing at B-Air.  A threat had been made against the aircraft via a phone 
call to the airport and a pre-determined action plan was put in place.  When 
the aircraft landed it was moved to an area away from the terminals and 
runways and was inspected by first response agencies.  The outcome was 
that the event was a hoax yet the pre-determined plan was successful in 
mitigating potential vulnerability for the airport.  During this event normal 
operations were still running at the site and the severity was considered a 
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Level 3: Major Disturbance with the potential for it to escalate to a Level 4: 
Crisis Disturbance event.   
• C-Air respondents discussed the critical incident of an extreme weather 
event at the airport that caused serious disruption to operations.  A 
particularly serious thunderstorm began in the morning above the airport site 
and stayed above the airport until early afternoon.  As a result no 
passengers could be unloaded from planes due to the safety risk associated 
with lightning strikes to passengers or airfield workers.  What started as a 
delay issue soon turned into a passenger welfare issue as some flights 
which arrived at 9am were still waiting to be unloaded at 4pm.  This 
disturbance essentially stopped all inbound and outbound flights from C-Air 
for the duration of the event and caused significant financial loss to the site.  
The event would be classified as a Level 3: Major Disturbance and 
highlighted a significant lack of corporation and capacity from airline partners 
as directives from the airport operator were ignored or overruled by external 
partners.  
 
The critical incidents discussed above by members of the corporate management 
level of analysis highlight the varied and unexpected nature of disturbance.  Where 
predetermined plans can make airport management organisations better equipped 
to deal with disturbance, they can also fail which shifts the perspective to decision-
making rather than simply following a pre-determined approach.  Disturbance 
incidents also highlight those different perspectives within an organisation that view 
risk in vastly different ways.  The critical safety failure at A-Air highlighted that 
members of the risk and compliance team classified the event as having potential to 
take operations out of control of the airport operator whereas other group members 
saw the event as a failure to follow protocol and addressed the disturbance as a 
training issue.  The following sections addresses the disturbance process model in 
terms of the stages of the process from the perspective of the corporate 
management level of analysis.   
 
4.3.1 Disturbance Process: Corporate Management Level 
As previously discussed, research question 1A explores the process that an airport 
management organisation experiences during disturbance.  The corporate 
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management level is responsible for a range of tasks at all phases of the process.  
The pre-event and post-event phases are key responsibilities of this group as much 
of the disturbance response and recovery processes are handled by the operations 
management level.   The corporate management level maintains key pre-event 
responsibilities such as the risk and compliance reporting function in the 
organisation that aims to seek out and mitigate vulnerability for the organisation.  
Furthermore, functions such as quarterly and incident based reporting of 
disturbance are run at this level in the form of committees.   
 
The initial analysis at the corporate management level focused on asking 
respondents about their views regarding the accuracy of the disturbance process 
model in real-world practice.  Of the eleven respondents the majority responded 
positively to the model in that it was a clear representation of practice.  Respondents 
who did not expressly state the relevance of the model began discussing the model 
in the context of their business function.  No respondents from the corporate 
management level of analysis discounted the model or suggested that it was not 
reflective of real-world practice.  Respondents highlighted that the process-based 
approach accurately reflected practice and explicitly highlighted the near-miss 
process as one that is critical to disturbance management.   
“This is exactly the flow that we had in our meeting the other day.  It’s basically 
the same process we discussed except that (near-miss process) which needs 
improvement because we are not really doing it.  So I think it’s very good.”   
“Nothing there surprises me.  I can see you have pulled together a lot of 
elements from different models that are being used.  I do agree with you that 
there is, and I have been involved in cases with a lot of companies, where 
there has been a near-miss and its almost like well lets just bury it and not 
research it or see how its got there.”   
 
Another key point highlighted by respondents at the corporate management level 
was the importance of the post-event phase in understanding disturbance.  
Respondents agreed the separation of review and learning was important as they 
serve different functions in the post-event phase.  Furthermore, learning was 
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highlighted as a potential area for improvement not only at the corporate 
management level, but organisation wide.   
“I think it's great.  I mean I can see elements of all sorts of approaches.  Yeah 
I can see how you get to plan-do-check type overlay on it.  I certainly agree 
around the definition (separation of components) of review and learning.  You 
know one of the things I know we don’t do terribly well is retain and develop 
that learning.”   
 
As with the process outlined in Chapter Three- Methodology, the analysis of themes 
looked for both corresponding and dissenting views of the generic component of 
disturbance.  This is a critical component of qualitative investigation as it presents 
different sides of the argument that may present a more accurate picture of the 
situation and reveal emergent themes.  A key component of this in this thesis was 
seeking out potential revisions to the conceptual disturbance model to further the 
applicability to practice.  As mentioned in the opening of this section, no dissenting 
views were presented and in-depth interview participants accepted the applicability 
of the model.  The only area that could be considered a potential review to the 
model from the perspective of the corporate management level was the emphasis 
placed on understanding near-miss processes.  These were discussed as being of 
critical importance to understanding both disturbance and vulnerability in an airport 
management context.   
 
The near-miss function was highlighted as being a critical component of 
understanding disturbance.  Corporate management respondents highlighted that in 
real-world disturbance events the process does not always progress through all 
stages and as such flexibility is needed in any representative model.  This was a 
critical point discussed in the literature review of previous disturbance models that 
did not have flexibility built in whereby disturbance could be avoided yet still 
reviewed and learned from.  By being able to review the underlying attributes of why 
disturbance did or did not take place, it has the potential to assess the root causes 
of disturbance rather than simply treating issues on a case-by-case basis.   
“I don’t have an issues with the model.  I think it simplifies it enough that 
people can actually understand “well this is what we do” but also we can 
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recognise that you can miss steps (near-miss) because that’s the way the 
system can work.”   
“It seems to flow very logically.  I mean we avoid the thing (disturbance) and 
go straight to post-event analysis (near-miss) and in the meeting we had the 
other day this was deliberately the sort of flow that we went through.  It was 
run by our emergency manager so not really my area but he is probably done 
a fair bit of work around this.”   
 
Furthering this discussion was the notion that near-miss functions are understood 
and acted upon in different ways by different parts of the organisation.  It was 
highlighted by corporate management respondents that the understanding of near-
miss function is somewhat compartmentalised.  Areas with a specific focus on risk 
management were highlighted as embedding feedback from a near-miss back into 
pre-event components.  However other elements of the corporate management 
function, where disturbance and vulnerability may not be such a central objective, 
respondents highlighted it as a less understood and implemented business function.   
“People will tell you that we capture some of that information in the information 
notification system.  I actually do think in some ways we do learn from each 
other when those incidents occur.  Is that fed back in to improve?  In some 
areas, yes.  I would like to think that within the operations area at middle 
management those issues occur and they actually learn from them and feed 
that back in.  I know that happens in health and safety because that is what 
those systems are meant to do.  Does it happen within other areas?  Probably 
not.  So we just need to get everyone to the same level of sophistication … 
that would be just an awesome thing to do.”   
“I would say that does apply to us in some areas of the business.  We have 
some parts of the business areas, but not all of the areas.  We (risk 
management team) are very passionate about protecting near-misses and 
those discussion meetings need to look at trends and what's it telling us.”   
 
This contention that near-miss components are understood and valued more by 
some areas of corporate management than others was supported by non-risk based 
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respondents.  This highlighted that although a near-miss is a critical area of 
importance for airport management organisations, there is a limited level of 
understanding outside of specialist risk management and compliance employees at 
the corporate management level.  This presents a key potential area of 
improvement for understanding disturbance at the corporate management level.   
“I know other areas of the business that you get probably better feedback 
because I have heard the terminology ‘near-miss’ a lot.  So obviously, the 
other areas it’s easier to detect but not really something we know about or 
look at.”   
 
The following section of the corporate management level of analysis will focus on 
research question 1B of this thesis regarding the process stages of disturbance.  
The analysis will then develop into a summary of both the generic components 
(Section 4.3.1) and the process stages (Section 4.3.2) of disturbance at the 
corporate management level in Section 4.3.3.   
 
4.3.2 Disturbance Stage Functions: Corporate Management Level 
Research question 1B is focused on exploring the disturbance management 
process by drilling down to the functions of the specific stages that an airport 
transitions through during disturbance.  The pre-event phase of the conceptual 
disturbance process model investigates the first four stages of planning, 
preparation, detection, and avoidance.  The corporate management level raised a 
number of other different areas of importance than the prior leadership analysis.  
One of the most critical components raised was the misalignment of sections of the 
business in terms of planning and preparation.  The previous section regarding 
disturbance process looked at this miss-alignment regarding knowledge of a near-
miss however the analysis of planning, preparation, detection, and avoidance also 
revealed issues with organisational silos.  In this situation mismanagement of 
planning actually caused the disturbance.  Two respondents speaking from both 
sides of a disturbance, one that was responsible for the risk function in the business 
and one who headed the department that caused the issue, highlighted these 
opposing perspectives regarding planning and preparation.   
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(Risk Manager) “Its too inward looking, it’s not outward looking.  Absolutely, 
and then that’s so obvious.  They don’t want to find anything wrong with it.  
They actually don’t.  They can convince themselves its all ok.  I know I’ve seen 
them do it.  Because nobody plays devils advocate.  Nobody challenges 
because they don’t want people involved.”   
(Department Manager) “We had a particular change which was signed off by 
the change advisory board as being low risk.  It is a function of our group, so 
it’s only our group involved on that board.  However, they identify who the 
business stakeholders are in relation to any change.  And once they agree 
that the change will occur they negotiate on the timing.”   
In this instance the department manager saw no issue with the approach to planning 
and perpetration for a scheduled upgrade being handled within team without 
consulting other areas of the business.  The department manager only considered 
timing of change issues rather than working cross-functionally and assessing the 
potential disruption from the perspective of those who require the system for 
business-as-usual operations.  What started as a ‘technical upgrade’ caused a 
serious disturbance issue for almost all components of the business when the 
change failed and rollback did not occur.  This example highlighted the vulnerability 
created by not considering the potential impact at the planning and preparation 
stage for all business units.   
 
Corporate management level analysis highlighted the importance of cross-
functionality in non-technical issues.  In the example discussed below, a business 
decision was made without consultation with organisational groups who would be 
impacted by potential disturbance.  In this the objective of revenue was placed 
above reliability and resulted in higher vulnerability and backlash from end users. 
“We can start from the very beginning before my time when the decision was 
made that the project was going to be put in place.  So from the planning 
phase, it was designed without adequate consultation within the business.  So 
we have got engineers going ‘this will work and this is what we need to do’.  
And then we have got other people in other departments going ‘we need to be 
making money’.  And its all about making money lets be realistic.  Nobody 
gave any consideration whatsoever in the development group to public 
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perception and the power of public opinion coming back on the company.  For 
a small return it cost us so much more in terms of our reputation.”   
 
Cross-functional development of planning and preparation was again highlighted in 
a non-technical disturbance as a means of lowering vulnerability.  By having a range 
of stakeholders involved from the early stage of development, critical issues that 
may not have been considered by project management teams can be considered 
and mitigated.  This risk informed approach to planning and preparation helps 
enable avoidance of disturbance all together or at the very least provides 
forewarning of issues so that appropriate strategies may be developed.   
“During that development phase, is making sure that you've got a working 
group that covers the breadth of those – the various stakeholders. So, to 
actually getting them to – to put their operational hat on. During the design 
phase, so that they are actually telling you about the risks that are – that are – 
that may be incurred and the ones that are obvious to them during that design 
phase.”   
“I guess probably something that we don’t do so well is ensuring that our 
areas operating procedures and perception is actually shared with other areas 
and making sure that everything is compatible.”   
 
Within the preparation and detection stages, corporate management level 
respondents highlighted a potential lack of understanding of some employees about 
current approaches to disturbance developed for their airport.  This highlights two 
key considerations regarding staff training.  First, appropriate training of staff 
members is required to enable them to have the experience and skills required for 
dealing with disturbance.  Second, to confirm that the correct members of our 
organisation are involved in training so that they are adequately prepared if and 
when they are called upon in a disturbance scenario.  Both these elements highlight 
the requirement of a more detailed approach in developing staff knowledge around 
disturbance.   
“The guy in that incident was put in a situation where he didn’t have the 
information, he didn’t have training, and he was getting a lot of pressure from 
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a higher authority to do something about the situation.  And he was lucky he 
got out so easily.  It could have been much more serious.”   
“I'm not so clear on what we've done in the pre-event phase.  And that maybe 
just my lack of knowledge.  But if that is the case then someone is not getting 
the message out.  Because I imagine I'm reflective of a lot of people who 
aren't directly involved.  Not quite knowing what's happening out there.”   
“From a detection perspective we’ve had some comments back from people 
recently that people don’t know who to go to if there is an incident or spill.  So 
we have to go reinforce, so that’s all about the detection.  So we expect that 
there are spills occurring that we are not being told about because it’s just 
easier out in the drain now.”   
 
The response phase of the proposed conceptual disturbance process model looks 
at stages five and six of the process of coordination and facilitation, and 
containment and limitation.  Responses differed from the leadership level of 
analysis, whereby corporate managers were far more focused on issues around 
assessment, cooperation and delegation than the leadership level focus of simply 
implementing a pre-determined plan.  The first area discussed focused on a lack of 
understanding around the initial assessment processes regarding disturbance.  The 
respondent recounted an example where there was a lack of a clear approach 
around understanding the severity of the situation and communicating it to 
appropriate parties in the system.  Understanding the severity of the situation is a 
critical indicator as it enables decisions to be made regarding the appropriateness of 
response required.   
“There is work to be done about how to analyse what the incident is and form 
some assumptions about what the potential impact to the business is and then 
communicating that.  See they were told they had to provide an update in 
15min and I said ‘nothing happens in 15mins’ and our airport emergency 
manager said ‘that’s not part of the system’ then we realised they don’t have a 
set approach for that.  The ability to analyse that first assessment, work out 
what the impacts to the business are, and prioritise what they are going to do, 
and then communicate that.”   
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The second component highlighted by the corporate management level of analysis 
looked at the issue of cooperation and cross-functionality during the initial function 
of response.  During the instances recounted, members of the corporate 
management group did not feel that they were being adequately worked with and 
the skills they could potentially provide to the situation were being underutilised.  
Furthermore, this highlighted the potential that those managing the disturbance 
were not focused on the critical business functions that are required for returning to 
business-as-usual operations.  In both of the examples below, members of the 
corporate management level needed to actively try and get involvement in the 
coordination and facilitation, and containment and limitation stages of response.   
“I just don't think they realised exactly how critical and how important it is to 
include our group, to keep us in the loop.  It wasn't until I'm ringing up the 
response centre going, ‘can you let us know what's going on with the power’.  
And I had to say, ‘why don't I come down to the response centre’ instead of 
me having to call.  I was thinking ok so we were not even thought of being 
included originally.  And that’s the sort of thing.  If it happened again we would 
be one of the key people who are thought of.”   
“Yeah it's really just about working together better.  And I think this 
organisation is guilty of silos running around the airport.  There is a bit of a 
bipolar nature to the way we operate and that's not ideal.  I have certainly had 
some examples where I've forced my involvement in something where they 
would be resistant and then once it's all over everyone goes, ‘oh, that was so 
great I didn't know you knew how to do that’.  And so to be honest looking at it 
from where I sit in the organisations, it's a pretty big weakness I think.”   
 
The third component highlighted by the corporate management level regarding 
response was that of delegation of tasks.  Due to the size and complexity of airports 
it is understandable that a range of tasks are required to be outsourced to 
contractors and consultants who are specialists in a particular area.  It becomes 
interesting when disturbance occurs, without a clear management function 
organising them, there is potential to create further vulnerability.  The example 
below highlights an issue whereby a range of “specialists” was dealing with different 
components of a disturbance without a central coordination function being 
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undertaken by the airport.  In this instance delegation created a lack of coordination 
and facilitation.   
“In the initial stages I’m not sure if there was any real coordination because 
when I spoke with our staff involved he said “we had lots of different people 
working everywhere”, I said “oh what were they working on? was it 
coordinated? why were they working on those things and not other things?”.  
His response was “well they are the consultants who are experts in that”.  So a 
heap of consultants and third party providers have come in because all they 
are here to work on is one piece of kit, they don’t understand the relationship 
with other pieces of kit, because they don’t work on that.  And they don’t care 
because they have got a key performance indicator on the contract that says 
you look after that and you do these things.”   
In a similar way, when those who have had tasks delegated to them then require 
management this also causes problems.  A corporate management level 
respondent recounted an instance where during a disturbance a contractor wanted 
to delegate decision making back to the organisation rather than follow the pre-
determined standard operating procedure.  This resulted in a delay in making the 
decision and moved away from the pre-determined process.  Although in this 
example the outcome was a positive one, had this been a time sensitive decision or 
if the contractor was unable to contact the organisation directly the consequences 
could have been potentially more serious.   
“Well there is a standard operating procedure around this but they still came 
back to us.  They had to be directed by us because they were worried some of 
this was starting to escalate out of their control, although it didn’t.  Technically 
they really should have been able to manage it on their own, but because in 
that event that you had lifts out, you had lighting failing, and all the devices 
failing at various points, we just, you know, we needed to pitch in and help 
advise.”   
 
The recovery phase of the conceptual disturbance process model looks at stages 
seven and eight of the process by addressing operational continuity and disturbance 
resolution.  Members of the corporate management level discussed a number of 
issues further developing what the leadership level of analysis previously discussed.  
The first of these elements focused on the process for implementing partial 
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operations.  This function of operational continuity involves having a clear 
understanding of what constitutes a critical business system and prioritising the 
order by which elements are recovered.  The two examples below highlight the 
different ends of the spectrum with regards to staging a return.  The first example 
highlights a detailed approach that was consultative with the business and 
implemented a recovery of technology based on the key needs of the time (however 
still requiring a formalisation of the process for future disturbance events).  The 
second example highlights an unsound approach that was noted by corporate 
management respondents to be influenced by factors other than what was best for 
the business in disturbance.   
 “We went through it (recovery decision-making) and said, ‘what are the critical 
systems and critical areas’.  So obviously things like the coms 
(communications) rooms, the radios, getting the internet back up for them.  
We went through it and said, ‘what are the key things’ and we went in and sort 
of looked at our priorities and said, “okay well which coms rooms are the most 
important and we need to get things up and running in these rooms first for 
those reasons.  So we actually did that well.  I mean a documented solution 
does need a lot of work.  We've got a very limited idea, we don't have a formal 
draft yet (of critical systems).”   
“They would have formed an opinion as to what systems were important either 
based on who was putting the most pressure on them.”   
 
The second element discussed by the corporate management level was the need 
for flexibility in the recovery phase.  As highlighted in Chapter Two – Literature 
Review by both high reliability theory and agility theory, the need to be flexible in 
disturbance is paramount to providing appropriateness of action.  In the case of the 
example below, the disturbance was so out of the ordinary that no plans were in 
place to consider how to deal with bringing operations back to business-as-usual.  
As such the mindset quickly shifted to a problem solving approach that looked at 
making the most appropriate decisions to deal with the current situation.  A ridged 
system would have stalled in its response whereas flexibility enabled workarounds.   
“So we did lots of different things in that event.  We were a bit limited as 
obviously we're not the aircrafts operators and we're not ground handlers, but 
we do own terminals and aero bridges and so on, so you know we helped a 
124 
lot.  Thing like processing aircraft and enabling aircraft to be processed in 
areas where they normally would not be able.  Things like partner aircraft 
docking back into our terminals (where they would normally only dock at their 
allocated bays rather than airport common user bays) and sending domestic 
aircraft that at any international all those sort of things yeah.  So really a lot of 
gradual workarounds and improvising to get things going again (back to 
business-as-usual).”   
 
The third consideration discussed regarding the stages of operational continuity and 
resolution introduced the issue of events that last for extended periods.  As airport 
management organisations have a limited surge capacity (unlike first response 
agencies), a critical issue in response is how to sustain management of the 
disturbance until it can be resolved.  This highlights the critical issue of requiring a 
plan in place to deal with protracted events and resulting elements such as fatigue 
management and staff redundancy.   
“So we have worked closely with some consulting firms but if there was a 
massive incident that was ongoing and we had to close the airport down for 
days, myself and my boss would need to fly by the seat of our pants.  And 
that’s not ideal, but generally in my experience this is what happens.  So the 
busiest is obviously the first hour, but if it was ongoing, I would have to stretch 
my staff out to twelve hours but I can’t push my team beyond that.  And then 
we would have to start roistering because then you cant think straight, you get 
so tired you are almost drunk.”   
 
The post-event phase of the conceptual disturbance process model looks at the 
ninth and tenth stages as review and learning.  The corporate management level of 
analysis highlighted three themes as the process by which is post-event function is 
undertaken, the legitimacy of the process, and the challenge of embedding learning 
back into the organisation.  These areas highlight similar findings to the leadership 
level of analysis in that the review stage is more straightforward to implement than 
the learning stage of the process.   
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The first area looked at the process of review and what functions are emphasised.  
The three examples discussed below highlight nuances of the process and that 
even within the review process, further examination take place.  The review stage 
was discussed as corporate management level staff as being separated by an initial 
in team review and followed by a secondary stakeholder wide review process.  The 
purpose of the initial review was highlighted as focusing on an analysis of what 
functioned well during disturbance and where are areas for potential improvement.  
The initial review also takes advantage of time proximity to the event by capturing 
elements that may be later forgotten.  The third example highlights the importance in 
the secondary review stage to have all members with an understanding of the 
critical issues prior to commencing the holistic review.  The third example highlights 
where the respondent felt there was assumed knowledge that detracted from their 
experience of the review stage.   
“We did a kind of hot wash sort of I call it hot wash, but it's just that – that 
immediate review, ‘what have we learned from today?’  So that then we can sit 
down later on and say, ‘structurally what do we need to improve?’  So, I think 
in a sense there's the immediate review while it's still fresh in people's minds, 
and just capturing all of what you can. And then it's the more the deeper 
review of ‘okay, stepping back a little bit now, how could we have managed 
that whole show better?’”   
“Actually both times as the team we sat down (to review). I mean obviously the 
airport did it as well. But we actually separately in our group and said, ‘okay, 
what worked, what didn't work?’ You know just that initial review.  And as I 
said, from the previous event we had, we had put a lot of things in place for 
this one.”   
“What we missed was that we didn’t start off with describing the event that led 
us to the having a review, but I know that there was previous in team reviews 
undertaken, so we didn’t spend the time sort of starting saying, ‘okay so what 
do we get out of that’.  Those were a bit of assumed knowledge that the 
people around the table would all be on the same page.”   
 
The second area highlighted the importance of legitimacy of the review and learning 
stages to highlight key issues in an honest and open way.  Without an honest review 
of practice it is impossible to implement and embed lessons learned in a meaningful 
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way.  Furthermore, the issue of a no-blame-culture highlights that some members of 
the organisation do not feel confident in speaking up and highlighting areas of 
importance.  As the review and learning stage is critical for the continual 
improvement of the system by adjusting pre-event functions, the issue of legitimacy 
in the review and learning stages is a critical area of improvement needed for airport 
management organisations.   
“Its been interesting because its been front of mind and I have had a number 
of discussions with the CEO over the last month about this idea of a no blame 
culture of reporting.  And I said, ‘yeah we say that but we don’t really have 
that’ so we are having fairly detailed conversations about what that means.   
But we know that there are areas of the business that don’t legitimately 
review.  We need to work on that.”   
 
The third area that was addressed by the corporate management level was that of 
embedding learning back into the organisation.  Two points that were highlighted 
from the corporate management level was the involvement of appropriate staff as 
well as the ability to feed information back into the pre-event process.  The first 
example highlights that not all staff are available for the review and learning stages 
and as such information can be missed.   
“Its important to have the people that were involved in the incident do debriefs 
and that sort of stuff.  But then the problem is we don't push that out to the 
wider organisation.  We might be lucky that same people were involved in the 
same type of incident again, and they can deal with it very well, but what about 
others in the business who weren’t involved and have to learn it all over again. 
We don’t capture very well no.  I mean not in a way that is easily 
communicated to the rest of the company.”   
The next two examples highlight the issue of delivering information back to staff as a 
means of enhancing the learning stage.  Respondents discussed the issue that in 
some cases information is compartmentalised in the more senior levels and not 
driven back into the organisation.  As with the second issue of the legitimacy of 
review, this also raises the concern that when information is not developed and 
implemented as a means of improving functionality at lower levels, the process is of 
little value.   
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“For me the main weakness is connecting the post-event stuff, which tends to 
be done more in a kind of senior management and board level than in the 
middle management level.  And then how we get that back into the lower 
operations levels.”   
“I think an area we could improve is probably a post-event disseminating or 
debriefs.  Something that I think that needs a little bit more structure and then 
filtering that back to information and training (for staff).  Yeah that’s probably 
where I would say we could improve.”   
These examples highlight the potential that the embedding of post-event knowledge 
back into the planning and preparation stages of pre-event is not occurring explicitly 
within airport management organisation.  Furthermore, these issues emphasise the 
importance of having members of all organisational levels and departments involved 
to gain a cross-functional view of disturbance.  Higher levels of involvement at the 
initial post-event phase is proposed to improve the potential for buy-in improvement 
practices.  The following section of this study will present a summary of findings 
from the leadership level of analysis.  This will address both the process of 
disturbance discussed in Section 4.2.1 and the functions of specific stages 
discussed in Section 4.2.2.   
 
4.3.3 Study One: Corporate Management Level Summary 
This analysis revealed a number of critical incidents including a critical technology 
failure (Level 3: Major Disturbance), a critical safety failure (varied analysis 
depending on group), a terminal power failure (Level 3: Major Disturbance), a bomb 
threat on an inbound flight (Level 3: Major Disturbance), and a severe storm event 
(Level 3: Major Disturbance).  During only one of these critical incidents (the bomb 
threat of Level 3: Major Disturbance) did the airport management organisations 
have a specific plan to respond to the situation it was encountering.  In other 
instances the process was developed through coordination and communication 
between various groups both internal and external of the respective airport 
organisations.   
 
The first part of the corporate management level analysis, Section 4.3.1, discussed 
proposed conceptual disturbance process model and its relevance to real-world 
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practice.  As with the leadership level of analysis, there was holistic support for the 
model and respondents stated that it was highly reflective of real-world practice.  
Dissenting views were not present in the data and the one area of adjustment was 
highlighted as the critical importance of the near-miss process from the perspective 
of the corporate management level.  This was reinforced by respondents who 
supported the flexible approach of the disturbance process as being reflective of 
what actually happens in airport management organisations.  This discussion 
revealed the emergent theme that understanding of near-miss events is potentially 
not holistically understood in airports and that more development is required.  
Document analysis at the corporate management level revealed no clear process 
around the capture or analysis of information regarding near-misses at any of the 
data collection sites.  This included a review of planning and development programs 
(such as documents A01, A02, A06, A07, A12, A19, A21, A35, A40, B01, C04, C06, 
and C19) as well as review of real-world disturbance events (such as documents 
A13, A14, A15, A20, B03, B05, B06, C22, and C23).  Participant observation with 
members of the corporate management level also revealed member had an 
understanding of the importance of capturing near-misses but that the complexity 
and resourcing required to do it correctly was out of the reach of their respective 
departments (corporate management participant observation with A-Air, B-Air and 
C-Air).  As such, it is a consideration that the near-miss phase be further developed 
into the disturbance process model to better reflect the requirements of airport 
management organisations.   
 
The second part of the corporate management level analysis, Section 4.3.2, looked 
at the functions of the specific stages of the disturbance management process from 
the perspective of the corporate management level.  The discussion of the planning, 
preparation, detection, and avoidance stages highlighted the importance of 
developing organisation wide involvement in the pre-event phase as a means of 
providing detailed understanding, cross-functionality, and more accurate process.  
Documentary analysis supported the maturity of the pre-event phase at airport 
management organisations with the development of generic approaches to deal with 
the most encountered disturbance (such as documents A01, A02, A06, A07, A12, 
A19, A21, A35, A40, B01, C04, C06, and C19).  The response component of the 
discussion highlighted issues regarding coordination and facilitation as the detail of 
the pre-event component struggled to translate to response.  This was present in 
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terms of a lack of clear processes regarding assessment, staff feeling excluded from 
actions, and issues regarding delegation of tasks to third party operators.  Recovery 
highlighted issues around understanding of critical systems and the need for a 
prioritised return to operational continuity.  Furthermore, the shift to a flexible 
decision-making approach was highlighted as a key function within the operational 
continuity stage.  Protracted events were also highlighted as a potential area of 
vulnerability with consideration needed regarding the length of time a group could 
function while trying to return to business-as-usual operations.  The final component 
of post-event introduced the two-stage approach of review being in-team followed 
by a holistic review.  Some respondents raised concerns about the legitimacy of the 
process and mentioned that in some instances staff did not want to raise issues.  
Finally, embedding was addressed a critical challenge as a means of integrating 
learning back in the pre-event function of the business.  As with the previous 
paragraph, respondents highlighted the need to enhance resourcing to “close the 
loop” and ensure that corrective action was  (corporate management participant 
observation with A-Air, B-Air, and C-Air).   
 
A summary of the key issues from Section 4.3.1 - 4.3.2 is provided below in Table 
4.3.   
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Table 4.3: Summary of Disturbance Findings – Corporate Management 
Analysis 
RQ1A: What is the process that an airport 
experiences during disturbance?   
 
RQ1B: What are the functions of the specific 
stages an airport experiences during 
disturbance?   
 
• Critical incidents highlighted examples of 
disturbance taking place at the Major 
Incident Disturbance Level 3 whereby 
airport operators are still in authority.   
• Respondents at the corporate 
management level of analysis supported 
the proposed disturbance process model.  
• As with the leadership level of analysis, 
corporate management level respondents 
highlighted the critical important of the 
near-miss function in developing better-
prepared systems.   
• Respondents highlighted the relevance of 
flexibility in the model whereby avoidance 
was a possibility in real-world examples.   
• Cross-functional development and 
consultation, particularly in planning and 
preparation, was highlighted as of critical 
importance in the pre-event stages.   
• Corporate managers highlighted 
understanding the critical components of 
the system and employee skillsets as an 
area for improvement for response and 
recovery.   
• As with the leadership level of analysis, 
corporate management level respondents 
discussed the key importance of post-
event yet highlighted challenges around 
legitimacy of the process and embedding 
practice back into the pre-event phase.    
 
The following section of this document, Section 4.4, further develops the discussion 
of disturbance with a focus at the operations management level of analysis.  As with 
corporate management level, the operations management level functions as middle 
management within airport management organisations and staffed with knowledge 
area experts specific to areas such as security, emergency response, and safety.  
As with the discussion in this section, the operations management level sits 
between the leadership level and the officer level in terms of the organisational 
hierarchy.   
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4.4 Disturbance Process Model: Operations Management 
The third disturbance level of analysis focuses on the operations management level.  
The operations management level encompasses members involved in the 
management of airport critical infrastructure with a focus on safe and reliable 
operations.  The operations management level of analysis sits at the second most 
senior level of the airport hierarchy, as with the previous corporate management 
group, and sits below the leadership function of the organisation.  Although the 
corporate management and operations management groups sit at the same level in 
terms of significance, the function they perform during both business-as-usual and 
disturbance differs.  The operations management group is the unit most responsible 
for the development of activities dealing with airport emergency planning and 
response, as well as security and safety measures for the airport.  In terms of 
disturbance, this group represents the key strategic development and management 
function for airport organisations.  In-depth interview respondents at this level of 
analysis included five Security Managers, four Terminal Managers, four Emergency 
Managers, three Airside Operations Managers, one Airside and Wildlife Manager, 
and one Airside Facilities Manager.  In their business-as-usual roles, members of 
the operations management level are responsible for emergency and security 
management including tasks such as planning and development of procedures, the 
development and implementation of training programs for staff, and the review and 
implementation of action items highlighted by prior disturbance events.  When a 
disturbance takes place (at Level 2: Minor Disturbance and above) the operations 
movement group functions as the key management and decision-making function 
for the organisation.  Their key role is in the coordination of staff and ensuring 
appropriateness of actions taken to bring operations back to a business-as-usual 
state of functionality.  Respondents from the operations management level all have 
extensive experience in the strategic operations and response functions of 
disturbance and are considered experts in the disturbance management process.   
 
The first component of this section involves an investigation of a range of critical 
incidents discussed by members of the operations management level of analysis.  
The operations group plays a more fundamental role in the management and 
functionality of disturbance events.  As mentioned previously, members of this level 
are called upon as expert decision makers with eleven of the eighteen respondents 
functioning as incident commander during live and training events.  Members of the 
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operations management level have discussed the following critical incidents as live 
events that occurred at their respective airport sites.   
• A-Air respondents discussed two critical incidents in the form of a critical 
failure of airport information technology infrastructure (as also discussed by 
the leadership analysis level in Section 4.2 and the corporate management 
analysis level in Section 4.3) and a serious safety failure which had the 
potential to escalate much higher than it did (as also discussed by the 
corporate management analysis level in Section 4.3).  The information 
technology failure caused disruption not only to business operations but also 
to the safety and reliability of the system.  Respondents at the operations 
management level highlighted that even up to six hours after the event full 
functionality had not been recovered of critical systems such as incident 
reporting and maintenance sign off for compliance.  This emphasised, in a 
normal accident theory type approach, the far-reaching impacts of a failure in 
one component can have on the overall reliability of a system.  The second 
event of the serious safety failure was this time highlighted from the 
operations side of the situation whereby classifying it as a training issue 
rather than a safety failure.  This stressed the key differences in how 
different components of a system define, categorise, and report on the 
severity (and potential severity) of a disturbance event.   
• B-Air respondents discussed two critical incidents that occurred as a terminal 
power failure/full evacuation (as also discussed by the leadership analysis 
level in Section 4.2 and the corporate management analysis level in Section 
4.3) and a bomb threat to an inbound flight (as also discussed by the 
corporate management analysis level in Section 4.3).  The terminal power 
failure/full evacuation was discussed in similar terms to the leadership and 
corporate management levels of analysis but with a higher emphasis placed 
on both coordination with first response agencies as well as the complexity 
in re-opening the site when operations were able to commence.  
Respondents discussed the importance of facilitating the work of first 
response agencies as well as highlighting the preparedness of the airport 
management organisation to provide expert knowledge of the site.  
Furthermore, operations management respondents discussed the need to 
facilitate a staged return to operations whereby the system does not move 
from one disturbance straight into another by dealing with overcapacity 
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issues.  The second event of the bomb threat to the inbound flight 
highlighted similar functions of facilitating the ability of first response 
agencies to work on airport.  An issue that was recounted by operations 
management respondents was when the disturbance ran outside of regular 
business hours and no members of the airport leadership team remained on-
site.  Respondents noted that this sent a somewhat mixed message to staff 
that were dealing with serious business disruption event that had the 
potential to become a disaster had the threat been actualised.   
• C-Air respondents discussed two critical incidents as an extreme weather 
event at the airport that caused serious disruption (as also discussed by the 
corporate management analysis level in Section 4.3) and an extended high-
tempo operations event.  The extreme weather event was one that 
developed from a disruption to operations through to a passage welfare 
issue whereby people had been in planes for hours without being able to 
disembark.  A distinction from the data at the operations management level 
was the early recognition by a member of the team (who had extensive 
experience as a first responder) for the event to potentially become a more 
social-welfare focused disturbance.  This perspective was not given a high 
priority until later in the event when passengers started to get distressed and 
aggressive on-board the aircraft in question.  Although dismissed when 
initially raised, it served as a key learning experience for members of the 
operations management team who redefined their position to make sure that 
people were given priority in all instances.  The second event was of 
extended high-tempo operations occurred due to a major international event 
with the host city being that of C-Air.  This critical incident provided a unique 
insight into a commercial enterprise running extended high-tempo operations 
(as discussed in the context of aircraft carrier operations at sea by Rochlin, 
LaPorte and Roberts, 1987) while maintaining high levels of performance.  
Operations management respondents highlighted a range of different 
strategies employed during this period including standing up the operations 
centre for the duration, as well as bring in business-as-usual staff members 
to add capacity where needed.   
 
The critical incidents discussed above by the operations management analysis level 
have highlighted some different perspectives from the previous more business-
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oriented respondents of leadership and corporate management.  A common thread 
during these critical incidents was the way different people define and understand 
disturbance.  The examples from A-Air of both a technical and human disturbance, 
highlighted the differences in which dissimilar groups gauge the impact and severity 
of the disturbance.  This was similar to B-Air in that operations staff were 
disappointed by a lack of presence of senior leadership during what could have 
been a serious event.  It is quite possible that this was a reflection that senior 
leadership was completely confident in the actions of operations management 
however this interpretation was not shared by all members.  The examples from C-
Air highlighted the importance of placing social welfare first in all disturbance 
scenarios.  Furthermore, the utilisation of protracted high-tempo operations by using 
business-as-usual staff as a surge capacity highlighted a potential learning 
opportunity for other airport management organisations.  With these critical incidents 
in mind, the following section will now further investigate the conceptual disturbance 
process model by exploring the process from an operations management 
perspective.   
 
4.4.1 Disturbance Process: Operations Management Level 
As previously introduced, research question 1A investigates the representativeness 
of the disturbance management process to real-world practice.  This investigation 
thus far has been undertaken with the leadership and corporate management levels 
of analysis to investigate the accuracy and relevance of the proposed model.  As 
reported, the previous sections have highlighted wide-ranging support for the 
proposed model with advice for improvement of the process.  This investigation will 
now focus on the operations management level of analysis.  The operations 
management level serves as the main strategic planning and management function 
within airport management organisations for dealing with disturbance events.  In 
many cases these employees function as expert decision makers who aim to guide 
airport management organisations through disturbance.  The initial analysis at the 
operations management level investigated the conceptual disturbance management 
process model for relevance and accuracy.  Operations management respondents 
supported the model as being highly representative of real-world practice.  
Respondents highlighted that they could recount examples whereby actual 
disturbance events had developed through this process.   
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“For an event I think that (the model) is quite relevant.  I can relate a couple of 
events we have had that actually go around that cycle.”   
“I think generally speaking that’s actually quite correct.  You know you mean 
you could break it down a little bit more in terms of the component parts and 
so on, but yeah I would say that generally speaking that’s pretty right.  I don’t 
think there is anything you would adjust at this level.”   
 
Furthering the discussion from the corporate management level, dissenting views 
were sought out to interrogate the process however no clear opposition was 
identified.  Members of the operations management level discussed the model in 
terms of emphasising areas of key importance for real-world practice.  Specifically, 
feedback on the model highlighted a range of areas that could be considered as 
objectives within particular phases of the process.  A critical area that was 
highlighted as being of significance for airport management organisations was the 
need to develop a holistic process which incorporated all four phases of pre-event, 
response, recovery, and post-event.  As with the previous two levels of analysis of 
leadership and corporate management, this further reinforced the ability of the four-
phase process to represent disturbance in airport critical infrastructure.  The post-
event phase was highlighted by respondents of all data collection sites as being a 
critical component of the process that presently causes significant challenges for 
airport management organisations.  Specifically, the post-event function was 
discussed as being a chokepoint within the process where current systems lack the 
ability to embed explicit learning back into the organisation.   
“I think your model is actually spot on.  Yes I think this is important (entire 
process).  The preparation is really important, detection is really important but 
I think avoidance is a hard one. But it is spot on.  If everything (in pre-event) 
goes properly you usually go to here (post-event). If it doesn't then this is 
where you end (response recovery).  I think where we run into problems is 
from here (response) to here (recovery).  I think that is the issue most times.  
Everyone is thinking we've covered all off so we expect to go to there (post-
event).  That is where we tend to fall down.”   
“It looks reasonably accurate about how it would normally go.  I suppose the 
biggest challenge is then when we have things occur, how do we bring that 
back in?  How do we learn from it?”   
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“The model has captured all of the issues I think and plugged in to that (review 
and learning back to pre-event). That would be great to close that loop and a 
really important part of it I think. Yes, would be to make sure that they’re all 
linked together and they’re all link to that pre-event matrix.”   
“I think with the learning if we could be explicit in that arrow in the top left 
corner that's about implementation of learning, then I think that would help. 
Then feed into that planning and preparation side.”   
As members of the operations management level of analysis are responsible for 
much of the specific functions of review and learning within the post-event process 
their interest in this area could be expected.  The distinction from the discussion at 
the leadership and corporate management levels is found in both the need to 
critically review current practice and the difficulty of undertaking the post-event 
process.  Rather than a process that simply ‘takes place’, the post-event function is 
one that requires meaningful development to enact change in the pre-event 
function.  Without this linking function between the post-event and pre-event phases 
much of the benefit that can be taken from disturbance is lost.  As such, this will be 
a significant area of discussion in the learning and review discussion of Section 
4.4.2.   
 
As highlighted in the literature discussion of previous disturbance models, the need 
to provide flexibility in the process is of critical importance whereby the system has 
functioned effectively and avoidance has been able to be attained.  As discussed in 
the literature review of this thesis, prior academic work had noted the opportunity to 
avoid disturbance yet the process still developed through pre-determined response 
and recovery phases.  In real-world practice this would not occur and an ideal 
approach (presented by this thesis) is that the post-event function of learning and 
review would still take place to interrogate the rationale behind avoidance occurring.  
Members of the operations management level highlighted the representativeness of 
this avoidance function whereby the model has the ability to ‘short-cut’ phases that 
are not required.  Respondents highlighted that this is a key goal of airport 
management organisations whereby systems are resilient to disturbance and are 
able to avoid the need to activate response and recovery processes.   
“I think its really important to be able to short-cut the process (referring to 
middle arrows).  So that makes perfect sense as a cycle.”   
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“Yeah I think that it’s a good approach and hopefully going through that 
process (avoidance stage) of trying to avoid anything virtually happening as 
everyone sort of would love to achieve, unfortunately you don’t always achieve 
that.”   
“Yeah you are right that can go from there (pre-event) to there (post-event), 
and it wasn't really an event, so you are missing out any sort of response and 
recovery.”   
 
The operations management level noted the importance of maintaining a level of 
airport operations (where possible) even while significant disturbance events were 
taking place.  This was highlighted by the importance of considering both recovery 
and response phases concurrently.  As recounted by interview respondents, airport 
management organisations do not wait for the response phase to finish before 
tasking up recovery processes.  Rather, the system functions whereby both decision 
making and actions are focused providing response to disturbance and continuity of 
operations at the same time.  The example below highlights the increased difficulty 
in considering both response and recovery as simultaneous functions and the 
requirement of the delegation of tasks to expert decision makers (usually operations 
management level).   
“So even during the response you're thinking of the recovery aspects.  Have I 
got the right people in the right location to support the human recovery?  If I 
don't get that group working quickly then will I need another team of people 
who can start dealing with that?”   
This requires senior decision-makers in the operations management level of 
analysis to task individuals to deal with specifics of the components of response and 
recovery so that the organisation can return to business-as-usual operations as 
soon as is appropriate.  The following three examples highlight this concurrent 
process occurring in both infrastructure disturbance (Level 2: Minor Disturbance of a 
burst water main in the airport terminal) and security events (in both cases a Level 
3: Major Disturbance where a passenger breached the screen point without being 
appropriately cleared resulting in the sterile area requiring rescreening).   
“The business is all about keeping the business running.  You are not only 
affecting this point but you're affecting airports up-line, and all your customers 
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businesses down the track, so it can take days to recover.  So you will try and 
isolate the area and work around that area if you can and most times you can.  
For example if you had a burst water main on northern concourse you would 
isolate that area and try and run the business from the rest of the terminal and 
recover that way (Minor Incident Disturbance Level 2).  Then you can have 
recovery and continuity happening at the same time.”   
“Once we start the screening of the passengers back into the terminal, we are 
coming back on line, not accountable that we are fully back on line if as I said 
we had thousands of people in the lounge that we had to take in (Minor 
Incident Disturbance Level 2) .  And again there is still a few little things, you 
got to abide that customer servicing, trying to keep people calm and getting 
people through the – have to go on the flight earlier and those other people so 
trying to separate them and whatever.  So actually that recovery starts from 
the get go of the event.”   
“We were trying to look at how we can continue to manage operations, get 
passengers and manage the flows to a point where when the electricity gets 
switched back on and we are ready to go.  The security manager was actively 
looking at processing passengers, getting them ordered in-flight order, ready 
at security.  Hand screening people through to customs, so that when we 
pressed the button, we had people queued in customs ready to go and we 
could just then switch it on almost.”   
These real-world examples reinforce the contention from both the leadership and 
corporate management levels of analysis that response and recovery are 
simultaneous functions in airport management organisations.  As such, any it is 
proposed that revisions made to the disturbance process model should reflect this 
position.   
 
The other significant area of discussion for the operations management level of 
analysis was the near-miss component of the disturbance process model.  As 
highlighted by the previous levels of analysis, the near-miss function is one of 
significant importance to airport management organisations as it functions to 
highlight areas of potential vulnerability.  As the operations management level are 
responsible for operations of the airport in both business-as-usual and disturbance, 
respondents have a particularly close perspective to the near-miss process in terms 
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of its key value to the organisation.  The first area highlighted was the high 
complexity of airport management organisations and the significant difficulty in 
capturing near-miss information.  The examples below highlight the difficulty in 
identifying when a near-miss has occurred due to system and reporting factors.    
“Everyday in this environment there are thing happening that we miss.  Not 
intentionally but we as an industry miss.  And that comes down to a number of 
things technology, human factors, the environment, the workspace areas and 
communication.”   
“I'm sure we have near-misses every day that on my side I don't hear about 
until we actually have a hit.  If I come in first thing in the morning everything is 
up they could have had five near-misses.  They could have even had an 
outage but not enough to cause a hit because in the night there is no 
operations going.”   
 
Furthermore, operations management level respondents highlighted the value that a 
developed near-miss function can bring in terms of continual improvement for airport 
management organisations.  In the example below the respondent (a senior airport 
security manager) discussed the advantage that embedding learning of near-miss 
event provides.  Moreover, that a near-miss should be considered as significant a 
function as reporting and learning as when dealing with actual disturbance events.   
“When we look at an emergency might be an airline has declared a full 
emergency and we immediately go into our procedures but the plane lands 
safety and there is no issue.  But what we should still do is review that 
response component and look at what we have actually done.  So we should 
look at lessons learned and get feedback on what’s preceded and then as you 
said embed it back into the planning and process area and on the decision 
making process.”   
 
The near-miss function was also discussed in terms of the complexity of reporting 
and change as a result of information.  Respondents noted that, from their 
perspective, there was a lack of system adjustment that could be made when a 
near-miss had been identified.  This was discussed as being due to two reasons.  
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First, respondents highlighted a lack of authority to make actual changes to 
standard operating procedures to correct errors.  Rather than have the ability to 
change the procedure themselves, the respondent in example one (a senior airport 
emergency manager) was reliant on other managers to implement change based on 
their recommendations.  In this first situation, there was limited oversight to identify if 
any adjustment had actually been made based on near-miss recommendations. 
“What bothers me about it is I am not sure we capture all of them.  And then 
what gets done with it once we capture the information.  One of the challenges 
in my position, and I talked to my boss about it, is that I will see things that are 
a near-miss that needs sorting, but because I don’t manage anybody directly, I 
am relying on other managers to have the vision or the knowledge I have to 
deal with the issue and fix it.”   
Second, operations management level respondents highlighted the perception that 
even when information was being reported up to the appropriate more senior 
managers, little is being done to correct vulnerability.  The respondent highlighted 
that the lack of understanding the trends around disturbance caused the potential to 
evolve from vulnerability into a critical incident.  This is an interesting statement for 
two reasons.  If information is being reported to more senior levels without being 
actioned and corrected, this represents a clear lack of support for enhancing 
resilience in the organisation.  The other possibility is that information is being taken 
on board and corrections made yet the information is not being accurately relayed 
back to the staff that highlighted the vulnerability in the first place.  Both of these 
contentions present a critical challenge in a cultural sense for airport management 
organisations in the way they monitor reporting of near-miss events and provide 
feedback to members of all organisational levels to further encourage reporting.   
“Even though we do report that systems aren’t reporting the near-miss is 
higher up.  So guys on the ground are reporting and keeping daily duty logs of 
everything they do but it's not getting up to senior management. So even 
though we are reporting those near-misses they aren't really being trended 
enough to actually go anywhere.”   
The final component highlighted at the operations management level regarding 
near-miss processes revealed an operational area where data is being captured but 
potentially not used to inform practice in airport management organisations.  
Respondents highlighted that a key area of information was duty manager reports 
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that are developed during each shift.  These reports highlight a wide range of 
information that took place during the particular shift and serve as a component of 
hand-over to the following shift.  Duty manager reports are a well-established 
practice in airport management organisations and are known within all operational 
areas inside the airport management industry.  As well as serving this business-as-
usual information function, operations management respondents highlighted the 
potential for these reports to provide a detailed picture of operations and the 
potential to further explore areas of potential vulnerability.  Furthermore, as these 
reports are developed a number of times each day, they provide an up to date 
picture of operations with the potential to provide a trends based analysis approach 
on areas of potential vulnerability.  Respondents highlighted that at present little is 
done with this information outside of the duty management team.   
“The only thing I can think of is the duty manager reports which every shift, 
their shift has a report and a night shift has a report which will report on any 
incidents (Normal Operations Disturbance Level 1 or Minor Incident 
Disturbance Level 2).  Somebody could escalate that so you can look at some 
of those potentially and say what went well there and why didn’t it escalate.  
But other than that, at the moment, probably the information is there but not as 
much of a review and learning process around those points.”   
“Another feed is the duty manager log that they say everyone has got access 
to.  It covers the key points of what happened, well, what could have 
happened but didn’t (Normal Operations Disturbance Level 1 or Minor Incident 
Disturbance Level 2).  So we are reporting on it but we haven’t highlighted it.  
It doesn’t get fed up to anybody and they are just sitting in the duty manager 
office.  They probably just sit the log and maybe they will mention that on their 
monthly meeting.”   
 
The following section will discuss research question 1B that further investigates the 
disturbance process model in terms of the specific stages of the prescribed phases.  
A summary of the areas discussed in both this current section and the following 
Section 4.4.2 will be provided at the conclusion of the operations management 
analysis in Section 4.4.3.   
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4.4.2 Disturbance Stage Functions: Operations Management Level 
Research question 1B explores the conceptual disturbance management process 
by investigating the functions of the stages specific to airport management 
organisations.  The pre-event phase of the conceptual disturbance process model 
investigated the first four stages of planning, preparation, detection, and avoidance.  
As previously mentioned, members of the operations management level of analysis 
play a critical role in the specific planning and preparation stages of the disturbance 
management process.  Discussion with respondents highlighted a key focus on 
three specific areas of the development of appropriate planning for disturbance, the 
critical importance of training in the preparation of the system to deal with 
disturbance, and the potential limiting factors that can influence the specific stages 
of the pre-event phase.  Respondents highlighted that these three areas of 
development, training, and that potential limiting factors are central to how they 
develop and embed practice in airport management organisations.  
 
The first area highlighted by respondents of planning emphasises the importance of 
preparing an appropriate plan that has been developed in concert with the range of 
airport management stakeholders.  As airports are particularly complex forms of 
critical infrastructure, competing interests and objectives have the potential to form 
different perspectives on what the goals of dealing with a disturbance are.  Where 
as government agencies may be focused on areas such as chain of evidence and 
preservation of a crime scene, airport operators (and their commercial partners) will 
concentrate efforts far more in the continuity of operations space.  The first example 
below also highlights the importance of understanding the internal business needs 
and the capability of members of staff to implement the plan where needed in an 
appropriate fashion.  By understanding these needs, airport management 
organisations are able to develop a plan that is more relevant and able to be 
operationalised in a real-world disturbance event.  The second example highlights a 
comment regarding the value of the conceptual disturbance model to test and 
review current planning and training to assess the validity of the plan in practice.  
Respondents highlighted the importance of continually reviewing the planning and 
preparation stages to further embed reliable practice in airport management 
organisations.    
“Whenever you do your development you need to involve all stakeholders.  
You might be the driver but you need to have all stakeholders involved and get 
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their feedback and understanding to what it is.  Mind you, we also need to 
educate our operations staff that just because something has gone astray, we 
don’t want to have too much reliance on it.  And this comes back to reliance 
and specifically those quick decision exercises in training – here is a problem 
so what do you do now duty terminal manager?  Put yourself in the position 
where you have to really do it.  And that is part of your continuity planning and 
so I think with the duty terminal managers in particular and others around we 
don’t have those business continuity plans in place or even standard operating 
procedures that might deal with basic faults rather than a business continuity 
plan.”   
“I think this works well with the training cycle.  The training cycle needs 
constant analysis by looking at the plans, how we implement the plans, 
implement the training, evaluate the training, validate the training, and then 
you feed back into your plan again.  Its very similar to that and I think the 
model makes a lot of sense.  Something we have always tried to do here is to 
record those lessons learned and as you said get them involved and 
embedded back into the process.  It’s an ongoing battle but we are improving 
with it.”   
 
For the second area of training, operations management respondents highlighted 
the value that appropriate training can bring to an airport management organisation.  
By developing a training program to enable staff to better understand and implement 
the pre-determined plan, even in times of difficulty or distress, staff will be able to 
respond in a more suitable manner.  As noted by the first example below, within the 
training function a key focus is on making sure the program accurately reflects the 
organisational requirements and that staff are undertaking training in the intended 
fashion rather than practicing bad routines.  The second example further reinforces 
this point in that the more development experience staff have in both desktop 
sessions and live exercises the easier dealing with a real-world disturbance event 
will be.   
“When the shit hits the fan everyone goes back to the absolute basis of their 
knowledge.  Doesn't matter if their hair is on fire.  They know this is my job to 
own.  And I get frustrated with the practice makes perfect comment.  Well it 
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doesn't.  Perfect practice makes perfect.  Maybe you’re doing the wrong 
thing?”   
“It’s all about training and it’s all about desktops and making sure that 
everyone knows what they have to do.  Yeah and if you do that, if it’s done 
regularly, it should go pretty smoothly.  And I think we are very good at that 
here within the operations department.”   
 
The third part discussed in the pre-event phase was areas which operations 
management respondents viewed as limiting factors for appropriate development.  
These were components that employees viewed as barriers to the appropriate 
implementation of the planning and preparation stages of the process.  The first 
component discussed was the need to have training that is embedded into 
employees rather than requiring reliance on plans.  In a real-world event 
respondents noted that they need to have a detailed and entrenched knowledge of 
the appropriate processes.  In the first example the respondent recounts where 
persons are still trying to learn the appropriate approach at a time when others have 
a clear understanding and are trying to implement a real-world scenario.   
“And that's again why we talk about preparation and training. And the training 
aspect, I suppose what really pisses me off is that you'll get people that turn 
up on that day of the live training to learn the training.  That day we test - we 
don't train. And there is a big difference.  And a lot of people don't understand 
the difference between training and testing.  We're testing the merits of our 
plan.  You're not there to work out, ‘hang on what does page 7A say again?’  
That’s not what we are there for.  You should know page 7A back to front 
before you roll up. Huge failing from where I sit.”   
In a similar way, the next example details the need to have training that is 
specifically designed to an airport context.  The respondent highlighted shifts in the 
industry since privatisation that has placed pressure on organisations to outsource 
to more generic training.  This presents an issue regarding the legitimacy of training 
and the potential impact it has when members of staff are required to respond to a 
real-world disturbance event.   
“It’s funny talking to some of the other ports that used to be there a very long 
time ago, especially in government days when resources were a lot more, and 
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it was really taken away when airports started getting privatised cut jobs and 
said get lean, a lot of people you can outsource that to now.  It’s really 
generic-based training and even though certified it's not airport specific, and 
these kind of activities need to be assessed based on the airport.”   
The notion of legitimacy of the pre-event phase also extends to the way in which we 
require operational staff to risk assess the development of projects.  The first 
example below highlights an interaction between an operations management level 
respondents and a corporate member of staff regarding the development of a new 
project.  In this interaction the operations management respondent is asked to 
review the project, as is a standard practice for that airport management 
organisation, however the request is made conditional to a short time period.  In this 
example the result of the assessment was that the program was appropriate to go 
ahead however this was not accurate and was in breach of federal regulations.  This 
example further highlights the need to have a legitimate pre-event process that 
undertakes genuine assessment by areas experts to understand potential 
vulnerability of proposed adjustments to the system.   
“A lot of the issues we face of the moment is they will send us a drawing and a 
twenty page document and say ‘I need you to do a review on this but I really 
need that back in two days so hurry up with your review’ and you have all of 
your other duties to do as well reviewing projects for people … so when are 
we going to review it?  Well what usually happens is that you do and you do it 
really quick and in this case something has happened and someone has gone 
‘yep it looks all good’ when it actually wasn’t all good and it caused a serious 
breach.  So for me that is really not a legitimate.”   
The second example further highlights the importance of legitimacy in the pre-event 
function, in this instance looking at the need to have accurate manual processes 
developed.  In this example the respondent notes that planning needs to be 
developed by looking at the minimum functionality required to remain operational.  
In situations where pressure is high due to the time critical nature of the airport 
management environment, overly complex and inflexible plans can be more of a 
hindrance than help.  The respondent notes legitimate manual processes as a 
current area of improvement for airport management organisations.   
“I think the biggest challenge for us further developing will be the complexity.  
At the moment, if we have a plane crash we are dead in the water.  So I think 
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being able to adapt is the biggest thing.  Like I said in forty-two years I've 
never really had two days the same.  And one of the things airlines were good 
at was developing a plan to roll back to whether it be manual check in 
processes or things like that.  They were very good at a basic plan to work to 
but with the flexibility to be able to change that to suit the situation.  We are 
not very good at that.  Because a lot of people develop a plan and say ‘well 
that's how we are going to do it’ but at the end of the day it's not that way.  So 
that's the biggest mistake I think you can do is to lock yourself into that plan 
and not be open to other possibilities.”   
 
The response phase of the conceptual disturbance process model investigates 
stages five and six of the process as coordination and facilitation, and containment 
and limitation.  As with the leadership and corporate management levels where 
there was clear variance in the in which respondents define response, the 
operations management view presented a range of ways in which they interpret the 
purpose of response.  The examples below present three different explanations 
from operations management respondents that represent different degrees of 
adherence to pre-determined processes.  The first example from a senior manager 
in the landside operations area highlights that the response process is about 
implementing the pre-developed approach (similar to the position contended by the 
leadership level of analysis).  This position highlights the linkages between the pre-
event stages of planning and preparation, and the response function of the airport 
management organisation when the plan is activated.   
“And when we talk about facilitation, I don’t know whether this happens at 
other airports, but we just get on with it.  It’s not just we sit there and go, ‘what 
am I supposed to do’?  We just all know what we are going to do, we have 
trained it and understood it so we get on with it.  So in regards to coordination 
and facilitation it all comes back to the work we have done in planning and I 
think we are good at that?  It’s never ever for me been where I thought who 
the hell is in control.”   
The second example from a senior manager in the airside operations area notes the 
potential for flexibility.  As situations may require variance between the pre-
determined planning and preparation stages and what is actually required in real-
world response, this respondent highlighted the move to a more decision making 
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based position.  As such, this understanding of response looked at both 
implementation of a pre-determined plan as well as having the ability and authority 
to adjust the plan to make it appropriate to the specific situation encountered by the 
airport management organisation.   
“My response is really about assisting and helping coordinate.  Particularly 
around manpower and possibly then once we have ascertained the nature and 
how long that could be there - if it was weeks - I would get the airside 
coordinator to start organising rosters; how are we going to cover all this?  
What sort of resources do we need?  To get us towards recovering the site.  
So its really looking at what we are doing and what other areas we need to 
consider outside what we had planned for.”   
The third example is from a senior manager in the terminal operations area who 
discusses response in a decision-making focused manner.  In a distinction from the 
first two areas which placed high emphasis on implementing pre-determined plans, 
this approach looks first at developing a clear assessment of the situation.  The 
decision-making based approach is introduced as including members internal and 
external of the organisation (stakeholders, contractors, first response groups) in 
developing a consistent objective based response.  It should also be noted that the 
respondent below has over thirty years experience in airports from ground staff to 
senior operations management.   
“The hardest part is getting through this coordination and facilitation.  So it’s 
about asking those questions and getting everyone on the same page.  What 
are we going to focus on?  What are our priorities? How are we going to deal 
with this?  And we just do it systematically.  Don’t panic.  And that’s what its all 
about. We cant do shit about the situation that’s happened, accept it, lets 
move on, and lets deal with it in these stages.  And yeah I think that the model 
is spot on for really working out those decisions.”   
All three of the examples above highlight real-world tested approaches to 
responding to disturbance events.  They highlight that there is a range of ways to 
define and understand the process with successful outcomes.  The potential 
weakness here is when we have persons who view the process in different ways 
working together.  If we had a situation whereby the respondent from example one 
(follow the plan and go do it) and the respondent from example three (discuss the 
issues and develop in coordination) were dealing with the same disturbance this 
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introduces the potential for conflict.  This presents a key area of consideration for 
this thesis in that it highlights the need for airport management organisations to 
develop a clear framework around how we intend to deal with disturbance response.   
 
The next area of consideration discussed by the operations management level was 
coordinating response functions with groups outside of the airport management 
organisation.  Respondents discussed the relationship as one that is best developed 
with open communication and inclusion.  The first example discusses an instance of 
a landside disturbance where a sterile area breach occurred and emphasises the 
need to include different groups (in this cases airline who operate areas of the 
terminal, security staff, and police) to develop a consistent and clear approach to 
response.  The second example discusses an airside event with the same need to 
have open communication and involvement to make sure that coordination and 
facilitation are developed in the most appropriate manner for the disturbance.  This 
approach of coordination and facilitation across the internal/external boundary of the 
organisation is a key area for both Level 3: Major Disturbance and Level 4: Crisis 
Disturbance severity events.   
“So one of the biggest problems here is you are dealing with three 
components so we have got to get together and talk and share the 
information, collectively make a decision and run with it, and support each 
other.  And all it takes is two minutes of ‘this is what’s happened, this is the 
situation, and our assessment is this’.  And the reality is if we don’t know 
where they have gone we have got no option.”   
“There were some big challenges that day and unfortunately I think a lot of 
them were out of our control because we had about 25 airplanes parked on 
the taxiways.  I guess there were some shortcomings on our part in 
communication across to users.  The airlines were heavily affected that day.  I 
think we had difficulty communicating to them.  I think they were running their 
own sort of show while we were up here trying to understand what was going 
on.”   
 
The final area discussed by operations management level respondents was the 
issue of capability in response.  Respondents highlighted concerns with the ability of 
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airport management organisations to respond to a disturbance while at the same 
time attempting to maintain normal operations.  The first example highlighted the 
need to maintain safe and reliable operations whilst simultaneously dealing with 
pressures around keeping costs at a manageable level.  The difficulty in keeping 
costs low while having an appropriate number of people to deal with disturbance 
presents a potential conflict.  The second example reinforces this position by 
highlighting a situation where operations were already strained by inclement 
weather and then the situation compounded by a potential emergency on an 
inbound flight.   
“And one of the big issues at the moment is if we are responding to something 
being able to maintain normal operations.  It’s a huge challenge and a lot of 
the time it really stretches us.  You get right back down to the resourcing, the 
redundancy, and the contingency.  We get hammered here so much about 
costs, money.  And I think the airport is doing really with the structure we have 
got, but its something that could be looked at to improve because even at the 
best of times we can really be at the limit.”   
“I think where we probably struggle here is balancing business-as-usual with a 
response.  So for example just yesterday we had a local standby for an A380 
coming in and that was during a pretty serious storm.  So were already under 
the pump at that stage.  So, I mean we're very stretched to that point in time 
already because we only have certain amount of resources on the airfield.  Its 
hard at the best of times and when something else gets thrown in as well 
sometimes you just need to be lucky.”   
These two examples highlight the importance in having a clear understanding as to 
the capability of an organisation to respond while maintaining standard operations.  
This is a serious consideration for airport management organisations for two 
reasons.  First, consideration needs to be given to the ability of the site to maintain 
compliant with federal regulations regarding safety and security while operations are 
close to their limit.  Second, even if we are compliant with federal regulations, are 
we placing ourselves in a position of greater vulnerability?  During participant 
observation at airport management sites this was evident when employees were 
discussing concerns about a high increase in bird strikes while airside staff were 
busy responding to a weather event.  Although within regulations, airport operators 
should consider areas such as financial and reputational risk when decisions such 
as this are made.   
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The recovery phase of the conceptual disturbance process model explores stages 
seven and eight as operational continuity and disturbance resolution.  Members of 
the operations management level looked at three main areas with regards to the 
way airport management organisations recover from disturbance.  The first of these 
areas looked at the ability of the organisation to develop a staged return to 
operations whereby operational continuity is gradually increased until we return to 
business-as-usual operations.  Two examples are presented below with the first 
demonstrating a staged return following a terminal evacuation and the second 
highlighting cooperation between groups to return operations gradually to business-
as-usual operations following a severe weather event.   
“We have got procedures around how we go back getting everyone back into 
the lounge in stages as in the screening staff would go back in first and they 
will do sweep of the area and check out if it’s safe and secure and then airport 
staff to enter the building so they can go guard their shops and make sure 
nobody can get in or steal anything over there.  And then we go through the 
process of screening the passengers back in.”   
“There was no physical clean up for that event.  It was just a matter of the 
airport working with airlines, manoeuvring, adjusting, catching up, by these 
aircraft parking up, the terminal, they all work together and then 12 hours, 24 
hours later we are back into normal operations, normal timeframes, normal 
schedules (this was a Major Incident Disturbance Level 3).  It was really just a 
natural event but again that’s just total cooperation.  You can’t achieve that 
without the entire group working together.  We didn’t set up any sort of formal 
recovery committee we just maintained the airport emergency operations 
centre till we were back to normal operations.”   
 
The second theme discussed by operations management level respondents was the 
ability to provide a surge in output when required to deal with bringing operations 
back to business-as-usual.  The example below highlights the rescreening of 
passengers following a terminal evacuation.  The challenge in this scenario is 
making sure that screening protocols are followed while dealing with increased 
pressure from high levels of passengers.  The respondent in this example, a senior 
airport security manager, notes the importance of the ability to surge where required 
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and notes that from early in the response phase the increase in staff required to 
recover efficiently had already been identified and actioned.   
“So you don’t need a lot of labour to evacuate an area.  You need a lot of 
labour to screen them back into the area efficiently.  So in that evacuation 
process we will have staff coming across from the international terminal to 
start up more machines here so when the decision is made to reoccupy we 
have got massive capacity going back in which then means that we are going 
to have planes filling quicker.  In that speed you are very vulnerable when you 
are screening back in though because the screeners are going to want to be 
doing things fast and you have got to stand there and monitor and tell them to 
slow down and screen like normal.”   
 
The third component discussed for operational continuity draws attention to the 
need for cooperation between groups both internal and external of the airport 
management organisation.  In the example below, the respondent emphasises the 
need for all parties to recognise the overarching goal of the airport management 
organisation to bring operations back online (this would be applicable in Level 4: 
Crisis Disturbance events where external first response agencies are in command of 
the situation).  As noted, a key part of this is to demonstrate that the airport 
management organisation has the capacity and the skills to regain control of the 
situation and develop towards business-as-usual operations.   
“The hardest part of the recovery is trying to get everyone that thinks that they 
are important on the same page. Get everything back to recovery as quickly 
as possible so that everyone starts to think everything is starting to get back to 
business-as-usual.  So it’s just a confidence in the operation of the airport 
operations staff.”   
 
The post-event phase of the conceptual disturbance process model looks at the 
ninth and tenth stages of the process as review and learning.  The operational 
management level of analysis discussed three themes as being critical in the post-
event phases.  The first of these themes looked at the process by which airport 
management organisations undertake review.  The first example below highlights 
the relevance of splitting the review and learning functions into separate functions 
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on the conceptual disturbance process model as they serve different objectives.  
Respondents highlighted this by the fact that airport management organisations can 
review without then learning anything or that they can learn from experience without 
doing a review.  By separating these components on the conceptual disturbance 
process model a better representation of real-world practice is undertaken.  This first 
theme of the process of review and learning also highlights the importance of 
involving participants from all levels within the organisation, particularly those staff 
members in front line jobs.  So these front line staff are usually the first to recognise 
and respond to disturbance it is of critical importance that airport management 
organisations can draw from their first hand knowledge of the situation and develop 
appropriate strategies for further organisational development.   
“I agree in where you’ve got your review and your learning separated like that 
because not only do you learn from your review, but you can learn from a 
whole lot of other areas that need to also be taken into consideration.”   
“Its important after that event that you do have learning or review of what 
should happen or what we could have done better and how we can change 
whatever we need to change so that can happen.  Yeah and I think those guys 
on the ground should be part of those briefings that we have as well, you 
know, you bring them into the room and go through the whole process.”   
 
The second of the review and learning stage themes discussed the importance of 
embedding practice into the pre-event stage once improvements have been 
revealed.  Operations management respondents highlighted the critical challenge of 
embedding practice back into the organisation due to a number of reasons.  The 
first example highlights the difficulty in developing a holistic understanding across 
operations as members of staff, although experienced in the business-as-usual 
operation of the airport, may have not had involvement in particular types of 
disturbance response and recovery activities.  A potential remedy to this was 
considered as the involvement of staff in desktop and training exercises that cover a 
range of disturbance areas.   
“So it is mostly about learning from the incident, and how we can get that back 
into the workforce.  Because I can have people on duty for ten years, and in 
those ten years we might have had four or five accidents, but because they 
were not on that particular shift they have not got that experience. So that is 
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very difficult, and we try and incorporate that learning from incidents into the 
desktop work and exercises that we have.  The challenge is getting that 
across those learnings on board.”   
 
The next respondent examples highlight the importance that time and accountability 
play in embedding corrective measures into practice.  The first respondent notes 
that there can be an air of complacency with embedding change as once the live 
portion of the event is concluded there is a tendency to feel the organisation is out of 
danger.  The second respondent notes that in the past the airport management 
organisation did not impose strict timelines on remedial actions and as such there 
was limited correction.  The danger of this practice is that should a similar event 
occur the organisation will not be adequately prepared to deal with such a 
disturbance.  The respondent notes that his has been an area of improvement for 
the organisation with strict timelines being implemented for corrective actions.   
“Based on the type of incident it might not happen again for years (Crisis 
Disturbance Level 4).  So after something dies down, I think there's a natural 
tendency to say, ‘oh okay well that's it’ when we need to actually work on 
improving the process.”   
“So historically what was happening was that we do the review. There would 
be a whole lot of learning’s and recommendations and that'd sit open.  For 
months and months, years even.  And people say, ‘we'll get to it eventually’ 
because there wasn't an investment in it.  Now it’s something that is 
improving.  So, you'll find that we have a very strict time line to those things 
too.”   
 
The previous levels of analysis discussed that the post-event stages of review and 
learning is undertaken for disturbance irrespective of severity (with leadership 
highlighting challenges of this practice for lower severity incidents).  Operations 
management level respondents, who are usually responsible for the post-event 
phase, highlighted that this is not the case.  In actual practice events that would be 
considered Level 4: Crisis Disturbance and Level 3: Major Disturbance are reviewed 
in a pre-determined practice.  Disturbance events that would fall under the 
classification of Level 2: Minor Disturbance and Level 1: Normal Operations 
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Disturbance receive an unstructured and limited review with no explicit learning 
function present.  Respondents from all data collection sites highlighted that a far 
greater emphasis is placed on the review and learning function of higher level 
events and that knowledge is not embedded into the pre-event phase on lower level 
disturbance.  As lower level events occur more often, and have the tendency to re-
occur, this represents a key area of improvement for airport management 
organisations.  As discussed by Turner’s (1987) work in Disaster Incubation Theory, 
elements that appear as small issues often have the ability to compound over time 
and become more serious concerns for organisations than if they were managed at 
the initial lower level of severity.   
“In the emergency stuff that the airport emergency manager does the post-
events, look at it all and look at what we can do better.  That's the emergency 
response stuff like to a plane crash.  In lower level stuff I think we just fly by 
the seat of our pants really (laughs). Duty managers keep a log of events that 
goes out to the senior management of what's been going on but that’s about it 
really.”   
“The small lower level stuff, you never spend the time on that – It goes out to 
the universe.  So honestly it just slips into the business without anyone 
reviewing the issues really.”   
“If it was a local standby and it came to nothing we would just report on the 
event.  We will have a bit of a debrief of did everything work and was the 
communication good, what worked and what didn't work that sort of thing.  
Just a discussion really.  If it was a full emergency afterwards we would have 
an official debrief and review that would involve a lot more people.  We would 
review what worked, what didn't work, what do we need to implement, what 
we need to change in our standard operating procedures, all of those sorts of 
things.”   
“So we pretty much have a protocol here and it’s now being written into the 
documentation that any level three incident or above must have a debrief.  
Unless it’s something that’s a really short duration.  Like for example every 
once in a while we have a full emergency, and it’s only like 10 minutes long 
when their plane lands and stuff.”   
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The following section of this study will present a summary of findings of the 
operations management level of analysis.  Section 4.4.3 provides a discussion of 
the process of disturbance examined in Section 4.4.1 and the functions of specific 
stages discussed in Section 4.4.2 is provided.   
 
4.4.3 Study One: Operations Management Level Summary 
This analysis began by detailing critical incidents from the different data collection 
sites relevant to the operations management level.  This analysis looked at a critical 
information technology failure (Level 3: Major Disturbance), a critical safety failure 
(varied analysis depending on group), a terminal power failure (Level 3: Major 
Disturbance), a bomb threat on an inbound flight (Level 3: Major Disturbance), and a 
severe storm event (Level 3: Major Disturbance).  An interesting finding was that 
even though the majority of these events were discussed by the leadership and 
corporate management levels of analysis, operations management level 
respondents recounted a different understanding of events.  The data revealed 
nuances in ways in which the levels define the severity of different situation, look at 
the impacts on the broader business, develop response and recovery cross-
functionally, and rank objectives in terms of importance.   
 
The first section of the operations management level analysis, Section 4.4.1, 
discussed the process of the proposed conceptual disturbance model and its 
relevance to real-world practice.  As with the leadership and corporate management 
levels, the operations management level of analysis supported the contention that 
the conceptual disturbance process model was representative and applicable to 
real-world practice.  Respondents noted the strength of the model as its ability to be 
flexible (‘short cutting’ the process for a near-miss) and discussed the critical 
importance of the post-event phase for airport management organisations.  
Suggestions for improvement of the model were centred on the potential for the 
model to highlight the notion that in real-world practice the response and recovery 
phases happen concurrently, a contention also discussed by prior analysis at the 
leadership and corporate management levels.  This contention was supported by 
documentary analysis, particularly situation reports from real-world events, whereby 
response and recovery were seen as complementary elements of the same process 
(documents A13, A14, A15, A20, B03, B05, B06, C22, and C23).  Furthermore, the 
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operations management respondents further supported the importance of the near-
miss function for airport management organisations.  The operations management 
level of analysis also revealed the complexity in capturing and embedding 
recommendations based on near-miss information.   
 
The second section of the operations management level analysis, Section 4.4.2, 
discussed the specific stages of the disturbance process model and their respective 
functions.  The pre-event phase focused heavily on the planning and preparation 
phases of the process.  Operations management respondents discussed the 
importance of including a wide range of stakeholders in development, as well as the 
legitimate testing and review of planning and preparation activities.  This included 
the development of appropriate and accurate training with the use of real-world 
examples in desktops and exercises where possible.  The pre-event phase also 
revealed limiting factors such as over-reliance on plans, the lack of airport specific 
training, and the lack of genuine assessment of performance.  The response phase 
revealed different perspectives on how respondents understand the function of 
response.  Some viewed it as simply following a pre-determined plan, others a 
highly flexible decision-making approach, with others indicating a middle ground 
position of the two.  As with the pre-event phase, operations management 
respondents highlighted the importance of coordinating with stakeholders outside 
the organisation to ensure a managed response.  The response phase also raised 
the issue of airport management organisations being able to respond while 
maintaining some level of operations, and the potential vulnerability this creates.  
Respondents noted that operations are stretched at the best of times let alone 
during disturbance.   The recovery phase noted the practice of a staged return to 
operations, as well as a surge capacity to bring more employees to deal with 
recovery when required.  Furthermore, respondents noted that when operations 
have been removed out of the control of the airport management organisation a key 
part of bringing operations back online is demonstrating to first response agencies 
that the organisation if capable of dealing with the situation.  Post-event phase 
contributed a great deal of data.  Respondents noted that the process of review and 
learning needs to involve employees from all levels of the organisation to ensure a 
detailed picture of the issues is revealed.  Respondents noted the difficulty in 
accurately undertaking the review and learning process and the need to certify that 
corrective measures have been undertaken in a timely and precise fashion.    
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A summary of the key issues highlighted in Sections 4.4.1 Disturbance Process: 
Corporate Management Level and 4.4.2: Disturbance Stage Functions: Operations 
Management Level is provided below in Table 4.4.   
 
Table 4.4: Summary of Disturbance Findings – Operations Management 
Analysis 
RQ1A: What is the process that an airport 
experiences during disturbance?   
 
RQ1B: What are the functions of the specific 
stages an airport experiences during 
disturbance?   
 
 
• Critical incidents highlighted distinctions 
in the ways that various groups define 
and respond to disturbance 
• As with the leadership and corporate 
management levels, the operations 
management level supported the 
accuracy and real-world relevance of the 
proposed conceptual disturbance model.   
• As with corporate management, 
respondents from operations 
management highlighted the importance 
of flexibility in the model and addressed 
the near-miss process against real-world 
examples.   
• Operations management respondents 
highlighted the challenges of capturing 
near-miss information and embedding 
corrective practices back into the pre-
event phase.   
 
• As with the corporate management level, 
operations management respondents 
highlighted the need to develop the pre-
event, response, and recovery functions 
in a holistic manner with participation 
from all levels within the organisation and 
appropriate external stakeholders.   
• Operations management respondents 
identified distinctions in the way they 
conceptualise response in the degree 
they follow pre-determined plans or 
incorporate situational decision-making.   
• The ability to respond and recover from 
disturbance while maintaining partial 
operations was highlighted as a potential 
vulnerability.   
• Operations management respondents 
highlighted post-event review and 
learning as being more involved in higher 
disturbance events with lower severity 
events receiving minimal attention.   
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The following section of this document, Section 4.5, presents the final level of 
analysis of study one by exploring the officer level of analysis.  The officer level is 
defined as employees who function as front line staff in the various operational roles 
in airport management organisations.  These respondents sit at the lowest level of 
the organisational hierarchy and are managed by both the corporate management 
and operational management levels of analysis.  Although they lack seniority in the 
management of disturbance, the officer level of analysis provides the most 
knowledge and understanding in terms of direct dealing with disturbance events.   
 
4.5 Disturbance Process Model: Officer 
The fourth disturbance level of analysis focuses on the officer level of the airport 
management hierarchy.  The officer level includes employees who have a much 
higher level of responsibility for the actual tasks of response and recovery to 
disturbance rather than simply the management function (as with the corporate 
management and the operations management level).  As such, the officer level 
represents a more hands-on role with regards to disturbance events than the three 
previously discussed analysis levels.  In-depth interview respondents at this level 
included six Airport Security Officers, four Duty Terminal Officers, four Airside Safety 
Officers, one Emergency Operations Officer, one Airside Wildlife Officer, one 
Corporate Risk and Compliance Officer, one Airside Operations Officer, one 
Terminal and Landside Officer, one Media Officer, and one Training Officer.  
Members of the officer level are involved across the full scale of disturbance severity 
from Normal Operations Disturbance Level 1 through to Crisis Disturbance Level 4 
operations.  With regards to organisational hierarchy the officer level sits at the 
lowest level of seniority and as such are considered to be front line employees.  In 
terms of business-as-usual functionality, officer members are specialists in specific 
areas from the perspective of undertaking tasks rather than developing strategy.  
The business-as-usual tasks of this level revolve around reviewing business 
operations, assessing elements that have the potential to create vulnerability for the 
organisation, and deciding if they are able to take corrective action or if the decision 
needs to be delegated up the hierarchy.  Respondents from the officer level all have 
extensive experience in the practical elements of disturbance by responding to a 
range of disturbance incidents and as such are considered experts in the 
disturbance management process.    
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The first component of this section involves the investigation of critical incidents of 
the three airport management organisations from the perspective of officer level 
respondents.  The value of capturing the officer level of analysis is that this group is 
almost always directly involved or directly impacted by disturbance at airport 
management organisations.  This was the case in the examples where officers were 
involved in the response, recovery, or post-event review and learning function of the 
process.  The following represent the most discussed critical incidents from the 
twenty-one in-depth interviews with the officer level.  As these respondents 
discussed a wide range of examples, the most emphasised critical incidents have 
been discussed in this section.   
• A-Air officer respondents discussed a number of critical incidents ranging 
from Level 1: Normal Operations Disturbance events through to Level 3: 
Major Disturbance events.  The most commonly discussed critical incident 
for officer respondents level was a critical failure of airport information 
technology infrastructure (as also addressed by the leadership analysis level 
in Section 4.2, the corporate management analysis level in Section 4.3, and 
the operations management analysis level in Section 4.4).  Respondents at 
the officer level highlighted the serious disruption to business, both in a 
corporate and operational sense, which this disturbance caused.  
Particularly, respondents felt that the disturbance, which was started as a 
planned change, could have been handled in a much more open and 
collaborative fashion from the start.  Had they been involved in the planning 
and preparation aspects of the intended change, respondents from the 
officer level felt the disturbance may have been avoidable.  Another critical 
point to emerge from this disturbance was that respondents highlighted that 
they received little information about the progress of the disturbance and that 
they were required to seek out information rather than have it available in an 
open and shared manner.  This disturbance event highlighted the 
importance of communication and collaboration in a pre-emptive sense as a 
means of avoiding or managing disturbance.   
• B-Air officer respondents also highlighted a range of critical incidents from 
different severity levels.  The most frequently discussed example was that of 
a terminal power failure/full evacuation (as also detailed by the leadership 
analysis level in Section 4.2, the corporate management analysis level in 
Section 4.3, and the operations management analysis level in Section 4.4).  
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Respondents highlighted the difficulties in both the response and recovery 
phase of this disturbance event particularly around coordination and 
communication.  Prior to this disturbance taking place plans had been 
adjusted to move all communication during disturbance to push-to-talk style 
radiophones.  This was seen as the best option as due to the potential for 
overloading of mobile phone towers during a disturbance event.  The key 
issue was caused however when all power turned off both in and around the 
airport site and all infrastructure for the radiophones thus had no power.  In 
this critical incident officer level respondents recounted needing to return to 
mobile phones for communication (which did not end up overloading the 
mobile phone towers) for their main source of communication.  This critical 
incident highlighted the need to test pre-determined plans for accuracy and 
develop the ability to improvise when presented with a failure.   
• As with the previous data collection sites, C-Air officer level respondents also 
discussed a wide range of incidents at different severity levels.  The most 
widely discussed critical incident was the extreme weather event (as also 
discussed by the corporate management analysis level in Section 4.3 and 
the operations management analysis level in Section 4.4).  Respondents at 
the officer level noted the complexity of dealing with outside agencies and 
attempting to coordinate response across a range of groups.  At one stage of 
the event an officer member staff had been tasked with working in a major 
airline partner as the airline had ‘lost planes’ on the ground amongst other 
concerns.  This had not been a pre-determined approach however it proved 
very successful in coordinating across organisational boundaries.  Again, 
this critical incident highlighted the importance of understanding pre-event 
planning and preparation but also having the ability to implement a flexible 
approach where required.   
The critical incidents discussed by the officer analysis level highlighted a 
perspective informed by a much more ‘hands-on’ approach with disturbance.  A key 
learning from these critical incidents was that officer respondents noted the need for 
a regimented pre-event program that embedded planning and preparation in actual 
practice.  However, respondents also noted the need to modify, adjust, and 
improvise based on the particular scenario presented.  This was noted as being of 
critical importance where pre-determined plans had failed and officer level 
respondents needed to return to bare minimum resources and collective problem 
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solving and decision-making.  Furthermore, this ability to improvise was noted as a 
key area of importance when dealing across organisational boundaries.  
Considering these critical incidents, the following section will now explore the 
conceptual disturbance process model from the officer perspective.   
 
4.5.1 Disturbance Process: Officer Level 
As detailed by the previous section, the officer level of analysis has the most 
experience dealing directly in an on-the-ground capacity with disturbance (rather 
than the corporate management and operations management levels of analysis 
which serve more of a management function).  In the initial part of this investigation 
respondents were asked to give their thoughts on the conceptual disturbance 
process model in terms of its reflection of real-world practice.  As with the previous 
levels of analysis, both supportive and conflicting views were sought however the 
officer level of analysis presented overwhelming support of the process.  
Respondents expressed that the model presented an honest representation of real-
world practice.  Particular elements singled out in this discussion was the flow 
between the different phases of the model being accurate as well as the fact that the 
officer respondents could recount real-world examples of disturbance which 
followed this process.  Furthermore, respondents highlighted the flexibility of the 
approach (in terms of avoidance) as being relevant to how actual disturbance takes 
place at airport management organisations.   
 “I like all of it.  I think it captures the entire process really well.”   
“That seems to be pretty much how of an incident occurs, and how it’s 
resolved … yeah.”   
“Look, it’s pretty good.  I am pretty happy with all that.  I really can see in there 
because you are getting every event.  You are breaking it down again which is 
really good.  So, planning, preparation, detection and avoidance, that’s pretty 
well covers everything there for the pre-event.  So response, coordination, 
facilitation – yeah, that’s pretty good.  Coordination in recovery is really 
critical.”   
“I like it.  I'm trying to remember where I've seen something similar.  Haven’t 
seen it in this circular graph before on how it all works though which is spot on.  
And didn't cycle it back to the start which is what we need to happen.  So I 
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really like this yeah.  Good little model I think.  I want that (avoidance stage – 
respondent laughs).”   
“I definitely agree with flow.  That’s the flow for how things are done currently.  
The planning and preparation has being highlighted over the last 2 years, 
since we have had a new emergency management person.  Detection, 
coordination, facilitation; that’s a strong area and really in focus with this 
airport.  I mean this falls (model) perfectly along with what we are doing 
currently.”   
“That pretty much covers it, I mean obviously this is generic and that’s good 
because it can apply to anything.  There is nothing that I can think of to add to 
it and I am running through this kind of process every day.”   
The above examples highlight a portion of the responses given for the officer level 
of analysis supporting the accuracy of the four-phase approach using pre-event, 
response, recovery, and post-event as the descriptors of the process.   
 
As identified in the previous levels of analysis, the officer level also highlighted the 
fact that in real-world practice, response and recovery are taking place concurrently 
rather than in a linear fashion as conceptualised in previous models.  Officer level 
respondents highlighted that although the four-phases (of pre-event, response, 
recovery, and post-event) remain accurate, the process of response and recovery 
are usually being undertaken at the same time by different components of the 
airport management organisation.  This was noted by the need to either maintain 
operations while responding or bring operations back on line as quickly as possible.  
Officer level respondents noted that by considering and implementing the response 
and recovery processes as concurrent, a more efficient process can be achieved for 
the organisation.  The examples below highlight these points by discussing the shift 
to considering both phases from the onset of the disturbance.   
“The fallout will be different depending on the disturbance.  Especially in the 
recovery phase because in recovery you will have a team setup to recover 
and a team to set up to continue business.  The idea is to get business back 
up and running and so you concentrate this team on that (operations group to 
response phase of model) and then a team on the recovery of trying to sort 
the issue of what caused the emergency.”   
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“Yeah, that process is pretty much the same as what we do.  We've got to 
have the airport still running if at all possible during any emergency situation.  
The aircraft have still got to land and still got to take off even though there 
might be a certain situation that we are dealing with over to the side.”   
(Regarding the example of an unattended item in an airport terminal) “I know 
it’s going to impact the operations.  So, I’m already thinking ahead to try and 
make sure that we are only limited on what we need to do.  We need to make 
sure that we still got the operations and the airport running.  And then make 
plans to just keep things moving. But then if it comes that there is a bomb then 
we evacuate (Minor Incident Disturbance Level 2).”   
 
The near-miss discussion at the officer level was far less detailed than at the 
previous three levels of analysis.  This was very interesting to note as previous 
levels, being corporate management and operations management, noted a large 
portion of potential near-miss data coming from reports generated at the officer 
level.  Even when prompted, officer level respondents noted that they had 
overheard the term but mentioned that they were far more focused on dealing with 
‘real-incidents’ and that other parts of the airport management organisation looked 
at near-miss events.    
 “I don't think we have really considered that idea of compound issues.  I think 
we're probably not very good at capturing near-misses because there is an 
attitude in the company that ‘well if nothing happened then its all right’.  Well 
not that nothing happened this time but we were lucky.”   
 
A more alarming theme emerged by officer level respondents who noted that 
reporting was intentionally lacking around these types of events.  In the examples 
below, the respondent notes that there was a lack of a culture of reporting within the 
organisation and that person who did highlight issues were leaving themselves open 
for a negative response.  This presents a critical issue for airport management 
organisations and a potential cultural barrier to developing a mature system for 
learning from and correcting errors.   
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“We have a culture that people don't want to report things.  They don't feel like 
they have any voice to say things are not right.  Well we say we have no 
blame culture but that has never been articulated.  I think the thing is when 
people do stick their neck out and say something you often to get your head 
bitten off!  I have done it several times just last week actually.  And you know, 
even after getting my head bitten off I still think I did the right thing, I still don't 
regret what I did.”   
 
The key issues of not understanding the near-miss function, not taking the process 
seriously, and employees not feeling like they can report on issues all present 
serious issues for airport management organisations.  Of particular worry here is 
that more senior levels have discussed the importance of the near-miss function but 
the criticality of that is not filtering down to the officer level.  This should be 
considered a critical area of both planning and cultural improvement for airport 
management organisations.  The following section will investigate research question 
1B that explores the functions of the specific stages of the conceptual disturbance 
process model.  A summary of both the findings of the disturbance process (Section 
4.5.1) and the functions of the specific stages (Section 4.5.2) will be provided at the 
conclusions of the officer level of analysis in Section 4.5.3. 
 
4.5.2 Disturbance Stage Functions: Officer Level 
As previously detailed in this chapter, research question 1B is focused on exploring 
the functions of the specific stages of the conceptual disturbance management 
process.  The pre-event phase of the model included the first four stages of the 
process as planning, preparation, detection, and avoidance.  In discussion with 
officer level respondents, the clear areas of importance to them were the planning 
and preparation stages of the conceptual disturbance management process.  
Training was seen as the central component of these stages.  Particular attention 
was noted that for officer level respondents, training functions as a means of being 
better prepared to deal with events should they occur.  Officer level respondents 
also noted that the additional time and resources made available for training has 
improved the capability of the organisation to respond to and recover from 
disturbance.   
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“You don’t want them (staff) doing it the first time that they actually have to do 
it for you.  And that’s why I always like the Emergency Drills and Exercises 
and all that to get everyone thinking that way.”   
“So we give regular training with our incident coordination team, our incident 
management team, the duty terminal managers, the airside operations group.  
So last year was huge for training for us, this year have taken a step back as 
unfortunately the airport emergency managers time has just been so thin.  But 
last year in particular we spent a lot of time on training and that was 
highlighted that during the incident.”   
 
The pre-event phase also revealed that some officer respondents felt that the 
legitimacy of training could be improved.  This is a similar theme introduced by the 
corporate management analysis level regarding the appropriateness of staff skills in 
dealing with disturbance.  The example below highlights that officer level 
respondents in the corporate side of the business potentially lack understanding of 
how they could be involved in the response and/or recovery phases of disturbance.  
This highlights an interesting issue regarding where training is being appropriated in 
airport management organisations and is there a potential to enhance the skills of 
non-operations staff in dealing with disturbance.  This is of particular interest as prior 
data has discussed the challenges of airport management organisations in dealing 
with protracted events and also with responding to disturbance while at the same 
maintaining levels of operational continuity.   
“And what do all the people in this building (corporate headquarters) do when 
they have got no computers?  But shouldn’t they do something to help out the 
ops guys?  But none of them can and its never been brought up in the 
corporate context of ‘look if we lose everything, then we might need all hands 
on deck for this’.  These people here would just be completely useless.”   
 
Officer level respondents from the operations side of the organisation also 
discussed the issue of legitimacy in training that was first presented in the 
operations management level.  In the example below, the officer level respondent 
recounted that previous live testing of the emergency plan was set up two days in 
advance.  In this situation the respondent mentioned that the process lacked 
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legitimacy as it was unrealistic of what would actually be required in a real-world 
disturbance event.  As prior data of this chapter (as well as prior work in the risk and 
crisis management space) the more realistic training and testing can be the better 
chance practice has of being replicated when it comes time to respond and recover 
in a real-world context.  Airport management organisations (and the federal 
agencies that regulate them) should consider how representative their current 
approach is to how an actual disturbance process would take place.   
“Our annual exercise for example was setup for two days before.  It’s not real 
testing by them (internal and external participants) going out and putting up 
the tents for two days time - you don’t get that much time.  Get them to do it 
when it’s uncomfortable, when they are under pressure.  Tell them that there 
is going to be an emergency, but give him an idea at the different part of the 
Airport.  They are already thinking ‘okay, maybe we can do this, maybe we 
can do that’ and then all of a sudden change it on them and then its an actual 
challenge.  Actually make it real.”   
 
The response phase of the proposed conceptual disturbance model introduces 
stages five and six of the process as coordination and facilitation, and containment 
and limitation.  Respondents at the officer level of analysis noted the linkage from 
the pre-event phase to the response phase as the need to have the ability to clearly 
implement pre-determined activities relevant to the severity of the disturbance.  Of 
particular importance was the need to understand the plan and be able to implement 
it without needing to refer back to the document.   
“We all have to be up-to-date with our airport emergency plan.  That get 
updated often and we’ve got roles in that, it could be any from a standby to a 
terrorist attack, to anything else like that.   When we have an issue each 
person has a role to play.  So for the airside guys they should all know three 
basic ones we attend: standby, emergency and crisis and should know exactly 
what to do off by heart.”   
 
Furthermore, communication was highlighted as a critical area of coordination and 
facilitation from the outset of a disturbance.  As mentioned in previous analysis 
levels, communication is of critical importance but the officer level discussion 
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highlights the flow of information up the chain-of-command rather than within 
specific group levels.  Members of the officer level of analysis discussed their 
requirement in providing situational awareness back to the operations management 
level.  This need to provide communication back was noted as a function of 
providing senior decision-makers information by which they can develop appropriate 
strategies to deal with disturbance.  Furthermore, this was also discussed as the 
need for the more senior operations management level groups to provide detail to 
corporate management or leadership components of the business.  This places 
significant importance on the information captured and filtered up by officer level 
respondents on the ground during disturbance.   
“If there’s anything in regards to full emergency I will have to speak to my 
boss.  That’s just to chat with him just to keep him updated.  Because we 
might have to go into to overtime, we might have to do all those sorts of things 
as well.  And he has to be aware as well because he might get a phone call 
from the emergency manager saying, “so do you know what’s happening?”  
And then he’s got to know so I have to notify him, so he’s got a handle on 
what is happening on the ground as well.  Because he might be called up to 
be part of the emergency management team.”   
Another more emergent area of communication is the notion of the relationship 
between silos and how information is disseminated throughout airport management 
organisations.  Of particular importance for both the coordination and facilitation and 
containment and limitation functions is the need to develop an accurate picture of 
what is taking place on the ground during disturbance events.  Respondents at the 
officer level of analysis noted how silos create inefficiency and the potential for 
difficulty in maintaining consistent situational awareness.  The first example below 
highlights the challenge of communicating across organisational boundaries 
whereby information is not shared across groups and as a result more pressure is 
placed on the airport management organisation to continually recount the same 
information.  The second example highlights a similar challenge within the 
organisation whereby respondents recounted limited consistency around which 
persons within the organisation are responsible to deal with specific disturbance.  In 
this example the officer level respondent notes that it is consistently different people 
that has the potential to lead to confusion or misinformation about the key areas of 
importance.   
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“Where the process falls down, whilst you may speak to the ground handling 
agent the supervisor information doesn't always trickle all the way through so 
you will get repeated phone calls asking are you aware do you know because 
not everyone of their staff know, so you will have two people on the check-in 
counter and one at the other check-in both ringing to tell you that the signs 
don’t work which we are already aware of.”   
“When we get to the coordination and facilitation there is probably not any one 
person we turn to because the airport is siloed pretty severely I believe.  The 
thing is when you have a problem you deal with one person, and the next 
week next week with a different set of people.  And none of them talk to each 
other so everything is always different.  So when they do have a manager who 
oversees the recovery they may not necessarily have been involved in all 
aspects.”   
 
Furthermore, within the response phase of the officer level discussion, respondents 
highlighted the distinction of running the coordination and facilitation, and 
containment and limitation stages during corporate business hours and operational 
hours.  All airport data collection sites in this study are open for continual operation 
however the business function only operates during normal business hours.  As 
such, before 9am in the morning and after 5pm on weekdays, and all weekend, 
there is no management capacity above the officer level at the.  Therefore, when 
disturbance event occurs outside of business hours, officer level respondents are 
responsible for a much larger portion of the decision-making and implementation of 
response activities.  Some operations management level employees are available in 
an on-call capacity, however as noted by the examples below, management level 
component are not usually readily available.  In the first example, the respondent 
discusses the distinction between business hours and outside hours response 
functions.  The second example further highlights the additional responsibility and 
pressure placed on officer level employees when responding outside of business 
hours.   
“Any time of the day and if it’s a weekday it’s great because everyone’s here 
so the transition to an emergency management team is very quick.  If it’s 3 
o’clock in the morning then that is a different story.  I will need to start tasking 
straight in my office probably whatever the severity of the incident.  If it’s 
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serious enough I will go straight to the emergency management centre and set 
it up and get it going and start working from there.  It might be hours before 
the actual emergency or security guys are fully up and running and in that first 
part of it you are really on your own.”   
“When I was in control centre operations, things would happen and you’re 
basically on your own with the back end staff and contractors. You’re trying to 
contact the management but they’re probably not awake or not bothered 
answering their phone on the weekends.  The stress is just huge in that kind of 
a situation.”   
Observation and discussion with groups at different airport data collection sites 
highlighted that disturbance usually happens outside of business hours.  Particular 
to this was during peak times which tend to occur early in the morning before the 
majority of management staff are in or after close of business for evening peek 
times.  Observation participants at the management level (both corporate and 
operations) discussed examples of returning home from work on a Friday afternoon 
only to be required to turn around and return to assist officer level staff as a 
disturbance event had occurred during a peak time.  If airport management 
organisations are experiencing high levels of disturbance events outside of business 
hours without appropriate corporate or operations management staff available this 
represents a potential vulnerability for these organisations.  This highlights the 
potential for airport management organisations to consider the adjustment of work 
hours at the management level to assist the officer level and provide more detailed 
management during disturbance events.   
 
The recovery phase of the conceptual disturbance process model focuses on 
stages seven and eight of the process by exploring the areas of operational 
continuity and disturbance resolution.  Respondents from the officer level 
highlighted key themes in recovery as efficient communication, the ability to 
implement a staged return to operations, and the need for holistic development of 
recovery skills across the organisation (not simply limited to the operational 
components).  The first area of communication highlighted the importance of clear 
communication to ensure groups are aware of the situation and the strategy to 
return to business-as-usual.  The example below highlights that officer level 
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respondents note that communication is important for both internal staff and external 
stakeholders and is operationalised in the form of regular situation reports.   
“Once we know that we will be operational again, that information goes out via 
sitrep (situational report).  So we have sitreps which go out on an hourly basis 
to keep everyone up-to-date, employees, all airport stakeholders, incident 
response, and the airlines as well.  That is mainly what we are dealing with in 
the incident coordination centre, trying to get that information out to the 
appropriate people as quickly and as accurately as we can.”   
 
The second area of a staged return to operations functions as a component of 
operational continuity stage in the conceptual disturbance process model.  In this 
stage the airport is not fully operational but is working towards returning to business-
as-usual operations.  The example below details the repatriation of a terminal after a 
full evacuation.  In this example the terminal had been unused for some time due to 
a full power failure and as such additional staff were required to restart airport 
systems.  An additional function here was the need to surge staff numbers to 
prepare for the high volume of passengers needing to be screened through security.  
In this process the respondents noted the need to assess the situation and slowly 
bring operations online rather than potential causing a more serious disturbance by 
commencing full operations too quickly.   
“I would suggest here in the recovery, that’s probably more specific on the 
type of thing.  Because we do talk a lot about that in getting the facility back up 
to 100% but also about that staged recovery.  That’s is talked about a lot in all 
of our debriefs that we’ve done.  Once we’ve dealt with the event and we’ve 
processed it, how quick can we get it back to full capacity again?  You are 
making sure that the site and employees are okay to return to operations 
before you fully commit to a return.  The facility hadn’t been running for six 
hours, so their job was full on and most of the airline staff ran all night through 
the next morning just doing flights.  They brought extra staff as well in because 
they had to just do deal with the amount of people.”   
 
The third emergent area for recovery focused on potential vulnerability in the 
corporate side of airport management organisations in dealing with disturbance 
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events.  As revealed by observation and documentary analysis, as well as the 
example below, the operations side of airport management organisations have far 
more confidence in dealing with disturbance as it is a central part of their everyday 
function at the airport.  However, the corporate side of airport management 
organisations is far more accustom to dealing with business-as-usual processes and 
as such is somewhat underprepared for disturbance.  The example below highlights 
the need for awareness of disturbance in both the operational and corporate 
functions of emergency management organisation.  This is of particular importance 
for two reasons.  First, the improved knowledge of corporate staff members could 
develop into the potential to assist in functions around communication and 
management in disturbance.  Second, the improved skills and training of the 
corporate side of airport management organisations could be utilised as a surge 
capacity in disturbance response where more staff are required to assist in bringing 
operations back online.   
“If we were out for a long period of time I really don’t think we would handle 
that well (Crisis Disturbance Level 4).  Like I know we exercise the emergency 
response, like the emergency managers has organised the civil aviation safety 
exercises and that sort of thing, all the police run around, and the ambulance 
service and everything … but as the corporate side of the company like WE 
(referring to corporate staff) never exercise so we have no idea about what we 
are going to actually do?”   
 
The post-event phase of the conceptual disturbance process model explores 
stages nine and ten of the process as the components of review and learning.  
Officer level respondents highlighted two very clear themes about the post-event 
process.  The first of these themes highlighted the process by which the review 
function takes place in airport management organisations.  In a similar way to other 
levels of analysis, officer level respondents highlighted the review process as being 
one that is first developed in team and then developed to involve all parties at a later 
time.  The first example below highlights an officer level respondent recounting what 
would be the initial discussion following an airside local standby event.  The initial 
review process is focused on understanding what decisions were made and why, 
and exploring potential areas of improvement.   
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“So the first part of the debrief is right after the event and you sit there for a 
couple of minutes.  Was there a problem with your vehicle or was there 
anything else? Are you okay with the radio?  You know you just have to 
improve on that.  Why did you rush when the aircraft was 15 miles at out?  We 
still got time to collect out thoughts and set up out there.  What we are viewing 
that car that you hand off the radio to someone with not as much experience 
as you?  … So once all that stuff is finished we then will report our findings for 
the review with everyone else (internal and external review)”   
The second example highlights the process from moving from the initial in team 
review to the holistic review involving all stakeholder groups.  The officer level 
respondents draws attention to planning adjustments made as a result of lessons 
learned from a real-world disturbance event.  This would constitute the link between 
the post-event phase of the conceptual disturbance process model, back to the 
initial pre-event phase.   
“We conducted our individual debrief in internal teams within the airport itself, 
then we conducted an overall debrief.  So there is the hot wash-up on the day 
then we have all agency's and response.  Then we produce a report of 
learnings and that’s distributed again and then those action items are 
addressed.  For us it was really good timing in relation to the release of the 
airport emergency plan, so we made amendments to that plan from the 
debrief.”   
 
Although the above example highlights learning that is embedded back into the 
airport management of an organisation, this would better serve as the exception 
than the rule.  Officer level respondents highlighted a number of limiting factors in 
the process of embedding information back into the organisation as a result of both 
the review and learning stages.  In the first example, the officer level respondent 
recounts that in their time at the airport they had been involved in a wide range of 
serious disturbance events yet never involved in the whole group review process.  
The respondent mentions that rather than involve employees at the lower level of 
the hierarchy, they utilise the prior documentation and reporting to represent the 
position of what took place during the disturbance.  This should be an area of 
consideration for airport management organisations as there is a potential for a 
much more detailed picture of the events and decisions made during a disturbance 
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when you have those involved at all stages of the disturbance management 
process.   
“I have been involved in a lot of serious incidents and almost every one of 
them there has been a some sort of a debrief after the incident (Major Incident 
Disturbance Level 3 and Crisis Disturbance Level 4).  I have to say, not once 
that I have been invited to one of those debriefs.  Very rarely do we have the 
operations team that was on actually on during the event getting involved at 
the whole team debriefs so it’s based heavily on what we report after the event 
or during the event.”   
The next two examples all highlight limiting factors around the ability to transfer 
information gathered at the review stage into learning for corrective practice.  The 
three examples below highlight the distinction between review and learning in that 
shortcomings in embedding practice back to the pre-event phase have resulted in 
the same disturbance events occurring again.  Respondents highlight that at the 
time of the disturbance the business has the motivation of ‘we wont do it again’ but 
once that intention fades, unless explicit corrective practice has been implemented 
there is no guarantee the business will not end up in the same position.  In a similar 
way to the operations management respondents, officers also noted the presence of 
information in duty manager logs that are not reviewed for potential areas of 
improvement.   
“I don't believe it does get closed.  There are too many situations where it 
doesn't close.  We don't learn enough, we review it, but we don't learn much 
because we continue to do the same thing.  And it seems to be that “oh yeah 
we won't do it again” but it does happen again.  So I don't know that we learn 
much. We review but I don't know that we learn much.”   
“May be some of the issues that are here in the post-event probably aren't fed 
into the detection and avoidance for them next time. So from my experience I 
believe that we probably didn’t learn a lot out of post-event work.  The problem 
is that after those events are finished I think a lot of the information gets left in 
duty logs and it probably never gets looked at ever again.”  
The following section of this study will present a summary of findings of the 
operations management level of analysis.  A discussion of by the process of 
disturbance discussed in Section 4.5.1 and the functions of specific stages 
discussed in Section 4.5.2 is provided.   
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4.5.3 Study One: Officer Level Summary 
The officer level analysis began by investigating specific critical incidents from the 
different data collection sites of this study.  As officer level respondents represented 
the largest group of in-depth interview participants, the most discussed critical 
incidents was applied rather than cataloguing all areas examined.  The critical 
incidents investigated include a critical information technology failure (A-Air), a 
terminal power failure/full evacuation (B-Air), and an extreme weather event (C-Air).  
The perspective presented by the officer level of analysis introduced a hands-on 
perspective from participants directly involved in the disturbance process.  The 
discussion highlighted critical functions of the officer level as providing situational 
awareness via communication to more senior levels, the challenges when 
disturbance takes place involving a wide range of stakeholder groups, and the need 
to shift from following plans to a more decision-making based approach where 
appropriate.  All three critical incidents were categorised as Level 3: Major 
Disturbance in severity that highlighted the challenges of maintaining operations 
while undertaking response and recovery activities.   
 
The first section of the officer level of analysis focused on understanding the 
process by which disturbance events occur and comparing real-world practice 
against the conceptual disturbance process model.  Following on from the positions 
highlighted by the leadership, corporate management, and operations management 
levels, the officer level of analysis supported the approach of the conceptual 
disturbance process model and stated that it was highly reflective of real-world 
practice.  As with the previous section, officer level respondents discussed that the 
response and recovery phases are usually undertaken concurrently rather than the 
linear fashion represented in previous work.  As such, a potential revision for this 
work is to develop the response and recovery process as a single component rather 
than separate functions as a means of making the model further reflect real-world 
practice.  Respondents noted that although the response and recovery components 
are taking place at the same time, usually it is different components of the business 
who are responsible hence it is critical to maintain clear communication and 
understanding across groups.  The final area addressed in the first section looked at 
the near-miss process that was apparent in its absence (as was its absence from 
officer level documents which focused on incidents exclusively rather than near-
misses; A27, A36, A38, A39, A40, B01, B04, B09, C01, C02, C04, C14, C21, C25, 
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C26, C28).  Respondents were largely unfamiliar with the concept and noted that it 
was something that happened at the more senior management level.  This 
presented a critical issue as the corporate and operations levels highlighted the 
importance of tapping into information from the officer level to provide a detailed 
understanding of near-miss events.  In a more troubling finding, officer level 
respondents highlighted a lack of reporting culture within airport management 
organisations for fear of potential pushback.   
 
The second section investigated the functions of the specific stages of the 
conceptual disturbance process model.  Officer level respondents focused 
specifically on the stages of planning and preparation, highlighting the importance of 
the training function.  Furthermore, respondents discussed the importance of 
legitimacy of training in reflecting real-world disturbance events.  The response 
function was discussed in a similar way to leadership respondents in highlighting the 
function as implementing pre-determined plans.  This contention was supported by 
both standard operating procedures and disturbance response plans (documents 
A01, A27, A38, A39, B01, B08, C19).  In situations where plans were not 
appropriate, officer level respondents discussed the importance of communication 
(both internal and external of the organisation) in developing appropriate 
containment and limitation strategies.  The response phase also highlighted the 
issue of disturbance events taking place outside of business hours, hence placing 
considerable pressure on officer level respondents to manage and respond to 
situations with limited support.  The recovery phase of the process further 
highlighted the importance of communication in providing both situational 
awareness of the disturbance and providing of understanding of the strategy to deal 
with the condition.  Officer level respondents also highlighted issues around the 
operational continuity stage in providing a gradual return to business-as-usual 
functionality.  A potential opportunity for enhancing capability around recovery was 
highlighted as providing skills holistically across the business (not only in operational 
areas) whereby corporate staff may provide a support or surge function where 
required.  The post-event highlighted the need for further involvement from the 
officer level with an emphasis placed on enhancing learning in airport management 
organisations.  A summary of the key issues highlighted in Section 4.5.1 
Disturbance Process: Officer Level and 4.5.2: Disturbance Stage Functions: Officer 
Level is provided below in Table 4.5.   
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Table 4.5: Summary of Disturbance Findings – Officer Analysis 
RQ1A: What is the process that an airport 
experiences during disturbance?   
 
RQ1B: What are the functions of the specific 
stages an airport experiences during 
disturbance?   
 
• Critical incidents discussed the role of 
officer level respondents as being 
focused on providing communication to 
more senior organisational levels, 
implementation of plans where suitable, 
and decision-making and cooperation 
when necessary to deviate from pre-
determined plans.   
• As with the leadership, corporate 
management, and operations 
management levels of analysis, the 
officer level supported the accuracy and 
real-world representativeness of the 
conceptual disturbance process model.   
• Officer level respondents supported the 
contention that response and recovery 
function concurrently.   
• Officer level respondents had a much 
lower understanding of the near-miss 
process.  Furthermore, they reported 
concerns regarding the reporting culture 
of lower level employees in airport 
management organisations.   
• Officer level respondents highlighted 
training as the critical function of the 
planning and preparations stages.  
Particular importance was placed on the 
need for legitimate, real-world training in 
preparation for disturbance.   
• The response phase highlighted the need 
to implement plans as well as awareness 
of communication and coordination with 
stakeholder groups.   
• Recovery further highlighted the 
importance of communication as a means 
of providing a consistent understanding of 
the intended strategy for the gradual 
return to business-as-usual operations.   
• Officer respondents from the corporate 
areas highlighted a need for further 
training in response and recovery stages.   
• Officer respondents noted key issues 
around embedding learning back into 
airport management organisations 
following a disturbance.   
 
Sections 4.2 to Section 4.5 have presented a review of the conceptual disturbance 
process model across the four level of analysis of this thesis.  This review has 
looked at RQ1A investigating the process of disturbance, and RQ1B exploring the 
functions of the specific stages of the process.  The following section will provide a 
detailed summary of the analysis so far and will provide a foundation for further 
investigation in the Chapter Six – Discussion section of this thesis.    
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4.6 Disturbance Process Model Summary 
The previous sections of this chapter have explored the applicability of the 
conceptual disturbance process model to real-world practice.  This investigation has 
taken place by addressing the relevance of the model at all levels of the airport 
management hierarchy.  This approach has enabled a holistic picture of the 
relevance of the model to be explored against the analysis levels of leadership, 
corporate management, operations management, and officer.  Specifically, this 
analysis took place by exploring the process by which disturbance events occur 
(research question 1A) and the functions of the specific stages of the process 
(research question 1B).  This enabled a detailed picture of the applicability of the 
model to the airport management context as well as highlighting areas for potential 
improvement of the process.  This section will now provide a summary of the key 
points of this chapter as a means of providing a clear position which further 
discussion and comparison to prior literature may be developed in Chapter Six – 
Discussion.   
The initial discussion of each level of analysis was an exploration of critical incidents 
highlighted by respondents.  As discussed in Chapter Three – Methodology, the 
critical incident technique is especially useful for investigating examples of real-
world practice from the perspective of respondents.  All respondents had previous 
involvement in a wide range of airport incidents (in a pre-event, response, recovery, 
and/or post-event capacity) and as such had the ability to speak from personal 
experience.  Rather than explore every critical incident discussed by respondents, 
this thesis has looked for disturbance events that were discussed across the various 
levels of analysis specific to each data collection site.  As such, three critical 
incidents emerged that provided detail on the considerations and challenges present 
during real-world events from the perspective of the entire airport management 
organisation hierarchy.  The events selected for further discussion included the 
critical technology failure (A-Air), the terminal power failure and full evacuation 
(B-Air), and the extreme weather event (C-Air).  All three of these events 
constituted a Level 3: Major Disturbance event meaning that although the airport 
management organisation was still in charge of operations, outside agencies were 
required to bring operations back to business-as-usual.  During all three examples, 
the airport management organisations were operating at a reduced level of 
functionality, but were never actually offline.  Table 4.6 below highlights the 
summary findings of these three critical incidents.   
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Table 4.6: Critical Incident Comparison 
Critical 
Incident 
Analysis 
Level Summary Findings 
 
A-Air: 
 
Critical 
Technology 
Failure 
 
Leadership 
Leadership level respondents discussed the event from the 
perspective of issues around passenger facilitation and negative 
impacts to revenue. 
Corporate 
Mgt. 
Corporate management level respondents cited the key issues to 
emerge from the event as a lack of consultation across business 
groups and issues regarding risk awareness. 
Operations 
Mgt. 
Operations management level respondents highlighted the lack of 
understanding some groups have about the ripple effect a failure in 
one component of the airport can have on other operational areas. 
Officers 
Officer level respondents noted a significant disconnect between 
areas of the business and a lack of consultation on projects 
resulting in a negative effect on other areas of airport organisation. 
 
B-Air: 
 
Terminal 
Power 
Failure and 
Full 
Evacuation 
 
Leadership 
Leadership level respondents discussed the event in terms of 
passenger facilitation impacts, loss of revenue, and the staffing 
increase required. 
Corporate 
Mgt. 
Corporate management level respondents cited the failure of a pre-
determined approach to communications and the need to 
implement an improvised workaround to deal with the confusion. 
Operations 
Mgt. 
Operations management level respondents highlighted the need to 
coordinate with first response agencies as a means of providing a 
gradual return to business-as-usual operations. 
Officers 
Officer level respondents noted a similar position to the corporate 
level noting the failure of the communications plan and the need to 
test pre-determined plans for accuracy prior to disturbance. 
 
C-Air: 
 
Extreme 
Weather 
Event 
 
Leadership 
Leadership level respondents discussed the event as one which 
was previously unconsidered by the site and required a high level of 
improvisation to resolve. 
Corporate 
Mgt. 
Corporate management level respondents cited deficiencies in 
coordination and cooperation between the airport management 
organisation and external airport stakeholders. 
Operations 
Mgt. 
Operations management level respondents highlighted the need for 
more understanding of vulnerability as the event was originally 
considered a business disruption but quickly turned into a social 
welfare disturbance. 
Officers 
Officer level respondents noted issues regarding the challenges of 
coordinating with external stakeholder groups as well as the 
importance of flexibility in response and recovery approaches. 
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4.6.1 Disturbance Process Comparison 
RQ1A is focused on exploring the process by which disturbance events take place 
in airport management organisations.  This was undertaken by asking respondents 
about the applicability of the conceptual disturbance process model to represent 
real-world practice.  This was undertaken at the leadership, corporate management, 
operations management, and officer levels of analysis with the three data collection 
sites.  Respondents at all levels highlighted the representativeness and accuracy of 
the process.  Furthermore, respondents were able to recount real-world examples 
that developed along in the same manner as the conceptual disturbance process 
model.  The flexibility of the process was discussed as being accurate whereby not 
every disturbance moves through all potential stages but at a minimum pre-event 
and post-event need to take place for enhanced understanding and organisational 
development.  Dissenting views were sought out from respondent but none were 
present.  Moreover, respondents discussed areas of the model they viewed of 
critical importance, or areas that could be better highlighted in a stronger way.   
 
Potential areas of improvement were highlighted by respondents observing that in 
real-world practice the functions of response and recovery would take place 
concurrently rather than in a linear process as represented by the conceptual 
disturbance process model (as well as in extant disturbance literature).  
Respondents discussed that in a commercial airport management organisation 
there would be a management function overseeing separate business components 
who would be dealing with the disturbance, while at the same time looking to bring 
operations back to business-as-usual.  Furthermore, respondents from the 
leadership and corporate/operations management functions highlighted the 
importance of understanding near-misses but highlighted the difficulty in capturing 
information.  Respondents at the officer level, who were highlighted as having the 
highest potential to capture near-miss information, were far less knowledgeable on 
the function and noted that much higher value was placed on dealing with ‘real’ 
incidents.  This highlighted a critical lack of vulnerability assessment by those 
closest to the operational function of the business.  A lack of reporting culture was 
highlighted as a potential barrier to the further development of near-miss functions 
within airport management organisations.  A comparison of these key process 
themes against the discussed levels of analysis is presented below in Table 4.7.   
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Table 4.7: Disturbance Process Comparison Grid 
 Model Acceptance Model Adjustments Near-miss Process 
Le
ad
er
sh
ip
 
• Respondents supported 
the representativeness of 
the model to real-world 
airport practice.   
 
• Nonconforming views were 
sought but not present.   
 
• Flexibility of process was 
noted as important.   
 
• Ability to utlise the model 
to evaluate and stress test 
current practice was noted.   
• Respondents highlighted a 
potential improvement as a 
combined approach of 
response and recovery.   
 
• Respondents noted that in 
real-world practice usually 
different components of 
the organisation would be 
dealing with response and 
recovery concurrently.   
• Near-miss functionality 
was noted as of critical 
importance to airport 
management 
organisations.   
 
• Respondents noted that 
the function required more 
detailed structure and 
process.   
 
• Highlighted a potential 
approach of near-miss 
managers/experts within 
airport organisations.   
C
or
po
ra
te
 M
an
ag
em
en
t 
• Respondents supported 
the representative of the 
model to real-world airport 
practice or began 
discussing disturbance 
event using the model as a 
framework.   
 
• Nonconforming views were 
sought but not present.   
 
• Flexibility of the model was 
highlighted as a strength of 
the process.   
• Corporate management 
level respondents 
suggested no direct 
adjustments to the model.   
 
• Areas highlighted as of 
critical importance were 
near-miss and post-event 
functions.   
• Respondents highlighted 
the potential for different 
levels of commitment and 
understanding around 
near-miss processes in 
airport management 
organisations.   
 
• Highlighted that capturing 
of near-miss data does 
take place but that review 
and implementation of 
corrective strategies is 
lacking.   
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 M
an
ag
em
en
t 
• Respondents supported 
the model as being highly 
representative of real-world 
airport practice.   
 
• Respondents noted that 
they recalled real-world 
disturbance events that 
took place using this 
process.   
 
• Noted the flexibility of the 
model as relevant and 
accurate.   
• Respondents noted the 
critical importance of the 
post-event function and 
the need to further develop 
embedding of learning.   
 
• Respondents noted that in 
real-world practice a 
response and recovery 
would function as a 
concurrent process.   
• Near-miss functionality 
was noted as being critical 
to airport operations but 
difficult to capture.   
 
• Need for further 
development of practice on 
potential vulnerability 
rather than simply actual 
incidents was highlighted.   
 
• Duty manager logs was 
highlighted as a potential 
near-miss data source.   
O
ffi
ce
rs
 
• Respondents supported 
the model as being highly 
representative of real-world 
airport practice.   
 
• Respondents highlighted 
pre-event, response, 
recover, and post-event as 
the central components of 
what they deal with ‘every 
day’.   
• Respondents noted that in 
real-world practice a 
response and recovery 
would function as a 
concurrent process with 
different officer groups 
tasked in specific roles.   
• Near-miss knowledge and 
understanding was lacking 
at the officer level 
presenting a key 
vulnerability in capturing 
near-miss data.   
 
• Lack of reporting culture 
highlighted as a potential 
barrier to information 
capture.   
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4.6.2 Disturbance Stage Function Comparison 
The exploration of the functions of the specific stages of disturbance was the goal of 
research question 1B.  This question explored the specific sections by asking 
respondents from the leadership, corporate management, operations management, 
and officer levels of analysis about their experience during both the preparation for 
and actions during disturbance events.  The first phase of pre-event looked at the 
specific stages of planning, preparation, detection, and avoidance.  The majority of 
the discussion across the four levels of analysis was at the planning and preparation 
stages.  The leadership level of analysis focused their discussion on the federally 
regulated planning requirements of safety and security.  Much of this discussion was 
concentrated at the Level 4: Crisis Disturbance severity that focuses on low 
likelihood/high consequence events.  The corporate management level discussed 
the pre-event phase in terms of the barriers to accurate development.  Their 
discussion looked at issues regarding organisational silos as well was 
improvements needed to the assessment of what employees are trained and what 
level of skills they require to be appropriately prepared for disturbance.  The 
operations management group also discussed the need for the development of 
planning outside of organisational silos (cross functionally).  Furthermore, 
operations management respondents highlighted the need for legitimacy in training 
and discussed the conceptual disturbance process model as a means of assessing 
the applicability of training to exercising and real-world disturbance.  The officer 
level continued this discussion by highlighted legitimate airport based training as a 
critical component of pre-event function.   
 
The second phase of response looked at the stages of coordination and facilitation, 
and containment and limitation.  Leadership respondents noted this process as the 
implementation of pre-determined plans by ‘other’ staff of the organisation.  
Corporate management respondents noted that they would like more involvement in 
this phase and at present felt their skills were underutilised.  Operations 
management respondents were the most heavily involved in the response function 
citing the importance of communication during disturbance.  They also presented 
the challenge of responding and maintaining operations as well as different views on 
the process for response.  The officer level presented a similar position focused on 
the importance of communication yet highlighted a perspective similar to leadership 
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of implementing a pre-determined plan.  They also highlighted the detrimental 
impact of silos as well as the potential vulnerability to out-of-hours disturbance.   
 
The third phase defined as recovery explored the stages of operational continuity 
and disturbance resolution.   Leadership and both management levels supported the 
stage of operational continuity highlighting the importance for airport management 
organisations to have a gradual return to business-as-usual operations following a 
disturbance.  Respondents highlighted the move away from a planned approach in 
recovery to focus more on a situation specific problem solving and decision-making 
approach.  As with the response phase, communication was highlighted as a key 
area of importance to ensure that the correct strategy is developed and shared with 
participants.  Of particular interest was the need for airport management 
organisations to be able to surge staff numbers where required to bring functionality 
back to business-as-usual levels.  This presents an interesting challenge as 
currently operations for all sites are run at high levels of efficiency, hence a surge 
capacity while maintaining operations presents a significant challenge.   
 
The fourth and final phase of post-event focused on the stages of review and 
learning.  Leadership respondent highlighted that this process takes place for all 
Level 4: Crisis Disturbance and Level 3: Major Disturbance events with an 
expectation that it would also function in lower level disturbance.  The management 
and officer levels sited that the review process takes place in stages whereby an 
initial in-team review takes place followed by a full stakeholder review at a later date 
(again this is for more serious events only).  A significant area supported at all levels 
was that airport management organisations are successful at reviewing disturbance 
but poor at learning.  A rationale why this maybe the case included respondent 
discussing a lack of a reporting culture within data collection sites due to a 
perceived fear of reprisal.  Respondents noted that airport management 
organisations had a tendency to consider a disturbance closed following the recover 
phase rather than developing a legitimate post-event function.  Furthermore, 
respondents noted a lack of implementation and communication around corrective 
measures whereby lower level respondents were not clear if anything had been 
amended following a disturbance.  A comparison of these key stage function themes 
against the four levels of analysis is presented below in Table 4.8.   
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Table 4.8: Disturbance Stage Function Comparison 
 Pre-Event Response Recovery Post-Event 
Le
ad
er
sh
ip
 
• Focus on planning 
from a federally 
regulated safety 
and security 
perspective. 
 
 
• Low likelihood/High 
consequence 
perspective with a 
focus on Level 4: 
Crisis Disturbance 
events.   
• Coordination and 
facilitation as the 
process of 
implementing pre-
determined plans.   
 
• Perspective of 
‘others’ in the 
organisation dealing 
with response.   
 
• Leadership focused 
on stakeholder 
management.   
• Operational 
continuity signaled 
a move to a more 
decision-making 
based approach.   
 
• Business continuity 
plans highlighted as 
an area of 
development at all 
airport management 
sites.   
• Review process 
dependent on 
disturbance severity 
with Crisis and 
Major events more 
structured than 
Minor and Normal.   
 
• Leadership 
perspective of ‘all 
stakeholders’ 
involved in review 
process.   
C
or
po
ra
te
 M
an
ag
em
en
t • Organisational silos highlighted as a 
barrier to the 
development of 
accurate planning 
and preparation.  
 
• Improvements 
needed in ‘who we 
train’ and ‘in what 
we train’ airport 
staff.   
• Involvement of staff 
in disturbance 
limited to operations 
groups with 
potential to 
enhance corporate 
involvement.   
 
• Highlight issues 
delegation of 
response tasks 
(internal and 
external of the 
organisation).   
• Operational 
continuity 
highlighted as a 
gradual return to 
operations.   
 
• Move away from a 
‘plan following’ 
approach to a more 
decision making 
based approach.   
 
• Vulnerability to 
protracted events.   
• Staged review 
process of in-team 
followed by all 
stakeholders.   
 
• Legitimacy of 
review could be 
improved along with 
improvement of ‘’no 
blame’ approach.   
 
• Embedding of 
learning not filtering 
to lower levels.   
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 M
an
ag
em
en
t • Need for planning 
and preparation 
functions to occur 
cross-functionally.   
 
• Legitimacy of 
training highlighted 
as an area for 
improvement.   
 
• Model discussed as 
a potential process 
for assessment.   
• Perspectives on 
response moved 
from simple plan 
implementation to 
detailed decision-
making focus.   
 
• Communication 
highlighted as of 
critical importance.   
 
• Capability to 
respond and 
maintain 
operations.   
• Operational 
continuity discussed 
as a gradual staged 
return to operations.   
 
• Need for a surge 
capacity highlighted 
as important for 
some disturbance.   
 
• Internal staff and 
external group 
recovery strategy.   
• Split of review and 
learning stages 
highlighted as being 
accurate of practice 
 
• Process for post-
event is dependent 
on severity and not 
standard practice.  
 
• Corrective 
measures need to 
be implemented 
and signed off.   
O
ffi
ce
rs
 
• Training was 
highlighted as the 
key function of the 
pre-event stage.   
 
• Respondents 
highlighted the 
need for legitimate 
airport based 
training as well as a 
more holistic 
approach to also 
include corporate 
functions.   
• Implementation of 
plan a key focus.   
 
• Communications 
function to mode 
senior decision 
makers.   
 
• Silos have the 
potential to create 
vulnerability.   
 
• Outside of business 
hours pleasure on 
officer level.   
• Communication of 
strategy to internal 
and external groups 
 
• Need to increase 
staffing to surge 
where required.   
 
• Potential 
vulnerability of the 
corporate area with 
limited 
understanding of 
recovery.   
• Staged review 
process of in-team 
followed by all 
stakeholders.   
 
• Higher involvement 
of the officer level 
discussed.   
 
• Lack of reporting 
back on prescribed 
corrective functions. 
 
• Lack of support for 
reporting.   
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4.6.3 Study One: Themes and Implications 
The first study of this thesis presented a range of interesting data around the way in 
which disturbance occurs in airport management organisations.  RQ1A addressed 
how this disturbance process takes place in a real-world setting.  Two key themes 
emerged from the process investigation of this study.  The first being that the 
conceptual disturbance process model is highly reflective of real-world practice yet 
there is still the potential to further improve the accuracy of the model.  Respondents 
highlighted that in real-world practice the function of response and recover occur 
concurrently.  The implication of this is that consideration should be given to 
modifying the conceptual disturbance process model to better reflect this position.  
The second theme that emerged was around the criticality of the near-miss function.  
Although cited as highly significant to airport management organisations, the near-
miss function is lacking implementation holistically within the reviewed sites.  The 
implication of this highlighted the potential to further modify the conceptual 
disturbance process model to demonstrate the significance of both potential and 
actual vulnerability in disturbance.   
 
RQ1B addressed the functions of the specific stages during the conceptual 
disturbance process model.  A range of key themes emerged regarding the 
functions of the specific stages in terms of both the functions required and the 
considerations needed to ensure performance.  This included themes such as the 
impact of slios, the legitimacy of training, communication, and limiting factors such 
as poor embedding of learning.  This investigation revealed that in some stages of 
the process all levels present a similar understanding of function, whereas in others 
different pictures are presented.  As such a traditional approach to defining the 
stages at ‘all levels’ would not accurately present real-world practice.  Therefore, a 
consideration of this thesis is to present definitions of the specific stages but also 
include level specific considerations that are required to represent an accurate 
understanding of the process.  The implications of both RQ1A and RQ1B will be 
further developed in Chapter Six – Discussion of this thesis.  The following 
component, Section 4.7, will now present the conclusion of this chapter.   
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4.7 Summary 
Chapter Four – Disturbance Process Model has explored research questions 1A 
and 1B of this thesis.  These questions investigated the process by which 
disturbance takes place, as well as the functions of the specific stages of this 
process.  This investigation took place by looking at four levels within airport 
management organisations of leadership (Section 4.2), corporate management 
(Section 4.3), operations management (Section 4.4) and officer (Section 4.5) levels.  
This was developed into Section 4.6 that provided a summary of the key themes 
presented during this chapter.  These themes highlighted areas whereby the 
conceptual disturbance process model can be improved.  Specifically these 
improvements will focus on representing the response and recovery phases as a 
single area, improving the significance of the near-miss function, and defining the 
stages of the process with considerations for organisational level specific functions.  
This will be further discussed and developed in Chapter Six – Discussion of this 
thesis.  The following section Chapter Five – High Reliability Assessment will 
explore the traits of high reliability in an airport management context.  Following the 
discussion of high reliability, Chapter Six – Discussion will provide further detail on 
both studies as well as discuss convergent themes of disturbance and high 
reliability.   
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Chapter Five – High Reliability Assessment 
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5.1 Introduction 
Chapter Five – High Reliability Assessment details the second research study of this 
thesis.  Where the first study focused on the exploration of the conceptual 
disturbance process model, this second study explores the traits of reliability that 
have the potential to influence how effectively an organisation deals with 
disturbance.  As discussed in Chapter Two – Literature Review, seminal authors in 
high reliability theory Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) defined five specific traits that high 
reliability organisations encompass.  These traits of preoccupation with failure, 
reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and 
deference to expertise serve as factors that highly reliable organisations encompass 
and cultivate.  As highlighted by previous literature review, much of the prior 
research in this topic has been undertaken in either a government agency or military 
context.  The distinction of this research study is that it is undertaken in a 
commercial airport management organisation with the competing objectives of 
return for stakeholders and resilient functionality.  It is contended that these 
competing objectives have the potential to influence the development and sustaining 
of highly reliable practice.   
 
This chapter will explore the ways in which the four analysis levels of leadership, 
corporate management, operations management, and officer consider reliability to 
be representative in their organisation.  Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) developed a 
series of quantitative surveys to audit the representativeness of the different traits of 
reliability in organisations.  This study has utilised this prior work as a starting point 
and developed a qualitative approach to better understand the rational behind why 
participants feel the specific traits do or do not apply to their airport management 
organisation.  The purpose of research question 2A is to explore the five traits of 
high reliability in a commercial airport management context as a means of 
contributing to knowledge in the high reliability and airport management literature 
spaces.  This takes place by asking respondents about the five traits of high 
reliability and to outline in what ways the statement does or does not apply to their 
airport management organisation.  The in-depth interview data is presented in table 
format approach whereby each response is included and coded against the 
respondent discussing the trait in a positive , negative , or mixed 
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manner .  The data is then refined to explore the motivations and themes 
present and compared against the other findings of that specific trait and level. 
Following this, research question 2B explores the potential to enhance reliability in 
airport management organisations.  This is undertaken by including examples that 
respondents discussed as being areas of key opportunity as well as from 
opportunities highlighted from the presence (or lack of presence) of current traits of 
high reliability.  The interview data regarding research questions 2A and 2B was 
compared against participant observation contexts (outlined in Table 3.6) and 
documentary analysis (detailed in tables 3.7 – 3.8) as a point of triangulation to 
develop findings.   
 
As with study one, this investigation develops across four levels of analysis of 
leadership (Section 5.2), corporate management (Section 5.3) operations 
management (Section 5.4), and officers (Section 5.5).  As mentioned in Chapter 
Three – Methodology, due to the unpredictable nature of the airport management 
environment some respondents from the first study were unable to complete all 
components of the high reliability assessment due to being called away on urgent 
operational requirements.  As was discussed, in cases where this has happened, for 
the sake of consistency of analysis, their assessment has been disqualified from this 
study.  Included respondents comprised of all six leadership respondents, ten 
corporate management respondents (-1), sixteen operations management 
respondents (-1), and thirteen officer respondents (-8) for a total of forty-five in-
depth interviews.  Although this represents a drop for in-depth interview respondents 
from the first study, this still represents a significant amount of data on high reliability 
in airport management organisations with forty-five in-depth interviews on the topic.  
Table 5.1 below highlights the seven sections of this chapter.   
Table 5.1: High Reliability Assessment Chapter Sections 
Chapter One:  Introduction  5.1  Introduction      
5.2  HRT Leadership     
5.3  HRT Corporate Management   
5.4  HRT Operations Management   
5.5  HRT Officers      
5.6  HRT Comparison of Levels    
5.7  Summary      
Chapter Two:  Literature Review  
Chapter Three:  Methodology  
Chapter Four:  Study One  
Chapter Five:  Study Two  
Chapter Six: Discussion  
Chapter Seven:  Summary  
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5.2 High Reliability Assessment: 
Leadership Level 
As addressed in the previous chapter, leadership level respondents are general 
manager or higher employees who are responsible for the strategic management 
and direction of their respective airport management organisations.  These 
respondents have a high level of expertise and experience in disturbance situations.  
At the leadership level of analysis no reduction of respondents was present and as 
such participants included one Chief Executive Officer, one Corporate General 
Manager, one Organisational Development General Manager, and three Operations 
General Managers.  Document analysis focused on leadership risk management 
documents as well as observing meeting detailing reviews of prior disturbance 
events.  As such, the first component of this section will explore the current 
presence of Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2007) traits of high reliability.  The second 
component of this section will examine the potential to further develop reliability in 
airport management organisations.   
 
5.2.1 Current Presence: Leadership Level 
The first trait of high reliability has been expressed as preoccupation with failure.  
This trait is focused on understanding the way in which organisations understand 
and critically analyse vulnerability in their system.  As members of the leadership 
level of analysis serve as heads of department or higher in airport management 
organisations, the emphasis they place on reliability has the potential to influence all 
levels below.  Particularly, the importance they place on the exploration of areas of 
vulnerability and the development of corrective measures has the potential to help 
or hinder the development of reliability and resilience in airport management 
organisations.  Of particular importance to understanding preoccupation with failure 
is the way in which the organisation regards ‘close calls’ and near-misses.  
Leadership respondents were asked to respond to two questions regarding errors 
and corrective measures.  These questions focused on the way in which we 
understand vulnerability, as well as the importance placed on using information on 
near-miss events to review and improve practice within airport management 
organisations.  Table 5.2 below highlights the leadership level position as mixed, 
being not clearly positive or negative but rather an area for more detailed 
understanding and improvement within airport management organisations.   
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Table 5.2: Leadership Preoccupation with Failure 
Presence Comment 
 
We can improve on that.  I think that we are moving in that 
direction.  Not quite there yet but getting there.   
 I guess it depends on what the incident is.   
 
We are seeing that more and more recently because we are trying 
to develop that area.   
 
Great statement … but I am not sure that we honored it in practice.  
We try to and we are moving that way but I applaud this sentiment.   
 I think we look it at as a failure or a success sometimes.   
 
Certainly understanding failure and looking to learn but in practice, 
not applying.  I think that's probably one of the issues we need to 
work with.   
 
This first trait of preoccupation with failure was highlighted as being an area which 
leadership level respondents noted the need for improvement.  Furthermore, 
respondents noted that their organisations were moving towards being more 
focused on vulnerability yet in a cultural sense, this represented a clear challenge 
moving towards maturity.  As leadership level members are aware of the importance 
of understanding vulnerability and note the need to improve, the challenge becomes 
how to actively enhance legitimacy within their respective airport management 
organisations.  Observation of senior risk and compliance meeting noted 
discussions around specific disturbance events rather than looking at the potential 
for vulnerability.   
 
The second trait of high reliability has been articulated as reluctance to simplify.  
This trait is focused on understanding the way information is categorised and made 
available throughout our system.  Of particular interest in this trait is in 
understanding the ways in which the organisation seeks out information regarding 
the potential for vulnerability and disturbance in our system.  The more detailed 
information can be drawn out from the front line, the better informed decisions can 
result.  Leadership respondents were asked to comment on two questions regarding 
the way which disagreement takes place in our organisation and the ability of our 
system to capture and utilise information from our organisation.  As members of the 
leadership level of analysis are often receiving information that is ‘filtered’ through 
other groups, the ability to keep the detail required to make appropriate decisions is 
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paramount.  Table 5.3 highlights the responses from the leadership level that 
represented both mixed and negative response on the trait of reluctance to simplify.   
Table 5.3: Leadership Reluctance to Simplify 
Presence Comment 
 Again moving in a direction but not there yet.   
– 
Not necessarily because the system is not streamlined.  When you 
talk about airside I think we do accept risks that probably we 
shouldn’t because of complacency as people in that environment 
are exposed to a high-level of risk.   
 I think the more we can make information accessible and available the better will be.  We’re not there yet though.   
 
The principle is something we would wish to embrace, and 
hopefully we are progressively embracing, but we are not where we 
need to be.   
– I know that we do have systems in place where people can report to improve but I don’t know how effective they really are to be honest. 
 I think that varies a great deal in different places in the organisation.   
 
As with the first trait of high reliability, the second trait of reluctance to simplify was 
discussed by the leadership level of analysis as an area for improvement.  
Respondents noted that systems were currently in place yet lacked the ability to 
provide a shared understanding across the various business groups.  This 
highlighted the potential of organisational silos as a limiting factor for the sharing of 
data.  Where negative perspectives were given leadership respondents emphasised 
it as a failure of the shared information system rather than a cultural failure of the 
organisation.   
 
The third trait of high reliability has been developed as sensitivity to operations.  
This trait is focused on understanding the organisation at all levels of the hierarchy.  
This is achieved by the presence of a cross-functional understanding of the 
business with the ability to drive decision making lower in the organisation.  An 
organisation that has a detailed sensitivity to operations is able to better understand 
the components and interactions of its system and correct small failures before they 
have the ability to escalate.  Leadership respondents were asked to comment on 
cross-functionality in terms of understanding the objectives of other groups within 
the business as well as understanding what role other groups play when operations 
move out of business-as-usual.  Table 5.4 highlights that the leadership level 
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represented a mostly mixed position regarding sensitivity to operations with one 
respondent presenting a negative opinion and one stating a positive opinion.   
Table 5.4: Leadership Sensitivity to Operations 
Presence Comment 
+ I think we are very good at that and it is probably a strength.   
 I agree more with the latter end of the statement.  I don’t think it’s as good as it could be in terms of the detailed knowledge.   
 Not always with that one.  Its something we could work on.   
 
You need to ensure that silos are not a limiting factor on the 
organisation and have an understanding outside your own particular 
are.  We are not there yet.   
 We are highly aware of what each team does and but then I would also say that other teams are only generally aware of what we do. 
– 
I would have thought we are relatively poor at that.  I think there's a 
lack of understanding but its dependent on which level. The more 
senior you get the more broader the view across.   
 
Following from the first two traits of high reliability, the third trait of sensitivity to 
operations is discussed by the majority of leadership respondents as an area for 
further development.  Two critical points to emerge from the examples above is first, 
the positive response that sites that the trait is potentially one-way whereby their 
group has a detailed understanding of other yet other groups have a less involved 
understanding of the respondents group function.  The second is the position from 
negative response that notes that the understanding is situational based on the level 
of seniority in the organisation.  This negative response contends that the more 
senior levels of the organisational hierarchy have a more detailed cross-functional 
understanding than lower organisational levels.   
 
The fourth trait of high reliability was defined as commitment to resilience.  This 
trait describes that reliability is the key organisational objective during all models of 
operations be they business-as-usual or during a disturbance.  Leadership level 
respondents were asked to discuss their thoughts on the development of risk 
management in their organisation as well as the importance of safe and reliable 
operations.  For any piece of critical infrastructure it would be expected that the 
organisations approach towards resilience would be of the highest importance.  As 
with the first trait of preoccupation with failure, the direction senior management 
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takes has the potential to influence business components underneath.  Table 5.5 
highlights the leadership position towards commitment to resilience as unanimously 
positive.   
Table 5.5: Leadership Commitment to Resilience 
Presence Comment 
+ Yes absolutely, absolutely.   
+ I agree with that statement.   
+ Yep we do.  It’s in our goals of our organisation and within our strategies and just flows down into everyday.   
+ 
We have made excellent progress and we have got a risk 
management framework that we challenge ourselves to make sure 
is part of our day-to-day business.   
+ Yeah I think that’s very strong here.   
+ I think that's certainly true.  And we're passionate about rolling out our risk management stuff.   
 
Leadership respondents replied unanimously that this was an area supported by 
their respective organisations.  Respondents highlighted that this was a core 
component of what their business believed in and maintained and as such was an 
area that all sites were very strong in.  Based on this unanimous position of 
commitment to resilience, from a cultural perspective this represents a key strength 
in terms of high reliability functionality at the leadership level as well as the influence 
that this has on members of middle management and front line staff.  A potential 
area where this sentiment could fall down is when members of the leadership level 
of analysis do not ‘practice what you preach’ and move away from resilience in 
favour of other business objectives.   
 
The fifth trait of high reliability was presented as deference to expertise.  This trait 
looks at the way in which organisations can be flexible in times of disturbance and 
give expert decision makers the ability to deal with specific situation.  In this way, 
the ability of an organisation to defer to expertise where required enables the shift of 
standard business-as-usual practices to more specialist disturbance based function 
quickly and efficiently.  This extends to the ability of those who may normally not be 
the most senior in terms of organisational hierarchy to direct the strategy around 
response and recovery as a direct result of their skills and expertise in the area.  
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Leadership respondents were asked questions on the ability of the organisation to 
delegate authority to person with the most suitable expertise, ability, and training.  
Table 5.6 highlights that Leadership respondents equally presented positive and 
mixed feedback regarding deference to expertise.   
Table 5.6: Leadership Deference to Expertise 
Presence Comment 
+ 
Yes absolutely.  Again the way that we are structured is almost in 
that there are processes, but there is expertise within the process, 
so we know who those experts are in those streams.   
+ Oh great, we are very good at doing that.   
 
I think that’s a work in progress because a lot of this stuff, through 
my experience is, you don’t really know how good people are until 
they are in the heat.   
+ I agree with the statement and I think we are in a relatively good place in that respect.   
 Its there but its not well structured would be my feedback.   
 Somewhat.  I think sometimes we can have a simplistic view and discount the technical expertise in our organisation.   
 
The positive position from leadership respondents noted that deference to expertise 
is something that they feel their respective organisations does well and has specific 
processes to highlight persons of expertise and defer to them when and where 
required.  The mixed position presented issues around deference to expertise being 
an area that was strong in some functions yet potentially lacking in others.  
Specifically, those who were unsure about the trait highlighted that structure around 
identification could be improved along with better processes to give authority to 
experts where required.  Within both positions, there was some ambiguity with 
regards to the ‘system’ by which we categorise expertise within airport management 
organisations.  The first respondent notes that it is available in ‘processes’ whereas 
the fifth respondent notes a lack of structure.  Document analysis of a range of 
airport management documents notes that information was present regarding 
expertise but was limited the Level 4: Crisis Disturbance events as part of airport 
emergency planning documents.   
 
This section has detailed the five traits of high reliability against the leadership level 
of analysis.  This discussion will be further developed against the other analysis 
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levels of corporate management, operations management, and officer.  Following 
this a comparison of levels will be developed to identify areas of consistency and 
differences.  This next section will discuss the potential to develop high reliability 
from the perspective of the leadership level of analysis.   
 
5.2.2 Potential Development: Leadership Level 
The previous discussion focused on the current present of the five traits of high 
reliability from the leadership analysis perspective.  This analysis highlighted areas 
where respondents felt the organisation was functioning in a positive, negative, or 
mixed fashion.  A number of the responses highlighted areas where respondents felt 
the organisation needed further development.  Key issues that were highlighted at 
the leadership level included the need to improve culture particularly around areas 
of understanding vulnerability, information sharing, and shared understanding of 
objectives.  With these themes in mind, this section will now investigate leadership 
level respondents thoughts and opinions on the further development of high 
reliability in airport management organisation.   
 
The first area leadership level respondents highlighted the need to embed post-
event reviews of practice within all levels of the organisation.  In the example below, 
the respondent notes that in some situations, more junior levels of staff consider a 
disturbance event to be concluded once response is over.  As was explored in 
Chapter Four- Disturbance Process Model, a critical component for the 
improvement of airport management organisations is the need to embed corrective 
practice.  Participant observation revealed much lower levels of review than 
espoused by leadership respondents (participant observation at A-Air, B-Air and C-
Air).  The example highlighted the need to improve the value we place on corrective 
practice and the attention we give to understanding vulnerability.   
“The thing is still this post review, is going to be about me or the airport 
emergency manager doing it so they're not going to do it themselves.  They 
would just want to get on with their work now.  Again it is a cultural thing and 
we are trying to do that.  But it is taking a fair bit of leadership just to pull the 
stakeholders together.  Because everyone wants to get back to business-as-
usual but still needs a force to pull them away and say ‘no, there is a post-
event coming’ to keep that focus.”   
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This has a direct connection to the high reliability traits of preoccupation with failure 
and reluctance to simplify.  Preoccupation with failure in the way in which we 
consider vulnerability in our system and reluctance to simplify in the importance of 
capturing detailed information to improve practice.  By developing a position that 
rewards the embedding corrective practices, airport management organisations can 
highlight the importance of vulnerability and the continual improvement of highly 
reliable practice.   
 
The second area of development noted by leadership level respondents focused on 
the opportunity to improve the delegation and use of information within airport 
management organisations.  As previously detailed, reluctance to simplify notes the 
importance of comprehensive information to make decisions from whereby 
information is not filtered unnecessarily through components of the system.  In the 
example below, the respondent notes clarity of decision-making and the governance 
around the delegation of decisions as being an area for further development.  
Furthermore, the issue of organisational commitment was highlighted in that 
enhanced resourcing would be required to mature these practices in airport 
management organisations.   
“I think that there needs to be a better clarity about delegation of decisions.  
Who can make what decision and when.  I think that's a very important aspect.  
I think a better induction is needed around this and we are actually writing our 
revised induction at the moment.  So working across teams to understand that 
process better and that's always good, and I think that could happen more.  
It’s also about how much importance the organisation attributes to it because 
the time is money basically and that is to about getting resource.”   
The above example highlights elements of deference to expertise (improvement in 
governance of decision making), sensitivity to operations (working across teams to 
enhance understanding), and commitment to resilience (organisational support for 
the enhancement of practice).  As the proposed idea functions during staff induction, 
this type of initiative highlights the potential to further develop highly reliable practice 
with employees as one of their first experience with the organisation.   
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The third area of development noted by leadership level respondents is the need to 
further develop the skills and training of senior members in the organisation across 
all business areas.  The example below, the airport management organisation in 
question has an executive-on-call arrangement whereby different members of the 
leadership team are responsible should a disturbance occur.  In this way, members 
who are not directly responsible in their business-as-usual role are required to 
attend the airport outside of business hours and function as the business manager 
of the situation.  A respondent highlighted that their experience with the process has 
been one that was difficult at the start but has improved with time.  The respondent 
also raises the potential for further development of the process to improve training 
for members of non-operational business components.   
“I am on the executive-on-call roster and actually feel confident now.  I didn’t 
my first month working on it, but certainly feel confident that I know what to do 
an emergency.  But just by virtue of your position you are put onto the 
executive on call which means having a job of particular seniority.  But 
someone in one of the exclusively commercial areas who have got no 
operational understanding or awareness, what would they be able to do?  And 
even my areas of the company because its is very much into 9 to 5 business.  
So I think that’s an area we could really improve.”   
This example highlights an initiative to enhance the sensitivity to operations of 
leadership level employees.  In this way, members are given exposure to different 
parts of the organisation through training an involvement in disturbance events.  
This initiative also has the cultural advantage of giving non-operational leaders an 
increased understanding of what operations do during the disturbance management 
process.  This section has discussed the potential to further develop high reliability 
in airport management organisations from the leadership analysis perspective.  The 
key areas of opportunity were highlighted as the development of corrective 
practices, improvements in delegation, and enhanced understanding cross-
functionally.  The following section will summarise Section 5.2.1 regarding the 
current presence of traits and this section, Section 5.2.2, regarding enhancement of 
high reliability.   
 
5.2.3 High Reliability Assessment: Leadership Level Summary 
The first component of the leadership level of analysis focused on exploring the 
current presence of high reliability in airport management organisations (research 
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question 2A).  This investigation took place by utilising the Weick and Sutcliffe 
(2007) five traits of high reliability as a means of exploring practice.  The first trait, 
preoccupation with failure, was discussed as the leadership group as an area 
needing improvement in airport management organisations, particularly around the 
importance of understanding vulnerability.  The second trait, reluctance to simplify, 
highlighted a combination of mixed position and negative position on the trait with 
both highlighting need to further develop systems of information sharing within 
airport management organisations.  The third trait, sensitivity to operations, again 
revealed further development needed in the area.  Furthermore, respondents noted 
that the function of cross-functional understanding was more developed at senior 
levels in organisations with more a mode limited approach the further away you get 
from the strategic function.  The fourth trait, commitment to resilience, noted holistic 
support with respondents viewing this as a key strength of their respective 
organisations.  The fifth trait, deference to expertise, highlighted both positive and 
mixed perspectives with the point of difference being respondents’ views on 
systems to identify and delegate authority to different persons in the organisation.  
Figure 5.1 below provides a visual summary of these leadership positions with 
positive , negative , or mixed manner  views being 
represented against the five traits of reliability down the left hand side. 
 
Figure 5.1: Leadership Visual Summary* 
 
 
R1 
 
R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 
PWF       
RTS  –   –  
STO +     – 
CTR + + + + + + 
DTE + +  +   
 
*The above figure should not be considered a quantitative measure of the leadership level of analysis but rather simply a visual representation of different 
respondent views and their relationship to the traits of high reliability.   
 
The second component of the leadership level of analysis explored the potential to 
further develop high reliability in airport management organisations as developed in 
research question 2B.  Three for potential development were highlighted.  First, the 
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development of review and corrective practices to enhance preoccupation with 
failure and reluctance to simplify.  Second, the improvement of how airport 
management organisations delegate tasks in a structure fashion to develop 
deference to expertise.  Third, the involvement (in both preparation and actual 
disturbance event) of leadership level members with other operational components 
of the business has the potential to improve sensitivity operations.  Table 5.7 below 
summarises the findings from Sections 5.2.1 - 5.2.2.  
Table 5.7: Summary of HRO Findings – Leadership Analysis 
 
RQ2A: What is the current level of high 
reliability in Australian airports? 
 
 
RQ2B: What is the potential to further 
develop high reliability in Australian 
airports?   
 
• Preoccupation with failure was 
represented as a mixed position as area 
of improvement.   
• Reluctance to simplify was discussed as 
a mixed and negative position citing the 
lack of a detailed system of cross-
functional information sharing.   
• Sensitivity to operations was noted as 
being a mixed position in need of further 
development.  Respondents noted the 
potential for one-way understanding 
whereby operations groups had a clear 
understanding across the business other 
areas would not have the same detail.   
• Commitment to resilience was discussed 
from a unanimously positive position and 
highlighted as a key strength.   
• Deference to expertise was discussed in 
a mixed and positive manner with the 
ability of the system to identify and defer 
to experts being the critical area of 
strength.   
• Higher importance placed on corrective 
practices by leadership to further develop 
practices around preoccupation with 
failure and reluctance to simplify.   
• Improved understanding and structure 
around delegation of decision-making to 
improve practices of deference to 
expertise.   
• Higher involvement of operational staff in 
non-operational components, such as 
projects involving the development of 
plans and procedures, of the business to 
improve sensitivity to operations. 
• Higher involvement of business staff in 
operational components of the business, 
such as the executive-on-call program, to 
enhance sensitivity to operations.    
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This section has provided a summary of data regarding high reliability from the 
perspective of leadership respondents.  This analysis will be developed across all 
four levels of analysis.  The following section will now further this analysis at the 
corporate management level.   
 
5.3 High Reliability Assessment:  
Corporate Management Level 
As detailed in study one, members of the corporate management level of analysis 
are responsible for the business-as-usual functions of airport management 
organisations.  Members of this group are also responsible for components of audit, 
compliance, and risk reporting as well as delivering reports to the board around 
performance.  During disturbance, members of the corporate management level are 
called upon to provide a range of supporting functions for the operations 
management team and serve as a key component of communication to more senior 
levels.  At the corporate management level of analysis, one respondent was unable 
to continue with the in-depth interview and as such the total number of respondents 
was ten.  The revised respondents at this level included three Corporate Risk and 
Compliance Managers, two Information Technology Managers, one Occupational 
Health and Safety Manager, one Communications Manager, one Car Parking 
Manager, one Environmental Manager, and one Standards and Assurance 
Manager.  As with the leadership level of analysis, the first component of this 
section will focus on research question 2A and explore the current presence of 
Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2007) traits of high reliability in airport management 
organisations.  This will be followed by research question 2B investigating the 
potential to further develop these areas in airport management organisations.   
 
5.3.1 Current Presence: Corporate Management Level 
The first trait of high reliability has been developed as preoccupation with failure.  
As previously discussed, preoccupation with failure is interested in the ways in 
which we look at deficiencies in our system.  Particularly important to this is the 
attention we pay to seeking out ‘bad news’ as a means of understanding 
vulnerability and developing corrective measures.  As member of the corporate 
management level of analysis are responsible for such critical business components 
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as risk and compliance, occupational health and safety, communications, and 
information technology, the consideration an airport management places on 
understanding vulnerability is of critical importance to their role.  Corporate 
management level participants were asked two questions to investigate their 
thoughts on how their organisation considers failures and errors in the system.  
Table 5.8 below highlights the response from the corporate management level as 
mostly mixed, with one negative, and one positive.   
Table 5.8: Corporate Management Preoccupation with Failure 
Presence Comment 
– That would be nice to achieve but no we don’t do that.   
 I think selectively.  I know that there are some sections that do it but I don’t know for example if all areas do that.   
 Well the extent of it is we have various committees on this and things go to the board but doesn’t get lower down.   
 It hasn’t really extended my group and I think as far as the rest of the organisation goes I think it’s stuck in a few groups.   
+ We do that.  What could we have done better? What could we do to avoid it again?  And things like that.   
 I can only talk about the near-misses I know about.  So I suppose it's self selecting for that response.   
 
I think historically we had a management team who had that fear of 
failure and not really steeping back and learning by experience.  I 
think we are starting to shift away from that culture.   
 There is an ongoing dialogues and conversations about that type of thing.  I know there is a certain move in my area to try and do that.   
 I would say that does apply to us but only really in some areas of the business.   
 So I have to say that holistically we are probably a little bit mixed as an organisation on that.   
 
In a similar position to the leadership level of analysis, members of the corporate 
management group looked at preoccupation with failure as an area of improvement 
for airport management organisations.  An interesting theme to emerge from the 
data was that some respondents noted that within their own particular group (those 
with a particular risk or safety focus) people openly and honestly discussed 
vulnerability but they did not feel it extend out to other parts of the organisation.  
This presents a distinction in looking at the traits of reliability whereby there is the 
potential to have different understanding at the group or organisation level.  In this 
study respondents were asked their thoughts specifically at the organisational level.  
Observation with corporate management respondents further supported this 
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contention whereby the large majority of work was undertaken in a reactive rather 
than a proactive fashion.  Corrective actions were focused on specific disturbance 
incidents rather than dealing with the underlying cause of the vulnerability.  This was 
further highlighted by document analysis whereby in reviewing a range of post 
incident reports, similar corrective measures were appearing consistently without 
being undertaken.  This inability to close off action items signalled an inability to deal 
with more abstract issues of vulnerability and systemic resilience.    
 
The second trait of high reliability has been expressed as reluctance to simplify.  
As previously discussed, this trait focuses on how we categorise and consider 
information in our system particularly regarding vulnerability and disturbance.  Of 
particular importance here is focusing our system on not taking information at face 
value and exploring the underlying elements of data around decision-making and 
objectives.  As with the previous trait of preoccupation with failure, corporate 
management respondents are heavily involved in functions of review and 
improvement within airport management organisations.  This involves tasks such as 
the critical investigation of incidents or areas of non-compliance that are relevant to 
airport functionality.  Interview questions were asked of corporate management 
respondents to explore their thoughts on how information is captured, utilised, and 
understood in airport management organisations.  In a similar fashion to the 
leadership level of analysis, corporate management respondents represented 
reluctance to simplify in a negative and mixed position.  However, the distinction 
from the leadership position was that this was more tilted to a negative view of the 
current presence of reluctance to simplify.  Table 5.9 below highlights the corporate 
management respondent positions.   
Table 5.9: Corporate Management Reluctance to Simplify 
Presence Comment 
– Obviously we have proven that doesn’t occur.  No, that doesn’t, and I’ve had examples of that recently.   
– 
No.  I think we don’t have well implemented information capturing.  
A lot of groups will just not report stuff because they just can’t be 
bothered or there is just too much information.   
– I think we have got too much information here.  Its very siloed and there is no holistic approach.   
– Doesn’t happen at all which is clear.  There are silos within this airport which I think are damaging and uncontrollable.   
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 Across the business we are not there. In my group I think we're not too bad.   
– No I don't think so.  I think that there is assumed knowledge and assumed behaviours all over the place.   
 This airport is really rich with data.  We've got buckets of it.  And we often have a tendency sometimes to overcomplicated things.  
– I don’t know if that’s right.  I don’t think it is widespread across the organisations.  I think it rests with certain control centers.   
– No, absolutely not.  That does not describe our organisation.   
 
Our airport really engages in the assurance and audit program 
through both security and airside safety.  In the other areas I think 
it’s starting to move in the right direction.   
 
Corporate management respondents highlighted this in a negative fashion stating 
that there is limited focus on information capturing in a cross-functional manner.  
When it does occur, respondents highlighted that it was present only in specific 
parts of the organisation and highlighted organisational silos as a key limiting factor.  
Where respondents highlighted a mixed position reluctance to simplify was 
discussed in terms of an area in need of improvement for airport management 
organisations.   
 
The third trait of high reliability has been developed as sensitivity to operations.  
As previously introduced, this trait is concentrated on the ability of the organisation 
to have an understanding across business units as well as across hierarchal levels.  
In this way, organisations that are considered to be appropriately sensitivity to 
operations have a clear understanding of the key issues that persons on the ‘front-
line’ are dealing with during daily operations.  In a hierarchal sense, as the corporate 
management level of respondents between members of the leadership and officer 
functions of airport management organisations, they serve a critical function in 
highlighting information both ways.  They have the opportunity to highlight key areas 
of vulnerability to leadership based on interactions with officers, and conversely can 
explain strategic decisions to officer level respondents.  Participant observation of 
meetings regarding the review of prior disturbance events and the strategic 
development of risk systems in airport management organisations showed 
significant differences in what corporate managers were prepared to say to leaders.  
In one particular instance, a corporate manager raised a number of issues to the 
researcher and mentioned that it would not be appropriate to talk that way “in front 
of the boss” due to them not wanting to air bad news in public.  As shown below in 
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Table 5.10, respondents discussed a mix of negative and mixed opinions for the trait 
of sensitivity to operations.   
Table 5.10: Corporate Management Sensitivity to Operations 
Presence Comment 
 
To a certain degree I think that exists.  So again its different levels 
of sophistication and understanding in the organisation about how 
that works.   
– No.  I don’t think anyone has a really good understanding.   
 
I would say within my group are familiar with that.  I think we have 
got a fair way to go to help others within the business understand it 
if you know what I mean.   
 I think most people have a general idea of the different business units but they would not have an on the ground understanding.   
 I think in my group we're very high there.  Because we are across the whole business.   
– 
I think there is a culture here of, ‘it's not okay to disagree’.  So its 
looked at as a real problem if we're not agreeing on something.  
Whereas I don't see it as a problem at all.   
– I think we've got an awareness of it but it’s not without conflict.  We could probably build on that.   
– 
I don’t think any of those are particularly true.  I mean, it’s a 
complex business and there is no active program to educate people 
across business areas would be my comment.   
– 
I think we're extraordinarily siloed amongst different teams.  We're 
very driven on what it is that we need to do within particular groups 
without considering the impact of what we do to other teams.   
– 
So I think that’s what we don’t do well because we may believe this 
is the perfect process and develop a program around that in one 
department.  But we haven’t taken the time to actually ensure that 
the capabilities, be it systematic or checklist or just simple things, 
can actually align to our ideals.   
 
The position presented above by the corporate management level of analysis note 
an interesting departure from the leadership position on this trait.  Corporate 
managers discussed this in a far more negative manner noting the inability of airport 
management organisations to have a clear understanding cross-functionally.  
Respondents discussed issues around the areas of organisational culture, slios, and 
structural issues around the availability and distribution of information.  As with 
reluctance to simplify, where respondents highlighted a mixed response on the 
issue they noted that they considered the area strong within their team yet weak in a 
system wide context.  With the corporate management level functioning as a path of 
communication from lower to more senior levels, their position of sensitivity to 
operations being low highlights a critical issue for airport management 
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organisations.  Furthermore, of particular interest in the data was that the corporate 
manager respondents highlighted business-as-usual only examples and negated to 
discuss linkages with the operations management function.  Observation and 
document analysis provided limited detail as to any linkages between the corporate 
management and operations management functions with the exception of 
documentation on post-event review and learning.  As such, sensitivity to operations 
in both a hierarchal and cross-functional sense could be considered a key 
vulnerability for airport management organisations.   
 
The fourth trait of high reliability is defined as commitment to resilience.  As 
previously discussed, this trait is focused on understanding the way which our 
organisation both verbalises and acts on both safe and reliable performance.  In 
terms of commitment, is it something that the organisation truly believes and 
embodies in practice, or is it idealised but not supported.  An interesting point to 
consider here is the distinction between business-as-usual and disturbance modes 
of operation.  As highlighted in Chapter Two – Literature Review, high reliability 
organisations are those that are not averse to disturbance, but rather disturbance 
does not disable their operations.  By continually dealing with disturbance events, 
organisations are able to further refine and develop their ability to deal with the 
unexpected.  To better understand commitment to resilience, corporate 
management level respondents were asked to comment on the ways in which 
airport management organisations commit to safe and reliable operations, as well as 
building peoples awareness of vulnerability.  As highlighted in Table 5.11 below, 
respondents noted almost unanimously that this was a positive area for the 
organisation with only one respondent highlighting a mixed position due to potential 
conflicts of resilience over commercial objectives.  
Table 5.11: Corporate Management Commitment to Resilience 
Presence Comment 
+ Yes absolutely I believe that and I would have to say that is our commitment.   
 
I think that’s what is verbalized.  I think that in certain circumstances 
when push comes to shove, dollars and the commercial aspect can 
outweigh.   
+ 
Yes the airport does.  We have got a risk and compliance group 
headed up by someone who is really experienced and has got a 
strong team.   
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+ 
I think this airport is better than most.  Particular the work our risk 
and compliance group and our emergency management group is 
doing is good.   
+ Absolutely.  Safety is number one across the whole business. Which includes all the risk registers and things like that.   
+ Totally agree with that. Yeah it’s definitely our focus, and I think we continuously strive for that.   
+ I think we do.  I mean we do focus on risks everyday in the business.   
+ Yeah I think there is a really strong emphasis on safety, both with aviation side of the business and generally.   
+ Safety is pushed very, very strongly from the CEO down.   
+ 
Yes organisation wide and my team particularly so as I said it’s 
inbuilt around our safety and management systems.  It’s inbuilt in all 
our meetings.   
 
Corporate management respondents highlighted that both within team and across 
the organisation, a core commitment to resilience was present.  Respondents noted 
that this was a clear focus and was continually developed within groups.  An 
interesting element to emerge from some of the responses was the notion that 
resilience was something that was embedded in the risk, compliance, and 
emergency management functions in the business.  In this respondents felt that the 
organisation was resilient because ‘someone’ was looking out for the business 
rather than a function embedded in their own role.  Although representing a very 
strong positive position in terms of commitment to resilience, there is a potential that 
we are overconfident that ‘someone’ will take care of it rather than embedding 
resilient functionality in all components of the corporate management level (and the 
broader organisation).  The mixed response noted the conflict between reliability 
and commercial objectives that highlights the potential that resilience may be an 
area we aspire to but requires further support from actual practice to embed.   
 
The fifth trait of high reliability has been developed as deference to expertise.  As 
previously discussed, deference to expertise is an organisational trait of particular 
importance when moving out of business-as-usual operations and into a disturbance 
state.  In this situation, a shift of authority to persons with the most appropriate skills 
and expertise enables quick action on the situation.  Authors Weick and Sutcliffe 
(2007) note that this is also important in business-as-usual situations whereby 
subject matter experts are in an appropriate place to give guidance to avoid 
potential vulnerability.  An example from a corporate management perspective 
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would include the risk assessment of a new project whereby involvement of skilled 
employees in the particular area of development as well as 
risk/compliance/emergency management would represent an ideal situation.  Table 
5.12 highlights the thoughts of corporate management respondents on deference to 
expertise in airport management organisations representing a clear split between 
positive and mixed positions.   
Table 5.12: Corporate Management Deference to Expertise 
Presence Comment 
+ I actually believe that is the case.  The board in particular values the expertise within the business.   
 
I think we have the ability to do that.  We certainly have a lot of very 
experienced and very capable people here but they are not 
necessarily the people in the decision-making roles.   
+ Yeah we do that here.  You have accountabilities and you have chains of command if a key accountability is not available.   
+ 
I believe very much that we have the ability with the middle and 
senior managers to identify who does what and there is no issue 
pushing that person forward.  I think this airport is one of the better 
companies with regards to that.   
+ Yeah I think we do.  I think we definitely do that.   
 Sometimes.  As I said before I'm not sure that everyone understands what someone else can bring.   
+ 
I think we do that.  There are a couple of people in this business 
that if there were a crisis you would actually want them to be the 
person in charge.   
 
Look definitely expertise is listened to but I think that we have a 
quite hierarchical structure.  I think sometimes it’s not clear to the 
experts within our organisation why decisions are necessarily made 
by management.   
 
I think bits and pieces of that are true.  Like we will have senior level 
people who assume they understand it all and wont consult widely, 
but there are lots of good examples of consulting with experts too.   
 
That’s again empowering the right level of management with the 
right tasks.  On the whole we could probably do that better in 
identifying people’s strengths.   
 
Both the leadership and corporate management levels of analysis have represented 
a split between positive and mixed positions on deference to expertise.  Where 
leadership level respondents highlight identification of experts and structural issues 
to improve, corporate management respondents discussed the issue in more 
empowerment of staff terms.  Other potential areas of improvement were discussed 
as understanding different skills of staff as well as communication between levels 
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regarding the rational behind decisions and the involvement of the most appropriate 
people in discussions.   
 
This section has discussed the current level of high reliability in airport management 
organisations from the corporate management level perspective.  This discussion 
will continue later in this chapter with further analysis of the operations management 
and officer levels of analysis.  The following section will investigate the potential to 
further develop high reliability in airport management organisations from the 
corporate management perspective.   
 
5.3.2 Potential Development: Corporate Management Level 
The previous section investigated the Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) five traits of high 
reliability from the corporate management perspective.  This analysis highlighted 
areas where corporate management staff considered their respective organisations 
to be positive, negative, or mixed in terms of functionality.  This second layer of 
analysis highlighted a more negative position than the previous leadership level.  
Corporate management respondents noted a number of areas they viewed as 
limiting factors to high reliability and noted key areas for improvement.  
Respondents highlighted a range of critical issues including varied commitment to 
risk depending on group function and the limiting nature of silos in airport 
management organisations.  Particularly, the hindrance of silos to communication 
and cross-functional understanding were discussed as being areas needing 
improvement.  With these key areas of deficiency as a focus, the following section 
will now explore the potential to further develop high reliability in airport 
management organisations.   
 
The first area highlighted by corporate management level respondents was the 
need to have more detailed understanding of where the actions of different groups 
within airport management organisations have the potential to conflict.  The 
following respondent notes that this could be accomplished by a clear development 
of what the overarching goals of the organisation are and the component functions 
each group contributes to that position.  Furthermore, the example notes the need 
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for development of a more transparent vision of company priorities that are currently 
not visible.   
“So there are so many different agenda in this business.  What is a priority for 
one person is not for everybody else or other groups.  I think it needs that 
stronger sense of direction, ‘this is what the company is doing this is what the 
goals are’, and that will help everybody else work out what do we actually 
need to do.  So when you have one department saying ‘well that’s not a 
priority for us but its something that impacts on the way entire departments do 
their job that’s an issue.  So I think there are lot of decisions on priorities being 
made in isolation and not a lot of strategic direction over where the companies 
priorities are.”   
The above example highlighted the importance of sensitivity to operations of critical 
infrastructure and the need to have a clear and holistic understanding of group 
function.  This could be achieved through the development of more cross-functional 
teams in the organisation with members from a range of groups represented.  The 
result of either of these tactics would develop more involvement in a cultural sense.   
 
The second area emphasised by corporate management level respondents was 
the issue of information being trapped at more senior levels without filtering down to 
other levels of the organisation.  This follows on from the first area of a holistic 
understanding of group function, yet deals also with the issues of hierarchal silos as 
well as group silos.  The following respondent highlights that distinction is present in 
how different members of the leadership team involve, delegate, and provide 
information to employees at the middle management level.  This example notes the 
barrier that is created in terms of information flow and understanding between those 
in more senior positions and the resulting perception in middle management 
employees.   
“We have you know whatever it is half a dozen general managers, half a 
dozen manager teams roughly.  And you have a bottleneck depending on how 
they manage their own portfolios and are fairly variable in terms of how willing 
they are to be open to involvement from others and to delegate.  So there are 
a lot of discussions and decisions made at the executive level that doesn’t 
filter down and we are not involved in at all even though we might be the 
experts in that particular area.”   
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As with the first area, this example highlights the importance of sensitivity to 
operations to nurturing a clear cross-functional understanding within airport 
management organisations.  A straightforward way of enhancing this issue would be 
to develop a function where more detailed justification is given to employees 
regarding the decisions made at the leadership level.  In this way, the leadership 
level members could make organisational strategy more open and available to lower 
level employees while still protecting sensitive information where appropriate.   
 
The third area discussed by corporate management level respondents was the 
potential to develop a program whereby employees were exposed to a wider range 
of groups within the airport management organisation.  The respondent example 
below notes a program could function whereby new (or current) employees would 
serve in an internship style function whereby they are placed in different areas of the 
business for a specific length of time before starting in their intended position.  A 
similar program was discussed by another respondent whereby a member of their 
organisation was placed on secondment to another airport management 
organisation with one of their staff being placed in their airport.     
“When I first started my career I spent four rotations throughout the business 
and so what you get is that you actually end up understanding of all those 
different business components than if you just came in at one area.  It’s had 
that opportunity so all who are coming as juniors into a new business are not 
so junior when they finish.  I think it’s absolutely realistic to have that here and 
particularly if someone comes in as an accountant or a finance officer.  You 
always know they are going to end up as finance officer, but make it that they 
don’t get to that position for nine months, because they do three months 
rotations elsewhere.  And that’s really powerful for that person when they go 
back there to have that level of understanding.  I think it’s absolutely within the 
reach of this business.  We don’t have as many employees as that business 
so you couldn’t take on twenty employees a year but you could have five 
people here?  It’s a small percentage of your workforce but I think there are 
some serious benefits in that over time.”   
This example highlights an excellent opportunity to enhance particularly sensitivity 
to operations and deference to expertise.  As discussed in the two previous areas, 
by enhancing our understanding and information flow cross-functionally we improve 
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our sensitivity to operations resulting in a system that is more aware of the functions 
and objectives of its components.  By giving employees first hand experience with 
subject matter experts in the respective parts of airport management organisations, 
employees are more likely to understand the skills of particular groups and work 
with them in a consultative manner where appropriate.   
 
This section has discussed the potential to further develop high reliability in airport 
management organisations from the corporate management level of analysis.  This 
discussion centred on enhancing sensitivity to operations through more open 
involvement across groups, across hierarchal level, and by experiencing work 
functions.  The following section will now summarise Section 5.3.1 regarding the 
current presence of traits and Section 5.3.2 regarding enhancement of high 
reliability in airport management organisations.   
 
5.3.3 High Reliability Assessment: Corporate Management Level Summary 
The first component of the corporate management level of analysis looked at the 
current presence of high reliability in airport management organisations (research 
question 2A).  The first trait, preoccupation with failure, was highlighted in a similar 
position to the leadership level of analysis as mostly mixed.  Furthermore, corporate 
management respondents noted that they felt that preoccupation with failure was 
supported well by their group but not holistically across other groups.  The second 
trait, reluctance to simplify, was detailed in a negative way highlighting a lack of 
ability to capture information at all levels within the organisations and use it in a 
cross-functional manner.  The third trait, sensitivity to operations, was also 
discussed in a more negative way with corporate management respondents 
highlighting issues with a lack of cross-functional development due to silos and 
weaknesses in reporting culture.  The fourth trait, commitment to resilience, was 
looked at in a consistent way to the leadership level by highlighting mostly positive 
position.  One area of interest was that some corporate management members 
‘externalised’ resilience in terms of other members of the organisation are 
responsible for it rather than it being a specific part of their job.  The fifth trait, 
deference to expertise, highlights perspectives of both positive and mixed results 
with respondents noting areas in need of improvement as the clear delegation to 
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staff and communication of decisions from leadership back to corporate 
management.   
 
Figure 5.2 below provides a visual summary of these corporate management 
positions with positive , negative , or mixed manner  
views being represented against the five traits of reliability down the left hand side. 
 
Figure 5.2: Corporate Management Visual Summary* 
 
 
R1 
 
R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 
PWF –     +     
RTS – – – –  –  – –  
STO  –    – – – – – 
CTR +  + + + + + + + + 
DTE +  + + +  +    
 
*The above figure should not be considered a quantitative measure of the leadership level of analysis but rather simply a visual representation of different 
respondent views and their relationship to the traits of high reliability.   
 
The second component of the corporate management level of analysis investigated 
the potential to further develop high reliability in airport management organisations 
(research question 2B).  This investigation highlighted areas whereby corporate 
management level respondents saw opportunities to enhance.  Respondents 
discussed a range of opportunities to with a particular focus on the development of 
sensitivity to operations.  Table 5.13 below provides a summary of this section.   
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Table 5.13: Summary of HRO Findings – Corporate Management Analysis 
 
RQ2A: What is the current level of high 
reliability in Australian airports? 
 
 
RQ2B: What is the potential to further 
develop high reliability in Australian 
airports?   
 
• Preoccupation with failure was discussed 
in a mixed way with respondents noting 
distinctions between their own group and 
the organisation holistically.   
• Reluctance to simplify highlighted a far 
mode negative position than was 
previously represented by the leadership 
level of analysis.  Respondents 
highlighted a lack of information 
capturing and utilisation.   
• Sensitivity to operations was also 
discussed in a more negative position 
than leadership respondents again 
noting a lack of cross-functional 
development due to silos and reporting 
issues.   
• Commitment to resilience was consistent 
with leadership position as mostly 
positive and a strength for the 
organisation.  Some respondents 
discussed it in ‘external’ terms.   
• Deference to expertise highlighted a 
mixed position with issues of 
empowerment, delegation, and 
communication discussed.   
• Development of understanding across 
airport management groups through 
cross-functional experiences to improve 
sensitivity to operations.   
• Development of more open 
communication from leadership levels to 
provide more transparently of decision-
making to enhance sensitivity to 
operations in a hierarchal sense.   
• Placement program development to 
enable employees a range of first hand 
experiences in different groups within the 
organisation to enhance sensitivity to 
operations and deference to expertise.   
 
This section provided a summary of data regarding high reliability from the 
perspective of corporate management respondents.  The following section will 
further this analysis at the operations management level.    
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5.4 High Reliability Assessment:  
Operations Management Level 
As detailed in the first study of this thesis, participants from the operations 
management level of analysis are responsible for a number of functions in both 
business-as-usual and disturbance models of operation.  Members of this group are 
responsible for the strategic development of planning, response to and recovery 
from disturbance, and the critical review of practice after events have taken place.  
In any disturbance event above a Level 1: Normal Operations Disturbance style 
event, members of the operations management group will be involved in some 
capacity.  Usually these respondents are involved as expert decision-makers and 
leaders during a disturbance.  Where events move out of the control of the airport 
management organisation, for example in a Level 4: Crisis Disturbance event, 
members of this team would be the main point of contact between the airport 
management organisation and federal agencies dealing with the disturbance.  At the 
operations management level of analysis, two respondents were unable to complete 
the interview on all five traits of high reliability.  As such, the revised in-depth 
interview participants included five Security Managers, four Terminal Managers, 
three Airside Operations Managers, two Emergency Managers, one Airside and 
Wildlife Manager, and one Airside Facilities Manager.  As with the leadership and 
corporate management levels of analysis, respondents are first asked to detail their 
thoughts on the current presence of high reliability in airport management 
organisations (RQ2A).  This will be followed up by exploring the thoughts of 
operations management respondents as to the potential to further develop high 
reliability in airport management organisations (RQ2B).   
 
5.4.1 Current Presence: Operations Management Level 
The first trait of high reliability has been developed by previous research as 
preoccupation with failure.  As members of the members of this group area 
largely responsible for dealing with disturbance, the consideration would be that 
they are particular focused on understanding system vulnerability.  Respondents 
were asked to comment on questions regarding the way in which the system looks 
at deficiencies and the seriousness placed on corrective action.  As highlighted in 
Table 5.14, where the previous levels of analysis had a predominantly mixed 
position on preoccupation with failure, the operations management level presented 
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much more varied views.  The respondents discussed a fairly even split between 
those who felt preoccupation with failure was represented in a positive, mixed, or 
negative way.   
Table 5.14: Operations Management Preoccupation with Failure 
Presence Comment 
– I don't think we're doing that at all.   
– We report and record as required but we don't implement and improve as much as we should.   
+ I think initiatives we have implemented recently show that.   
+ I see it that way.  These incidents are pretty well documented.  Anywhere you go you will find them pretty well investigated.   
 I think near-misses we still take them very seriously but we probably don’t review and improve as we should.   
– 
There is not enough staff here in this flat structure to go looking for 
issues.  If they wanted to prevent things truly you would need a lot 
more staff.   
 
I think for sure we are moving in that direction.  I think within 
operations we have moved into that space.  Others I’m not quite 
sure of and it’s more about profit.   
+ That’s in general true.   
 
I think that view is there but its more from the operational side of the 
business.  Sometimes the corporate side run around trying to pat 
themselves on the back.   
 I think it’s a bit of both.   
+ We are really strong on near-misses in this organisation I think.   
+ I’ll agree with that.  For example we take near-misses ridiculously seriously.   
+ Yes I think we are focused on that in a critical sense at this airport.   
+ 
Yes I think that’s a positive thing here.  I mean we look at near-
misses as in something we need to deal with not, ‘it worked, lets 
move on’.   
– Probably not as much as we should.  We don’t look at some of those near-misses at all really.   
 Certainly moving in that direction and we have done a lot to develop that recently.   
 
An interesting point to emerge from the operations management level analysis was 
the high degree of positive support for this by respondents.  Previous groups have 
presented a more mixed and negative approach to this whereas a number of 
operations management staff saw this in a more positive light.  Potentially 
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respondents are recounting their individual experience to wider organisation as 
operations management respondents are the group most responsible for functions 
around vulnerability and development of corrective measures.  Furthermore, 
respondents presented a range of positions.  A commonality with the corporate 
management respondents was that a number of operations management 
respondents felt their own particularly group functions well in this area but it was not 
holistically adopted throughout the organisation.  A previously highlighted theme of 
organisational silos has the potential to explain how members of some teams felt 
the organisation was strong where other groups highlighted it as a weakness.  This 
variance at all data collection sites further highlights the need to develop a holistic 
strategy of around the near-miss function as a means of understanding vulnerability 
in airport management organisations.   
 
The second trait of high reliability has been expressed in literature as reluctance to 
simplify.  As has been addressed in the prior analysis level, reluctance to simplify is 
focused on the ability of an organisation to develop and maintain a detailed 
understanding of vulnerability of their system.  By keeping information as detailed as 
possible, when the information reaches those with the expertise and experience to 
notice issues, corrective measures can be implemented accurately.  Respondents 
were asked questions regarding their thoughts on how information is captured and 
developed in their organisation as well as how critically the airport management 
organisation look at vulnerability.  As highlighted in Table 5.15 below, members of 
the operations management level of analysis presented a mostly negative view of 
reluctance to simplify within airport management organisations.  Furthermore, 
respondents who highlighted a mixed position were referring to distinctions between 
their team and other groups.   
Table 5.15: Operations Management Reluctance to Simplify 
Presence Comment 
– 
We have the ability to gather certain information on some 
processes but not all processes.  We are pretty well left to our own 
devices.   
– No because we are pretty siloed that is pretty hard to do.  I don't think we get points of view from everyone.   
+ Yes I would agree with that I would say.   
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 Yes and no to be honest.   
– I do think we simplify things.  Who gets listened to most?  He who shouts the loudest.  
– 
No that wouldn’t fit here.  Not to say that time critical down there in 
the support company is not as important but they don’t have to 
make a decision in ten seconds or one minute.  We are high risk in 
our decisions and we will be crucified if we make the wrong ones.   
– We certainly don’t have the ability to capture information from all organisational levels and use it from a centralised perspective.   
 I think the management are there it is just getting the culture of our external suppliers and customers to the same place.   
– 
Classic example was our power outage.  In training you might only 
get say 50 people turn up.  But the problem is that when the chips 
are down then you need everyone on deck.   
 
In our operations team we are encouraged here to sit here and if 
we’ve got an opinion, and we think there’ something it can be done 
better is to go and actively address it. 
 
I would say yes and I think the whole of my team would agree. I 
encourage openness from my team because the best way to learn 
is from everybody's experiences.   
– 
There are some areas of the business where we probably do take 
things for granted.  So I think we do need to change the mind of 
some people about that.   
– No I am not so sure about that one.  No we are not good at that.   
– Probably not so much.  We don’t possibly promote that enough.   
– 
Not quite correct for our organisation, especially that capturing 
information.  I think there is still a lot of work to do on the culture of 
getting people to report.   
– I don’t want to be too hard on the organisation I but don’t think in the organisation as a whole that’s true.   
 
Operations management respondents established a range of issues as to why they 
felt their respective organisations were deficient in the high reliability trait of 
reluctance to simplify.  The main reason was a lack of the ability to capture 
information and use it to develop corrective actions.  This was highlighted in an 
information system sense and also in the culture and mindset of members of the 
organisation.  Furthermore, respondents from both the negative and mixed positions 
highlighted the need to develop the way we look at vulnerability not only in the 
operational groups of the business but holistically.  The fifth response highlighted an 
interesting point whereby rather than the most appropriate course of action being 
listened to, there is a tendency sometimes to go with the position with the most 
power behind it.   
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The third area of high reliably has been defined as sensitivity to operations.  As 
highlighted in previous levels of analysis, sensitivity to operations notes the cross-
functional understanding within our system and particularly the ability to understand 
where objectives have the potential to conflict.  By understanding components 
beyond the scope of a particular group, members are able to anticipate and even 
correct potential vulnerability before they have a chance to incubate into 
disturbance.  As highlighted by Table 5.16, members of the operations management 
level of analysis discussed sensitivity to operations in a negative or mixed manner.   
Table 5.16: Operations Management Sensitivity to Operations 
Presence Comment 
– 
There is a fair bit of siloing.  One area is only looking out for it's side 
of the business rather than the entire business which needs to be 
looked I believe.   
– 
We're not really sure what's going on down there in the corporate 
side of the business and I'm sure that they are not sure of what's 
going on airside.   
– No and I think depends on where you sit in the company as to how much you understand other parts of the company's operations.   
– Very little.  Silos is the word I’m looking for.   
– I think there is a very limited number of people who have a reasonable idea about what happens in different parts.   
 You are bound by everyone else as well and I think our group understand the complexity behind it.   
– Within group is ok but there are serious intragroup issues corporate wide which cause that to break down.   
 
I think within my team we have a fairly good understanding of other 
department in operational, requirement or issues.  The other way 
not so sure.   
 I think sometimes we have the best possible intent but we are not following the correct chain of command or correct procedures.   
– 
No.  What I found in the incidents so far is everyone has probably 
their own agenda and people got their own reason to be here and 
they’ve got to get their own business associate up and running as 
quickly as possible.   
 I think there's still more understanding of operations that could happen in airport wide non-operational departments.   
 I think that has been a big area of improvement but still some parts of the business that is still foreign to.   
 
That’s been a weakness for us and over the last two years we have 
done a lot on that and I think within the operations group we have a 
clear idea of that.   
 I think we understand there is an impact on others but we might not understand how to change it.   
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– I think we have too many silos within the organisation that people are working to individual objectives.   
– I would say within the operations team it ok.  The res of the organisation – oh they wouldn’t have a clue.   
 
As with the corporate management analysis, the operations management 
highlighted clear positions of negative and mixed responses regarding sensitivity to 
operations.  Members who discussed the negative position noted issues around 
silos in the business from an information availability and a shared awareness sense.  
Respondents noted that many components of the business have little idea of what 
other areas do outside of their own team.  The mixed position again highlighted 
discrepancies as members of operational teams having a clear understanding of 
how components of the system interconnect, yet other groups having a limited 
understanding of the challenges and processes of their business.  As with previous 
analysis levels, this was highlighted as an area in need of improvement for airport 
management organisations.   
 
The fourth trait of high reliability is stated as commitment to resilience.  As 
previously detailed, commitment to resilience explores the seriousness that an 
organisation places on the development of maintaining reliability even when 
presented with disturbance.  As highlighted in the literature review component of this 
thesis, organisations who embody a high reliability approach are not averse to 
disturbance but rather they area able to understand and manage it so as to maintain 
operations.  When exploring this trait, operations management respondents were 
asked to give their thoughts on the significance their organisation places on risk 
management, safety, and reliability operations.  Table 5.17 highlights the position of 
respondents towards commitment to resilience as a combination of positive and 
mixed.   
Table 5.17: Operations Management Commitment to Resilience 
Presence Comment 
+ Yes we do… safety is paramount.   
+ I would say that it's something we're pretty good at.  I'm happy with how the business does that.   
+ Yes, 100% for all of that.   
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 That is drummed into us but I would like to see more training at every level not just the managerial level.   
 
And I think we do focus on it pretty well.  Safety is paramount but its 
at a cost.  Once again we go “yep safety is the most important but 
do we have to spend money on this? How long can we do without? 
do we want to be really really safe or just safe?” 
 Partially I would say.  I think sometimes “get the job done” can outweigh resilience.   
 I think in some areas that’s the case but I wouldn’t call it a commitment because sometimes that’s not followed.   
 We do consider safety the number one objective.  Risk awareness - I’m not sure if we did that too well.   
+ I would say yes on that for sure.  We go through that process all the time.   
+ Yes without a doubt.   
+ Yes. 100 percent.   
+ Yeah. I'd agree with that.   
 I think we have a commitment but actually knowing what it is and that what we are doing is safe is a weak link in that.   
+ Yes and there is a very close focus on the people that we put in our operations.   
+ 
Yes we are very strong in that area.  That’s come about from the 
CEO as there was a big change when he came along to look 
especially and safety and security.   
+ Yes definitely.  Yeah definitely not a problem with that.   
 
The operations management position for commitment to resilience represented a 
different approach from the leadership and corporate management positions.  
Whereas previous levels represented a highly positive position, operations 
management level respondents also presented a higher degree of mixed responses.  
As with the previous levels, respondents noted that this was a strong area for their 
organisations and was supported holistically.  The mixed position however 
presented a focus on the conflicting objectives of resilient functionality and 
commercial returns.  Respondents noted that there was a tendency in certain 
circumstances to trade off reliability in depending on the situation.   
 
The fifth trait of reliability is identified as deference to expertise.  As previously 
detailed, this trait is concentrated on the ability of an organisation to shift authority to 
the most appropriate persons to make decision.  In business-as-usual operations, 
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this may be as simple as including members of the operations management team in 
a walk through of a project site and making corrective adjustments based on their 
recommendations.  When disturbance occurs operations management level 
respondents would be the main expert decision makers who would be managing 
and tasking various components of the business to deal with the event.  Operations 
management respondents were asked questions about how they felt their 
organisation valued the experience and expertise of staff.  Furthermore, questions 
explored the ability of the organisation to shift modes of operations whereby 
authority was adjusted to give the most appropriate staff members, regardless of 
business-as-usual hierarchy, the power to make decisions without needing to gain 
agreement from up the chain of command.  Table 5.18 highlights the responses 
from operations management staff regarding deference to expertise as a 
combination of mixed, positive, and negative.   
Table 5.18: Operations Management Deference to Expertise 
Presence Comment 
+ Yes I actually do believe we do that well.   
+ 
Yes and we do that a lot.  Because we are so lean we have people 
that are good in certain areas so we do that really well.  We hand it 
to them quickly.  We know they are good at it.   
+ Yes all of that too. 
 
Yes we do that within our group but I find that other people don’t 
and sometimes people are very reluctant to other people who are 
more skilled to take on a particular role.   
 
Within divisions and within departments there is that ability for 
people to be identified and recognised and have their knowledge 
accepted but it falls down at that next level across the organisation.  
Because of our silos.   
– That’s not correct.  You will have people with limited information and limited knowledge tasked with making a final signoff.   
 
Some cases and parts of the organisation we do it, and in other 
areas where we don’t do it as well I think we are getting better.  I 
think there is an issue to empower people.   
+ I think we’ve got a good structure around that.  The structure here in terms of authority is quite flat but it seems to work.   
+ Yes.  Absolutely.   
 It depends on the incident.  When it is a serious incident then the business has got the ability to do that.   
 In incidents – yes, business as usual – no 
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 The majority of the airport understanding but the small groups of departments don’t have much input of understanding of this.   
 We have the ability to I think and sometimes we do it right and sometimes we probably don’t do it at all.   
– We don’t defer that control very well.   
– 
We have done a lot of work on that but I am still not comfortable 
with some of the higher ups.  Some of them just can’t let go of the 
authority they have got.   
– No I actually don’t think we do value the expertise of people, or not to the extent that we should.   
 
Where previous levels of analysis had discussed deference to expertise in a mixed 
and positive fashion, operations management is the first level to suggest a negative 
position.  This is of particular interest as in disturbance events the operations 
management level of analysis is the group most likely to be deferred to by other 
members of the organisation.  Operations management data again noted 
differences in how respondents conceptualise ‘in-group’ and ‘out-of-group’ positions 
whereby they view their own teams ability to defer to expertise as further developed 
than the rest of the organisation.  An interesting theme was presented by the 
eleventh response which discussed this as also being situational against the mode 
of operation.  In their response “In incidents – yes, business as usual – no” they 
note that when the situation absolutely requires it (during disturbance) they will be 
delegated to, however in normal business functionality the operations management 
level have less direct influence over decisions regarding their area of expertise.   
 
This section has explored research question 2A from the operations management 
perspective.  This investigation has focused on investigating the presence of the 
Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) five traits of high reliability as informed by operations 
management group members.  This investigation has highlighted that distinctions 
between the middle management levels of corporate management and operations 
management exist around the ways they feel the organisation represents both 
commitment to resilience and deference to expertise.  Particular areas of distinction 
at middle management were represented as commitment to resilience and 
deference to expertise, both represented in a more critical way by operations 
management respondents.  Furthermore, if operations management is compared to 
the leadership level of analysis on these two traits a position of even greater 
distance can be seen.  The following section will now further explore high reliability 
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at the operations management level by exploring the potential to further develop 
reliability in airport management organisations.   
 
5.4.2 Potential Development: Operations Management Level 
The previous discussion has focused on research question 2A of this thesis with an 
investigation of the five traits of high reliability.  The analysis highlighted a range of 
different respondent perspectives of preoccupation with failure, reluctance to 
simplify, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to 
expertise.  Respondent examples were categorised into positive, negative, and 
mixed positions regarding their perception on the organisations ability to satisfy the 
particular trait.  Operations management respondents noted a more negative 
position in preoccupation with failure, commitment to resilience, and deference to 
expertise than previously discussed levels.  Key issues were highlighted as a lack of 
awareness and shared understanding between different parts of the organisation as 
well as conflicts between operational objectives and commercial outcomes.  With 
these key themes in mind, this section will investigate research question 2B.  This 
will focus on exploring the potential to further develop high reliability in airport 
management organisations from the perspective of the operations management 
level of analysis.  As the operations management level are the main organisational 
area that deals with vulnerability and development of resilience, respondents 
discussed a wide range of ideas for enhancement.   
 
The first area discussed by operations management respondents was the need to 
increase the resourcing of the organisation to respond to vulnerability, be it from a 
disturbance event or a weakness in the system.  This was discussed in three 
different ways.  The first example from the respondent below highlights instances 
where identified corrective action is being neglected due to limitations of resources 
and the lack of a clear and direct return on investment from the airport management 
organisation.   
“I know other airports that have big redundancies in terms of their emergency 
staff.  I know that our emergency manager is about to get another person in 
their team but its not enough.  I know we are running a business, but you can 
only put fires out for so long, and those core business functions about 
learning, review, planning, and preparation really get missed out when you 
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don’t have the resources.  I really feel that all this kind of stuff here (response 
and recovery) is the easy part because you are just reacting to what you do 
day-to-day.  If your training is good enough and these things are in place this 
shouldn't be an issue.  These things (review and learning) are hard to do 
because they take time and often take money, and you might not see a return 
straight away.”   
The second example highlights issues with resourcing and vulnerability should a 
disturbance event take place.  In the example below the respondent notes that a 
number of critical airport operations positions do not have a backup redundancy.  
This creates vulnerability that should an event occur whereby a critical member of 
staff is unable to respond or is involved directly in the event, the airport 
management organisation has now lost all capacity in that particular area.   
“So this airport should have redundancy in every operational position and they 
don’t.  There is no redundancy for the airport emergency manager, very little 
redundancy for my role as security manager, and people may argue and say 
‘could fill in and do that role’, and that’s true but are they prepared to really do 
it in the event of something going really bad?  And are they prepared to 
manage it long term?”   
The third example also highlighted issues with resourcing and vulnerability.  This 
third respondent differs from the two prior examples in that rather than looking to 
increase staff numbers this position suggests making more efficient use of the 
persons available by training staff in multiple areas.  In this way, overall numbers of 
staff remain the same yet the airport management organisation develops the ability 
to surge resources when and where required.   
“We are very, very lean on numbers. So, we really need to multi task people. 
We need to give them multiple training. And in any new plan and preparation 
approach I think it's something that we need to focus on.  So you've got to be 
conscious that one person can't do one job. One person has to be available to 
be able to do multiple jobs.”   
All three of these positions have the ability to develop preoccupation with failure and 
commitment to resilience in airport management organisations.  By increasing 
resources capability in business-as-usual, disturbance, or by more efficient use, we 
improve the ability of our organisation to remain operational even when presented 
with a critical disturbance event.   
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The second area highlighted by operations management respondents discussed 
gaps in commitment to the development of risk systems between operational and 
corporate functions within airport management organisations.  The respondent 
below recounted running a training program for leadership members regarding their 
role in the airport emergency plan.  During this session leadership members were 
disengaged and more than likely learned very little from the training.  As these 
members play a key role in both business-as-usual and disturbance functionality at 
airport management organisations, a much higher level of commitment should be 
presented.   
“Well its interesting we are having this interview now because we only just 
discussed this sort of thing at one of our meetings this morning.  And the 
answer is no those executives would not understand their role.  We provided 
training so they could learn the role of incident coordinator or manager.  The 
majority of them were on their mobile phones sending emails or texts or 
whatever.  So even though that training has been provided a lot of that didn’t 
sink in and a lot of them are just not really interested in it.  They are more 
focused on other parts of the business and I don’t really thing they have any 
understanding past that.”   
The second example recounts a potential solution to commitment of non-operational 
staff for key emergency training.  The importance of education and embedding of 
understanding is noted but the need to highlight the critical nature of understanding 
vulnerability is addressed.  In this example below, the respondent recounts the 
same training series as the first respondent but highlights the need for intervention 
from the CEO to highlight the critical nature of the work.  
“The answer is really easy.  It’s about culture and developing that capability, 
training, and exercising.  So what you have got is within the operational group, 
I think there’s a really good understanding about the different roles and how 
the emergency management framework and the arrangements.  Outside of 
the operational teams, there’s almost no understanding whatsoever, and the 
issue there is getting that traction outside of the operational teams.  And I think 
the solution is education particularly at the senior levels.  We have got to get 
those execs along to training and it has to start at the top.  The CEO has to 
say that the emergency management is a critical part of our business and you 
will attend training.  You will attend training and you will be marked on what 
was discussed in the same way as everyone else.”   
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The ability to have employees undertake legitimate training is critical for any 
organisation looking to improve preoccupation with failure.  When our system can 
develop understanding not only in operational teams, but also holistically in our 
organisation a developed sensitivity to operations will be present.  Support from the 
most senior levels will highlight culturally the importance of reliability to the airport.   
 
The third area detailed by the operations management level of analysis was the 
potential to develop a program whereby non-operational staff can gain experience in 
operational areas of the airport.  This is a similar position presented by corporate 
management level respondents in Section 5.3.2.  In the example below, the 
respondent notes that when touring other airports, a program of cross-skilling of 
staff was discussed.  In this program, members of the corporate staff were required 
to work a certain amount of time each year in the operations department of the 
airport.  This was discussed as a means of developing a more detailed 
understanding of the organisation.   
“We just got back from a tour of some of the overseas airports.  So things like 
looking at their systems and getting presentations and all that sort of thing.  
One of the really interesting things was that one of them had put in all of their 
employee contracts that staff must do a certain amount of days each year 
working in the operations part of the airport.  So you and your manager get to 
pick the time, but you absolutely must go and work over there for a while.  So 
it might be helping out during peek times or something like that.  And I think 
that’s excellent because it gives those other parts of the business a much 
better understanding of what we are actually dealing with here.”   
As with the previous discussion from the corporate management perspective, this 
example at the operations management level highlights the ability to enhance 
sensitivity to operations and deference to expertise.  By enabling other members of 
non-operational parts of the business time working in operational areas a more 
detailed understanding will be developed.  This is particularly useful in developing a 
shared understanding of the challenges faced in operational areas as well as the 
skills and expertise available to members when a disturbance event takes place.   
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This section has discussed the potential to further develop high reliability in airport 
management organisations from the operations management perspective.  Key 
elements of resourcing and vulnerability, differences in operations and corporate 
perspectives of vulnerability, and experiencing different work functions.  The 
following section will now summarise Section 5.4.1 regarding the presence of traits 
of high reliability and Section 5.4.2 regarding the potential to enhance reliability.   
 
5.4.3 High Reliability Assessment: Operations Management Level Summary 
The first component of the operations management level of analysis looked at the 
current presence of high reliability in airport management organisations (research 
question 2A).  The first trait, preoccupation with failure, presented a far more 
positive position than the previous levels of analysis.  With operations management 
staff being largely responsible for the detection and correction of vulnerability, this 
may have been a representation their group position reflected organisation wide.  
The second trait, reluctance to simplify, highlighted a position consistent with the 
corporate management group of a negative position.  Operations management 
respondents noted a lack of ability to capture information in terms of both a 
developed data management system and barriers caused by organisational silos.  
The third trait, sensitivity to operations, revealed a combination of negative and 
mixed positions with a common thread being a lack of shared awareness about the 
functions and objectives of different business components.  The fourth trait, 
commitment to resilience, highlighted a combination of positive and missed 
perspectives that highlighted the first time respondents had moved away from the 
positive position.  Operations management respondents noted situations where 
conflicting objectives between operational and business functions had resulted in a 
trading off of resilience.  The fifth trait, deference to expertise noted mixed, positive, 
and the first instance of negative perspectives.  Respondents noted the distinction 
between the ability of their group to defer appropriately yet other parts of the 
organisation were not as developed.   
 
Figure 5.3 below provides a visual summary of these operations management 
positions with positive , negative , or mixed manner  
views being represented against the five traits of reliability down the left hand side.   
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Figure 5.3: Operations Management Visual Summary* 
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PWF – – + +  –  +   + + + + –  
RTS – – +  – – –  –   – – – – – 
STO – – – – –  –   –     – – 
CTR + + +      + + + +  + + + 
DTE + + +   –  + +     – – – 
 
*The above figure should not be considered a quantitative measure of the leadership level of analysis but rather simply a visual representation of different 
respondent views and their relationship to the traits of high reliability.   
 
The second component of the operations management level of analysis investigated 
the potential to further develop high reliability in airport management organisations 
(research question 2B).  Respondents discussed a range of areas where there was 
the potential to improve current practice.  The first area focused on issues around 
resourcing of staff in airport management organisations.  Three separate 
respondents from the operations management level discussed the area with 
different perspectives on the issue.  Positions varied from the need to increase staff 
numbers to implement corrective practice, the need for more developed 
redundancy, and better utilisation of current staff through cross-skilling.  The second 
area discussed different levels of commitment on training between corporate and 
operations groups.  A solution was presented as the need for organisational leaders 
to reinforce the critical importance of understanding vulnerability.  The third area 
detailed a potential to enhance cross-functional understanding and commitment 
through a program of involving corporate members in operational teams for short 
lengths of time.  Table 5.19 below summarises the findings from Sections 5.4.1 - 
5.4.2.   
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Table 5.19: Summary of HRO Findings – Operations Management Analysis 
 
RQ2A: What is the current level of high 
reliability in Australian airports? 
 
 
RQ2B: What is the potential to further 
develop high reliability in Australian 
airports?   
 
• Preoccupation with failure presented 
more positive position than previously 
seen.  Respondents still discussed the 
distinction that they felt their own group 
was more developed than other parts of 
the organisation.   
• Reluctance to simplify was highlighted as 
a negative with issues emphasised the 
lack of ability to capture and utilise 
information appropriately.   
• Sensitivity to operations discussed a 
combination of negative and mixed 
perspectives with a focus on 
development of shared understanding.   
• Commitment to resilience presented a 
combination of positive and mixed 
positions.  Competing objectives 
between operations and corporate 
functions was highlighted.   
• Deference to expertise highlighted a split 
of mixed, positive, and negative 
positions.  This was the first inclusion of 
a negative view of deference to 
expertise.   
• The development of appropriate 
resourcing was discussed in terms of 
increasing staff numbers and more 
efficient use of current staff through 
cross-skilling to improve preoccupation 
with failure and commitment to 
resilience.   
• Stronger development of links between 
corporate and operational components of 
the business supported by a top down 
commitment from senior leaders to 
improve sensitivity to operations and 
preoccupation with failure.   
• Placement of non-operational staff in 
operational parts of the business to 
enhance understanding and further 
develop sensitivity to operations and 
deference to expertise.    
 
This section has provided a summary of data regarding high reliability from the 
perspective of operations management respondents.  This analysis will be 
developed across all four levels of analysis.  The following section will now further 
this analysis at the officer level.   
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5.5 High Reliability Assessment:  
Officer Level 
As discussed in study one, members of the officer level of analysis are front-line 
employees who deal with both business-as-usual and disturbance events in a 
hands-on manner.  Members of this group are usually the first on the scene during a 
disturbance event and play a key function in communicating information to more 
senior levels.  Furthermore, as they are on-site more than management staff, they 
have the potential to notice areas that may represent vulnerability for the airport 
management organisation.  Due to the unpredictable nature of the work officer level 
respondents undertake, eight respondents were unable to complete responses on 
all five traits of high reliability bringing the total number of respondents to thirteen.  
The revised respondents at this level included four Airside Safety Officers, three 
Duty Terminal Officers, one Airport Security Officer, one Airside Wildlife Officer, one 
Corporate Risk and Compliance Officer, one Airside Operations Officer, one 
Terminal and Landside Officer, and one Media Officer.  This section explores the 
presence of the Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) five traits of high reliability (RQ2A).  This 
is followed be a discussion of the potential to further embed highly reliable practice 
in airport management organisations (RQ2B).   
 
5.5.1 Current Presence: Officer Level 
The first trait of high reliability has been discussed as preoccupation with failure.  
As addressed at the previous levels of analysis, preoccupations with failure is 
focused on the way in which organisations pay attention to and explore vulnerability 
within their system.  Organisations that are preoccupied with failure are mindful of 
areas where things could go wrong and have a culture that focuses on anticipating 
errors in the system.  Members of the officer level of analysis are those most in 
contact with areas which have the potential to go wrong in airport management 
organisations.  Areas such as airside safety, security, wildlife control, and terminals 
monitoring are all components where disturbance events take place.  Respondents 
from the officer level of analysis were asked questions regarding the way in which 
their organisation collects and uses information about vulnerability, as well as the 
ability of the system to review and improve practice.  Table 5.20 highlighted the 
responses from the officer level regarding preoccupation with failure noting mixed 
and negative positions.   
231 
Table 5.20: Officer Preoccupation with Failure 
Presence Comment 
 
Within our team I think we take near-misses very seriously and treat 
them as a learning tool.  Basically getting data to try and reduce the 
risk.   
– 
I don’t think they pay enough attention to near-misses.  Would be 
my opinion that they don’t even acknowledge them from what I 
have seen.   
– Well we don’t do that.  We have a hard enough time getting people to recognize incidents let alone a near-miss.   
– 
We probably don’t use information as much as we should as an 
Airport.  Management might see it and think that’s more dangerous 
than it is because they are not part of the environment and they are 
not living with it day in and day out so they don’t quite understand.   
– Across the business I would have to say not at all.   
 
I think its different in different parts of the business.  In the airfield 
whenever something went wrong we had to document, then we'd 
have an airfield safety coordinator go through it all, do an 
investigation and come up with a conclusion.  In the terminal it’s a 
bit different.  Similar but not the same doggedness.   
– I don’t think we probably do enough in the near-miss space.  Very occasionally will you get a near-miss incident report.   
 I thin that is true of what we do within our group but not sure about the rest.   
 
We have recently got a new team in that area who are right onto 
those things.  So we have a high attention in those areas at the 
moment.   
 
I think it would be entirely determinant on where it was, who’s fault 
or issue it was, was it poor communication, for how we would fit into 
it.   
 Kind of similar to what we do here but the hard bit is putting it into practice.   
 The do review but sort of looking into that and they send out the information but we don’t really see it.   
– Things are a little bit relaxed here on that and I suppose some of the smaller things sometimes get overlooked to keep the ball rolling.   
 
In comparison to the previously discussed level, officers represent a picture of the 
situation more consistent with the corporate management level than the operations 
management level.  This is particularly interesting as members of the officer level of 
analysis have much higher interaction with the operations side of airport 
management organisations.  The distinction between the operations management 
level have a more strategic approach and the officer level far more on-the-ground 
function.  The mixed position again highlighted the distinction between how 
respondents considered the level of preoccupation within group and across group.  
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Specifically the sixth response highlighting that the review and improvement process 
have a perceived different levels of commitment between the operational and 
corporate functions of the business.  The negative positions discussed by 
respondents highlighted some of the issues around reporting and improvement for 
near-miss events.  Again, this centred on the issues of the legitimacy of involvement 
in the review process and the communication back to front-line employees about 
what corrective measures (if any) had been implemented as a result.   
 
The second trait of high reliability has been defined as reluctance to simplify.  As 
noted by discussion in the previous levels of analysis, this trait explores the way in 
which the organisation values detailed information and utilises it to seek out 
potential areas of weakness in the system.  In this way organisations value the 
views of persons in our organisation who raise concerns about issues and use it to 
improve practice.  Officer level respondents were asked to comment on questions 
relating to the way their respective organisations capture information and then utilise 
it to make appropriate decision-making and corrective measures where required.  
Table 5.21 details the responses from the officer level of analysis as a combination 
of mixed and negative positions on reluctance to simplify.   
Table 5.21: Officer Reluctance to Simplify 
Presence Comment 
 
We have meetings specific to my area and also learn from other 
airports.  But I’m not sure how much information is shared across 
the organisation.   
– 
No.  One of the most frustrating things from out level is that it would 
seem that anything we suggest is only seen as negative comment 
on their ability to do their job.   
– 
That totally does not exist.  The people down at the pleb level, is 
what they consider themselves because that’s how they are made 
to feel, I would be surprised if any of them even considered that 
they have any ability to say something if they didn’t think something 
was right.  And who would they tell? Why is anyone going to listen? 
They’re nobody and that’s how they feel.   
– 
We are good at trying to get all the information out at the start but 
management don’t take it in.  They come back a couple of months 
later and it’s the way they wanted it done anyway so its not 
genuine.   
– 
I think people do take things for granted at times.  I’m sure all 
organisation fail to capture things from the lower levels but here a 
lot of things get reported and I’m not sure if it goes up.   
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 To a degree.  I think its fair to say some people have come into the organisation with their way of doing things.   
 
That applies to a certain extent.  We tend to have meetings there 
involving the management level and then I have to remind myself to 
relay it back to the guys on the ground.   
– 
I think we encourage as much as we can from our subject matter 
experts however we are continuously trying to tell them how to do 
their job.   
 We are ok with that within our team.  Everyone’s always willing to put their voice into the discussion as well.   
– I know we have systems in place where people can report to improve but I’m just not sure how effective they really are.   
 Same as the first in that we get a broad scope of information.   
 Not to sure about those actually.  Probably a bit of a mix.   
 I think some people are more open to comments than others.   
 
Respondents from the officer level highlighted a mixed position discussed that there 
are functions to gather information within airport management organisations 
however issues arise when sharing information across groups or across hierarchal 
levels.  This represents a challenge for organisations as the officer level is 
particularly important in discovering and communicating back areas of potential 
vulnerability to more senior components within the organisation.  Respondents who 
discussed the negative discussed reluctance to simplify in a similar way but 
highlighted more underlying cultural issues with information and reporting.  Officer 
respondents citing the negative position discussed their position that more senior 
members had no interest in what junior members of the organisation had to say on 
matters and that their opinion had no bearing on what corrective measures would be 
implemented.   
 
The third trait of high reliability is expressed as sensitivity to operations.  As 
addressed in the literature review and previous levels of analysis, this trait 
investigates the ability of the organisation to have a clear understanding of the 
critical issues at the ‘front-line’ of operations.  As addressed by prior research, the 
ability for organisations to cut through hierarchal obstacles and have a detailed 
understanding of the challenges faced in both business-as-usual and disturbance 
models of operations.  Officer level respondents were asked questions pertaining to 
the level of cross-functional understanding within their organisation in terms of both 
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objectives and work responsibilities.  Table 5.22 below highlights the data from the 
officer level of analysis as a combination of negative and mixed results.   
Table 5.22: Officer Sensitivity to Operations 
Presence Comment 
 We work with our stakeholders to look at issues every three months or so but I have never been invited to one of those meetings.   
– No.  I don’t think we as an organisation fully understand everyone else’s role because it is just too siloed.   
– 
This organisation is completely siloed, completely.  Not only do 
people not know how other areas of the business operate, people 
don’t know who those people even area.   
 
We are pretty fortunate that every quarter we have out boss come 
out and say this is the plan for the next few months.  But its not like 
we get consulted beforehand or anything like that.   
 
I think conflicting.  Certainly a possibility because operations groups 
objectives are the same but the retail section might be in conflict 
with those.   
– 
That’s a difficult one.  I’ve noticed this here at this airport more so 
than others that it’s a massive pissing contest between groups.  
Everyone here wants to flex their muscles on who’s more important.   
– 
I think I have a good understanding of how the business operates 
but to the person on they ground I think they have a poor 
understanding just because we are so removed from the rest of the 
operation.   
– 
Definitely not true.  We have had people out there for ten years and 
they would know every scenario and yet we don’t take that 
information and utilize it.   
 
Management focus on the day-to-day where I kind of feel neglected 
at times because they just don’t have the full understanding of 
what’s going on.   
– 
Not at all.  I mean the reputational issues are the classic example.  
They just don’t understand the reputational impact of an operational 
decision.   
– 
No I think its been an ongoing problem ever since I have been here 
and I’m sure an ongoing problem at airports around the world you 
know.   
– No definitely not.  Not even close mate.   
 
Every now and again I think we get a breakdown of 
communications between groups.   
 
The negative position from the officer level of analysis highlighted a strong feeling 
that more senior members in the organisation had a limited understanding of the 
requirements that offices deal with on a day-to-day basis.  Again, issues regarding 
organisational culture and silos were recounted as limiting factors for cross-
functional understanding within airport management organisations.  This would be a 
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long process but would certainly enhance cross-functional understanding as an 
outcome.  Respondents who highlighted a mixed position also discussed the 
perceived disconnect in terms of hierarchy and departments in airport management 
organisations.  From a high reliability perspective this represents a significant 
challenge to overcome as it requires more senior members to engage more with the 
‘front-line’ in a legitimate and open manner.   
 
The fourth trait of high reliability has been articulated as commitment to resilience.  
As highlighted by the previous levels of analysis, this trait looked at the ability of an 
organisation to deal with disturbance and maintain high levels of functionality.  As 
discussed in prior research, rather than being incapacitated by disturbance, 
organisations with a commitment to resilience area able to function at reduced 
levels of capacity while implementing response and recovery functions.  Officer level 
respondents were asked questions relating to the ability of their respective 
organisations commitment to safe and reliability operations as well as how 
rigorously their organisations enhances the capacity of staff to deal with 
disturbance.  Members of the officer level of analysis are able to provide a detailed 
perspective on resilience as they are involved in all stages of the disturbance 
management process from pre-event through to post-event review and learning 
functions.  Table 5.23 highlights data from the officer level of analysis as a 
combination of mostly positive with some mixed views on commitment to resilience.   
Table 5.23: Officer Commitment to Resilience 
Presence Comment 
+ The airport brings in people from outside the organisation to help with training which is really good.   
 I think their heart is in the right place but I’m not sure that the structures are in place to make that happen.   
 I think the idea of ‘safe operations’ is different for different areas.  Only certain areas know risk and they are the ones that deal with it.   
 
We are trained a lot to respond.  So I wonder do we gear our 
knowledge more towards serious areas of do we worry about the 
other little things?   
+ Yeah, I think so.   
+ Yeah that's pretty true. I must admit the training provided is excellent.  They're not afraid to spend money to get people trained. 
+ I think we are pretty good at promoting safety as the number one priority to staff.   
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+ We really are focused on security and safety so that’s an organisational push.   
+ Yeah that’s where our safety management system and risk registers come through.   
+ Yeah that is true.  Safety overrides it all.   
+ Yeah that’s true.  We are always having meetings and updating procedures at all times.   
+ Yeah that is pretty much the reason we are here.   
+ Yeah I agree with all that.   
 
The officer level of analysis highlighted positions previously discussed at the three 
more senior levels of analysis.  Following from the leadership and corporate 
management levels of analysis, the positive position highlighted the key value that 
the organisation places on the development of a resilient system.  This was also 
discussed by a number of operations management respondents citing the critical 
importance placed on safe and reliable operations.  The mixed position presented 
by some officer level respondents discussed a similar theme to operations 
management respondents regarding the potential conflicts created between the 
objective of resilient functionality and commercial objectives.  As noted by 
respondent A8, different components of the business have different levels of 
involvement and understanding regarding resilient functionality.   
 
The fifth trait of high reliability has been developed as deference to expertise.  As 
discussed in the prior levels of analysis, deference to expertise explores the ability 
of the organisation to shift the delegation of authority and decision-making when 
presented with vulnerability.  Officer level respondents are in an interesting position 
regarding deference as in some situation they are required to defer to more senior 
expert decision-makers whereas in other situation they are the key experts on the 
situation.  The limitation becomes when deference takes place because of ‘seniority’ 
or ‘authority’ rather than following the advice of the best person to make the 
decision.  Officer level respondents were asked to give their thoughts on questions 
related to the ability to divert authority to persons with the most appropriate 
expertise, experience, and training.  Table 5.24 below highlights the data for 
deference to expertise from the officer level of analysis by discussing a combination 
of positive and mixed positions.   
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Table 5.24: Officer Deference to Expertise 
Presence Comment 
+ 
If there is a problem out here and we don't have an answer we 
always will call into a supervisor who is more experienced.  We 
don't take chances and here and if we don't know the answer we 
don't make a rash decision.   
 To a certain extent I think the organisation has changed and its that change in culture but there is still a long way to go.   
+ 
I think the idea about experience is relevant at this airport.  People 
will come talk to my manager if they have an inkling that an issue 
might come up.   
+ I think we do that right.   
+ Yeah.  I am happy with the way that our agency structures that.   
+ 
I think they're pretty regimented in that approach here.  If the airport 
emergency plan says, “this person is in charge”, then that person is 
going to be in charge no matter what.   
 I suppose its easy to be critical but I think one of the challenges here is do we end up with the right people in the right positions.   
 
We do defer to people within the organisation if there is an incident 
but we are really reliant on external consultants.  I think we could 
build that capacity with robust training of our own staff and build that 
knowledge base.   
 
It’s a hard topic for myself at the moment because I think there has 
been somewhat a lack of training in that area at this airport.  
Sometimes staff really just don’t know what to do.   
 Sort of.  I think we go to our technical expertise when we have problems but not on all topics and not all the time.   
+ Yeah we have a lot of people who are good in their fields and you can involve them in that decision-making.   
+ Yes and I think it comes down to training and knowing the other people ability.   
+ On the whole things run pretty well and delegation goes where it needs to and works pretty well.   
 
Officer level respondents highlighted a mostly positive position to deference to 
expertise noting that they felt that processes were in place whereby staff could seek 
assistance when the situation required it.  In this way officers are focusing on them 
delegating to others rather than them being the authority on the particular matter.  
The mixed position by officer level respondents noted inconsistencies in deference.  
These inconsistencies related to a need to improve the structure of deference as 
well making sure that we have the right people being deferred to.  Respondents 
noted the need to develop training internally rather than relying on external 
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consultants who may or may not be available depending on the particular 
disturbance event.   
 
This section has discussed the current presence of high reliability from the officer 
level perspective.  The following section will further explore the officer level by 
highlighting the potential for further development of high reliability in airport 
management organisations.   
 
5.5.2 Potential Development: Officer Level 
The preceding section focused on the current presence of the five traits of high 
reliability from the officer perspective.  This analysis discussed areas where 
respondents felt that their respective airport management organisations functioned 
in a positive, negative, or mixed manner.  A number of key themes emerged from 
this data including distinctions between how respondents viewed the performance of 
their own group against other areas, limitation in shared understanding and 
awareness, and the need for a more detailed understanding of the airport 
management organisation at the front-line.  These themes presented a clear 
distinction between how more senior members of the organisation viewed reliability 
against the front-line officer level.  With this prior discussion in mind, this section will 
now address officer level respondent views on the potential for further development 
of high reliability in airport management organisations.   
 
The first area discussed the potential for further involvement of operational staff in 
any changes or development to the airport management organisation that may 
impact operations.  The two examples below are referring to the critical technology 
failure incident from A-Air, summarised in Section 4.6.  The first example below from 
respondent notes that in a number of situations the groups developing and 
implementing changes to components (be they technical, procedural, or cultural) of 
the airport management organisations are not including employees who would be 
impacted by the proposed modification.  This first example notes the need to 
capture on-the-ground knowledge as a means of better understanding the potential 
vulnerability created through system changes.  In the critical technology failure 
incident, members of the operational team were not involved in the risk assessment 
239 
process or planning process that was handled in-house by the information 
technology department.  The result was officer level respondents needing to revert 
to manual processes during a peak airport time for a ‘routine low risk’ change to the 
system.   
“One of the big things I’ve noticed here is we have people who make the 
decision but they are not the people who will be impacted by it when the shit 
hits the fan.  And they are not the people who then have to implement it and 
actually deal with it day-to-day.  They don't understand that there is an 
obligation that if you see that this is not right, we needed to find a solution.”   
The second example below further highlights details of lack of cross-functional 
involvement whereby the respondent notes the lack of communication during the 
disturbance event.  Furthermore, this example highlights that officer level staff felt a 
lack of consideration from team ‘in charge’ of the disturbance event and that little 
communication was to be expected as it was now an operations issue.  This 
highlights a potential cultural disconnect in terms of the values one group places on 
overall airport operations with another focusing specifically on their teams job.   
“It's still ongoing now even though this system is back operating as such.  But 
it is still not working properly.  We haven't had an update from anyone since 
9:00am and it is now 11:30am so there is then no communication from that 
department in the last three and a half hours.  I suppose they concern is 
finished but because they are not the end user.”   
Both of the above examples highlight the importance of involvement and 
communication when considering vulnerability.  These examples highlight areas for 
enhancement around all five traits of high reliability.  Specifically, these examples 
note improvement in preoccupation with failure in the legitimacy of risk assessment 
process, reluctance to simplify in the gathering and appropriate use of data in 
decision-making, sensitivity to operations in the communication with appropriate 
groups, commitment to resilience in how we consider the potential for errors in our 
system, and deference to expertise in how we involve appropriate experts in the 
decision-making process both before and during disturbance.   
 
The second area addressed the issue of how different parts of airport management 
organisations view vulnerability and other critical issues.  The following three 
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examples all note areas where officer level respondents have experienced 
differences between operational and corporate functions of airport management 
organisations.  The first example below discusses the issues of there being ‘two 
businesses’ in airport management organisations noting the cultural differences 
between components   of the organisation.   
 “The thing to remember here is that we have really got two businesses that 
are substantially different.  One part is the business side that handle all their 
stuff around parking cars and selling t-shirts and they are just nine to five.  
Then you have got the operations side of the place that is twenty-four-seven 
and we never stop.  The planes have for to land somewhere!  Most of the time 
one side of this company don’t really have any idea what the other side is 
doing.”   
The second example highlights a similar challenge in the way that corporate/senior 
employees could improve their understanding of the operational components of the 
organisation.  In this example below, the officer level respondent notes the positive 
experience of have their groups corporate manager visit the operational side of the 
business.  Furthermore, the respondent highlights the need for other managers and 
members of the senior leadership team to develop closer ties with the operational 
components of the organisation.  This front-line understanding can improve how 
staff understand the objectives and functions of other components of the business 
as well as further developing working relationships between groups.   
“I’ll tell you that something we can improve on here because one of the 
problems we’ve got is that senior management is all the way over here in head 
office and we are over on the airfield.  So my manager from up here comes 
over occasionally to talk to staff which is awesome but that next level up 
there’s probably a lot to be said for them coming down and spending a day 
and actually seeing what’s happening.”   
The third example introduces a more critical issue regarding differences in how 
components of airport management organisations consider vulnerability.  In the 
example below, officer level respondent recounts an interaction with a member of 
the leadership level regarding repeat incidents on a terminal escalator.  Prior to the 
discussion the officer had prepared data regarding the issue including findings that 
the large majority of persons getting injured were elderly females.  This presented a 
current issue of injuries occurring with the knowledge of the airport management 
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organisations but also the understanding that there was potential for a much more 
serious outcome impacting the airport from a range of legal, reputational, and 
operational perspectives.  The example below recounts this interaction between the 
officer and the leadership level employee.   
“So some of our heads of department do not have any risk based focused at 
all.  Revenue is everything and so they don’t really want to know about risk, 
they don’t really want to know about safety, or anybody getting hurt.  They 
think it’s not their problem even when it’s their asset so all of those incidents 
are actually their responsibility.  So we have taken it on and when all these 
incidents happened and we prepared a presentation showing the statistics.  I 
looked every incident on the travelators and the demographics and age, 
weather they were pushing a trolley, how many bags they had, what was the 
contributing factors.  We looked and it showed that most of the people 
involved were elderly and most were female.  And the ones with trolleys 
involved were pushed by an elderly females.  So we’ve got the context of 
overloaded trolleys with someone who is not very strong and they cant get off 
the travelators, so we are narrowing down how we can address that issue.  
But that particular groups response was ‘how many people are we talking 
about?’  So we said ‘well 40 people have been injured in the past year, and 
they said ‘ok well against the amount of people that go through that area in a 
year, that is like less than 1% so we can live with that.’  So the problem is my 
group cant live with that!”   
The three examples above highlight different examples of gaps between the 
corporate and operational functions of airport management organisations.  All three 
of these gaps pertain to how organisations consider and act upon vulnerability.  The 
first two examples note the perception of separation between corporate and 
operational functions of airports management organisations highlighting the 
potential for more cross-functional discussion and involvement.  The third example 
presents a serious and considerable gap in knowledge on vulnerability and the 
respect attributed to resilient operations.  This area of discussion presents an 
opportunity to further both sensitivity to operations and commitment to resilience 
through development of shared awareness and education of staff about 
vulnerability.   
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The third area detailed the need for a more comprehensive development of bottom-
up strategy development and implementation in airport management organisations.  
As discussed in the preceding discussion of high reliability traits, the ability to tap 
into the knowledge and understanding of members of the front-line of the 
organisation adds value by providing a more detailed and accurate picture of the 
current situation.  The first example below notes the perception that officer level 
employees are being instructed as to the best way to undertake tasks rather than 
being involved in the development of accurate processes around standard operating 
procedures.  The respondent notes the need for more senior members of staff to 
involve more experienced officer level employees in the development and 
implementation of programs for airport management organisations.   
 “A lot of our more senior staff have come from these bigger airports 
internationally and sometimes its like they say, ‘well because we’ve come from 
this big airport, this is the way you are going to do it.  This is better way to do it 
because you’re only a little airport and we’re going to show you how big 
brother does it.’  And I don’t think that’s always the best way for this airport 
because its not what we are.  So we are not even asked even though we 
might have been doing that job for years.  So there is a need to be a bit more 
realistic sometimes I think.”   
The second example from the below respondent highlights the potential to better 
involve officer level respondent and utilise internal knowledge rather than reliance 
on outside advisors.  In this way, as well as involving officer level respondents and 
giving them a feeling of providing a valued contribution to their work, the additional 
bonus is building an internal capacity to decision-make and problem solve.  This is a 
simple solution to developing links cross-functionally between groups and in a 
hierarchal sense between organisational levels.   
“So a lot of times I think that we are better off putting a high performance team 
together with people within the company.  Grab one person from each group 
and say one day a week, you guys are going to work on this problem for the 
next four weeks.  Come together and do it that way, rather than spend the 
hundred grand on some ‘expert consultant’ who is going to come in and try 
and do the same thing anyway but without any of that foundation.”   
These two examples both highlight the importance and the ability to enhance 
reluctance to simplify and sensitivity to operations.  By developing a program 
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whereby members of different organisational groups and levels are able to interact, 
airport management organisations have the potential to develop resilience through 
staff knowledge and practice.   
 
This section has the officer perspective on the potential to enhance high reliability at 
airport management organisations.  Key elements regarding the difference between 
corporate and operational components during disturbance and during business-as-
usual were discussed.  This discussion highlighted the potential to further develop 
highly reliable practice by a greater organisational focus on involvement across 
groups and across levels in the hierarchy.  The following section will now summarise 
Section 5.5.1 which detailed the presence of traits of high reliability and Section 
5.5.2 which explored the potential to enhance highly reliable practice in airport 
management organisations.   
 
5.5.3 High Reliability Assessment: Officer Level Summary 
The first component of the officer level of analysis looked at the current presence of 
high reliability in airport management organisations (research question 2A).  The 
first trait, preoccupation with failure, highlighted a combination of negative and 
mixed positions with respondents noting that within specific operational teams the 
attention to vulnerability was high but across the organisation was much less 
developed.  The officer level highlighted a more negative position than any of the 
previous levels of analysis.  The second trait, reluctance to simplify, also presented 
a combination of negative and mixed positions with respondents noting the inability 
of airport management organisations to capture information from the front-line and 
use it appropriately to inform decision-making.  The third trait, sensitivity to 
operations, was discussed from a mixture of negative and mixed positions with 
respondents discussed a limited understanding of front line issues from senior 
management.  Furthermore, respondents noted the lack of cross-functionality and 
that most business functions were focused on their own purpose.  The fourth trait, 
commitment to resilience, highlighted a mostly positive position of safe and reliable 
operations being the central operation objective.  Some respondents noted a mixed 
position of variance in different components of the business.  The fifth trait, 
deference to expertise, presented a combination of positive and mixed positions 
with respondents discussing the ability of officers to defer up when required but with 
some inconsistences present where seniority over expertise is still present.  A 
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number of the traits of reliability presented at the officer level of analysis present a 
similar position to operations management respondents and highlight a distinction in 
the way that operational and non-operational staff view issues regarding 
vulnerability and disturbance.  Figure 5.4 below provides a visual summary of these 
officer positions with positive , negative , or mixed manner 
 views being represented against the five traits of reliability down the left 
hand side.   
Figure 5.4: Officer Visual Summary* 
 
 
R1 
 
R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 
PWF  – – – –  –      – 
RTS  – – – –   –  –    
STO  – –   – – –  – – –  
CTR +    + + + + + + + + + 
DTE +  + + + +     + + + 
 
*The above figure should not be considered a quantitative measure of the leadership level of analysis but rather simply a visual representation of different 
respondent views and their relationship to the traits of high reliability.   
 
The second component of the officer level of analysis investigated the potential to 
further develop high reliability in airport management organisations (research 
question 2B).  This discussion highlighted a range of points where officer level 
respondents felt a disconnect between the operational and corporate function of 
airport management organisations.  The first area of the discussion highlighted the 
potential to develop involvement between teams within airport management 
organisations both in a planning and assessment function and during disturbance 
events.  This first example noted the potential to develop all five traits of high 
reliability by the use of cross-functional teams.  The second area discussed the 
inherent differences in how areas of airport management organisations understand 
and regard vulnerability.  The examples noted a significant misalignment of values 
regarding vulnerability and discussed the need to both educate and build stronger 
links.  The third area introduced the idea of a more bottom-up focus on information 
gathering and strategic development with the outcome being a more holistic 
understanding of the challenges and objectives ‘on-the-ground’.  Table 5.25 below 
summarises the findings from Sections 5.5.1 - 5.5.2.   
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Table 5.25: Summary of HRO Findings – Officer Analysis 
 
RQ2A: What is the current level of high 
reliability in Australian airports? 
 
 
RQ2B: What is the potential to further 
develop high reliability in Australian 
airports? 
   
• Preoccupation with failure for the officer 
level of analysis highlighted a more 
negative position than previous groups 
highlighting that understanding of 
vulnerability was much less developed 
outside of the operations team.   
• Reluctance to simplify presented a mixed 
representation with key issues sited as 
limited understanding of front-line issues.   
• Sensitivity to operations detailed a mixed 
and negative position with a lack of cross-
functional understanding discussed as a 
limiting factor.   
• Commitment to resilience was discussed 
as a mostly positive position with variance 
noted between operational and corporate 
functions in the respective airport 
management organisations.   
• Deference to expertise noted a 
combination of positive and mixed 
positions with respondents noting 
inconsistencies between how deference 
takes place in some parts of the 
business.   
• Development of cross-functional teams 
to enhance communication, 
understanding, and involvement to 
enhance all traits of high reliability.   
• Enhancement of understanding of 
different organisational components 
through education on vulnerability and 
disturbance to improve sensitivity to 
operations and commitment to 
resilience.   
• Consideration of a bottom-up approach 
information gathering and strategic 
development as a means of enhancing 
reluctance to simplify and sensitivity to 
operations.   
 
This section has provided a summary of data regarding high reliability from the 
perspective of officer respondents.  This analysis has been developed across all 
four levels of analysis.  The following section will now provide a summary of data 
from the current presence of reliability (research question 2A) and the potential to 
further enhance reliability (research question 2B).   
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5.6 High Reliability Assessment Summary 
The preceding sections of this chapter have explored the second research problem 
area of this thesis utilising high reliability theory as a frame of investigation.  This 
investigation took place by addressing airport management organisations from four 
levels of analysis encompassing leadership, corporate management, operations 
management, and officers.  These levels were investigated against two specific 
research questions.  Research question 2A focused on the current presence of high 
reliability in airport management organisations.  This first investigation utilised the 
established approach of the Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) five traits of high reliability to 
explore levels of preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to 
operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise.  Research 
question 2B further explored high reliability by investigating the potential to further 
develop high reliability in airport management organisations.  This second 
investigation highlighted a range of areas at all levels of analysis where there was 
potential to improve practice against the five traits of high reliability.  This section will 
provide a summary of the key points from this chapter and will provide implications 
for further development in Chapter Six – Discussion of this thesis.   
 
5.6.1 High Reliability Current Presence Summary 
RQ2A is focused on providing and understanding as to the presence of high 
reliability in Australian airport management organisations.  From this it can be 
clearly seen that variance exists in two distinct ways.  First, none of the four levels of 
analysis present in-level reliability in that all levels highlighted areas of weakness in 
terms of some of the five traits.  Second, variance exists across levels whereby 
some groups viewed certain traits as more or less present against other groups.  
For example, operations management level respondents viewed preoccupation with 
failure as being more representative than all of the other three levels combined.  
However the data also presented areas of consistency across the levels of analysis.  
For example, commitment to resilience was seen in an extremely positive light with 
the vast majority of respondents noting it as representative of their organisation.  
Furthermore, emerging from this data was the rationale as to why respondents 
considered the traits as they did.  This provided direction as to the limiting factors of 
high reliability in airport management organisations.  Table 5.26 provides a 
summary of the previous analysis comparing the levels of analysis against the 
specific traits of high reliability.   
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Table 5.26: Comparative Assessment of High Reliability Traits 
 
 
Preoccupation 
with Failure 
 
Reluctance  
to Simplify 
Sensitivity  
to Operations 
Commitment  
to Resilience 
Deference  
to Expertise 
Le
ad
er
sh
ip
 
• All Mixed 
 
 
• Moving 
towards that 
position but 
further 
organisational 
development 
required 
• 4 Mixed 
2 Negative 
 
• Moving 
towards that 
position but 
further 
development 
required.   
 
• Organisational 
silos a potential 
limiting factor.   
 
• 4 Mixed 
1 Positive 
1 Negative 
 
• Further 
development 
required. 
 
• Potentially 
situational 
and/or one-way 
understanding 
• All Positive 
 
• Highlighted as 
unanimously 
positive and 
consistent and 
a key strength 
of airport 
management 
organisations.   
• 3 Mixed 
3 Positive 
 
• Variance about 
the success of 
current process 
of identifying 
and delegating 
to expert 
decision 
makers.   
C
or
po
ra
te
 M
an
ag
em
en
t 
• 8 Mixed 
1 Negative 
1 Positive 
 
• Area of 
improvement 
with some 
groups more 
developed than 
others.   
 
• Discussion of 
‘in-group’ 
preoccupation 
rather than 
holistic.   
 
• 7 Negative 
3 Mixed 
 
• Limited ability 
to capture 
information in a 
cross-
functional 
manner due to 
organisational 
silos.   
• 6 Negative 
4 Mixed 
 
• Limited 
understanding 
of tasks and 
objectives 
holistically. 
 
• Areas with a 
presence 
across groups 
more 
developed. 
 
• 9 Positive 
1 Mixed 
 
• Highlighted as 
a key strength 
of the 
business. 
 
• Somewhat 
externalized as 
‘someone 
else’s job’ 
within the 
company. 
• 5 Mixed 
5 Positive 
 
• Variance on 
the ability of a 
organisation to 
defer correctly. 
 
• Awareness of 
skills and 
feedback on 
decisions were 
discussed as 
limiting factors. 
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 M
an
ag
em
en
t 
• 7 Positive 
5 Mixed 
4 Negative 
 
• Stronger 
positions rather 
than mixed 
based.   
 
• Discussion of 
‘in-group’ 
preoccupation 
rather than 
holistic.   
• 11 Negative 
4 Mixed 
1 Positive 
 
• Inability to 
capture 
information and 
utilise it 
appropriately 
was highlighted 
as a key 
limiting factor.   
• 9 Negative 
7 Mixed 
 
• Organisational 
silos as a key 
limiting factor.  
 
• Understanding 
within 
operations 
highlighted as 
higher than in 
other groups.    
• 10 Positive 
6 Mixed 
 
• Presented a 
less unified 
position than at 
previous levels.    
 
• Conflicting 
commercial 
and operational 
objectives 
highlighted as 
limiting factor.   
• 6 Mixed 
5 Positive 
4 Negative 
 
• Inclusion of 
negative 
position by 
those being 
‘deferred to’. 
 
• Discussion of 
‘in-group’ 
deference 
rather than 
holistic. 
 
O
ffi
ce
rs
 
• 7 Mixed 
6 Negative 
 
• Issues of 
capturing near-
misses and 
use of 
information an 
area for 
improvement. 
 
• Discussion of 
‘in-group’ 
preoccupation 
rather than 
holistic.   
 
• 7 Mixed 
6 Negative 
 
• Information 
gathering takes 
place yet 
sharing across 
groups and 
levels is limited 
 
• Discussion of 
‘in-group’ 
reluctance 
rather than 
holistic.   
• 8 Negative 
5 Mixed 
 
• Limited 
understanding 
of tasks and 
objectives 
holistically.   
 
• Perceived lack 
of information 
filtering down 
or up between 
levels.   
• 10 Positive 
3 Mixed 
 
• Highlighted 
safety and 
reliability as 
key objectives.   
 
• Noted potential 
conflicts 
between 
corporate and 
operational 
objectives at 
times.   
• 8 Positive 
5 Mixed 
 
• Ability to defer 
to higher levels 
was agreed.   
 
• Some 
inconsistences 
were noted 
whereby senior 
members 
wanted to hold 
authority in 
certain 
instances.   
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5.6.2 High Reliability Potential Development Summary 
RQ2B explores the potential to further develop high reliability in airport management 
organisations.  This investigation took place by exploring current areas of 
vulnerability and discussing potential ways to improve.  Ideas from the four levels of 
analysis contributed to the development of each of the five traits of high reliability in 
realistic ways that have the potential to be implemented by airport management 
organisations.  Table 5.27 below discusses the areas identified by each level for 
development, the implementation approach, and the corresponding traits of 
reliability that would be enhanced by developing the specific ideas.   
Table 5.27: Identified Areas of Development 
 
 
 
Development  
Issues 
Improvement  
Ideas 
Reliability 
Traits 
Leadership 
Review and corrective practice.   Support and reinforcement from senior management.   
PWF 
RTS 
Structure of delegation of tasks 
and decisions.   
Improved employee induction 
program and ongoing education.   
STO 
CTR 
DTE 
Skill and ability of executive 
members to manage disturbance.   
Further training and development 
for leadership level employees.   STO 
Corporate 
Management 
Employee communication and 
coordination between business 
components.   
Increased use of cross-functional 
teams.   STO 
Employee communication and 
coordination across business 
levels.   
Increased communication 
between levels particularly around 
justification of strategic decisions.   
STO 
Involvement and experience in 
different areas of the airport 
management experience.   
Employee rotation where 
participants would work in 
different areas on placement.   
STO 
DTE 
Operations 
Management 
Limitations of current staff 
numbers and resources.   
Increase staff for review of 
disturbance, redundancy in key 
operational positions, and cross-
skilling of staff.   
PWF 
CTR 
Commitment of senior staff to 
emergency management training.   
Influence from leadership level to 
highlight the critical nature of the 
training.   
PWF 
STO 
Non-operational employee 
understanding of operational 
tasks and objectives.   
Employee placement in 
operational teams for a per-
determined length of time each 
year 
STO 
DTE 
Officer 
Employee coordination and 
communication prior and during 
disturbance events.   
Enhanced communication and 
cooperation between business 
units with support from senior 
management.   
PWF 
RTS 
STO 
CTR 
DTE 
Alignment of understanding 
around what constitutes safe and 
reliable airport operations.   
Programs to develop skills and 
understanding relevant to 
vulnerability at all organisational 
levels and groups.   
STO 
CTR 
Detailed understanding of ‘front-
line’ perspective in airport 
management organisations 
 
Bottom-up information gathering 
and program development 
specific to vulnerability.   
RTS 
STO 
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5.6.3 Study Two: Themes and Implications 
The second study of this these has undertaken a detailed analysis of high reliability 
in airport management organisations.  RQ2A investigated the current level of high 
reliability in airport management organisations across four distinct levels of analysis.  
From this investigation, a number of themes emerged.  First, airport management 
organisations are not aligned with all five traits of high reliability but rather satisfy 
some of the traits.  Although these components do not represent a holistic picture of 
high reliability, they do represent areas of strength for airport management 
organisations dealing with vulnerability.  Second, airport management organisations 
have different representations of reliability across different organisational groups 
and hierarchal levels.  These different perspectives of reliability highlight component 
reliability within certain traits with higher representativeness.  For example, across 
the four levels of analysis both commitment to resilience and difference to expertise 
are shown to be highly representative of current practice with high levels of positive 
representation.  Rather than considering this in a positivists or statically significant 
sense, this finding should be considered in an interpretivist sense as a suggestion of 
reliability and a starting point for further understanding and development within 
airport management organisations.   
 
RQ2B addressed the potential to further develop reliability in airport management 
organisations.  This approach utilized the four analysis levels of leadership, 
corporate management, operations management, and officer to explore ways by 
which there was potential for further development across the five established traits 
of high reliability.  The key theme from the potential to further develop high reliability 
was the increase in cross-functional development in airport management 
organisations.  A number of the practices to enhance suggested more detailed 
involvement of group discussion between groups, project development across 
teams rather than compartmentalised, and work placement in other teams to expose 
staff to the objectives and functions of both the corporate and operational sides of 
airport management organisations.  All of these proposed initiatives would help to 
enhance shared awareness across airport management organisations.  The 
implications of both RQ2A and RQ2B will be further developed in Chapter Six – 
Discussion of this thesis.  The following component, Section 5.7, will now present 
the conclusion of this chapter.   
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5.7 Summary 
Chapter Five – High Reliability Assessment has explored research questions 2A 
and 2B of this thesis.  These questions investigated the current presence of high 
reliability in airport management organisations as well as the potential to further 
develop high reliability in airport management organisations.  This inquiry took place 
be analysing current practice at for levels within airport management organisations 
represented as leadership (Section 5.2), corporate management (Section 5.3), 
operations management (Section 5.4), and officer (Section 5.5) levels.  This 
investigation was then developed into Section 4.6 which provided a summary of the 
key areas of discussion and highlighted areas for further development in the 
following sections of this thesis.  The investigation of RQ2A highlighted that airports 
do not satisfy all traits of high reliability yet do against certain traits.  Particular traits 
of commitment to resilience and deference to expertise were noted as areas of key 
strength for airport management organisations.  The areas of preoccupation with 
failure, reluctance to simplify, and sensitivity to operations were represented in a 
more negative approach with variance between levels of analysis.  The examination 
of RQ2B revealed potential areas to further develop reliability in airport management 
organisations with respondents highlighting a range of approaches to enhance 
functionality.  These areas will be further discussed in the following chapter of this 
thesis, Chapter Six – Discussion.  This will then further develop into Chapter Seven 
– Conclusions.   
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Chapter Six – Discussion 
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6.1 Introduction 
Chapter Six – Discussion is presented in five sections.  These five sections compare 
and contrast the previous understanding in academic literature against the empirical 
analysis of this thesis.  Section 6.2 discusses the first study of this thesis, the 
examination of the conceptual disturbance process model.  This first study focused 
on two areas, RQ1A exploring the process by which disturbance takes place, and 
RQ1B examining the functions of the specific stages of the disturbance process.  As 
discussed in Section 4.6.3, a range of themes around the way disturbance functions 
in real-world practice was detailed and will be further explored in Section 6.2 of this 
chapter.  Section 6.3 examines the second study of this thesis, the exploration of 
high reliability in airport management organisations.  This second study addressed 
two areas, RQ2A reviewing the current presence of high reliability traits, and RQ2B 
exploring the potential for further development of high reliability in airport 
management organisations.  As stated in Section 5.6.3, themes concerning 
reliability against organisational levels of analysis and airport management groups 
were established and are further addressed in Section 6.3 of this chapter.  This 
chapter will finish with a summary of key points in Section 6.4.  The four sections of 
Chapter Six – Discussion are visually represented below in Table 6.1.   
 
Table 6.1: Discussion Chapter Sections 
Chapter One:  Introduction  6.1  Introduction      
6.2  Discussion One; 
 Disturbance Process Model   
6.3  Discussion Two; 
 High Reliability Assessment   
6.4  Summary      
Chapter Two:  Literature Review  
Chapter Three:  Methodology  
Chapter Four:  Study One  
Chapter Five:  Study Two  
Chapter Six:  Discussion  
Chapter Seven:  Conclusions  
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6.2: Discussion One: Disturbance Process Model 
The first study of this thesis focused on exploring the process by which disturbance 
takes place in airport management organisations.  As highlighted in Section 2.2 Risk 
and Crisis Disturbance Models, previous academic literature conceptualised the 
disturbance process in a range of distinct ways.  This thesis undertook a critique of 
existing models and highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of three key models.  
The three models, A Preventative Model of Crisis Management by Mitroff, Pauchant, 
and Shrivastava (1988), The Five Phases of Crisis Management by Pearson and 
Mitroff (1993), and Incident Escalation to the Limits of Contingency Planning by 
Smith (2006) were reviewed and further developed by the author into the conceptual 
disturbance process model which underwent empirical testing in study one of this 
thesis.  The conceptual disturbance process model was proposed to represent the 
key strengths taken from previous knowledge in academic literature. The true test of 
any conceptual model is to investigate the ability of the model to represent what 
occurs in real-world practice.  This investigation took place by exploring the 
proposed model across four layers of analysis (leadership, corporate management, 
operations management, and office levels) at three airport management 
organisations (A-Air, B-Air, and C-Air).  The conceptual disturbance process model 
is presented below in Figure 6.1.  
 
Figure 6.1: Conceptual Disturbance Process Model 
 
(Devine, Barnes, Newton, and Goonetilleke, 2013; developed from Mitroff, 
Pauchant, and Shrivastava 1998; Pearson and Mitroff, 1993; and Smith 2006) 
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This initial model explored a four-phase/ten-step conceptualisation of disturbance 
whereby a flexible process based approach was established.  In this way, 
disturbance could take place by functioning through all stages of the process, or 
‘short-cut’ the process depending on if avoidance could be accomplished from pre-
event into post-event function (representing a near-miss).  Moreover, this model 
introduced the potential for process to take place through partial activation of 
disturbance whereby recovery is avoided (the dotted arrow from response to post-
event).  This initial conceptual model also espoused that within each phase of the 
process, specific functions were present at each stage as a means of optimising the 
return to business-as-usual functionality for airport management organisations.  This 
chapter explores the key themes to emerge from study one and will discuss the 
further development of the conceptual disturbance process model.   
 
6.2.1 RQ1A: What is the process that an airport experiences during 
disturbance? 
During the empirical investigation of the conceptual disturbance process model, a 
number of key findings specific to the nature of the process emerged; 
1. Data across all analysis levels of airport management organisations 
supported the process-based approach whereby disturbance events include 
pre-event, response, recovery, and post-event phases.  Respondents 
stated that the model was highly reflective of real-world practice and many 
highlighted actual disturbance events that took place via the proposed 
process.  This finding highlighted the continued use of the four disturbance 
event phases.   
2. Data from the leadership, operations management, and officer levels of 
analysis suggested that the processes of response and recovery are not 
separate (as previously considered in the conceptual disturbance process 
model and the three reviewed literature models from previous literature), but 
rather a concurrent function whereby different components of airport 
management organisations deal with response and recovery at the same 
time.  Document analysis of prior disturbance events supported this 
contention by highlighting the necessity of considering response and 
recovery concurrently rather than in a linear manner (documents A13, A14, 
A15, A20, B03, B05, B10, C05, C22, and C23).  Furthermore, respondents 
noted needing to consider and manage both the response and recovery 
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functions from the initial stage of the disturbance.  This was further 
supported by participant observation date whereby the researcher observed 
members of the data collection site discussing response and recovery before 
an active process had commenced (participant observation at A-Air of a 
Level 2: Minor Disturbance event).  This finding revealed the need to further 
refine the conceptual disturbance process model with a parallel 
response/recovery phase to better reflect real-world practice and inform 
theoretical understanding of disturbance.   
3. Data from all levels of analysis emphasised the importance of the near-miss 
function for airport management organisations.  Previously this process was 
included whereby avoidance occurred and a post-event phase of review and 
learning would take place.  Although respondents noted the critical 
importance of this process they also discussed the need for airport 
management organisations to further develop the capturing of information 
and the overt post-event process.  Respondents noted that the development 
of a more comprehensive and purposeful approach to near-miss events 
would enable them to further understand vulnerability and implement 
corrective action prior to disturbance events taking place.  Both documentary 
analysis and participant observation data collection methods triangulated the 
minimal presence of explicit near-miss processes in airport management 
organisations.  This finding revealed the critical importance of a structured 
near-miss function to be incorporated into the disturbance process model to 
represent potential vulnerability as well as actual disturbance.   
4. An area that was not addressed by respondents was the previously 
considered process whereby disturbance would move directly from the 
response function to post-event.  This function was not mentioned by 
respondents at any level within the respective airport management 
organisations.  Furthermore, data collected via document analysis noted that 
even in the case of a ‘false alarm’ or ‘standby’ some function of recovery still 
tool place.  For example, where whole or partial terminal evacuation took 
place, passengers leaving the area during response where still required to 
be rescreened to re-enter the sterile area of the terminal.  During this 
process, backlogs (Level 1: Normal Operations Disturbance) occurred which 
negatively affected the system and as such required corrective measures 
within screening teams.  Although this example highlights disturbance 
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whereby the majority of the process is response and a lesser component of 
recovery, both functions do still occur.  This finding further supports the 
second finding of this section as response and recover functions occurring 
as components of the same phase.  
 
Based on the above findings, the conceptual disturbance process model requires 
adjustment to better represent real-world practice.  This adjustment will be required 
to focus on two key areas.  The first area is the modification being the development 
of response and recovery as a single phase of disturbance that occurs concurrently 
rather than in a linear fashion.  The second proposed amendment being the 
inclusion of an explicit near-miss phase whereby even when a disturbance is 
avoided, a process is still triggered into a review and learning function to better 
understanding the rationale behind the avoidance.  The revised model with the 
empirically developed improvements is introduced below in Figure 6.2.   
 
Figure 6.2: Critical Infrastructure Disturbance Process (CIDP) 
  
 Near-Miss 
   10. Near-Miss Learning 9. Near-Miss Review 
   
 
 
Pre-Event  
 
 
1. Planning 2. Preparation 3. Assessment  
 
 
 
    
   Response and Recovery 
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The Critical Infrastructure Disturbance Process (CIDP) model still represents a 
four-phase/ten-stage process however the way in which the process occurs has 
been amended to better reflect real-world practice.  The first adjustment took place 
by combining response and recover into a single phase.  This provides a function 
that accurately reflects of real-world practice.  Furthermore, the concurrent 
response/recovery phase provides a key contribution to theory as previous models 
of disturbance reflected these as separate phases.  This represents a further 
development of the conceptual model developed in this thesis as well as the 
previous work of Mitroff, Pauchant, and Shrivastava (1998), Pearson and Mitroff 
(1993), and Smith (2006).   
 
The second adjustment took place by adding near-miss as an explicit phase of the 
CIDP model.  In this way, the phases of pre-event, response and recovery, and 
post-event (represented as black in the above model) highlight the process that 
takes place when an actual disturbance occurs.  The phase of near-miss 
(represented as grey in the above model) represents the process that takes place 
when there was potential for disturbance to occur yet for some reason (be it 
controlled or uncontrolled) response and recover was not required.  Due to data 
reporting the critical importance of the near-miss function for airport management 
organisations, the above revised disturbance process model better emphasise its 
importance over the previous version.  Furthermore, the CIDP model provides a 
clear advantage over previous conceptualisations of disturbance whereby near-miss 
functionally was either omitted or implied in a tacit sense.  Additional adjustment to 
the model included moving avoidance and resolution out of stage functions and into 
linking functions between phases.  This was developed as these areas received 
lower discussion from respondents as actual stages and were highlighted as being 
areas that ‘just happened’ rather than under the overt and direct control of the 
airport management organisation.  As such, the arrows representing activation, 
avoidance, resolution, and embedding serve as shifts between phase states of the 
model rather than explicit functions of the model.  As with the first adjustment, the 
inclusion of a near-miss as an explicit stage represents a further development of the 
conceptual model developed in this thesis and develops the extant work of Mitroff, 
Pauchant, and Shrivastava (1998), Pearson and Mitroff (1993), and Smith (2006) 
into a new direction of looking at both live events and near-miss disturbance.   
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Section 6.2.1 has highlighted key findings from RQ1A regarding the disturbance 
process in airport management organisations.  Key revisions to the model have 
been undertaken to better reflect practice.  As such, regarding research question 
1A, “What is the process that an airport experiences during disturbance”, this thesis 
adopts the following position; 
! The process of disturbance functions in different ways depending on if the 
event activates or if it can be avoided.  Should an event become activated, 
airport management organisations experience disturbance via a process of 
pre-event, response and recovery, and post-event, followed by a return to a 
revised pre-event phase.  Where airport management organisations have 
experienced the potential for a disturbance event to occur, but for some 
reason it did activate and the organisation is able to undergo avoidance, the 
process occurs as pre-event, near-miss, followed by a return to a revised 
pre-event.  In both an active disturbance and an avoided disturbance as a 
near-miss, the final process of returning to a revised pre-event phase notes 
the improvements made due to enhanced gained in the post-event phase.  
The CIDP model provides an accurate representation of the process that an 
airport management organisation experiences during real-world disturbance.   
This section has provided development of RQ1A addressing the process an airport 
experiences during disturbance.  The following section will address the second sub-
question of research study one.  Section 6.2.2 will further explore the disturbance 
process model by drilling down into the functions of the specific stages of the 
process.  The following section is informed by the work of RQ1A and further 
contributes to understanding of the disturbance process in airport management 
organisations.   
 
6.2.2: RQ1B: What are the functions of the specific stages an airport 
experiences during disturbance?   
During the initial empirical investigation of the conceptual disturbance process 
model, a number of key findings specific to the functions of the specific stages 
emerged; 
1. Different hierarchal levels within airport management organisations 
understand the process of the disturbance process in distinct ways.  Rather 
than having a holistic view of the process, different groups within 
259 
organisations focus on different objectives of importance.  Critical incidents 
discussed in the data collection process further highlighted this disparity with 
respondents recounting the different disturbance events in different ways 
specific to organisational level.  Variance in these objectives highlights a 
potential vulnerability when dealing with disturbance.  As discussed in 
Chapter Two – Literature Review, critical to the disturbance management 
process is a coordinated and strategic approach to enable organisations to 
effectively deal with disturbance and return to business-as-usual operations.  
This finding presents two areas of consideration.  First, a clear picture of 
definitions around the specific stages of disturbance requires further 
development.  Second, specific hierarchal level considerations need to be 
made more visible so that a shared understanding of the objectives of each 
level can develop.  As such, this thesis suggests a revision to the definitions 
proposed by Devine, Barnes, Newton, and Goonetilleke (2013) (developed 
from the work of Mitroff, Pauchant, and Shrivastava, 1998; Pearson and 
Mitroff, 1993; and Smith, 2006) so that a more accurate understanding of 
stage functions may be gained.   
2. Different hierarchal levels within airport management organisations focus on 
different levels of severity when they consider disturbance.  Respondents 
were asked to provide examples of disturbance at various points during data 
collection yet were not prompted as to the severity of the example.  By not 
prompting respondents it was possible to draw out what the different levels 
considered to be their main focus of severity.  Members of the leadership 
level of analysis focused on Level 4: Crisis Disturbance and Level 3: Major 
Disturbance disturbance events as their primary consideration.  Members of 
the corporate management and operations management levels of analysis 
(collectively the middle management of airport management organisations) 
recounted a range of examples with the main focus being at the Level 3: 
Major Disturbance and Level 2: Minor Disturbance considerations.  The 
officer level of analysis noted examples at all levels of severity but had a 
clear focus on Level 2: Minor Disturbance and Level 1: Normal Operations 
Disturbance.  These distinctions further established the first finding that 
disturbance is considered in varying ways within airport management 
organisations.  As the first findings noted different considerations as to the 
objective/function at different levels, this second finding notes the natural 
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tendency for analysis levels to emphasise different considerations regarding 
the severity of disturbance.   
 
Based on the above findings, further development and clarity as to the functions of 
specific stages is required.  Where prior literature (Devine, Barnes, Newton, and 
Goonetilleke 2013) defined specific functions as holistic, this thesis has 
demonstrates that distinctions appear in how different organisational levels consider 
their role in stage functions of the disturbance management process, and 
furthermore that different levels focus on different levels of severity of incident.  As 
such, the following discussion sections will build on prior knowledge and provide 
redeveloped definitions for the ten stages of the CIDP model.  Furthermore, due to 
the emergent areas the focus of organisational levels and considerations of severity, 
this discussion will also include points of consideration to insure the definition 
provide is relevant in a holistic fashion.  Considerations are included in the form of 
questions for airport management organisations to help guide development on 
overcoming the potential barriers present at each stage of the disturbance process.  
As such, when referring to “we” this constitutes self examination by members of the 
airport management organisation.   
 
Stage one of the CIDP model is planning.  This stage was originally defined as, 
“The process of plan development for crisis management.  This is expected to 
include components dealing with processes, decision-making, communication, and 
authority” (Devine, Barnes, Newton, and Goonetilleke 2013, p.4, developed from 
Mitroff, Pauchant, and Shrivastava 1998, Pearson and Mitroff 1993, and Smith 
2006).  The majority of this definition remains accurate however further development 
is required to improve the accuracy against real-world practice.  The findings from 
study one further developed this position by discussing the theme of legitimacy in 
the planning development process.  Legitimacy was discussed in terms of ensuring 
that the correct persons are involved and that strategic development takes place 
cross-functionally for the airport management organisation.  Table 6.2 below 
provides the redeveloped definition of planning along with considerations from 
organisational levels and considerations of severity.   
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Table 6.2: CIDP Planning Stage 
Stage One: Planning 
Definition 
 
The process of plan development for disturbance.  This initial stage 
requires considerations regarding the processes, decision-making, 
communication, and authority required during disturbance.  Critical in 
the planning process is the need to ensure that information gathering 
and strategic development takes place with all impacted 
stakeholders.  By involving stakeholders from all organisational 
levels and groups, a more holistic understanding of planning needs 
and requirements will be developed.   
 
Level and 
Severity 
Considerations 
 
• Are we planning to deal with all layers of severity rather than simply 
low-likelihood/high-consequence events?   
• Are we gathering information to develop planning at all organisational 
levels and groups to provide holistic development?   
• Are we developing our planning function in cooperation with all 
organisational levels and groups to ensure legitimacy of the process?   
 
 
Stage two of the CIDP model is preparation.  This stage was originally defined as, 
“The process of testing the developed crisis management approach via training, 
desktop exercises, and real-world exercises.  A critical component here is to ensure 
that preparation is developed to a level that is as close to real life response and 
recovery as possible” (Devine, Barnes, Newton, and Goonetilleke 2013, p.4, 
developed from Mitroff, Pauchant, and Shrivastava 1998, Pearson and Mitroff 1993, 
and Smith 2006).  From this previous definition, findings from all layers of analysis 
highlighted the critical importance that training plays in the preparation stage for 
airport management organisations.  Emergent elements from the data built on the 
importance of training and highlight the need to focus on both operational and 
corporate components of the organisation with regards to training.  This was 
highlighted to be a current vulnerability for airport management organisations with 
the majority of focus being on the operational component at the neglect of corporate 
preparation strategies.  Furthermore, legitimacy was also highlighted as being of 
critical importance to ensure that training takes place that is developed specifically 
for an airport management context.  Table 6.3 below introduces the redeveloped 
definition and considerations.   
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Table 6.3: CIDP Preparation Stage 
Stage Two: Preparation 
Definition 
 
The process of embedding knowledge of the disturbance planning 
function at an individual, group, and organisational level.  The 
preparation stage requires training that provides participants with an 
accurate representation of what would be required during a real-world 
disturbance event.  Training requirements would include self-directed 
training, desktop exercise, and field exercises including members of 
both operational and corporate functions of the organisation.  
Attention should be paid to ensuring that training has been developed 
specifically for the intended context rather than other industries.   
 
Level and 
Severity 
Considerations 
 
• Are we preparing in a way that truly represents real-world 
expectations and challenges?   
• Are we including all relevant components of the airport management 
organisation in terms of levels and groups?   
• Are we implementing training that has been developed specifically for 
an airport management context?  If not, how have we contextualised 
the training to suit an airport context?   
 
 
Stage three of the CIDP model is assessment.  The assessment stage replaces the 
previously discussed stages of detection and avoidance due to emergent themes.  
The detection and avoidance stages were adjusted whereby detection became part 
of the activation linking process linking pre-event to response and recovery phases 
and avoidance was revised to link pre-event to near-miss phases.  As such, 
assessment is developed as a critical review function embedded within the pre-
event phase.  In this way, assessment forms around ensuring that the planning and 
preparation discussed in the two prior stages are functioning as originally intended.  
Furthermore, the assessment function is also seeking out external factors (such as 
changes in legislation or requirement) that may require adjustment to the pre-event 
phase.  This stage was developed due to findings around the key theme of 
legitimacy whereby assessment functions as a means of continually reviewing and 
enhancing practice.  Table 6.4 provides the proposed definition of assessment and 
discusses considerations for specific organisational levels and severity of 
disturbance.   
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Table 6.4: CIDP Assessment Stage 
Assessment 
Definition 
 
The process of continual review of the planning and preparation 
stages of the pre-event phase.  The assessment stage involves the 
review and appraisal of effectiveness of developed programs and 
training.  This would aim to investigate the appropriateness of the 
planning and preparation against the pre-determined objectives as 
well as the effectiveness of implementation in the organisation.  
Assessment would involve the consideration of disturbance across all 
four layers of severity.  Assessment also requires scanning of external 
factors that have the potential to influence the requirements and 
obligations of the pre-event phase.   
 
Level and 
Severity 
Considerations 
 
• Are we critically and legitimately reviewing our current approach to 
pre-event planning and preparation?   
• Are we highlighting areas where we are doing well (so that we can 
sustain them) and areas we requiring improvement (so that we can 
change them)?   
• Are we assessing the performance of our planning and preparation 
function against the different organisational level and potential 
severity? 
 
 
Stage four of the CIDP model is coordination and facilitation.  This stage was 
originally defined as, “The initial response component of the live phase of an event 
whereby the initiation of assessment and management of the situation takes place.  
Decision-making and situational awareness are critical to ensure an appropriate and 
timely response takes place” (Devine, Barnes, Newton, and Goonetilleke 2013, p.4, 
developed from Mitroff, Pauchant, and Shrivastava 1998, Pearson and Mitroff 1993, 
and Smith 2006).  Adjustment to the coordination and facilitation stage include the 
addition of highlighting the implementation of pre-determined planning (where 
appropriate), clear guidance around the delegation of specific tasks, and the 
importance of communication within the broader stakeholder network.  Furthermore, 
coordination and facilitation needs to consider the full range of potential severity 
levels encountered by an airport management organisation.  Table 6.5 introduced 
the revised definition of coordination and facilitation and notes level and severity 
considerations.   
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Table 6.5: CIDP Coordination and Facilitation Stage 
Coordination and Facilitation 
Definition 
 
The initial function when dealing with a disturbance that has activated 
and is live.  This involves the initial assessment of the situation to 
consider the severity of the disturbance as well as the 
appropriateness of pre-determined plans.  Where plans are not 
appropriate for the situation or require modification, clear governance 
is in place regarding who is able to make decisions and what the 
appropriate reporting line involves.  Critical functions include 
situational awareness of the disturbance as well as communication 
with appropriate levels and groups.   
 
Level and 
Severity 
Considerations 
 
• Do we have systems in place whereby staff are able to understand 
disturbance situations and make an informed judgment as to severity?   
• Do we have systems in place where we are able to quickly and 
accurately communicate and involve appropriate stakeholders (both 
internal and external of the organisation) in the situation?   
• Are staff empowered to make quick decisions (where appropriate) to 
avoid further escalation of disturbance?   
• Are we developing skills in coordination and facilitation across all 
groups within our organisation or in specific pockets of knowledge?   
 
 
Stage five of the CIDP model is containment and limitation.  This stage was 
initially defined as, “The secondary response component of the live phase of an 
event in which assessment has been undertaken and processes are in place to stop 
further escalation.  Objectives are focused on ensuring that, where possible, 
damage is localised to avoid cascading failure of the system” (Devine, Barnes, 
Newton, and Goonetilleke 2013, p.4, developed from Mitroff, Pauchant, and 
Shrivastava 1998, Pearson and Mitroff 1993, and Smith 2006).  Adjustments to the 
containment and limitation definition required decisions around plan implementation 
verses decision-making.  Furthermore, findings highlighted decisions around 
maintaining operations and the potential vulnerability it creates.  Following on from 
the coordination and facilitation stage, communication and situational awareness 
are still critically important.  Table 6.6 highlights the adjustments to the definition of 
containment and limitation and emphasises areas of consideration regarding 
different organisational levels and incident severity.   
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Table 6.6: CIDP Containment and Limitation Stage 
Containment and Limitation 
Definition 
 
The secondary function when dealing with a disturbance that has 
activated and is live.  The previous stage of coordination and 
facilitation will have assessed the situation and activated plans or 
made specific decisions to deal with the situation.  The function of 
containment and limitation is to ensure the chosen approach is 
implemented correctly and adjusted when needed. Considerations are 
given to the ability of the organisation to maintain operations while 
responding/recovering.  Furthermore, situational awareness is being 
updated appropriately and stakeholders (internal and external) are 
being kept up to date as to progress.  
 
Level and 
Severity 
Considerations 
 
• Are we implementing the correct approach to deal with the specific 
situation rather than just simply following pre-determined plans? 
• Are we monitoring the implementation of the decided approach to 
ensure that it is going according to our objectives? 
• Do we have the ability to adjust the approach where required to deal 
with adjustments to the operational environment or previously made 
decisions?   
• Are we updating situational awareness and providing information to all 
levels and groups, as well as appropriate external stakeholders.   
 
 
Stage six of the CIDP model is operational continuity.  This stage was initially 
defined as, “The initial recovery component of the live phase of an event whereby 
operations are in the process of being restored yet we have not yet reached a full 
operational capacity.  Decision-making is focused on a staged return with priority 
given to critical systems“ (Devine, Barnes, Newton, and Goonetilleke 2013, p.4, 
developed from Mitroff, Pauchant, and Shrivastava 1998, Pearson and Mitroff 1993, 
and Smith 2006).  Operational continuity was highlighted in the findings of all levels 
of analysis as being a critical stage in any disturbance management process.  
Findings highlighted the move away from planning and into a decision-making 
based approach due to the unpredictability of situations.  Furthermore, findings 
highlighted the need to situationally increase staff numbers to deal with retuning the 
site to business-as-usual operations.  Table 6.7 provides the revised definition of 
this stage based on the study one findings.   
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Table 6.7: CIDP Operational Continuity Stage 
Operational Continuity 
Definition 
 
The concluding stage of the response/recovery phase of a live 
disturbance.  In this situation the organisation has not yet returned to 
business-as-usual but is in a state of preparing to return to full 
operation.  This return is undertaken through a gradual return, 
increasing the functionality of the site in stages rather than running full 
operations immediately.  Consideration is given to return critical 
systems first and ensuring that stakeholders (internal and external) 
are aware and ready for the proposed return.  Critical to operational 
continuity is the ability of the organisation to surge staff numbers 
where required to provide a return to business-as-usual operations.   
 
Level and 
Severity 
Considerations 
 
• Are we communicating with both internal staff and external 
stakeholders our plan and intention for a return to business-as-usual 
operations?   
• Are we highlighting to both internal staff and external stakeholders the 
functions we require from them for an efficient return to normal ops?   
• Do we have a clear understanding of what our critical systems are so 
that a staged return may trigger those areas first?   
• Do we have the ability to increase staff numbers by bring more 
operational staff online or tasking corporate staff (who have received 
training) to deal with high-tempo operations?   
 
 
Stage seven of the CIDP model is review.  This stage was initially defined as, “The 
explicit review process addressing both information and decisions made during each 
of the prior phases of the event” (Devine, Barnes, Newton, and Goonetilleke 2013, 
p.4, developed from Mitroff, Pauchant, and Shrivastava 1998, Pearson and Mitroff 
1993, and Smith 2006).  Building on this previous definition, the findings from study 
one highlighted the review process taking place in a staged process manner 
whereby an ‘in-team’ approach is followed by a ‘stakeholder wide’ review process.  
Findings highlighted that more senior level considered reviews were taking place for 
all disturbance events however front-line employees this as not being accurate.  
Reviews take place based on severity whereby more serious incidents have a highly 
structured process with lower levels events sometimes receiving no review at all.  
Other findings highlighted the need to involve participants from all organisational 
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levels and nurture reporting.  Table 6.8 notes the revised position and highlights key 
considerations.   
 
Table 6.8: CIDP Review Stage 
Review 
Definition 
 
The first stage of the post-event phase.  Review functions as the 
examination and evaluation of information and decision-making from 
the live phase of the disturbance event.  The review stage takes place 
as a two-step process whereby an initial ‘in-team’ review takes place 
immediately following the disturbance with a more involved 
‘stakeholder wide’ review developing later.  Severity plays an 
influencing factor in the review process as more serious events 
involve a more detailed review process.  However, as highlighted by 
previous research (namely disaster incubation and normal accident 
theory), smaller errors in systems have the potential to become more 
serious over time if corrective measures are not implemented early.  
As such, considerations should be given to encouraging the open and 
honest review of events from all severity levels in a structured 
manner.   
 
Level and 
Severity 
Considerations 
 
• Are we involving the correct people in our review process?   
• Are we capturing information relevant to developing corrective 
practice?   
• Do we have a culture that values honest and open reviews and 
rewards persons who highlight areas for improvement?   
 
 
Stage eight of the CIDP model is learning.  This stage was previously defined as, 
“The process of highlighting areas for improvement and developing an approach for 
enhancing organisational reliability” (Devine, Barnes, Newton, and Goonetilleke 
2013, p.4, developed from Mitroff, Pauchant, and Shrivastava 1998, Pearson and 
Mitroff 1993, and Smith 2006).  Findings highlighted a number of areas critical to 
learning that build on the previous definition.  Findings noted that in a number of 
cases, decisions made on corrective actions or improvements are not filtering down 
to the lower levels within the organisation.  Rather than being involved in the 
process and provided with the rationale behind corrective action, lower level 
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employees are being simple instructed to change.  Respondents highlighted 
elements of push back in this approach.  Furthermore, responsibility for following 
through on corrective measures highlighted issues with signing off to link back to the 
pre-event phase.  Table 6.9 below highlights the revised definition of learning and 
discusses considerations for implementing accurate learning practice in airport 
management organisations.   
 
Table 6.9: CIDP Learning Stage 
Learning 
Definition 
 
The second stage of the post-event phase.  Learning functions as the 
development and strategic implementation of corrective actions based 
on the review of disturbance.  Learning involves the reinforcement of 
previously developed skills as well as the development of new abilities 
to improve understanding and actions during disturbance.  Critical in 
the learning stage is the holistic development of understanding 
whereby organisational members at all hierarchal levels are involved 
and informed of the proposed corrective practice.  Furthermore, 
accountability needs to maintained to ensure that corrective practices 
are implemented and do not remain unresolved.   
 
Level and 
Severity 
Considerations 
 
• Do we understand the key issues of the disturbance event? 
• Are we utilising information from appropriate levels and groups to 
provide a holistic picture of the required corrective actions? 
• Are we developing an approach that will reinforce what we have done 
well and correct what we need to improve?   
• Are we informing internal and external stakeholders of the corrective 
action and providing them when detail on why the strategy has been 
developed in this way? 
 
 
Stage nine of the CIDP model is near-miss review.  This stage is undertaken when 
rather than activating into a live disturbance, avoidance has taken place and the 
response/recovery phase has not been implemented.  Avoidance may take place 
due to the explicit actions of the organisation or due to external environmental 
factors outside the control of the airport management organisation.  The key 
objective of the near-miss review stage is to provide understanding as to why the 
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organisation was able to avoid activating into a live disturbance and investigating 
the potential vulnerability highlighted by a near-miss.  Findings at all levels of 
analysis noted the critical importance of the near-miss function yet the lack of 
development of a specific process for capturing information and developing 
improvement strategies.  In a similar way to the post-event review stage (stage 
seven of the CIDP model), the near-miss review function is focused on gathering 
information from appropriate organisational levels and groups.  The distinction in the 
near-miss review stage is that rather than focusing on actual issues, the mindset 
shifts to address potential areas of vulnerability.  Highlighting potential vulnerability 
requires that front line employees have the understanding and skills required to feed 
information into the system.  As discussed in study one, capturing near-miss 
information presents a significant challenge for airport management organisations 
and requires holistic support to be effective.  Table 6.10 defines the near-miss 
review stage and highlights considerations.   
Table 6.10: Near-Miss Review 
Near-Miss Review 
Definition 
 
The near-miss review stage requires information relevant to the 
potential for vulnerability.  The situation is reviewed against areas 
where escalation into the response/recovery phase could have 
occurred but did not.  Understanding the reasoning behind avoidance 
is the key objective of the near-miss review.  Critical to capturing 
information is the encouragement of reporting in an open and honest 
manner.   
 
Level and 
Severity 
Considerations 
 
• Are we training staff at all organisational levels the skills required to 
identify and understand the importance of near-miss information?   
• Are we capturing information from appropriate organisational levels 
and groups to inform our understanding of vulnerability?   
• Are we supporting employees who report areas of vulnerability to 
culturally enhance reporting within our organisation?   
 
 
Stage ten of the CIDP model is near-miss learning.  Near-miss learning follows on 
from the previous near-miss review stage and utilises information gathered to 
understand areas of potential vulnerability.  As with the stage eight learning function 
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in actual events, the involvement of appropriate organisational members across all 
levels and groups is critical in ensuring that appropriate development of corrective 
action is undertaken.  In the case of a near-miss, corrective action is focused on 
understanding the current strengths of the system to sustain practice in these area 
and weaknesses to highlight areas for improvement.  As with the previous stage in 
the CIDP model, the challenge comes from exploring potential areas of vulnerability 
rather than actual failures during a live event.  Once the learning process has 
highlighted areas for corrective action the next challenge making sure the ideas are 
embedded back into the pre-event phase.  As with disturbance learning, the near-
miss learning stage requires that the rationale behind corrective action is divulged to 
members across organisational levels and groups.  Clear guidelines about who is 
responsible for implementing corrective actions are critical in making sure process 
improvement takes place.  Table 6.11 defines this stage and highlights areas for 
understanding vulnerability.   
 
Table 6.11: Near-Miss Learning 
Near-Miss Learning 
Definition 
 
The near-miss learning stage functions as the development and 
strategic implementation of corrective actions based on the potential 
vulnerability highlighted in the near-miss review stage.  Near-miss 
learning focuses on the improvement of current and emergent skills 
for dealing with potential organisational vulnerability.  Developing this 
process in a cross-functional way is of key importance as it enables 
development at all appropriate organisational levels and groups.  As 
with learning from actual disturbance events, near-miss learning 
requires responsibility for corrective actions and follow-up to ensure 
that system improvements have been implemented.   
 
Level and 
Severity 
Considerations 
 
• Do we understanding key areas of potential vulnerability? 
• Are we involving the approach organisational levels and groups in the 
development of corrective practices and communicating rationale 
behind strategic decisions?   
• Are we making sure corrective actions are implemented 
appropriately?   
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Section 6.2.2 has highlighted key findings from RQ1B regarding the functions of the 
specific stages of disturbance.  In discussing this research question, adjustments to 
the previously developed stages have occurred along with redefined definitions.  An 
emergent finding was the need to highlight considerations specific to organisational 
levels and different levels of severity.  As such, regarding research question 1B, 
“What are the functions of the specific stages an airport experiences during 
disturbance”, this thesis adopts the following position; 
! The specific stages of the CIDP model during a live disturbance event were 
discussed as 1. Planning, 2. Preparation, 3. Assessment, 4. Coordination 
and Facilitation, 5. Containment and Limitation, 6. Operational Continuity, 7. 
Review, and 8. Learning.  When a disturbance does not activate and 
avoidance takes place, the CIDP process moves through the stages of 1. 
Planning, 2. Preparation, 3. Assessment, 9. Near-miss Review, 10. Near-
miss Learning. In either approach, specific functions are required to ensure 
the efficient return to the beginning of the CIDP process.  Furthermore, 
considerations regarding development within all appropriate organisational 
levels and different levels of severity have been included in this discussion 
as a means of guiding development for airport management organisations.  
These different considerations serve as an emergent finding of this thesis 
that has the potential to improve the development, implementation, and 
continual improvement of the CIDP model in practice.   
 
Section 6.2 has provided discussion relevant to research questions 1A and 1B of 
this thesis.  The first section of this discussion has highlighted revisions to the 
previous conceptual disturbance process model and adjusted to better reflect real-
work practice.  This discussion developed into the Critical Infrastructure 
Disturbance Process model that provides an accurate representation of the 
process of disturbance.  This process highlighted functions whereby disturbance 
activates and commences a response/recovery phase, or where avoidance takes 
place and the near-miss phase begins.  The second section of this discussion has 
defined the ten stages of the CIDP model.  This discussion provided specific 
considerations for understanding the ten stages of the CIDP from both within 
specific organisational groups, as well as the relationship with other business 
functions.  Section 6.3 will now address the second study of this thesis.   
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6.3: Discussion Two: High Reliability Assessment 
The second study of this thesis explored the idea of high reliability in airport 
management organisations.  The initial stages of this exploration were developed 
via the critical analysis of academic literature on high reliability provided in Section 
2.3 - 2.6.  The literature discussion progressed into three key areas of investigation.  
First, Section 2.6.1 detailed the previously defined traits of high reliability that are 
characteristics of highly reliable organisations.  Specifically, the Weick and Sutcliffe 
(2007) five traits of high reliable were identified as a means of understanding and 
exploring high reliability in airport management organisations.  Second, Section 
2.6.2 discussed the relationship between high reliability and organisational culture 
whereby underlying values, beliefs, and assumptions were identified as providing a 
means of understanding the fundamental aspects of how organisations consider 
disturbance and vulnerability.  This discussion served as a foundation for in-depth 
interview question development by asking respondents questions regarding their 
perspective on true representation of high reliability in their organisation.  Third, 
Section 2.6.3 discussed potential areas of high reliability enhancement with the 
concepts of sensemaking (how we reflect on past considerations and utilise it in 
present day decisions-making) and agility (the ability of the organisation to be highly 
flexible to deal with vulnerability) highlighted potential areas for development of high 
reliability in airport management organisations.  This investigation of prior literature 
formed as a foundation for the empirical investigation undertaken in study two.   
 
Study two focused on two research questions.  These questions explore the concept 
of reliability at four levels of analysis across three data collection sites.  RQ2A 
investigated the current level of high reliability in Australian airports by exploring the 
Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) five traits classification.  This resulted in the development 
of key areas of commonality and difference that highlighted a number of areas of 
consideration for airport management organisations.  RQ2B explored the potential 
to further develop high reliability in airport management organisations.  By 
investigating ideas for further development at four levels of analysis, a number of 
themes emerged as areas whereby airport management organisations can move 
closer to a highly reliable classification.  The following sections will provide further 
discussion of these areas and provide links back to previously identified themes 
from academic literature.   
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6.3.1 RQ2A: What is the current level of high reliability in Australian airports? 
During the empirical investigation of high reliability in airport management 
organisations, two key findings regarding the current level of reliability emerged; 
1. In a traditional sense, airport management organisations do not satisfy the 
definition of a highly reliable organisation.  Findings from the second study 
revealed that the first three traits of high reliability, preoccupation with failure, 
reluctance to simplify, and sensitivity to operations, are not present in airport 
management organisations in a meaningful fashion.  However, the last two 
traits, commitment to resilience and deference to expertise, were considered 
to be highly embedded and in this way airport management organisations do 
satisfy these requirements for high reliability.  As highlighted in the literature 
review component of this thesis, prior development focused on high reliability 
as being a yes/no classification, something an organisation ‘is’ or ‘is not’.  
This initial finding demonstrates that airport management organisations 
function in a manner of compartmentalised reliability whereby some traits are 
represented whereas other are not.  When we consider this finding against 
organisational culture, commitment to resilience and deference to expertise 
are then considered to be organisational values, beliefs, and assumptions 
that are representative of airport management organisations.  This first 
finding highlights that airport management organisations can be considered 
to satisfy some of the traits of high reliability but not all.  This initial finding 
represents a new application of Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2007) work as a 
means of better understanding the strengths and weaknesses of 
sociotechnical systems.   
2. When investigating the levels of analysis against the traits of reliability, 
variances appear between how different organisational levels represented 
the degree to which they felt the trait was applicable.  This represents an 
interesting finding for high reliability literature as previous studies had looks 
at understanding organisations holistically rather than looking at the 
perception at different hierarchal levels.  This second finding again notes that 
when considering high reliability as a holistic representation, high reliability 
theory negates to consider the variance present in how different 
organisational levels and groups feel their organisation represents particular 
traits.  Furthermore, by exploring the variances between level 
representations, findings the ability to highlight potential distinctions in the 
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way groups represent organisational values, beliefs, and assumptions.  The 
following discussion will now detail these findings and explore the 
distinctions of level variance.  This second findings represents an extension 
of Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2007) as it highlights the value in exploring variance 
of hierarchy and group objectives against the five traits of high reliability.   
 
Preoccupation with failure was addressed as the first trait of high reliability.  Figure 
6.3 below visually represents how the different levels of analysis view this trait.  
Interesting in this example is that members of the operations management 
represented this area in more positive manner than other layers.  Furthermore, 
respondents from the officer level (those who report to the operations management 
level) represented a more negative position that other groups.  This is the first 
example presents a cultural gap and highlights distinctions in perception.   
Figure 6.3: Preoccupation with Failure Visual Comparison* 
L       
CM         - + 
OM + + + + + + +      - - - - 
O        - - - - - - 
 
*The above figure should not be considered a quantitative measure of the leadership level of analysis but rather simply a visual representation of different 
respondent views and their relationship to the traits of high reliability.   
 
Reluctance to simplify was discussed as the second trait of high reliability.  Figure 
6.4 compares the four layers of analysis visually to demonstrate areas of variance.  
In this example it is clear to see that reluctance to simplify is considered a weakness 
in airport management organisations.  However, the example highlights that the 
middle-management level of corporate management and operations management 
consider this in a far more negative fashion than hierarchal levels above and below.  
As reluctance to simplify is related to the way we capture, utilise, and share 
information in a system, therefore the divide between the middle-management level 
and other layers highlights a critical weakness for airport management 
organisations.  Furthermore, findings highlighted cultural issues around cultural 
issues of reporting and blame as potential reasons for this disconnect.   
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Figure 6.4: Reluctance to Simplify Visual Comparison* 
L     - - 
CM - - - - - - -    
OM - - - - - - - - - - -     + 
O        - - - - - - 
 
*The above figure should not be considered a quantitative measure of the leadership level of analysis but rather simply a visual representation of different 
respondent views and their relationship to the traits of high reliability.   
 
Sensitivity to operations was examined as the third trait of high reliability.  Figure 
6.5 presents a consistent visual representation with the exception being at the 
leadership level of analysis.  As sensitivity to operations notes shared understanding 
across an organisation, this level variance highlights the need to improve cross-
functional development in airport management organisations.  Furthermore this 
difference highlights the potential need for leadership members to gain a more 
detailed understanding of how other members of their organisation view shared 
awareness.  Sensitivity to operations represents a key area of weakness in airport 
management organisations.   
Figure 6.5: Sensitivity to Operations Visual Comparison* 
L     - + 
CM - - - - - -     
OM - - - - - - - - -        
O - - - - - - - -      
 
*The above figure should not be considered a quantitative measure of the leadership level of analysis but rather simply a visual representation of different 
respondent views and their relationship to the traits of high reliability.   
 
Commitment to resilience was discussed as the fourth trait of high reliability.  
Figure 6.6 demonstrates visually the high level of support for commitment to 
resilience in airport management organisations.  This trait represents a key area of 
strength for airport management organisation as it notes that when considering how 
their organisation looked at risk, safety, and reliability, respondents noted that this 
represent a key commitment from the organisation.  An emergent finding from this 
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example was a number of respondents who discussed a ‘mixed’ answer did so by 
highlighting the distinction between their organisational group and ‘other areas’ 
within the organisation.  In many cases this was discussed as a means of 
highlighting improvement needed ‘other areas’ regarding commitment to resilience.   
Figure 6.6: Commitment to Resilience Visual Comparison* 
L. + + + + + + 
CM. + + + + + + + + +  
OM. + + + + + + + + + +       
O. + + + + + + + + + +    
 
*The above figure should not be considered a quantitative measure of the leadership level of analysis but rather simply a visual representation of different 
respondent views and their relationship to the traits of high reliability.   
 
Deference to Expertise was investigated as the fifth trait of high reliability.  Figure 
6.7 provides a visual representation of deference to expertise in airport 
management organisations.  This highlights a very interesting finding whereby 
members of the leadership, corporate management, and officer levels of analysis 
represent a highly positive position whereas operations management highlight a 
mixed/positive/negative position.  A consideration here is that in the majority of 
cases it is the operations management level that are being deferred to by the other 
levels of analysis.  Again, members of the operations management level who 
highlighted a mixed position noted that their group had a clear understanding of the 
process and functions of deference yet other components of the organisation 
sometimes had trouble ‘giving-up’ authority during disturbance.  Although 
representing a mostly positive position, improvements can still be made in how 
airport management organisations delegate authority during disturbance situations. 
 
Figure 6.7: Deference to Expertise Visual Comparison* 
L. + + +    
CM. + + + + +      
OM.        + + + + + - - - - 
O. + + + + + + + +      
*The above figure should not be considered a quantitative measure of the leadership level of analysis but rather simply a visual representation of different 
respondent views and their relationship to the traits of high reliability.   
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Section 6.3.1 has highlighted key findings relevant to research question 2A.  These 
findings emphasised the presence of compartmentalised reliability and level 
variance of specific high reliability traits.  As such, regarding research question 2A, 
“What is the current level of high reliability in Australian airports”, this thesis adopts 
the following position; 
! Australian airports are not high reliability organisations in the strictest sense 
of the definition.  However, as this research question is asking the ‘current 
level of high reliability’, airport management organisations can be considered 
to represent the traits of commitment to resilience and deference to 
expertise, and as such maintain compartmentalised reliability.  Had this 
research question set out to ask the more positivist question of “Are 
Australian airports highly reliable?” the answer would have been a 
resounding “no”.  As this research utilised Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2007) traits 
approach as a frame of investigation the result of airport management 
organisations as maintaining a position of compartmentalised was revealed.  
This represents a further development of Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2007) 
approach as a means of gauging understanding of the strengths of any 
sociotechnical system.   
! Building on the first point that airport management organisations represent 
traits of commitment to resilience and deference to expertise, variance exists 
between hierarchical levels within airport management organisations.  In this 
way, the 4 levels of analysis revealed that understanding high reliability is far 
more complex than first considered.  Looking at both hierarchal levels and 
different organisation sub-groups is critical to gauge a nuanced picture of 
understanding high reliability in complex sociotechnical systems.  This 
represents a new consideration for high reliability studies and notes the 
importance of considering a sub-cultured picture of organisations.   
 
This section has detailed the findings related to RQ2A.  These findings revealed the 
emergent themes of compartmentalised reliability and level variance.  The next 
section of this thesis will discuss findings related to the second sub-question of 
research problem area two.   
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6.3.2 RQ2B: What is the potential to further develop high reliability in 
Australian airports?   
Research question 2B further developed the investigation of this thesis in high 
reliability.  Two key findings emerged regarding the potential to further develop high 
reliability in airport management organisations;  
1. The first area for further development was highlighted as cross-functional 
experience.  Leadership findings noted the potential for an improved 
employee induction process whereby new employees would be given a more 
involved exposure to risk and vulnerability.  Corporate management findings 
introduced the idea of a rotation system whereby new (or selected) 
employees would undergo placement in different areas of the business for a 
set period of time.  Operations management findings revealed a process of 
having corporate members of staff work in the operation side of the business 
for a certain period of time each year (developed into their employment 
contract).  Officer level findings discussed the value that would be created by 
more contact from senior staff members visiting operations functions of the 
business more to gain a more detailed understanding of the challenges of 
day-to-day operations.  The development of programs aimed at cross-
functional experience provides an opportunity for organisations to enhance 
understanding across hierarchal levels and groups.  This first area provides 
a practical contribution for airport management organisations to enhance 
development of reliability within complex sociotechnical systems.    
2. The second area for further development was highlighted as cross-
functional strategic involvement.  Leadership findings introduced the need 
for development of skills and training to better interact with other 
organisational levels during disturbance.  Corporate management findings 
noted the need to develop more effective lines of communication across 
teams and across hierarchal levels within airport management organisations.  
Operations management findings discussed more committed involvement 
from leadership and corporate management levels in training of disturbance 
response/recovery activities.  Officer highlighted the need to align 
understanding of vulnerability through all levels and groups within airport 
management organisations.  As with the first point, cross-functional strategic 
involvement gives a hands-on approach for organisational members to 
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experience the challenges faced by different components of airport 
management organisations further enhancing shared understanding.   
Table 6.12 discusses the two findings of cross-functional experience and cross-
functional development against Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2007) five traits of high 
reliability.   
 
Table 6.12: Cross-Functional Development Tactics 
  
1. Experience 
 
2. Strategic Development 
 
Preoccupation 
with Failure 
 
 
• Enables employees from non-
operational groups to be 
exposed to vulnerability and 
disturbance events.   
 
 
• Involves staff from all levels and 
groups in the capturing and 
assessment of near-miss and 
disturbance information.   
 
 
Reluctance  
to Simplify 
 
 
• Non-operational employees are 
able to build understanding and 
skills related to the capture of 
information related to 
vulnerability and disturbance.   
 
 
• Information can be captured and 
propagated throughout the 
airport management system 
without the need to degrade 
contextually for the sake of 
convenience.   
 
 
Sensitivity  
to Operations 
 
 
• Develops understanding of the 
challenges front line staff in 
airport management 
organisations deal with during 
business-as-usual and 
disturbance.   
 
 
• Interaction with staff from other 
levels and groups within the 
airport management business 
enables a shared understanding 
of tasks and objectives to be 
developed.   
 
 
Commitment 
to Resilience 
 
 
• Facilitates improved 
understanding of the operational 
aspects of the airport and 
develops stronger links between 
corporate and operational 
functions.   
 
 
• Enables the planning and 
development function of new 
projects to consider the impacts 
from both a corporate and 
operational perspective by 
capturing a wider range of 
information.   
 
 
 
Deference  
to Expertise 
 
 
• Highlights the skills and 
capabilities of staff from both the 
operational and corporate 
functions in the business and 
develops links whereby staff can 
gain expert assistance where 
required.   
 
 
• Involves a wider range of 
expertise from different levels 
and groups within the business 
to enhance capability during 
business-as-usual and 
disturbance.   
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Section 6.3.2 has highlighted the key findings of research question 2B.  Findings 
noted the key areas of potential development as cross-functional experience and 
cross-functional strategic involvement.  As such, regarding research question 
2B, “What is the potential to further develop high reliability in Australian airports”, 
this thesis adopts the following position; 
! Australian airports have the ability to enhance all five traits of high reliability.  
Development of cross-functional experience enables staff to develop skills 
and understanding across work groups and hierarchal levels.  Development 
of cross-functional strategic involvement cultivates shared awareness within 
airport management organisations and brings stronger links between 
corporate and operational functions.   
 
6.5: Summary 
Section 6.3.1 - 6.3.2 have discussed research question 2A and 2B of this thesis.  
Findings from 2A highlighted airport management organisations as having 
compartmentalised reliability, rather than holistic development.  Furthermore, level 
variance was discussed as a previously unexplored area in high reliability.  Findings 
from 2B emphasised the findings of cross-functional experience and cross-
functional strategic involvement as a prospective means of further developing 
reliability in airport management organisations.  This thesis will now move into 
Chapter Seven – Conclusions and provide a detailed summary of this research as 
well as discussing elements of theoretical and practitioner significant, future 
research, and limitations of this work.   
  
281 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Seven – Conclusions 
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7.1 Introduction 
Chapter Seven – Conclusions, is presented in seven separate sections.  Section 7.1 
Introduction outlines the sections of this chapter.  Section 7.2 Study One 
Conclusions provides the findings and conclusions from study one of this thesis 
relating to the disturbance research problem.  Section 7.3 Study Two Conclusions 
outlines the findings and conclusions from study two of this thesis from the high 
reliability research area.  Section 7.4 Overall Conclusions discusses the findings of 
sections 7.2 and 7.3 in the context of the broader research area and concludes 
against the proposed hypothetical position introduced in Section 1.2 Research 
Background.  Section 7.5 Research Significance discusses the contribution of this 
thesis to contributing to understanding regarding disturbance, high reliability, and 
the airport management research from the academic and practitioner perspectives. 
Section 7.6 Limitations discusses the limitations of this thesis and discusses 
considerations where de-limiting has taken place.  Section 7.7 Future Research 
details the areas for further investigation in this topic.  Section 7.8 Summary 
concludes the sections of the chapter and ends the thesis.  The eight sections of 
this chapter are represented graphically in Table 7.1 below.   
 
Table 7.1: Conclusions Chapter Sections 
Chapter One:  Introduction  7.1  Introduction      
7.2  Study One Conclusions    
7.3  Study Two Conclusions    
7.4  Overall Conclusions     
7.5  Research Significance    
7.6  Limitations      
7.7  Future Research     
7.8  Summary      
Chapter Two:  Literature Review  
Chapter Three:  Methodology  
Chapter Four:  Study One  
Chapter Five:  Study Two  
Chapter Six:  Discussion  
Chapter Seven:  Conclusions  
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7.2 Study One Conclusions 
The first study of this thesis addressed the area of disturbance in airport 
management organisations.  A conceptual disturbance process model was 
developed from literature to provide a representation of best practice from previous 
disturbance management models.  Investigation in this thesis took place by looking 
at two specific research questions regarding the process of disturbance (RQ1A) and 
the functions of the specific stages in a disturbance (RQ1A).  The conclusions to 
these two research questions are provided below.   
 
RQ1A: What is the process that an airport experiences during disturbance? 
Chapter Six – Discussion highlighted that airport management organisations 
experience disturbance in one of two ways.  First, when a disturbance event has 
been activated and an event becomes live the process is experienced whereby the 
pre-event phase is activated into a response/recovery phase.  This notes a 
distinction over the previous conceptual model in that response and recovery now 
function concurrently.  When the response/recovery phase is concluded, the post-
event phase begins.  The post-event function then completes the cycle by aiming to 
embed corrective action back into the pre-event process.  Figure 7.1 below 
highlights the process for a live disturbance event in an airport management 
organisation.   
Figure 7.1:  Live Disturbance Process 
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An emergent finding of this thesis was the critical importance that airport 
management organisations placed on the near-miss function of disturbance.  In this 
way rather than looking at an actual disturbance event, members are aiming to 
understanding and interrogate areas of potential vulnerability to inform planning and 
preparation in the pre-event function to potentially avoid future disturbance.  In this 
way, the airport can also experience a near-miss disturbance whereby the process 
would develop from pre-event into near-miss, then embed corrective actions back 
into the pre-event phase.  The value of the near-miss process was discussed in 
terms of the ability for airport management organisations to understand and correct 
deficiencies in the system through the explicit adjustment of planning, preparation, 
and assessment stages.  This style of process was discussed by respondents as 
one that is attainable if appropriate resourcing and expertise are allocated towards 
the capture and management of near-miss information.  These findings represent a 
significant challenge for airport management organisations, as current market forces 
are working against building internal capacity for vulnerability assessment.  Key 
investment in terms of resourcing and expertise is required to further develop near-
miss capability in airport management organisations.  This function represents an 
area for further development and maturity for complex sociotechnical systems.  
Figure 7.2 highlights the process of a near-miss disturbance in an airport.   
Figure 7.2: Near-Miss Disturbance Process 
 
Therefore when considering the process for disturbance events in their entirety, the 
most accurate reflection is to look at potential disturbance and actual disturbance in 
the same process.  In this way, organisational members are familiar with the 
process and look at disturbance as activated and avoided events.  By understanding 
both actual and potential events on the same process, the importance of 
understanding system vulnerability is present during all levels of disturbance.  As 
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introduced in in Section 6.2.1, the Critical Infrastructure Disturbance Process 
(CIDP) model combines both disturbance and vulnerability in one model to 
accurately represent real-world practice.  Figure 7.3 below highlights the CIDP 
model in its entirety with both disturbance events and near-miss disturbance events 
captured in a singular process.  As detailed in Chapter 6 – Discussion, the CIDP 
model accurately represents the process that an airport management organisation 
experiences during both live and near-miss disturbance events.   
Figure 7.3: Critical Infrastructure Disturbance Process 
  
 Near-miss 
   10. Near-Miss Learning 9. Near-Miss Review 
   
 
 
Pre-Event  
 
 
1. Planning 2. Preparation 3. Assessment  
 
 
 
    
   Response and Recovery 
   4. Coordination and Facilitation 
5. Containment 
and Limitation 
6. Operational 
Continuity 
   
 
 
Post-Event  
 
 
8. Learning 7. Review    
 
(Developed by the author for this thesis) 
 
This thesis provided a review of existent literature regarding the process of 
disturbance and developed a conceptual model based on incorporating the 
strengths of previous work.  By empirically testing the conceptual model, the 
adjustments of a concurrent response/recovery phase, and the importance of 
understanding near-misses was highlighted.  It is the contention of this thesis that 
the Critical Infrastructure Disturbance Process model provides a detailed and 
accurate representation of the process an airport management organisation 
Avoidance 
 
Activation 
Resolution 
Embedding 
Embedding 
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experiences during a disturbance.  This model contributes to knowledge from a 
theoretical and practitioner perspective.  It is proposed that this model be tested in 
other critical infrastructure contexts to validate the transferability of the findings.  
Furthermore, this thesis contends that the Critical Infrastructure Disturbance 
Process model can provide value to practitioners as a means of enhancing 
preparedness for disturbance events and exploring system vulnerability.  At the 
least, the CIDP model serves as a rationale for enhanced resourcing for near-miss 
information capturing.   
 
RQ1B: What are the functions of the specific stages an airport experiences 
during disturbance? 
Chapter Six – Discussion revealed that previous definitions of the functions of 
specific stages of disturbance did not provide a holistic representation of real-world 
practice.  Findings revealed that within an airport management organisation, 
hierarchal levels and business groups consider different objectives of importance 
within particular stages of the CIDP process.  As such, to provide an accurate 
representation of the functions of the specific stages, this thesis adopted the 
approach of first defining the stages of the CIDP model, then providing 
considerations for each stage of the process against organisational level and 
incident severity.  This process provides a more accurate picture of practice as it 
presents that objectives can be aligned or competing depending on the particular 
situation.  As such, the comprehensive definitions and considerations (level and 
severity specific) of the Critical Infrastructure Disturbance Process stages were 
provided in Chapter Six – Discussion in the following tables: 
• Table 6.2:   CIDP Planning Stage       
• Table 6.3:   CIDP Preparation Stage      
• Table 6.4:  CIDP Assessment Stage      
• Table 6.5:  CIDP Coordination and Facilitation Stage   
• Table 6.6:   CIDP Containment and Limitation Stage   
• Table 6.7:   CIDP Operational Continuity Stage    
• Table 6.8:   CIDP Review Stage       
• Table 6.9:   CIDP Learning Stage       
• Table 6.10:   CIDP Near-Miss Review      
• Table 6.11:   CIDP Near-Miss Learning      
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These ten tables represent the solution to research question 1B in that they provide 
an accurate representation of the CIDP model in the context of an airport 
management organisation.  This thesis contends that the above definitions and 
level/severity considerations are utilised as means of reviewing current practice in 
airport management organisations.  This process should be undertaken across a 
range of groups (rather than simply risk/emergency management areas) to further 
develop understanding of the objectives and requirements during a disturbance.   
 
7.3 Study Two Conclusions 
The second study of this thesis explored the topic of high reliability in airport 
management organisations.  Utilising the Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) five traits of 
high reliability as a frame of investigation, this second study explored the current 
presence of high reliability in Australian airports (RQ2A) as well as the potential to 
further develop high reliability in Australian airports (RQ2B).  The conclusions to 
these two research questions are provided below.   
 
RQ2A: What is the current level of high reliability in Australian airports? 
As detailed in Chapter Six – Discussion, Australian airport management 
organisations should not be considered high reliability organisations in the traditional 
sense of the definition.  However, this was not the specific question under 
investigation.  The Australian airport management organisations demonstrated 
evidence of a position of compartmentalised reliability whereby Weick and 
Sutcliffe’s (2007) traits of commitment to resilience and deference to expertise do 
satisfy the criteria of the presence of high reliability.  As such, this thesis proposes 
that compartmentalised reliability is evidenced in the locations studied.  Although 
different from the holistic perspective of all five high reliability traits, this finding does 
still indicate areas of significant strength for airport management organisations.  The 
commitment of airport staff to resilient operations and the ability (and intent) to defer 
to expert decision makers provides an excellent foundation for the further 
development of Australian airport management organisations towards a more highly 
reliable operational approach.   
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An emergent theme from this investigation was the notion of organisational level 
variance.  This notion highlights another consideration for the further development 
of high reliability theory.  In a similar way to compartmentalised reliability, in a 
situation where one level within an airport management organisation is 
representative of all five traits of high reliability but other levels are not, can the 
organisation still considered highly reliable?  This poses an interesting question for 
the further development of high reliability literature.  Although not a direct focus of 
this thesis, the notion of sub-cultures in organisations represents an interesting fit 
with the prior question.  This thesis serves as a potential foundation for further 
investigation of high reliability across all levels of critical infrastructure functionality 
from front-line employees to senior executives.   
 
RQ2B: What is the potential to further develop high reliability in Australian 
airports? 
As described in Chapter Six – Discussion, this thesis has highlighted two key areas 
that have potential to further develop reliability in Australian airports.  The first area 
that emerged from the data was cross-functional experience.  This was 
developed as a range of ways staff from corporate and operational teams could 
work in ‘each other’s world’ for a certain length of time to gain a more detailed 
understanding of the challenge on the other side of the business.  The second area 
that emerged from the data was cross-functional strategic involvement.  In this 
area, findings highlighted the ability to develop work groups and communications 
across organisational departments and levels to enhance situational awareness.  
Both of these strategies were discussed against the five traits of high reliability 
(Table 6.12: Cross-Functional Development Tactics) and key areas of development 
were highlighted.  As such, these two strategies represent ideas for the potential to 
further develop high reliability in Australian airports.   
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7.4 Overall Conclusions	  
Before narrowing down to specific research questions, this thesis began by 
developing two overarching research questions.  The first of these questions asked; 
How does an airport move from business-as-usual, into a disturbance, 
and return to business-as-usual?   
 
As summarised by Section 7.2 of this chapter, this process takes place via the four-
phase/ten-stage process of the Critical Infrastructure Disturbance Process 
model.  The CIDP model provides a synthesis of previous academic work and was 
developed to provide a detailed representation of how disturbance functions in a 
real-world setting.  A live disturbance event will progress through the stages of pre-
event, response/recovery, post-event, and return back to the pre-event phase.  An 
event having the potential to become a live disturbance (that for some reason does 
not activate) would progress through stages of pre-event, near-miss (incorporating 
an explicit review and learning process that interrogates the conditions of the near-
miss and provides future corrective action), and returns back to the pre-event 
phases whereby corrections are implemented if required.   
 
This discussion developed into the complementary literature area of High Reliability 
(Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007).  The second overarching research question asked; 
Can Australian airports be considered functionally reliable against Weick 
and Sutcliffe’s five traits of high reliability? 
 
As detailed by Section 7.3 of this chapter, Australian airports are not considered 
functionally reliable against Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2007) five traits of high reliability.  
Australian airports do however satisfy two of the five traits of high reliability and as 
such can be considered to maintain a position of compartmentalised reliability.  This 
thesis contends that the presence of two of the five traits of high reliability should be 
viewed as an excellent foundation for the further development of resilience in airport 
management systems.  Furthermore, Section 1.2, proposed a hypothetical position 
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encompassing elements of both high reliability and disturbance.  This position was 
suggested as; 
An airport demonstrating high reliability traits is likely to exhibit specific 
capabilities including early recognition of disturbance, rapid and appropriate 
response, smooth transitions between modes of operation, and the integration 
of explicit post-event learning, recovering functionality back to an acceptable 
pre-event norm.   
 
As this investigation found that airport management organisations do not exhibit all 
high reliability traits but only commitment to resilience and deference to expertise, 
this previous position is somewhat debatable.  Specifically, airports looking to 
maintain competing interests of safe and reliable operations as well as being a 
commercially successful business, influences the ability to maintain all five traits of 
high reliability.  This thesis proposes that a more accurate position would be; 
Australian airport management organisations function as compartmentally 
reliable organisations that represent traits of commitment to resilience and 
deference to expertise.  Australian airport management organisations do have 
the potential to enhance practice to move closer to the definition of a highly 
reliable organisation.  Improvements regarding the development and 
maintenance of cross-functionality and shared awareness are required for 
these organisations to be considered highly reliability organisations against 
the Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) classification.   
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7.5 Research Significance 
This thesis provides a significant contribution to the complementary research areas 
of disturbance and high reliability.  Furthermore, findings in this document provide 
implications for practitioners, particularly Australian airport management 
organisations.  Tables 7.2 through 7.3 discuss the findings of this thesis with 
reference to theory and practice. These tables provide further detail on the 
significance of this research and provide suggestions for the implementation of 
findings in airport management organisations.   
Table 7.2: Disturbance Research Significance 
 
 
Theoretical Significance 
 
Practical Significance 
 
RQ1A: 
 
Disturbance 
Process 
 
 
• The development and testing of 
the CIDP model has introduced a 
more accurate process for 
understanding disturbance than 
previous studies. 
 
• Building on the work of existing 
literature in the development 
stage, this theoretically developed 
and empirically tested model 
provides a significant development 
in understanding disturbance 
processes in complex critical 
infrastructure.   
 
 
• The CIDP model provides an 
empirically verified approach for 
practitioners to prepare and 
review disturbance.   
 
• The CIDP model also serves as a 
training tool for explaining to non-
operational staff the process of 
disturbance, hence promoting a 
shared awareness of the 
requirements needed to return to 
business-as-usual operations.   
 
 
RQ1B: 
 
Disturbance 
Stage 
Functions 
 
 
• The CIDP model has provided a 
synthesis of prior work to 
empirically develop definitions of 
the specific stages of disturbance.  
These definitions provide an 
accurate representation of real-
world practice with practice 
leading theory in understanding 
the specific stage functions.   
 
• The inclusion of considerations at 
each level and severity provides a 
new way of considering the way 
we understanding disturbance.  
Rather than looking inward, this 
thesis contends that a shared 
understanding and awareness of 
stages will provide a more 
informed organisation when 
dealing with disturbance.   
 
 
• As with RQ1A, the inclusion of 
both definitions and stage 
functions for the CIDP model 
provides practitioners with a tool 
to enhance shared awareness of 
disturbance.   
 
• The questions in Tables 6.2-6.11 
should be undertaken as a cross 
functional exercise between 
different hierarchal levels and 
business groups to stimulate 
discussion around holistic 
coordination for disturbance.   
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Table 7.3: High Reliability Research Significance 
 
 
Theoretical Significance 
 
Practical Significance 
 
RQ2A: 
 
Airport High 
Reliability 
 
 
• Findings on Australian airport 
management organisations 
provide a further development of 
Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2007) traits 
of high reliability. Airports satisfy 
the traits of commitment to 
resilience and deference to 
expertise and as such are 
considered by this thesis to be 
compartmentally reliable rather 
than highly reliable.   
 
• Findings showed key differences 
between levels and groups in 
airport management organisations 
and has introduced to theory the 
notion of level variance in high 
reliability.   
 
 
• The findings of this study are 
significant to practitioners in 
airport management 
organisations, particularly senior 
management, as it articulates 
differences in understanding and 
support for the traits of high 
reliably across the system.   
 
• This study also demonstrates the 
value of reviewing commitment to 
reliability in systems and could 
serve as a framework for 
practitioners to implement similar 
review programs in their own 
organisations.   
 
 
RQ2B: 
 
Further  
Development 
 
 
• Findings around further 
development of high reliability in 
Australian airports provided 
strategies around cross-functional 
experience and involvement to 
enhance shared awareness.   
 
• As with the disturbance research 
area, this provides an example of 
practice guiding theory as to the 
most appropriate way to improve 
reliability in airport management 
organisations.   
 
 
• Findings on cross-functional 
experience and cross-functional 
strategic involvement have 
provided practitioners with a 
starting point for enhancing 
reliability in critical infrastructure.   
 
• The two findings serve as ideas 
for guiding the development of 
programs as well as overall goals 
for the further development of high 
reliability in Australian airport 
management organisations.   
 
 
The previous tables have detailed how the specific findings of this thesis contribute 
to knowledge of the complementary theoretical areas of disturbance and high 
reliability.  Furthermore, this thesis contributes to understanding of airport 
management organisations, in particular the challenges they face in terms of 
maintaining safe and reliable operations while operating as a commercial enterprise.  
As this thesis has been guided by an exploratory and qualitative research design, it 
is proposed that these findings serve as a foundation for further research and 
development in the discipline.  Just as this thesis has built on prior research, it is the 
hope of this thesis to stimulate robust discussion and future research.   
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7.6 Limitations 
The author of this thesis acknowledges that due to the chosen research design, 
limitations are present in this research.  As discussed in Chapter Three - 
Methodology, this thesis was developed with the aim of analytical generalisability 
rather than statistical generalisability and as such, a qualitative methodology 
provided the best approach (Yin, 2003).  Furthermore, this research has been 
developed using an airport management context, and as such, the findings of this 
research should be considered appropriate for use in similar contexts to the airport 
research space.  As discussed by De Bruijne and Van Eeten (2007; p.18) airports 
are considered as complex critical infrastructure in the similar way as other 
industries such as, “energy, information technology, telecommunications, health 
care, transportation, water, government and law enforcement, and banking and 
finance”.  This thesis contends that the findings of this work would be relevant to 
other complex critical infrastructure contexts, and would provide a foundation for 
further discussion.  This thesis further recommends that when comparing the 
conclusions of this research to other contexts, detailed empirical investigation 
should be undertaken in that particular organisation type to gauge the applicability of 
prior work.   
 
This research utilised a judgement (purposeful) sampling approach whereby data 
was collected based on its ability to inform understanding of the specific research 
questions (Eisenhardt, 2002).  The potential for bias exists when the research is 
exclusively responsible for selection.  This research de-limited this area by seeking 
advice from members of the supervisory team regarding the applicability of in-depth 
interview respondents, suggested contexts for participant observation, and selection 
of documents for analysis.  This advice was discussed with members of the three 
data collection sites to ensure that appropriate participants were involved in the 
research.  Members of the research supervisory team were also consulted 
regarding participant observation to ensure that research bias did not take place.  
This process functioned by working with the research supervisory team in 
discussion in person, over the phone, and on email regarding observed phenomena 
to reduce bias of a single decision maker.   
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The final key limitation of this research was the inability to directly report and detail 
on some of the participant observation and documentary analysis data due to the 
sensitive nature of the information.  As Australian airport management organisations 
are commercially run organisations, information regarding disturbance was regarded 
as commercial-in-confidence and potentially damaging to the organisations in 
question if details were revealed.  As discussed in Chapter Three – Methodology, 
the process of protecting the identity of respondent data took precedence over the 
transparency of reporting findings.  This limitation is acknowledged and this thesis 
has attempted to address it this through detailed and continuous consultation with 
the research supervisory team as well as keeping a detailed private log of 
participant observation and documentary analysis findings.  Furthermore, the thesis 
provides detailed direct quotes from in-depth interview participants to enable the 
reader a detailed picture of the airport management context.  The author of this 
thesis notes the requirement to build on the findings of this thesis in other critical 
infrastructure contexts.   
 
7.7 Future Research	  
This thesis suggests three main areas for future research.  First, the CIDP model 
can be further developed by exploring activities at locations other than the three 
data collection sites of this thesis.  This could initially take place by exploring the 
validity of the model with other airport management organisations.  A suggestion 
here would be to include a range of airport sites including smaller regionally based 
airports as well as airports not governed by the unified policing model.  A next stage 
would be to examine this work in contexts outside of Australia to explore the 
applicability of the findings to other overseas airports.  This could then extend to 
include other critical infrastructure contexts, as discussed by De Bruijne and Van 
Eeten (2007) as areas such as telecommunications, mining, and investment 
banking.  This would then further refine the applicability of the CIDP model in a wide 
range of critical infrastructure contexts.  This process could take place by using the 
same data collection tools of this study in the form of in-depth interview, participant 
observation, and documentary analysis.  As with the development of this study, it is 
suggested to explore the four phases and ten stages of the process in detail to look 
for confirmatory and dissenting points of view.  The final development of this work 
would be to explore the CIDP model outside of the critical infrastructure context.   
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A second avenue for further research entails the investigation of high reliability 
theory could be further developed by exploring the same data collection sites in a 
qualitative sense via the use of Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2007) Audits of Reliability and 
Mindfulness templates (A.14).  These audits provide a range of questions by which 
reliability can be explored in a quantitative manner and serve as a powerful tool for 
understanding the traits of high reliability in commercial organisations.  Furthermore, 
as the questions, scale, and analysis process is already established, this would 
serve as a good way to further explore high reliability in airport management 
organisations.  The further exploration of the findings of this thesis in a quantitative 
research approach would build on current findings and additional contribute to 
knowledge in the high reliability space.   
 
Finally, the research findings of RQ2B on the further development of high reliability 
in Australian airport management organisations provides a rich area for future 
research.  As this thesis suggests, development of cross-functionality in the airport 
management space has the potential to leverage the outcome of enhanced 
reliability.  Specific research around the enhancement of cross-functional 
experience and cross-functional strategic development would provide details on the 
implementation of these strategies in a real-world airport management context.  As 
with the two previous future research areas, this work should also be explored 
outside of the airport management context to understand the potential of developing 
more resilient critical infrastructure systems.   
 
7.8 Summary 
Chapter Seven – Conclusions, has summarised the key areas of this thesis.  
Sections 7.2 - 7.3 provided findings to the prescribed research questions and 
furthered the discussion with the inclusion of emergent areas.  Furthermore, Section 
7.4 discussed the conclusions of this thesis against the developed overarching 
research questions and proposed a revised position for airport management 
organisations.  Section 7.5 discussed the significance of this research in a 
theoretical and a practice sense.  Sections 7.6 - 7.7 detailed the methodological 
limitations of this study and proposed future research for further development of the 
findings of this thesis.  Finally, Section 7.8 has provided a summary of the Chapter 
Seven – Conclusions.    
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A.01: In-Depth Interview Questions 
 
Background: 
• Detail high reliability theory and background examples such as aircraft 
carrier operations at sea and the NASA space shuttle missions.   
• Explanation of the focus of the study (business-as-usual to business-not-
usual) and the key components of the proposed conceptual model of 
disturbance events.   
• Introduce scalability of disturbance and potential ratings from document and 
observation as crisis, major incident, minor incident, and normal operations.   
• Exploring interview respondents experience as an airport practitioner.   
 
 
Section 1: Disturbance 
1. Discussion of Conceptual Model 
Pre-Event 
Response 
Recovery 
Post-Event 
Flexibility of Process 
 
As an airport practitioner how do you think this approach captures the nature 
of risk and management of disturbance? 
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A.01: In-Depth Interview Questions (Cont.) 
 
2. In your position what have you experienced in terms of Pre-Event?  
planning  
(sop’s, documents, and regulatory) 
preparation  
(training, desktops, exercises) 
detection  
(when we are moving into a state of change) 
avoidance 
(were we able to avoid and if so do we have ability to capture information) 
 
3. In your position what have you experienced in terms of Response? 
coordination and facilitation  
(communication and management)  
containment and limitation  
(stabilize disturbance) 
 
4. In your position what have you experienced in terms of Recovery? 
 continuity  
(maintaining partial operations) 
 resolution  
(bringing back to business-as-usual) 
 
5. In your position what have you experienced in terms of Post-Event? 
 review  
(actions and decision making) 
learning  
(tacit and implicit embedding back into the organisation) 
 
6. Other possibilities: 
near-miss (did the system work or were we lucky?) 
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A.01: In-Depth Interview Questions (Cont.) 
 
7. Preoccupation with Failure 
• We regard close calls and near-misses as a kind of failure that reveals 
potential danger rather than as evidence of our success and ability to avoid 
danger.   
• We treat near-misses and errors as information about our system and we 
use this information to review and improve practice.   
 
8. Reluctance to Simplify 
• We take nothing for granted and employees are encouraged to express 
different points of view on issues.   
• We have the ability to capture information from all organisational levels and 
use it to inform the decision making process.   
 
9. Sensitivity to Operations 
• We have a good understanding of what other people in the business do and 
how sometimes objects are aligned and yet sometimes conflicting.   
• We are familiar with operations beyond our own group and understanding 
how the rules of the system change when we enter a disturbance state of 
operations.   
 
10. Commitment to Resilience 
• We have a commitment as an organisation to building people repertoires 
regarding risk awareness.   
• We have a key organisational focus of safe and reliable operations above all 
other objectives.   
 
11. Deference to Expertise  
• We value the expertise and experience of people and give the best persons 
the authority to make important decisions.   
• We have the ability to divert authority to persons who have the most suitable 
training and ability to deal with specific situations.   
 
12. Are there any additional comments you would like to make?   
Are there any elements you would like to recover?   
Do you have any questions for me?   
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A.02: Participant Observation Key Themes Prompt 
 
Disturbance: 
 
 
Disaster Incubation Theory and Man Made Disaster Theory Themes: 
Key Themes Contribution to Knowledge 
Incubation 
• Understanding areas of inherent vulnerability within 
critical infrastructure systems 
• Disturbance may compound in previously unconsidered 
ways and as a result create a more complex problem 
 
Escalation 
• Severity levels have the potential to change and as 
such considerations need to be re-assessed as to the 
appropriateness of the process employed 
• Disturbance events needs to be considered as fluid 
rather than static which emphasis being placed on 
continual understand and justification of decisions 
 
Cultural Influence 
• Understanding when and where the organisation is 
shifting away from acceptable levels of risk is critical 
• As highlighted by incubation, moving slowly away from 
a prior state has the potential to go unnoticed or 
ignored by organisational members with potentially 
serious consequences 
 
Sociotechnical Considerations 
• The combination of people and systems will always 
create a degree of risk and the potential for disturbance 
in organisations 
• Understanding the ways in which vulnerability is 
created through design, decision making, and oversight 
is of key importance in recognising the potential for 
systemic disturbance 
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A.02: Participant Observation Key Themes Prompt (Cont.) 
Normal Accident Theory Themes: 
 
Linear Interaction 
 
Complex Interaction 
• Critical components, subsystems, and 
controls are segregated 
• Dedicated connections in terms of 
functions and information flow 
• Substitutions are available if required 
• Feedback loops are limited 
• Detailed understanding vulnerability 
 
• Critical components, subsystems, and 
controls are interconnected 
• Connections are shared; indirect flow of 
processes and information 
• Limited substitutions are available 
• Feedback loops are present 
• Limited understanding of vulnerability 
 
 
Loose Coupling 
 
 
Tight Coupling 
• Delays in process are possible and the 
order of sequences can be adjusted 
• Multiple process approach 
• Slack is available in critical components 
of supplies, equipment, and personnel 
• Buffers and redundancies are a natural 
occurring in the system 
• Adjustments to supplies, equipment, and 
personnel are available and can be 
tasked up easily 
 
• Delays in processing are not possible and 
sequences must be consistent 
• Single process approach 
• Limited slack in supplies, equipment, and 
personnel 
• Buffers and redundancies must be 
developed into the system 
• Adjustments to supplies, equipment, and 
personnel are difficult and must be 
expressly pre-prepared in the system 
 
 
 
Key Theme 
 
 
Contribution to Knowledge 
 
Combined 
Classification of 
Interaction and 
Coupling 
 
• Interaction highlights the potential vulnerability present in a system 
by actions in an intended or unintended sequence 
• Coupling highlights the potential vulnerability produced in a system 
through co-dependency of people, processes, and resources 
• Classification of interaction and coupling can potentially highlight the 
strengths and weaknesses in a system which can guide the 
development of enhanced reliability 
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A.02: Participant Observation Key Themes Prompt (Cont.) 
High Reliability Themes: 
Reliability Enhancing Characteristics and 
Conditions: DeBruijne (2006) 
(*Additional text is thesis author comment) 
Traits of High Reliability 
Weick and Sutcilffe (2007) 
 
1. “Commitment to reliable operations in mission and 
goals” 
8. “Organisational culture of reliability” 
 
1. Preoccupation with Failure 
“They treat any lapse as a symptom that 
something may be wrong with the system, 
something that could have severe consequences 
if several separate small errors happened to 
coincide” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007, p.9) 
 
 
*Continuous and overt critical analysis of 
vulnerability and the potential for disturbance 
 
 
4. “High degrees of responsibility and accountability” 
9. “Strong presence of external groups with access 
to credible and timely operational information” 
 
2. Reactance to Simplify 
“HROs take deliberate steps to create more 
complete and nuanced pictures of what they face 
and who they are as the face it … They welcome 
diverse experience, skepticism towards received 
wisdom, and negotiating tactics that reconcile 
difference of opinion without destroying the 
nuances that diverse people detect” (Weick and 
Sutcliffe, 2007, p.10) 
 
 
*Members are actively involved in developing an 
accurate and holistic picture of vulnerability and the 
potential for disturbance 
 
 
2. “Sustained high technical performance” 
3. “Structural flexibility and redundancy” 
 
3. Sensitivity to Operations 
“(HROs) are attentive to the front line, where the 
real work gets done … When people have well-
developed situational awareness, they can make 
the continuous adjustments that prevent errors 
from accumulating and enlarging.  Anomalies are 
notices while they are still tractable and can still 
be isolated” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007, p.12) 
 
*Cross-functional understanding of system 
components regarding information and decision 
making with the ability to correct potential 
disturbance before it escalates 
 
 
6. “Continual search for improvement and training for 
worst case scenarios” 
7. “Reliability not marginalizable, not fungible (can 
not be traded off)” 
8. “Organizational culture of reliability” 
 
4. Commitment to Resilience 
“HROs develop capabilities to detect, contain, 
and bounce back from those inevitable errors that 
are part of an indeterminate world.  The hallmark 
of an HRO is not that it is error-free but that 
errors don’t disable it.  Resilience is a 
combination of keeping errors small and of 
improvising workarounds that allow the system to 
keep functioning” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007, 
p.14) 
 
 
*Reliability remains the key operational objective of 
the organisation during all modes of operation 
 
 
3. “Structural flexibility and redundancy” 
5. “Flexible decision-making processes” 
 
5. Deference to Expertise 
HROs cultivate diversity, not just because it helps 
them notice more in complex environments, but 
also because it helps them do more with the 
complexities they do spot.  Decisions are made 
on the front line, and authority migrates to those 
people with the most expertise, regardless of 
their rank” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007, p.16) 
 
*The system has the ability to identify and task 
expert decision makers to deal with situation specific 
disturbance 
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A.02: Participant Observation Key Themes Prompt (Cont.) 
High Reliability Themes (Cont): 
 
High Reliability Theory 
 
(Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007) 
 
 
High Reliability 
Characteristics and 
Conditions 
 
(DeBruijne, 2006) 
 
 
Agility and Edge 
Organising 
 
(Alberts and Hayes, 2003) 
 
Preoccupation  
with Failure 
 
• Commitment to reliable 
operations in mission and 
goals 
• Organisational culture of 
reliability 
 
! Shared Understand of 
Command Intent 
Reactance  
to Simplify 
 
• High degrees of 
responsibility and 
accountability 
• Strong presence of 
external groups with 
access to credible and 
timely operational 
information 
 
! Distributive Information 
Sensitivity  
to Operations 
 
• Sustained high technical 
performance 
• Structural flexibility and 
redundancy 
 
! Distributive Information 
! Dynamic Task Allocation 
! Shared Understanding of 
Command Intent 
Commitment  
to Resilience 
 
• Continual search for 
improvement and training 
for worst case scenarios 
• Reliability not 
marginalizable, and can 
not be traded off 
• Organizational culture of 
reliability 
 
! Collective Sensemaking* 
! Shared Understanding of 
Command Intent 
Deference 
to Expertise 
 
• Structural flexibility and 
redundancy 
• Flexible decision-making 
processes 
 
! Collective Sensemaking* 
! Distributive Power 
Allocation 
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A.03: Disturbance Process Model Analysis Template 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis for the first research problem area took place by investigating the 
conceptual disturbance process model.  The model was developed through 
combining elements of previous best practice models.  As such, it was important to 
empirically investigate both the components of the model as well as the process by 
which disturbance occurs.  This process took place after individual data analysis 
took place and notes regarding themes were developed against each of the four 
levels.  The purpose of the template was to synthesise these themes into clearer 
outcomes.  The left hand side of the template addresses RQ1A by looking at the 
validity of the model in terms of respondent thoughts and experience as well as real-
world critical incidents. The right hand side of the template addresses RQ1B by 
looking at the process in terms of prior to the event, the live phase of action, and the 
analysis that takes place after the disturbance.  Following the in-level analysis, 
cross-level analysis was developed and utilised in the discussion section of this 
thesis.   
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A.04: High Reliability Assessment Analysis Template 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis for the second research problem was developed through the investigation 
of high reliability in airport management organisations.  By utilising Weick and 
Sutcliffe’s traits of reliability (2007) approach the data collection sites were assessed 
against the areas of preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to 
operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise.  The five traits of 
reliability were investigated by asking respondents to discuss their thoughts 
regarding the presence within their organisation of the descriptor.  Furthermore, 
respondents were asked to give examples of real-world practice to better detail their 
perspective.  The left hand side of the template looks at areas of relevance to the 
current presence of traits whereas the right hand side is focused on the potential of 
enhancement.  In-depth interview data was compared and contrasted with both 
participant observation and document analysis during this process to develop 
findings.  As with the first research problem area, the templates were developed 
against the defined data collection levels and then analysed both in level and across 
level.    
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A.05: QUT Human Participants Form 
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A.05: QUT Human Participants Form (Cont.) 
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A.05: QUT Human Participants Form (Cont.) 
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A.06: QUT Research Participant Information Form 
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A.06: QUT Research Participant Information Form (Cont) 
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A.07: QUT Research Participant Recruitment and Consent Form 
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A.08:  Abstract:  
Measuring Security and Corporate Governance Performance in Airports: An 
Examination of Convergent and Divergent Practice 
 
Reducing uncertainty and managing risk in Airports are not only critical tasks 
integral to effective management practice but equally important for border protection 
and national security outcomes.  This latter issue has been emphasised on a 
national level in Australia with a number of recent high-level inquiries completed in 
recent years.  A critical research issue concerns the need for airports to better 
understand the relationship between operational and managerial requirements 
within an airport.  This centres around the need to accurately measure performance 
of both the operational outputs, which is the predominant focus of industry 
documents mentioned above, and key commercial and corporate governance 
factors.  While studies exist examining measures of safety at airports, key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs) related to operational security and risk and 
assurance within airport operations seem only to have only been discussed in a 
cursory manner historically within academic journals and non-specifically within 
industry assessments.  This paper reports on early findings of a study on the design 
and purpose of current security and governance performance measures used at key 
international airports in Australia across 14 key categories (ranging from 
infrastructure issues to corporate and operational factors): as derived from a number 
of industry and other published sources.  The study ultimately seeks to define 
standardised sets of performance indicators that support enhanced efficiencies 
across operational security and corporate governance activities and continuity of 
operations in International Airports. 
 
Barnes, P., Devine, M., & Camastral, M. (2011) Measuring Security and Corporate 
Governance Performance in Airports: An Examination of Convergent and Divergent 
Practice.  International Research Society for Public Management Conference 15.  
Open Panel Research Track.   
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A.09: Abstract:  
Analysing Crisis Response in Airports: A Study in Organisational Risk 
Management 
 
Airports are complex socio-technical systems that form a critical element of national 
infrastructure.  When airports encounter threat or disturbance the results impact not 
only the airport, but also the wider range of systems which depend on it.  Within this 
space relationships between government, business, and regulators have influenced 
the ways airports function along with regulatory and reporting requirements.  Much 
of the literature focuses on the dual causes of crisis in terms of both the complex 
nature of systems as well as the mismanagement of systems leading to breakdown 
(Boin & McConnell, 2007).  Research in crisis resilience in airports is of particular 
interest to both management theorists and airport operators as it provides a means 
of further understanding the competing interests of corporate and operations sides 
of the business relationship.  
 
Using the approach of edge organisations as a theoretical framework, this study 
contends to understand the ways in which organisations flex from business as usual 
to business not as usual, and the consequent recovery.  By utilising and edge 
approach (Alberts & Hayes, 2003) this study investigates the ways breakdown of 
systems can occur and addresses how resilience could be enhanced via a cross-
functional approach to the operational and corporate sides of the business through a 
Business Continuity Management approach.  Prior literature has focused on incident 
recovery from a purely operational perspective whereas this paper focuses on a 
holistic understanding of breakdown, crisis, and recovery across the corporate and 
operations components of the airport space. 
 
Devine, M. (2011) Analysing Crisis Response in Airports: A Study in Organisational 
Risk Management.  International Research Society for Public Management 
Conference 15.  New Researchers Track.   
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A.10: Abstract:  
Strategies for Embedding Agile Decision Making in Aviation Infrastructure 
 
As highlighted by previous work in Normal Accident Theory and High Reliability 
Organisations, the ability of a system to be flexible is of critical importance to its 
capability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from disturbance and disasters. 
This paper proposes that the research into ‘edge organisations’ and ‘agility’ is a 
potential means to operationalise components that embed high reliable traits in the 
management and oversight of critical infrastructure systems. 
Much prior work has focused on these concepts in a military frame whereas the 
study reported on here examines the application of these concepts to aviation 
infrastructure, specifically, a commercial international airport. As a commercial entity 
functions in a distinct manner from a military organisation this study aims to better 
understand the complementary and contradictory components of the application of 
agility work to a commercial context. Findings highlight the challenges of making 
commercial operators of infrastructure systems agile as well as embedding traits of 
High Reliability in such complex infrastructure settings. 
 
Keywords: Crisis Management, Agile Decision-Making, High Reliability, Aviation 
Infrastructure 
 
Devine, M., Barnes, P., & Donnet, T. (2013). Strategies for Embedding Agile 
Decision Making in Aviation Infrastructure.  International Conference of the 
International Institute for Infrastructure Renewal and Reconstruction 9.  Queensland 
University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia.   
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A.11: Abstract:  
A Critical Analysis of Crisis Escalation Models: Understanding Stages and 
Severity in Infrastructure Disturbance 
 
A range of authors from the risk management, crisis management, and crisis 
communications literature have proposed different models as a means of 
understanding components of crisis.  A generic component of these sources is that 
they discuss has focused on preparedness practices before disturbance events and 
response practices during events.  This paper provides a critical analysis of three 
key explanatory models of how crises escalate highlighting the strengths and 
limitations of each approach.  The paper introduces an optimised conceptual model 
utilising components from the previous work under the four phases of pre-event, 
response, recovery, and post-event.  Within these four phases, a ten stage process 
is introduced that can enhance understanding of the progression of distinct stages 
of disturbance for different types of events.  This crisis evolution framework is 
examined as a means to provide clarity and applicability to a range of infrastructure 
failure contexts and provide a path for further empirical investigation in this area.   
 
Key Words: Crisis Management, Crisis Escalation, Crisis Frameworks, Near-miss 
 
Devine, M., Barnes, P., Newton, C., & Goonetilleke, A. (2013). A Critical Analysis of 
Crisis Escalation Models: Understanding Stages and Severity in Infrastructure 
Disturbance.  International Conference of the International Institute for Infrastructure 
Renewal and Reconstruction 9. Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, 
Australia.   
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A.12: Executive Summary:  
Airport Reliability: An Exploration of High Reliability Practice to a Commercial 
Airport Context 
 
This research study details a component of the Business Continuity and Incident 
Response Management stream and its contribution to the Airports of the Future 
project.  A critical gap in understanding in this research space was that their was no 
empirically tested and ground-truthed model of crisis management, as well as a lack 
of understanding of the presence of high reliability traits in commercial airport 
management.  By utilizing a exploratory research approach this study first 
developed and tested a conceptual model with the outcome being a revised process 
based model of crisis understanding. 
 
Furthermore this model was further developed to highlight the importance of 
capturing and embedding near-miss information into our system in both an explicit 
and a cultural sense.  The second component of high reliability presence revealed 
that some areas are dependent on organizational level or task function whereas 
others are holistically adopted across an organisation.  This reveals the notion of 
“sub-cultures of reliability” which was a previously unexplored area of research.  The 
outcome of this finding for an airport management organisation highlights the need 
for a more detailed cross-functional understanding of business functions not only in 
business-as-usual but also in a disturbance event.  Future development is 
discussed and highlights the need for organisations to develop a more holistic 
understanding of vulnerability and culturally embed practice in all employees rather 
than a reliance on component groups within the organisation.  
 
Devine, M., Barnes, P. (2013). Airport Reliability: An Exploration of High Reliability 
Practice to a Commercial Airport Context.  Airports of the Future ARC Linkage 
LP0990135.  Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia.   
Further information on Airport of the Future is provided in appendix A.15 
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A.13: Executive Summary: 
Airport Agility: An Enhanced Crisis Decision Making Approach Through the 
Development and Tasking of Agile High Performance Teams 
 
High Reliability Theory is an area of literature developed out of an understanding of 
how complex sociotechnical systems can exist with near error free operations.  
Developed from research from aircraft carrier operations at sea, high reliability 
highlighted a means of understanding traits that make an organisation more able to 
deal with crisis.  The complementary concept of Agility Theory discusses means by 
which an organisation can better prepare to change from business-as-usual mode of 
operation into a response/recovery mode.  Agility highlights distributive information, 
collective sensemaking, distributive power-base, dynamic task allocation, and 
shared understanding of command intent, as ways by which an organisation can 
enhance resilience.   
 
Findings highlighted three areas to enhance agility.  First, the need to better embed 
decision making understanding, information and knowledge back into the 
organisation as an explicit process.  Second, an enhanced understanding of the role 
change which takes place between business-as-usual modes of operations and 
crisis modes of operation, and the need for staff to have a clear understanding of 
how this affects their tasking and objectives.  Third, the incorporation of the risk and 
emergency management function as a proactive expert decision making function 
against the more present reactive approach. Key to the implementation of this 
approach is the need to embed agile decision making in a top-down and bottom-up 
approach to ensure the empowerment of expert decision makers throughout the 
organisation.  The ability for expert decision makers to have authority and support to 
make critical decisions is crucial to the success of this approach.  
 
Devine, M., Huriwai, R. (2012). Airport Agility: An Enhanced Crisis Decision Making 
Approach Through the Development and Tasking of Agile High Performance 
Teams.  Airports of the Future ARC Linkage LP0990135.  Queensland University of 
Technology, Brisbane, Australia.   
Further information on Airport of the Future is provided in appendix A.15  
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A.14: Audits of Reliability and Mindfulness 
Reproduced with the authors permission from: Weick, K. E., & Sutcliffe, K. (2007). Managing 
the Unexpected: Resilient Performance and an Age of Uncertainty (2 ed.). San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass.   
 
Assessing Your Firm’s Preoccupation with Failure (p.94) 
How well do the following statements characterise you organisation? 
For each item, select the descriptor that best reflects your conclusion: 
 
1 We actively look for failures of all sizes and try 
to understand them.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
2 When something unexpected occurs, we 
always try to figure out why our expectations 
were not met.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
3 We treat near-misses as information about the 
health of our system and try to learn from 
them.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
4 We regard near-misses as failures that reveal 
potential dangers rather than as success that 
show our capability to avoid disaster.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
5 We often update our procedures after 
experiencing a near-miss.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
6 If you make a mistake it is not held against 
you.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
7 People report significant mistakes even if 
others do not notice that a mistake is made.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
8 Managers actively seek out bad news.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
9 People feel free to talk to superiors about 
problems.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
10 People are rewarded if they spot potential 
trouble spots.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
     
1 = Not at all 
2 = To some extent 
3 = A great deal 
<12 you are preoccupation with success and should be 
actively considering how you  
can immediately improve your focus on failure 
12-20 you have a moderate preoccupation with success 
rather than a fully mindful  
preoccupation with failure 
>20 suggest a healthy preoccupation with failure and a 
strong capacity for mindfulness 
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A.14: Audits of Reliability and Mindfulness (Cont.) 
Reproduced with the authors permission from: Weick, K. E., & Sutcliffe, K. (2007). Managing 
the Unexpected: Resilient Performance and an Age of Uncertainty (2 ed.). San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass.   
 
Assessing Your Firm’s Reluctance to Simplify (p.96) 
How well do the following statements characterise you organisation? 
For each item, select the descriptor that best reflects your conclusion: 
 
1 People around here take nothing for granted.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
2 Questioning is encouraged.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
3 We strive to challenge the status quo.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
4 People feel free to bring up problems and 
tough issues.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
5 People generally depend their analysis to 
better grasp the nature of the problems that 
arise.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
6 People are encouraged to express different 
views of the world.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
7 People listen carefully, and it is rare that 
someone’s view goes unheard.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
8 People are not attacked if they report 
information that could interrupt operations.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
9 When something unexpected happens, people 
spend more time analyzing than advocating for 
their view.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
     
1 = Not at all 
2 = To some extent 
3 = A great deal 
 
>24 the potential to avoid simplification is strong 
15-24 the potential to avoid simplification is moderate 
<15 suggests that you should actively consider how you can 
immediately improve your capabilities to prevent 
simplification in order to improve your firms capacity for 
mindfulness 
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A.14: Audits of Reliability and Mindfulness (Cont.) 
Reproduced with the authors permission from: Weick, K. E., & Sutcliffe, K. (2007). Managing 
the Unexpected: Resilient Performance and an Age of Uncertainty (2 ed.). San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass.   
 
Assessing Your Firm’s Sensitivity to Operations (p.97) 
Indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about your 
organisation.   
 
1 On a day-to-day basis, there is always 
someone who is paying attention to what is 
happening.   
Agree Disagree 
2 Should problems occur, someone with the 
authority to act is always accessible to people 
on the front lines.   
Agree Disagree 
3 Supervisors readily pitch in whenever 
necessary.   
Agree Disagree 
4 People have discretion to resolve unexpected 
problems as they arise.   
Agree Disagree 
5 During an average day, people interact often 
enough to build a clear picture of the current 
situation.   
Agree Disagree 
6 People are always looking for feedback about 
things that aren’t going right.   
Agree Disagree 
7 People are familiar with operations beyond 
their own job.   
Agree Disagree 
8 We have access to a variety of resources 
whenever unexpected surprises crop up.   
Agree Disagree 
9 Managers constantly monitor workloads and 
reduce them when they become excessive.   
Agree Disagree 
    
Count the number of “agree” and “disagree” responses.  The greater the number of 
“disagree” responses, the less sensitivity to operations.  Use these questions to begin 
thinking of ways to improve your sensitivity to operations and capacity for mindfulness.   
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A.14: Audits of Reliability and Mindfulness (Cont.) 
Reproduced with the authors permission from: Weick, K. E., & Sutcliffe, K. (2007). Managing 
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Assessing Your Firm’s Commitment to Resilience (p.99) 
How well do the following statements characterise you organisation? 
For each item, select the descriptor that best reflects your conclusion: 
 
1 Resources are continually devoted to training 
and retraining people to operate the technical 
system.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
2 People have more than enough training and 
experience for the kind of work they do.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
3 This organisation is actively concerned with 
developing people’s skills and knowledge.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
4 This organisation encourages challenging 
“stretch” assignments.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
5 People around here are known for their ability to 
used their knowledge in novel ways.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
6 There is a concern with building people’s 
competence and response repertoires.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
7 People have a number of informal contacts that 
they sometimes use to solve problems 
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
8 People learn from their mistakes.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
9 People rely on one another.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
10 Most people have the skills to act on the 
unexpected problems that arise.   
Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
     
1 = Not at all 
2 = To some extent 
3 = A great deal 
 
>20 the commitment to resilience is strong 
12-20 the commitment to resilience is moderate 
<20 suggests that you should be actively considering how 
you can immediately begin building resilience and the 
capacity for mindfulness 
  
331 
A.14: Audits of Reliability and Mindfulness (Cont.) 
Reproduced with the authors permission from: Weick, K. E., & Sutcliffe, K. (2007). Managing 
the Unexpected: Resilient Performance and an Age of Uncertainty (2 ed.). San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass.   
 
Assessing the Deference to Expertise in Your Firm (p.101) 
How well do the following statements characterise you organisation? 
For each item, select the descriptor that best reflects your conclusion: 
 
1 People are committed to doing their job well.   
 Not at all 
To some 
extent 
A great 
deal 
2 People respect the nature of one another’s job 
activities.   
 
Not at all To some extent 
A great 
deal 
3 If something out of the ordinary happens, people 
know who has the expertise to respond.   
 
Not at all To some extent 
A great 
deal 
4 People in this organisation value expertise and 
experience of hierarchical rank.   
 
Not at all To some extent 
A great 
deal 
5 In this organisation, the people most qualified to 
make decision make them.   
 
Not at all To some extent 
A great 
deal 
6 People typically “own” a problem until it is 
resolved.   
 
Not at all To some extent 
A great 
deal 
7 It is generally easy to obtain expert assistance 
when something comes up that we don’t know 
how to handle.   
 
Not at all To some extent 
A great 
deal 
     
1 = Not at all 
2 = To some extent 
3 = A great deal 
>14 the deference to expertise is strong 
8-14 the deference to expertise is moderate 
< 8 suggests that you should be actively thinking of ways to 
improve the deference to expertise and capacity for 
mindfulness 
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The Mindfulness Organising Scale (p.103) 
How well do the following statements characterise you organisation?   
For each item, select the descriptor that best reflects your conclusion: 
 
1 We have a good “map” of each person’s talents 
and skills.   
 
Not at all To some extent 
A great 
deal 
2 We talk about mistakes and ways to learn from 
them.   
 
Not at all To some extent 
A great 
deal 
3 We discuss our unique skills with each other so 
that we know who has relevant specialised skills 
and knowledge.   
Not at all To some extent 
A great 
deal 
4 We discuss alternatives as to how to go about 
our normal work activities.   
 
Not at all To some extent 
A great 
deal 
5 When discussing emerging problems with 
coworkers, we usually discuss what to look out 
for.   
 
Not at all To some extent 
A great 
deal 
6 When attempting to resolve a problem, we take 
advantage of the unique skills of our colleagues.   
 
Not at all To some extent 
A great 
deal 
7 We spend time identifying activities we do not 
want to go wrong.   
 
Not at all To some extent 
A great 
deal 
8 When errors happen, we discuss who we could 
have prevented them. 
 
Not at all To some extent 
A great 
deal 
9 When a crisis occurs, we rapidly pool our 
collective expertise to attempt to resolve it.   
 
Not at all To some extent 
A great 
deal 
     
1 = Not at all 
2 = To some extent 
3 = A great deal 
 
>17 your firm’s mindful organising 
practices are strong 
11-17 your firm’s mindful organising 
practices are moderate 
<11 suggest that you should be actively 
thinking of ways to improve your firm’s 
mindful organising practices 
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A.15: Airports of the Future Background 
 
“To provide a world-class platform for the continuous improvement of airport 
planning, design and operations.   
The modern airport plays a pivotal role in the economy, liveability and sustainability of a city 
and its region.  Airports are critical components of international transport networks, complex 
socio technical systems characterised by interdependence.  By their very nature, airports 
present great planning, operational and security challenges, balancing the need to move 
people and goods swiftly and efficiently, yet with ever-increasing levels of security and 
safety.   
This research project commenced in 2008 with a pilot study examining efficient security and 
passenger flows.  Following the success of the pilot, the Airports of the Future Project has 
grown into a five-year multi disciplinary program involving almost 30 research partners 
internationally.  The program aims to improve the safety, security, efficiency and passenger 
experience within Australian airports by developing an integrated and adaptive complex 
systems approach for the design, management and operation of airports.   
The ability to analyse, re-engineer and manage large-scale, multi-stakeholder, multi-
jurisdictional, and socio technical systems requires significant advancement in both the 
understanding of ‘complexity science’ and its application.  Ultimately, the goal is to improve 
airport effectiveness and cultivate flexibility for the sustained growth of airport operations.  
Research outcomes are expected to provide tools to manage airport effectiveness and 
balance conflicting security, economic and passenger-driven pressures.   
These tools will improve productivity, enhance capabilities for critical infrastructure 
protection, and lessen the cost of mandated security, which is estimated to grow to $152 
million by 2010 for the five major Australian airports.  The deliverables of this project will be 
transferable to other complex socio-technical systems providing the potential to transform a 
range of Australian critical infrastructure and transportation hubs.”   
(www.airportsofthefuture.qut.edu.au/introduction) 
